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The Cost of Good Intentions: Why the Supreme Court's Decision Upholding Affirmative Action Admission Programs is Detrimental to the Cause

Leslie Yalof Garfield

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court's decision in Grutter v. Bolinger, which upheld the University of Michigan School of Law's race-preference admission plan, seemed cause for celebration among affirmative action proponents. The decision marked the first time that the Court upheld a race-preference admission plan against an Equal Protection challenge. Though the decision is celebratory in theory, in fact it is not much of a gain for those who believe that the only way to ensure a diverse classroom is through affirmative action programs.

Specifically, the Court ruled that an affirmative action admission policy is permissible if it provides for admissions officers to individually review each applicant. Individual review, the Court found, allowed for admissions officers to consider race as a factor in the admissions process, but not to the exclusion of other personal attributes that might add to diversity in the

1. Professor of Law, Pace Law School. B.A., with Honors, Univ. of Florida, 1982; J.D., Univ. of Florida, 1985. The author would like to thank Kristin Furrie and Katy O'Connor for their outstanding research assistance.
Considering race as one factor among many passed Constitutional muster. Proponents of affirmative action heralded the *Grutter* decision because it retained Justice Powell's edict in *Regents of the University of California at Davis v. Bakke*, that race can be considered as a factor in the admissions process. However, the reality of the decision means that schools must construct affirmative action policies that meet the stringent limitations of the Court's most recent decision on the issue. Specifically, post-secondary schools that choose to consider race as a factor in admissions must individually review each applicant to the school.

Ensuring individual review is an attainable goal for law schools and small liberal arts colleges. However, such a goal is highly problematic for large universities as their applicant pool can be as high as 500% of that of the smaller schools. Consequently, the only way for a large number of the country's colleges and universities to meet the demands of the *Grutter* decision is to hire additional admissions officers who can provide the kind of review mandated by the Court.

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5. *Id.* at 334-41.
6. *Id.* at 342-44. The Court established that a university's objective of achieving racial diversity to further its educational mission is a compelling governmental interest that can survive strict scrutiny. *Id.* at 328-30. The Court confirmed that the Law School's use of race is a "plus" factor when considering applicants individually is narrowly tailored because non-minority applicants are not unduly harmed. *Id.* at 341-44.
8. See discussion infra Part III.
9. *Grutter*, 539 U.S. at 333-44 (upholding the University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action policy because it provided for individual review of each applicant, whereby race became a "plus" factor among the multitude of diversity factors used in admissions).
10. For example, the University of Michigan Law School received "more than 3,500 applications each year for a class of around 350 students." *Id.* at 312-13.
However, hiring additional admissions officers comes at a cost. Like most other services, this cost is passed to the consumers. The most logical way for schools to foot the bill for the Grutter mandate therefore is to increase the application fee to the nation’s institutes of higher education. While this is a seemingly innocuous means to meet the higher goal of achieving diversity in the classroom, the practical effect of increasing application fees is that it will arguably deter a disproportionate number of underrepresented minorities, who are often members of the lowest socio-economic classes. If this assumption is indeed true, then the very decision that has been heralded for achieving diversity in the classroom will, in fact, result in quite the opposite.

II. The Advent of Affirmative Action in College Admissions

To understand the dilemma that those charged with creating affirmative action admission programs face, it is important to have a sense of how the application process works. As a general matter, the college and post-college application review process is quite uniform among American institutions of higher education. Most schools require applicants to submit their high school transcript, standardized test scores, a summary of their co-curricular and extra-curricular activities, personal recommendations and a personal statement. High school tran-
scripts provide admissions officials with an understanding of a student's academic achievement and the rigor of his or her educational experience. Most schools provide colleges with a cumulative grade point average (GPA), which provides reviewers with an objective quantifiable number against which they can measure other applicants.16 The co-curricular and extra curricular activity sheet, personal statement, and recommendations provide reviewers with an understanding of who the student is, what makes her unique and what she will contribute to the institution to which she is applying.17

Admissions officials also pay a significant amount of attention to standardized test scores. Standardized test scores are an essential component of the application process because they are easily quantifiable, easily comparable and, arguably, objec-

Id. at 110.


17. See The Princeton Review, Sophomore Year – Time to Narrow Down Your Extra Curricular Activities, http://www.princetonreview.com/college/research/articles/prepare/extracurriculars.asp (last visited Oct. 28, 2006) (“To a large extent, a college's opinion of how interesting you are will be determined by what you do when you're not in class. Your extracurricular activities can play a big part in distinguishing you from other applicants and determining your chances for admission.”).
tive. Indeed, the widespread and heavy reliance on these scores have made them "a fixture of the college application process." The Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) is the most widely used standardized test score. The SAT was created in the mid-1940s to eliminate the elitist favoritism that was rampant among admissions offices in America's top colleges and universities. In order to even the playing field, Henry Chauncey, Chief of the Educational Testing Service (ETS) and James Bryant Conant, Harvard University President, worked together to make the SAT a "hurdle for admission to the country's prime universities." Their efforts succeeded and the SAT took off as one of the two most important means for evaluating students.


There was a [New York Times] series about athletics in New York City. It focused on who gets what and who doesn't get what. You take these vast inequalities, and then get to the college application process. You then realize that over the last thirty years, we have increasingly become a society run as a testocracy where the opportunities one gets in life depends, in large part, on which institutions one has attended and how one performs on standardized tests. These standardized tests reflect in part, who is class privileged, since we know that the strongest correlation on the SAT, or even the LSAT, is with economic status or whether your parents went to college, graduate or professional school.


20. Originally, the SAT was called the “Scholastic Aptitude Test,” but in 1997 the Educational Testing Service (ETS) changed the name to the “Scholastic Assessment Test.” Christopher Jencks, Racial Bias in Testing, in The Black-White Test Score Gap 64-66 (Christopher Jenkins & Meredith Phillips eds., Brookings Institute 1998). If the SAT measures aptitude and African-Americans score lower on the SAT than white students, this suggests that African-Americans suffer from "some kind of innate disability." Id. at 66. After unsuccessfully arguing that "the SAT measured abilities developed over many years," ETS changed the name of the SAT to the Scholastic Assessment Test. Id.; see also Shaw, supra note 18, at 489.

21. The ACT is another standardized test that first began in 1959. See FAQs About Signing Up For and Taking the Test, http://www.actstudent.org/faq/faq.htmll (last visited September 6, 2006). While not as popular as the SAT, nearly 1.2 million students took the ACT in 2004. Id. The test covers English, math, reading, and science, and is taken by more than 50% of high school graduates in approximately 25 states. Id.; see also ACT or SAT - How to Choose Between the SAT and the ACT?, http://collegeapps.about.com/od/satactandotherexams/f/satoract.htm (last visited September 12, 2006).


23. Id. Interestingly, Carl Brigham who invented the SAT was opposed to ETS and it was not formed until after his death. NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST:
for admission to school (the other being high school grade point average).\textsuperscript{24}

As the 1950's progressed, college enrollment increased dramatically and more schools began to require the SAT.\textsuperscript{25} In 1957 over half a million students took the SAT.\textsuperscript{26} By 1970, over two million students were taking the SAT each year.\textsuperscript{27} In 2003 a record number of students took the SAT, marking the largest increase in the number of test takers in fifteen years.\textsuperscript{28}

The SAT provided a quick and dirty means to admit students.\textsuperscript{29} Indeed, the use of these standardized tests proved so beneficial to expediting the admission process that graduate schools soon joined the bandwagon.\textsuperscript{30} Admission to law school is predicated on the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT),\textsuperscript{31} graduate schools consider an applicant's score on the Graduate Man-

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{24} Lemann, supra note 23, at 155-56.
\bibitem{25} Id. at 85.
\bibitem{26} Id.
\bibitem{27} Id. at 218.
\bibitem{30} The MCAT was first developed in 1928, but did not become the narrow MCAT that we know today, focusing on science and cognitive skills, until 1977. See Robert C. Bowman, M.D., History of the MCAT, http://www.unmc.edu/Community/ruralmed/history_of_the_mcat.htm (last visited September 6, 2006). The LSAT was first administered in February of 1948. See Law School Admission Council, http://www.lsacnet.org/LSAC.asp?url=lsac/research-reports/RR-94-01ExecutiveSummary.htm (last visited September 6, 2006).
\bibitem{31} See Law School Admission Council, http://www.lsac.org/LSAC.asp?url=lsac/about-the-lsat.asp (last visited September 6, 2006) (“[t]he Law School Admission Test (LSAT) is a half-day standardized test required for admission to all ABA-
management Admissions Test (GMAT), and medical schools require applicants to take the Medical College Admissions Test (MCAT).

College admissions officials generally looked at the mean standardized test score and grade point average of their applicant pool, comparing those factors against students admitted to the academic institution in previous years and were able to draw a line, marking the point at which students would be accepted or rejected from a school. Students above the mean were considered for admission to the school; students below the mean were rejected. Consequently, a student's standardized test score often dictated the likelihood of admission to a college, university or graduate school.

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32. See Why Use the GMAT Exam?, http://www.gmac.com/gmac/TheGMAT/WhatIstheGMAT/WhyUsetheGMAT.htm (last visited September 6, 2006) ("[t]housands of graduate management programs around the world use the Graduate Management Admission Test in their admissions process."). The Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT) examination consists of three main parts, the Analytical Writing Assessment, Quantitative section, and Verbal section. See Format and Length, http://www.gmac.com/gmac/TheGMAT/WhatIstheGMAT/FormatandLength.htm (last visited September 20, 2006).

33. See Welcome to the Official Medical College Admission Test (MCAT) Website, http://www.aamc.org/students/mcat/start.htm (last visited September 6, 2006) ("[t]he Medical College Admission Test (MCAT) is a standardized, multiple-choice examination designed to assess problem solving, critical thinking, and writing skills in addition to the examinee's knowledge of science concepts and principles prerequisite to the study of medicine. Scores are reported in each of the following areas: Verbal Reasoning, Physical Sciences, Writing Sample, and Biological Sciences. Medical college admission committees consider MCAT scores as part of their admission decision process.").

34. College admissions officials generally consider factors such as grades, test scores, high school curriculum strength, high school quality, geography, alumni relationships, leadership, race, and ethnicity. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 253-54 (2003) (noting the admission factors used by the University of Michigan). The pressure to use SAT scores is increased by the use of mean SAT/ACT scores in ranking colleges. U.S. News & World Report considers mean SAT/ACT score as part of a measure of the school's selectivity. See America's Best Colleges 2007: Undergraduate Ranking Criteria and Weights, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/college/rankings/about/weight_brief.php (last visited September 20, 2006). The mean SAT/ACT scores actually have more weight than high school G.P.A. See Id.

Relying on standardized tests, however, became increasingly problematic as it tended to benefit non-minorities and to have a deleterious effect on minorities. As a general matter, African-Americans performed less well on the tests than their non-minority peers. Many agreed that the tests asked questions that were biased against minorities. "The Scholastic Achievement Test, [in particular] has been widely criticized in this regard."

Indeed, the bias in the SAT is caused by a variety of factors and the precise explanation for the fact that minorities...
have traditionally scored lower than non-minority students has not been fully determined. However, a prominent explanation is that the test is biased because the questions on the SAT require knowledge of "[w]hite upper-middle class social norms." A common cited example of a culturally biased question from an early 1980s exam is:

RUNNER: MARATHON

(A) envoy: embassy
(B) martyr: massacre
(C) oarsman: regatta
(D) horse: stable

Approximately 53% of whites chose C, the correct answer, but only 22% of African-Americans chose C. Critics of the test hypothesized that test takers from lower income households failed to properly answer the question because the word regatta was not in their vernacular.

that underestimates the competence of one group relative to another\textsuperscript{41}, prediction bias ("whenever a test is used to predict an individual's future performance"), and selection system bias (which arises whenever three conditions are met: "(1) performance depends partly on cognitive skills and partly on other traits; (2) it is easy to measure cognitive skills but hard to measure the other traits that determine performance; and (3) the racial disparity in cognitive skills is larger than the racial disparity in the other, unmeasured traits that influence performance\textsuperscript{42}).

41. See Id. (examining the roles of test structure bias, heredity, environment, family, and income in the black-white test score gap). Those assessing the clear disparity among test scores thought it was because objective tests tested skills taught in schools that they were not allowed to attend. See Kidder & Rosner, supra note 35, at 155-58 ("[r]ace was the one area that threw the contradiction between the idea of the system (that it would fully deliver on the promise of American democracy) and the reality of it (that it apportioned opportunity on the basis of a single, highly background-sensitive quality) into the starkest relief.").


43. Id.

44. Id.

45. Not all the questions where minorities score lower than non-minorities are racially biased. In fact, on many SAT questions that appear facially neutral, whites still score much higher than African-Americans. Id. at 153-55. For example:

The singer now performs a more _________ repertoire of songs than in the past, when he sang only traditional ballads.

(A) sentimental
(B) experimental
(C) mellow
(D) customary
The disparate impact of the SAT yielded a widening divide of access to education between the elite and members of low socio-economic status and/or underrepresented minority classes. This growing inequity in admissions as a result of heavy reliance on the standardized test became a problem against the landscape of the emerging civil rights movement. As a general matter, politicians, government officials, and educators showed a heightened awareness of the lack of accessibility to higher education, and ultimately the professions for which these schools trained students. Consequently, colleges and post-graduate in-

(E) wary
Id. at 153. While 59% of whites answered correctly (choosing B), just 37% of African-Americans answered correctly. Kidder & Rosner, supra note 35, at 153. Therefore, questions where minorities score lower than non-minorities are not always easily identified. Id. In their article, Kidder and Rosner suggest that the problem of culturally biased questions is magnified because the disparate impact on minorities is built-in to the system, which results in a perpetual system of bias. Id. at 146. The SAT contains scored questions and un-scored questions. Id. The ETS statistically analyzes the answers to the un-score questions to determine whether they will appear on future SAT exams. Id. In particular, the ETS seeks to ensure that the questions (1) are reliable, which means consistent with the rest of the exam and (2) meet a specified level of difficulty. Id. at 156. ETS determines reliability based upon “the correlation between performance on that item and performance on the test overall.” Id. at 157. As mentioned above, whites tend to answer some questions correctly more often than African-Americans. Id. at 156. The converse—African-Americans students tend to answer some questions correctly more often the white students—is also true. Id. at 158. However, due to the reliability requirements in selecting questions, the pre-tested questions where African-American students out perform white students are not often included in the SAT. Id. Questions with bias favoring “[w]hites will tend to spuriously appear as reliable . . . because the benchmark of reliability is simply the sum total of all biased and unbiased questions—meaning there is a ‘tyranny of the majority’ dilemma inherent in the way reliability is constructed.” Id. at 158. Thus, the system of pre-testing questions is a “self-perpetuating” system that continues to result in a disparate impact on minorities. Id. at 158-59.


47. The SAT was widely in use by the 1950s. At the same time, the Civil Rights movement was emerging. In 1957, Congress passed the first civil rights legislation since Reconstruction. See The Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Civil Rights – The Civil Rights Act of 1957, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/DS/Civil_Rights_Civil_Rights_Act/CivilRightsActFiles.html (last visited September 6, 2006). The Civil Rights Act of 1957 provided for the enforcement of voting rights and criminal civil rights violations that were originally prohibited in the 1870’s. Id. The Act also established the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice. Id. Then in 1964, President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Bill into law. Id.
stitutions created a means to increase enrollment of minority students in their classes.

Starting in the early 1960s, admissions officials began to vary the manner in which minority groups were accepted to their schools. Many schools devised quota systems or other preferential policies that ensured that minority applicants were accepted to their colleges, universities and graduate schools, even if the applicants presented objective test scores that were not competitive with the majority of the school’s applicants. These programs, which were primarily designed to increase enrollment among African-American applicants, came to be termed “affirmative action admission policies.”48

Some of the earliest affirmative action admissions policies took the form of a quota system.49 Schools would set aside a number of seats for minority applicants, whose admissions files were not competitive with the files of non-minority applicants.50 In 1978, the Supreme Court struck down the use of quotas in the admissions process and schools changed their programs to enhance minority admissions “without reserving positions or benefits exclusively for minorities.”51 Colleges and universities created newly reconstituted affirmative action programs, which employed preferential treatment measures where factors such as race, gender, and ethnic origin were considered positive factors in admissions and scholarship determinations.52 These programs ranged from allowing for separate review of minority

48. See Civil Rights.Org, Civil Rights 101, http://www.civilrights.org/research_center/civilrights101/affirmaction.html (last visited September 6, 2006) (“‘[a]ffirmative Action itself has been defined as ‘any measure, beyond simple termination of a discriminatory practice, adopted to correct or compensate for past or present discrimination or to prevent discrimination from recurring in the future.’” (internal citation omitted)). The term was first used by President Kennedy in Executive Order No. 10925, calling for federal contractors to “take affirmative action to ensure” equal opportunity in the construction industry. Id. The term then spread, and was used to describe initiatives in the employment of disabled veterans and equal opportunity in education. Id.

49. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 273-275 (1978) (where the school’s special admission program reserved sixteen out of every 100 seats for minority students).

50. This type of program was struck down in Bakke. See discussion infra Part II.


52. Id.
applicants as a group and non-minority applicants, to giving “points” to minority applicants, to considering race as a factor in the application process.

The preferential nature of these programs gave rise to litigation from school applicants who were denied admission to their schools, arguably in favor of minority students with less impressive objective scores. Litigants challenged the affirmative action admission programs as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Specifically, these challenges argue that considering race as a factor in the admissions process unfairly favors one class over another. Surprisingly, only three challenges have reached the Supreme Court. Through these challenges, however, the Court has ar-

53. See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev’d, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033. The University of Texas had two separate reviewing subcommittees. Id. at 562. The Chair of the Admissions Committee set a different presumptive admission or denial Texas Index (“TI”) number for minorities, who were reviewed by one subcommittee and for non-minorities, who were reviewed by a separate subcommittee. Id. at 561. The Admissions Committee based acceptance to the University for all applicants on an index number that was a function of each applicant’s combined undergraduate grade point average and LSAT score. Id. at 557 n.9. The Chair set numbers that marked automatic admissions and denials, and the subcommittees reviewed applicants based on those numbers. Id. at 560-61.

54. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 244, 252-55 (2003). The University of Michigan used a points system from 1995-1998 that resulted in a certain number of spots being “protected” for minority candidates. Id. at 254-255. Students could receive points for underrepresented minority status or socioeconomic disadvantage. Id. at 255. Every application received points for such things as high school grade point average, standardized test scores and personal achievement or leadership. Id.

55. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001). The University of Michigan Law School’s admissions policy, adopted in 1992, called for race to be considered as a factor in the admission review process. Id. at 832. While grades were also a factor, the rationale for admitting students with lower scores was that they “may help achieve that diversity which has the potential to enrich everyone’s education and thus make a law school class stronger than the sum of its parts.” Id. at 827.

56. See discussion infra Part II.

57. The three challenges include Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and Gratz. As a general matter, few challenges have been filed considering the import of the issue. See, e.g., Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995) (invalidating a race-based scholarship program tied to the admissions process); Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. 551; Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001) (holding that universities may constitutionally aim to achieve diverse student bodies).
articulated clear guidelines defining constitutionally permissible affirmative action admission policies.

II. Supreme Court Guidelines For Constitutionally Permissible Affirmative Actions Programs

The Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of an affirmative action admission policy in *Regents of the University of California at Davis v. Bakke*. 58 Allen Bakke, a white male, charged that the University of California at Davis Medical School admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause by granting preferential treatment in its admissions decisions to applicants of color. 59 Bakke unsuccessfully applied for admission to the University of California at Davis ("Davis") Medical School in 1973 and 1974.60 He challenged the school's 1973 admission policy, adopted in an effort to diversify its entering class, on the grounds that it operated to exclude him from the school on the basis of his race. Bakke challenged the policy as violating the Equal Protection Clause,61 the California Con-
stitution,\textsuperscript{62} and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VI").\textsuperscript{63}

At the time, Davis employed a bifurcated admissions policy. One committee considered non-minority applicants who had achieved a minimum 2.5 undergraduate GPA ("UGPA").\textsuperscript{64} Another committee considered all minority candidates, regardless of their objective scores.\textsuperscript{65} The school set aside a certain number of seats for applicants in each of the groups.\textsuperscript{66} Individuals from the general applicant pool could not fill seats from the minority applicant pool, even if seats were available.\textsuperscript{67} Bakke claimed that the policy, which allowed the school to set aside a certain number of places for minority applicants with lower ob-
jective test scores than his own, was tantamount to a quota.\textsuperscript{68} The trial court found that Davis' admission policy was a racial quota and held that it violated the California and United States Constitutions, as well as Title VI.\textsuperscript{69} The California Supreme Court affirmed this holding.\textsuperscript{70} Upon the State's appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States granted \textit{certiorari}.\textsuperscript{71}

The Supreme Court subjected the Davis policy to the strict scrutiny test.\textsuperscript{72} According to the majority, "the Constitution guarantees that when a program "touch[es] upon an individual's race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear .... is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest."\textsuperscript{73} Thus, the Court wrote, the policy would be struck down unless UC Davis could prove that there was a compelling governmental interest in using a quota in the admissions process and that its affirmative action admissions policy as drafted was narrowly tailored to meet that interest.

Ultimately, the Court, in a highly fractionalized opinion, struck down the Davis policy. Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion,\textsuperscript{74} concluding that the Davis program violated both Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause.\textsuperscript{75} Applying the strict  

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Id.} at 277-78. When Davis rejected Bakke in 1973, four seats reserved for applicants from the minority pool were unfilled, while the seats for the general admission pool were filled. \textit{Id.} at 266. Following the second rejection, Bakke sued Davis and the Regents of the University of California in state court. \textit{Id.} at 279.
\textsuperscript{69} \textit{Id.} at 278-79. In reaching its conclusion, the trial court emphasized that minority applicants in the program were rated only against one another and that sixteen places out of the class of 100 were reserved exclusively for minorities. \textit{Id.} at 279.
\textsuperscript{70} Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152 (Cal. 1976). The California Supreme Court ordered UC Davis to admit Bakke to the Medical School, since the school was unable to demonstrate that he would not have been admitted in the absence of the challenged program. \textit{Id.} at 1172. Applying strict scrutiny, the court concluded that the program violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was not the least intrusive means of achieving the school's compelling goals. \textit{Id.} at 1167.
\textsuperscript{72} See \textit{Id.} at 290-95.
\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Id.} at 299 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)); Missouri \textit{ex rel.} Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938).
\textsuperscript{74} Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269.
\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Id.} at 271.
\end{footnotesize}
tiny test, Justice Powell found that there was a compelling governmental interest in attaining a diverse student body. A diverse student body contributing to a robust exchange of ideas, he wrote, is a constitutionally permissible goal on which a race-conscious university admissions program may be predicated. However, although the Constitution does not bar admission policies from introducing race as a factor in the selection process, Justice Powell concluded that the program was not narrowly tailored, and that preferring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination on its own.

The Davis admissions policy, which set aside a specific number of seats for students in identified minority groups, unfairly benefited the interest of a victimized group at the expense of other innocent individuals and, therefore, violated the Equal Protection Clause. Additionally, its practice of having sepa-

76. Id. at 279. Justice Powell also wrote that “in order to justify the use of a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is ‘necessary . . . to the accomplishment’ of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest.” Id. at 305 (quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973)); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964).

77. Attainment of a diverse student body is related to academic freedom. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12.

78. Id. Justice Powell noted that educational excellence is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body. Id. at 313-14.

79. Id. at 307 (“[w]e have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations.”). Title VI clearly establishes that where there is a need to overcome the effects of past racially discriminatory or exclusionary practices engaged in by federally-funded institutions, race-conscious action is required to accomplish the remedial objectives of Title VI. Id. at 307-09. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun agreed with this, stating that “[Title VI] does not bar the preferential treatment of racial minorities as a means of remedying past societal discrimination to the extent that such action is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 328 (Brennon, J., dissenting).

80. Id. at 307. Justice Powell upheld the California Supreme Court’s decision that the special admissions program was unlawful, and that Bakke was to be admitted to Medical School; however, the Court reversed the decision enjoining the Medical School from considering race in admissions. Id. at 324-25. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens, in a concurring opinion, agreed that the policy was unlawful because it unfairly favored one group over another. Id. at 324-26. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun concurred in the holding and dissented in part, as they did not believe that Bakke should be admitted to the Medical School or that quotas should be maintained. Id.
rate admissions subcommittees review minority and non-minority candidates inappropriately insulated applicants from comparison against the entire admissions pool.\textsuperscript{81} For these reasons, Justice Powell concluded that the Davis admissions policy was constitutionally impermissible.

Justice Powell’s opinion acknowledged that the majority viewed the Davis admissions policy as seeking to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance to the fulfillment of its mission and, in fact, as serving an important governmental interest.\textsuperscript{82} Justice Powell's opinion endorsed the policy of considering race as a “plus" in instances where an affirmative action admissions policy is free from clear goals or quotas.\textsuperscript{83} Indeed, a majority of the Court recognized the University's right to select students who would best contribute to the “robust exchange of ideas.”\textsuperscript{84} However, “ethnic diversity . . . is only one element in a range of factors a university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student body.”\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{81} Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
\textsuperscript{82} Id.
\textsuperscript{83} Id. at 317. For example, assume two applicants, one minority and one non-minority, have the same UGPA and MCAT scores. Under Justice Powell's opinion, an admissions committee can offer admission to the minority applicant before it offers admission to the non-minority applicant, since a diversity viewpoint “plus" UGPA and MCAT score is of more value to the school than a non-diversity viewpoint and the same “objective" test scores. For a discussion of the validity of the “plus" factor rationale, see Krista L. Cosner, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Lessons and Directions from the Supreme Court, 71 Ind. L.J. 1003, 1004 (1996).
\textsuperscript{84} Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-13.
\textsuperscript{85} Id. at 314. The Court acknowledged that the importance of diversity may be greater at the undergraduate level than at the medical school level, where the focus is on “professional competency,” but concluded that the “contribution of diversity is substantial" even at this level, because doctors provide services to a “heterogeneous population.” Id. at 313-14. The Court also noted that while law schools focus on gaining legal skills and knowledge, this focus “cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law interacts.” Id. at 314 (internal quotation omitted). Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist, joined in Justice Powell's conclusion that the program was invalid, based on the conclusion that the program violated Title VI, and thus there was no need to evaluate the program under the Equal Protection Clause.
For nearly fifteen years following Bakke, the federal appeals courts did not consider challenges to affirmative action admission policies. In 1992, however, the Fifth Circuit considered the first of several equal protection challenges, none of which made it to the Supreme Court. These decisions all hinged on the applicability of Justice Powell's majority decision. The various circuits reached different conclusions on the precedential value of Justice Powell's decision. In Hopwood v. Texas, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Justice Powell's decision in Bakke was not binding on its court and that race could not be considered as a factor in the admissions process.

The Johnson Court considered an appeal from the District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, which held that the University of Georgia's ("UGA") policy of awarding a fixed numerical bonus to non-white and male applicants, which it did not give to white and female applicants, was unconstitutional. The majority concluded that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke was rejected by the majority, and found not binding due to the fact that "no other Justice joined in that part of the opinion discussing the diversity rationale." 84. Id. 944.

86. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).

87. See Id. A majority of the Fifth Circuit broadly ruled that the University of Texas may not use race as a factor in law school admissions. Id. at 959. This holding suggests that all schools in its jurisdiction were prohibited from doing the same. Justice Powell's holding in Bakke was rejected by the majority, and found not binding due to the fact that "no other Justice joined in that part of the opinion discussing the diversity rationale." Id. at 944.

88. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (S.D. Ga. 2000). On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, UGA argued that the school's policy should be upheld because it was narrowly tailored to meet what Justice Powell acknowledged in Bakke as a compelling governmental interest in admitting a diverse class. Id.
was not binding under *Marks v. United States*, which held that “when a fragmented Court decides a case . . . the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”

Although the Court suggested that there could be a compelling governmental interest, ultimately, the court struck down UGA’s policy as failing the narrowly tailored test.

In *Smith v. University of Washington Law School*, however, the Ninth Circuit ruled Justice Powell’s opinion in *Bakke* was binding on its court, and that “the attainment of a diverse student body is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education.” The Eleventh Circuit agreed with

91. The Eleventh Circuit suggested there could be a compelling governmental interest because of the government’s demonstrated need for the program as a means to eradicate present effects of past discrimination. *Id.* at 1252. Interestingly, the court relied on a compelling governmental interest that justifies race based policies in the work place. *Id.* The court disregarded Powell’s stated compelling governmental interest in a need for diversity in the classroom. *Id.* at 1252-53.
92. *Id.* at 1254.
93. *Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch.*, 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001). The University of Washington Law School had used race as a factor in its admissions policy from 1994-1998, until the school voluntarily complied with a State of Washington law that precluded schools from granting preferential treatment to any individual on the basis of race. *Id.* at 1191.
94. The Ninth Circuit applied the analysis of *Marks*, which held that “the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in judgments on the narrowest grounds” is binding on the Court. *Id.* at 1199. Therefore, Justice Powell’s opinion in *Bakke* was binding.
95. *Id.* at 1197. The Ninth Circuit went on to state that:

The district court correctly decided that Justice Powell’s opinion in *Bakke* described the law and would require a determination that a properly designed and operated race-conscious admissions program at the Law School of the University of Washington would not be in violation of Title VI or the Fourteenth Amendment. It was also correct when it determined that *Bakke* has not been overruled by the Supreme Court. Thus, at our level of the judicial system, Justice Powell’s opinion remains the law.

However, the Law School has encountered a peripeteia in its own state; it is bound by I-200, which precludes it from granting “preferential treatment” to any individual "on the basis of race.” That has rendered Smith’s request for prospective relief moot because we “[should] not assume that a university, professing to employ a facially nondiscriminatory admissions policy, would operate it as a cover for the functional equivalent of a quota system. In short, good faith [should] be presumed in the absence of a showing to the contrary . . . ."
Hopwood when it reached a similar conclusion in Johnson v. Board of Regents of the University of Georgia.\textsuperscript{96} The Johnson majority concluded that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke was not binding;\textsuperscript{97} however, it was still willing to uphold the policy if it passed the strict scrutiny test.\textsuperscript{98} The split among the circuits made the issue ripe for Supreme Court review.

In 2003, twenty-five years after the Bakke case, the Supreme Court again considered the constitutionality of affirmative action admission plans when it heard the twin cases of Grutter v. Bolinger\textsuperscript{99} and Gratz v. Bolinger.\textsuperscript{100} Gratz v. Bolinger, was filed by a Caucasian female and a Caucasian male, each of whom were denied admission to the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and the Arts ("LSA").\textsuperscript{101} Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher challenged LSA's admissions policy, alleging that it improperly used race as a factor, in violation of 42 USC §§ 1981 and 1983, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\textsuperscript{102}

Barbara Grutter challenged the University of Michigan School of Law's ("Law School") admissions policy as violating the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.\textsuperscript{103} At the time Grutter applied to the school, the Law School used an admissions plan that allowed admissions officials to consider race as one of several factors that would lead toward admission into the school.\textsuperscript{104} Specifically, the policy re-
quired those reviewing applications to consider each applicant individually and to weigh a series of attributes including, Law School Admission Score, undergraduate degree and grade point average, race or ethnicity, work experience, years out of law school, etc.\footnote{Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338 (noting factors in admission includes fluency in foreign languages, overcoming personal adversity and family hardship, extensive community service, unusual intellectual achievement, employment experience, nonacademic experience, and personal background).} Given the propensity for minority applicants to perform less well on the LSAT, the policy allowed admissions officials to treat race as a "plus" in an effort to admit a more critically diverse class.\footnote{Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318.}

Grutter challenged the program in federal court, arguing that the law school used race as a predominant factor, which gave members of a minority group a significantly greater chance of admission than a non-minority student with the same credentials.\footnote{Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317.} Grutter also alleged that the law school had no compelling reason that would justify the use of race.\footnote{Grutter, 539 U.S. at 321.} The district court agreed with Grutter that the use of race was unlawful, because the Law School did not have a compelling interest in increasing the racial balance of its entering class and the use of race was not narrowly tailored.\footnote{Grutter, 539 U.S. at 321.} The Court of Appeals sitting \textit{en banc} reversed, holding that there was a compelling state interest in admitting a diverse entering class and that the Law School's plan, which allowed committee members to treat race as a "plus," was narrowly tailored to meet that goal.\footnote{Grutter, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, subjected the Law School's admissions policy to strict scrutiny. \textit{Id.} at 321. The court concluded that Justice Powell's majority opinion in \textit{Bakke} was not binding, and therefore the Law School's mission of admitting a diverse class was not a compelling governmental interest to justify including race in the list of non-objective factors that could contribute to an applicant's success. \textit{Id.} The district court further found that the admissions policy was not narrowly tailored, concluding that the Law School's goal of admitting a "critical mass" was practically indistinguishable from a quota, and was such an}
Concurrent with Grutter’s court challenge, Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher challenged LSA’s admissions policy, arguing that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. 111 Between 1995 and 2000, LSA revised its admission's amorphous figure that a program could never be narrowly tailored to achieve it. Id. Judge Friedman issued an injunction prohibiting the Law School from considering race in its admissions policy. Id. In response to the district court decision, the Law School petitioned the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit heard the Grutter appeal en banc on the same day as Gratz. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 259 (2003).

The main issues before the Sixth Circuit were whether the district court erred in concluding that Justice Powell's opinion was not binding and, if so, whether the Law School's admissions policy passed constitutional muster under Powell's reasoning in Bakke. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 321. As to the first issue, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court improperly applied a Marks analysis to the plurality opinion in Bakke. Id. In Bakke, Justice Brennan's concurrence, which was joined by three other Justices, signaled his agreement with Justice Powell that diversifying a student body could be a compelling governmental interest. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 742-43 (6th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, the court found that its subsequent treatment of Bakke, in cases like Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., supports the conclusion that Powell's position in Bakke represents the holding of the case. Id. at 743. Justice Martin held that since, under a Marks analysis, Justice Powell's decision in Bakke is binding on the courts, it should remain the law until the Supreme Court expressly overrules it. Id. at 744.

Once the Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court misapplied controlling law, it considered whether, under Bakke, the Law School's admissions policy was narrowly tailored to meet the compelling governmental interest of admitting a diverse entering class. Id. at 746-47. The court recognized that the Law School's admissions policy closely tracked the Harvard Plan, which the Bakke Court suggested would pass strict scrutiny. Id. at 747. Specifically, the Law School policy did not use quotas, only considered race, ethnicity, and other soft variables as potential “plus” factors in an applicant's file, and read and evaluated each applicant individually. Id. For these reasons, it was narrowly tailored. The court further considered the school's policy of weekly reviews of the race and ethnicity of the admitted applicants. Id. The goal of this practice, according to the Law School, was to ensure that the school enrolled a “critical mass” of underrepresented minority students, so that a few wouldn't feel isolated or as though they must be the spokesperson for an entire group of people. Id. Enrolling a critical mass, the Law School offer, ensured that the entire class would obtain the benefits of an academically diverse student body. Id. Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit Court was satisfied that a “critical mass” did not equal a quota, and the court upheld the Law School's admissions policy. Id.

The petitioners from the Grutter case filed a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court following the Sixth Circuit decision. See Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2002). The Court granted certiorari on December 2, 2002. The Gratz petitioners also asked the Court to grant certiorari, even though the Sixth Circuit had not yet rendered an opinion in that case, so that the Court could address the constitutionality of affirmative action admissions policies “in a wider range of circumstances.” Gratz, 539 U.S. at 260.

111. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 249-50.
policy on several occasions. Essentially, the admissions policy allotted a point value, called a SCUGA score, to certain factors, including high school GPA, standardized test scores, geography, alumni relationships, quality of high school, etc. Additionally, the policy allotted points for the unique characteristics of an applicant. The school combined the SCUGA score with a student’s SAT and GPA. An applicant’s total score determined whether the committee would read the application. The district court found that LSA had a compelling interest in achieving a diverse student body, and the admissions program between 1999 and 2000 was narrowly tailored. The court of appeals did not consider the constitutionality of LSA’s admissions program.

Both cases made their way to the Supreme Court and were decided on the same day, June 23, 2003. Because these were challenges to racial-preference policies, the Supreme Court subjected both to strict scrutiny. Thus, the Court could only uphold the policy if the proponents demonstrated that the

112. Id. at 254-57.
113. “SCUGA” is an acronym with letters signifying “the quality of an applicant’s high school (S), the strength of an applicant’s high school curriculum (C), an applicant’s unusual circumstances (U), an applicant’s geographical residence (G), and an applicant’s alumni relationships (A).” Id. at 254.
114. See Id.
115. See Id. In 1995-97, these unique characteristics were termed “an applicant’s unusual circumstances.” Id. at 254-55. For 1995 and 1996, minority applicants were rated based upon a different scale than non-minority applicants, but in 1997 the minority status was allotted a higher point value under the “unusual circumstances” category. Id. at 255. In 1998, the points for such unique characteristics were allotted under categories such as “personal achievement or leadership” and “miscellaneous,” which included “membership in an underrepresented racial or ethnic minority group.” Id. Finally, in 1999 and 2000, the LSA added an additional procedure that allowed for applicants to be “flagged” for further review. Id. at 256. In 1998-2000, twenty points on a 150 point scale, were awarded for “membership in an underrepresented racial or ethnic minority group.” Id. at 255-56.
116. Id. at 258. For a discussion on the different admissions policies, see supra text accompanying note 34.
117. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 259-60.
program was narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest.120

In each case, the Court held that there was a compelling governmental interest in achieving a diverse classroom;121 and for that reason, any program aimed at achieving a diverse entering class would pass the compelling governmental interest prong of the strict scrutiny test. The Court differed, however, in whether the two programs were narrowly tailored. In Gratz, the Court struck down LSA's affirmative action admission program, holding that it was not narrowly tailored because it gave points, wholesale, to a class of individuals and did not allow for individual review in a meaningful way that would assess whether a particular applicant would contribute to a diverse setting.122 In Grutter, however, the Court upheld the law school’s program, ruling that its policy of requiring admissions committee members to individually assess each application was narrowly tailored.123 The individual review process ensured that an applicant was not admitted solely based on membership in a particular class, but instead, was admitted because his or her race or ethnicity was one of several factors that might contribute to creating a well-rounded entering class with robust discussion.124

120. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270.

121. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-33; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-76.

122. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-76. The Supreme Court upheld Justice Powell's explanation that universities could use race as a “plus” factor. Id. at 270 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978)). However, the Court also re-emphasized the “importance of considering each particular applicant as an individual, assessing all of the qualities that individuals possess, and in turn, evaluating that individual’s ability to contribute to the unique setting of higher education.” Id. Then, the Court found that the University's policy of distributing twenty of 150 points to an applicant based upon qualifying as an “underrepresented minority” did not provide for the individualized review required by Bakke. Id. at 271-72. The Court found the awarding of points made race the “decisive” factor for “virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant.” Id. at 272.

123. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333-44.

124. Id. The Court found that the Law School plan bears the ‘hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan[,]” because it used race as a “‘plus’ factor in the context of individualized review of each and every applicant.” Id. at 334. The Court described the Law School's plan as “highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment.” Id. at 337.
Chief Justice Rehnquist provided the majority opinion in the *Gratz* decision.\textsuperscript{125} Writing for the majority,\textsuperscript{126} Chief Justice Rehnquist found that the fatal flaw in the University's admissions policy was its failure to provide individual review of each candidate.\textsuperscript{127} LSA's policy of automatically distributing twenty points to every applicant from the "underrepresented minority" applicant pool had the result of treating race as an absolute, "which could jettison a member of an underrepresented group into the accept category, regardless of the experiences or qualities that race had contributed to the development of the individual."\textsuperscript{128} LSA's admission policy went beyond the spirit of Justice Powell's opinion in *Bakke*, that race could be considered a factor in the admissions policy since it failed to allow for interpretation of "individual qualities or experiences not dependant upon race but sometimes associated with it."\textsuperscript{129}

Under LSA's policy, admissions officials individually reviewed applications but only if the application got a high enough SCUGA score. The majority found this policy flawed since the individual review was only provided after admissions counselors automatically assigned points to a candidate.\textsuperscript{130} They rejected the LSA's concern that the volume of applications made it impractical to use an admissions system primarily

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{125} *Gratz*, 539 U.S. at 244.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas joined the Court's majority opinion.
\item \textsuperscript{127} *Id.* at 271. "[The Court finds] that the University's current policy, which automatically distributes 20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single 'underrepresented minority' applicant solely because of race, is not narrowly tailored to achieve educational diversity." *Id.* at 270.
\item \textsuperscript{128} *Id.* at 270-71. LSA's policy went beyond the spirit of Justice Powell's edict that race can be considered a factor in admissions, since it failed to allow for interpretation of "individual qualities or experience not dependent upon race but sometimes associated with it." *Id.* at 272-73. The Court held that the possibility of committee review, "is of little comfort under our strict scrutiny analysis." *Id.* at 274. There was not enough information in the record to know how many applicants were actually "flagged" but the Court felt that it was undisputed that the individual consideration was "the exception and not the rule." *Id.* at 274. It also did not satisfy strict scrutiny because the individualized review of the committee only occurred after LSA distributed "the University's version of a 'plus' that makes race a decisive factor for virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant." *Id.*
\item \textsuperscript{129} *Id.* at 272-73 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978)).
\item \textsuperscript{130} *Gratz*, 539 U.S. at 271-72
\end{itemize}
based on individual review, and thus automatic assignment was
the only means to efficiently consider the volume of applicants
it received each year. In response, the Court wrote, "the fact
that the implementation of a program capable of providing indi-
vidualized consideration might present administrative chal-
 lenges does not render constitutional an otherwise problematic
system."132

In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor wrote that LSA's
practice of assigning points to applicants merely because they
are members of a particular class precluded the committee from
considering the particular applicant's ability to contribute to
meaningful class discussion. Under LSA's policy, "under-
represented minority" status granted the applicant such a sig-
nificant number or points that it had the effect of almost
 guaranteeing acceptance to the school, rather than serving as a
contributing factor in the decision making process. Justice
O'Connor found that the policy, which she defined as a "non-
individualized mechanical system" was flawed and therefore
unconstitutional.

Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, found LSA's pol-
icy flawed because "it awards all underrepresented minorities
the same racial preference." The system of automatically as-
signing points failed to afford admissions counselors the ability

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131. Id. at 275.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 277-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring). LSA's automatic award of
points did not satisfy the requirement of providing individualized consideration.
Id. This is in contrast to the Law School's program, which O'Connor held constitu-
tional because each application was read completely and considered individually
and therefore race was only used as a "plus." Id.
134. Justice O'Connor acknowledged that an applicant could acquire a signifi-
cant number of points through the other factors in the applicant's SCUGA score,
but noted that the points assigned for those other categories were significantly
lower than those assigned for race. Id. at 279. Consequently, "[e]ven the most
outstanding national high school leader could never receive more than five points
for his or her accomplishments—a mere quarter of the points automatically as-
signed to an underrepresented minority solely based on the fact of his or her race."
Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
to identify and consider what viewpoints an applicant might bring to the classroom.\textsuperscript{137}

The various majority opinions in \textit{Gratz} clearly endorsed the notion that seeking a critical mass of diverse viewpoints in the classroom serves a compelling governmental interest. However, race in and of itself did not dictate the viewpoint that an individual might bring to the classroom. In order to ensure this, admissions officials needed to evaluate the voice that each applicant would bring to the classroom. Such a voice is not automatically determined based on race. Thus, anything short of an individual evaluation of an applicant’s history, past experiences, and other factors that might contribute to his or her values and opinions, would fall short of being narrowly tailored.\textsuperscript{138}

In \textit{Grutter v. Bolinger}, a divided Court upheld the Law School’s admissions policy.\textsuperscript{139} The Court first reaffirmed past decisions, which found a compelling governmental interest in admitting a diverse entering class.\textsuperscript{140} Furthermore, the Court found that the Law School’s policy was narrowly tailored to meet that interest since it allowed members of the admissions committee to individually review each applicant in a way that

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{137} \textit{Id.} at 281. Ultimately, Justice Thomas would have gone further than his brethren and perhaps (given his opinion) even overruled \textit{Bakke}. \textit{Id.} According to Justice Thomas, “a State’s use of racial discrimination in higher education admissions is categorically prohibited under the Equal Protection Clause.” \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{138} Those dissenting believed that the program was, in fact, narrowly tailored to meet the strict scrutiny test. Justice Souter would have likely upheld LSA’s policy. \textit{Id.} at 295 (Souter, J., dissenting). Noting the holdings in \textit{Bakke} and \textit{Grutter}, Justice Souter wrote that the Court has acknowledged that there is a compelling governmental interest in achieving diversity and that race can be considered a plus in the admissions process in order to achieve that diversity. Awarding value requires a school to consider race in a way that increases the applicant’s chances of acceptance. \textit{Id.} at 295. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent focused more on the need to correct past inequality than it did on the need for diversity in the classroom. \textit{Id.} at 298 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She wrote, “[t]he stain of generations of racial oppression is still visible in our society.” \textit{Id.} at 304. As a result, there is a compelling need for such policies and wide latitude should be given when interpreting whether the policies are narrowly tailored. \textit{Id.} at 303. Therefore, Justice Ginsburg found “no constitutional infirmity.” \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{139} \textit{Grutter v. Bollinger}, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). Justice O’Connor wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. \textit{Id.} at 310. Justices Scalia and Thomas joined in part. \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{140} \textit{Id.} at 322-32.
\end{itemize}
considered race and ethnicity among a host of diversity factors.\textsuperscript{141}

The majority reaffirmed Justice Powell's conclusion in \textit{Bakke} that achieving diversity in education supports a compelling governmental interest.\textsuperscript{142} "Skills needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to a widely diverse people, cultures, ideas and viewpoints."\textsuperscript{143} Thus, the school's articulated compelling governmental interest transcends the classroom to society as a whole.\textsuperscript{144}

Once the majority concluded that the Law School's program met the compelling governmental interest prong of the strict scrutiny test, it turned its attention to whether the program was narrowly tailored. The ideal policy, according to the majority, would be "flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant and place them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them the same weight."\textsuperscript{145} The Law School's policy of considering race or ethnicity as only one of many equal factors that could contribute to making an applicant qualified for admission to the law school made the program sufficiently flexible.\textsuperscript{146} Recalling the language of many

\textsuperscript{141} Id. at 334-35.
\textsuperscript{142} Id. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, observed, that in the Court's view, "attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School's proper institutional mission, and that 'good faith' on the part of a university is 'presumed' absent 'a showing to the contrary.'" Id. at 333. The Law School properly articulated a compelling governmental interest, by stating in its mission statement the need to admit a "critical mass" in order to assemble a class that is broadly diverse. Id. at 328-30. Justice O'Connor stated that the benefits from diversity "are substantial," as shown by the District Court. Id. Achieving diversity helps promote "cross-racial understanding," breaks down stereotypes, and lets students better understand people from other races. Id. at 328-32. These benefits of diversity were also asserted by the amicus curiae, including major American businesses, and high-ranking retired officers and civilian officials from the United States Military. Id. at 331-32.

\textsuperscript{143} Id. at 331. The Court also adopted the military's conclusion that "a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide national security." Id.
\textsuperscript{144} Id. at 331-32.
\textsuperscript{145} Id. at 334 (internal quotation omitted).
\textsuperscript{146} Id. at 337-42. Justice O'Connor found significant similarities between the Law School's policy and the Harvard Plan, to which Justice Powell referred in \textit{Bakke} as constitutionally permissible. Id. at 334-40. Both plans adequately en-
of its earlier strict scrutiny cases, the Court considered whether
the Law School policy was the least restrictive means to achieve
its goals. Indeed, any policy that gives some sort of preferential
treatment to a particular category of persons would be less than
ideal and one could always speculate that there are more re-
strictive alternatives to achieving the goal of a diverse class-
room.\textsuperscript{147} To be sure, while the Court recognized that one might
be able to hypothesize alternatives to the Law School’s policy,
the policy before the Court met the strict scrutiny test.\textsuperscript{148} Justice
O’Connor, writing for the majority, concluded that narrowly
tailored “does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-
neutral alternative.”\textsuperscript{149}

The Court next turned its attention to whether the Law
School policy’s mission of seeking a “critical mass” would mean
that the policy was too broad in scope to be narrowly tailored.
The Court’s dissenters argued that the goal of seeking a “critical
mass” was really nothing more than a disguised quota.\textsuperscript{150} The
majority disagreed, and ultimately concluded that the program
was sufficiently narrowly tailored and therefore passed the
strict scrutiny test.\textsuperscript{151} Ultimately, the Court was sufficiently

\textsuperscript{147.} See generally id. at 341.
\textsuperscript{148.} Id. at 337-41. The Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit that the school
had considered race-neutral alternatives. Id. at 339-40. The district court had
proposed race-neutral alternatives like using a lottery system, decreasing the
school’s reliance on grades and test scores, or automatically admitting a certain
percentage from each high-school. Id. at 340. The Court rejected these alterna-
tives; the lottery system would not work because it precluded the individualized
review that is required. Id. Requiring the Law School to lower its standards
would be to drastically change the school and require it to sacrifice a vital part of
its educational mission. Id. Automatically admitting a certain top percentage
of each high school class would also not work because they also precluded individual-
ized review and the Court did not understand how it could be applied to graduate
level schools. Id.

\textsuperscript{149.} Id. at 339.
\textsuperscript{150.} See generally id. at 374-75 n.12. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia,
Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas dissented.

\textsuperscript{151.} “The Law School’s goal of attaining a critical mass of underrepresented
minority students does not transform its program into a quota.” Grutter v. Bollin-
numbers and achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse student body, and
between numbers and providing a reasonable environment for those students ad-
convinced that the Law School had adopted a workable and constitutionally permissible program.\textsuperscript{152}

III. The Challenge of Meeting the Supreme Court’s Affirmative Action Ideal

\textit{Grutter} and \textit{Gratz} create a blueprint for constructing an affirmative action admissions policy that would withstand an

\textsuperscript{152} While the Court found that a policy that considers race or ethnicity as one factor among several factors to be narrowly tailored, it expressed its concern that schools continue to use such policies \textit{ad infinitum}. \textit{Id.} at 342. “In the context of higher education, the durational requirement can be met by sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions policies and periodic reviews . . . .” \textit{Id.} Justice O’Connor wrote that the Court “expect[s] that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.” \textit{Id.} at 343.

Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy each filed a separate opinion in which they concurred in part and dissented in part. Both Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia’s opinions suggest that they would never uphold an admissions policy that granted racial preferences. \textit{Id.} at 347-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) and 349-78 (Thomas, J., concurring in part). Justice Thomas concurred with that part of the Court’s holding which he interpreted to require “that racial discrimination in higher education admissions would be illegal in 25 years.” \textit{Id.} at 351. He disagreed, however, with the Court’s decision to uphold the Law School’s compelling interest in maintaining a diverse entering class. \textit{Id.} Thomas looked at the Law School’s policy from a pragmatic standpoint. The Law School’s need to use race as a plus in admissions was derived from its desire to admit an elite entering class. \textit{Id.} As a general matter, non-minority students significantly outperformed underrepresented minorities on objective tests, hence the need for the “plus” in the admissions policy. \textit{Id.} at 369-70. If, however, the Law School chose to admit a majority of the student body with objective test scores, it would not need to give underrepresented minorities a “plus” in the admissions process. \textit{Id.} at 378. There is no compelling state interest in having an elite Law School, and for this reason the policy should have been struck down Chief Justice Rehnquist in his dissent provided little guidance toward what he thought the Law School could have done to make the process narrowly tailored. \textit{Id.} at 378-87 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). He paid careful attention to the relationship between the number of underrepresented minority students who applied to the Law School, and the number who were accepted. According to the Chief Justice, “the correlation between the percentage of the Law School’s pool of applicants who are members of the three minority groups, and the percentage of the admitted applicants who are members of these same groups, is far too precise to be dismissed as merely the result of the school paying ‘some attention to [the] numbers.’” \textit{Id.} at 383. The mathematical precision, in which Justice Rehnquist believed the Law School engaged, was problematic as it was tantamount to a quota. \textit{Id.} at 383-86. For this reason, Rehnquist would have struck down the law school program. \textit{See} Garfield, \textit{supra} note 119, at 670-71.
equal protection challenge.\textsuperscript{153} Under these most recent cases, a court will find a compelling governmental interest in adopting a race-based admissions policy whose mission includes admitting a critical mass of underrepresented minorities.\textsuperscript{154} A court will also likely conclude that a program meets the narrowly tailored prong of the test if it provides for meaningful individual review of applicants.\textsuperscript{155}

Precedent confirms that a policy identical to that of the Law School's is the constitutional ideal. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in \textit{Grutter} found that the individual review process of the Law School program ensured that an applicant's admission was not based predominately on membership in a particular class.\textsuperscript{156} The \textit{Gratz} majority essentially endorsed the \textit{Grutter} plan by holding that anything short of individual review of applicants against all other applicants would fail a constitutional challenge.\textsuperscript{157} Thus, administrators and admissions officials at post-secondary schools need only adopt the Law School model to insulate their institutions from future constitutional challenges. Even the Court acknowledged that the Law School model is not easily attainable for schools that receive a significantly large number of applications\textsuperscript{158} in any given academic year.\textsuperscript{159} The challenge, therefore, is for large educational institutions to create an affirmative action admission policy that mimics a model that was created for a relatively small graduate institution.

At the outset, colleges and universities would be well advised to adopt a mission statement to support their affirmative

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[153.] See Garfield, \textit{supra} note 119, at 679-83, (discussing the “new” strict scrutiny test the Court developed for reviewing affirmative action admission programs).
\item[155.] \textit{Grutter}, 539 U.S. at 309.
\item[156.] Garfield, \textit{supra} note 119, at 677.
\item[157.] Id. at 684.
\item[158.] The Law School receives more than 3,500 applications and admits approximately 350 students annually. \textit{Grutter}, 539 U.S. at 312-313. LSA receives roughly 15,000 first-year applications every year and admits approximately 9,400 students. \textit{University of Michigan College of Literature, Science, and the Arts Profile} 3 (2005), http://www.lsa.umich.edu/UofM/Content/Lsa/document/LSAprofile2006.pdf.
\item[159.] \textit{Gratz}, 539 U.S. at 275.
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action admission policies. The Law School's mission statement identifying its goal to "promote and enhance classroom discussion both inside and outside the classroom by admitting students with perspectives that vary from those that have not experienced historic educational discrimination" clearly satisfied the compelling governmental interest prong of the strict scrutiny test. Thus, schools could adopt a mission statement with identical language and know that they are fairly likely to succeed in showing a compelling governmental interest.

The absence of a mission statement will not preclude a court's finding of a compelling governmental interest if the defending school can demonstrate that its policy is intended to obtain diversity in the classroom. LSA did not offer the Court an identifiable mission statement. Even so, the Gratz Court concluded that given Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, an affirmative action admission policy could meet the compelling governmental interest prong since there is great educational value in a robust exchange of diverse ideas. A declaration of

When asked about the policy's "commitment to racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students from groups which have been historically discriminated against," Lempert explained that this language did not purport to remedy past discrimination, but rather to include students who may bring to the Law School a perspective different from that of members of groups which have not been the victims of such discrimination. Lempert acknowledged that other groups, such as Asians and Jews, have experienced discrimination, but explained they were not mentioned in the policy because individuals who are members of those groups were already being admitted to the Law School in significant numbers. Id. (internal citations omitted).

161. Id. at 329-31. The mission statement notes a "commitment to racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students from groups that have been historically discriminated against, like African-Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans, who without this commitment might not be represented in our student body in meaningful numbers." Memorandum of Law in Support of Renewed Motion By Defendants Bollinger, Lehman, and Shields for Summary Judgment on the Grounds of Qualified Immunity at *2, Grutter v. Bollinger, Civ. No. 97-75928 (E.D. Mich. June 14, 2000), available at http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/admissions/legal/grutter/rmqigr03.html (last visited September 25, 2006).

162. See Id.


intent on the part of the school, however, would make any constitutional challenge easier to survive.

The other requirement for constitutionally permissible affirmative action admission programs is the need for individual review of applicants. The Gratz majority rejected LSA’s admissions policy because of its failure to look at each applicant and what he or she might contribute to the classroom. According to Justice Rehnquist, Bakke required schools to consider each applicant’s “individual qualities or experiences,” including race. A meaningful, individualized review of each application was the only way to assure compliance with the Court’s rule of law.

Under the Gratz and Grutter Courts’ edicts, however, a school may continue to automatically reject or automatically admit candidates, alleviating an admissions office of individual review of every application. The automatic reject/admit practice is a means to decrease the number of applications that a school’s admission office must spend time reviewing. This practice is clearly necessary given the “volume of applications,” which makes it “impractical to review each applicant individually.”

Under this program, a school sets certain objective numbers for an applicant’s SATs and UGPA which would assure them acceptance or rejection to the school. Thus, for in-

165. See supra text accompanying note 133.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 127 and 128.
167. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 272. See also supra text accompanying note 128.
168. Students may be admitted or rejected by a clerk without counselor review if grades and test scores are above or below certain standards. See Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 14, n.6, Gratz v. Bollinger, Civ. No. 97-75231 (E.D. Mich. May 30, 1999), available at http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/admissions/legal/gratz/gzsumfnt.html (last visited September 25, 2006). LSA states that the “automatic admit’ process relates only to the timing of when clerks caused certain applicants to be informed of admissions decisions . . . .” Moreover, although clerks were able to reject candidates with low grades and test scores without counselor review, the process was not utilized because clerks were uncomfortable rejecting students without counselor review. Id.
170. The increasing importance to a school’s reputation based on its U.S. News & World Report ranking has, arguably, increased schools’ use of automatic accept/reject categories. U.S. News & World Report credits a school’s student selectivity with 15% of the weight in ranking schools. This 15% is also weighted,
stance, the 2005 *Fiske Guide*, one of the leading guide books on American colleges and universities, reports that students admitted to the Washington University of St. Louis, an elite private institution in St. Louis, Missouri, had a mean verbal SAT score range between 640 and 730 and a mean math SAT score range between 670 and 750. Most students were also in the top 10 percent of their class, or had a UGPA of approximately 3.6. Hypothetically, Washington University would automatically reject an applicant who submits objective scores of a 2.5 GPA and an 1100 SAT, which is below the school's mean numbers. Presumably, someone with these scores does not present a profile similar to a large portion of the school's entering class and would, therefore, be unable to compete academically. In contrast, the school might automatically admit an applicant who submits an SAT score of 1600 and a UGPA score of 4.0, well above that same mean. Schools need only review all applications that fall between the automatic accept and automatic reject categories.

The *Grutter* and *Gratz* decisions provide clear guidelines for schools to follow. Any institute of higher education interested in meeting the Court's affirmative action admission policy need merely identify as its mission the goal of admitting a diverse entering class. The school must also ensure that it reviews applicants even-handedly, providing individualized


172. *Id.* (3.6 average on a 4.0 scale is considered an A average).
173. A 2.5 on a 4.0 scale is equal to a C+ average.
174. A student with a UGPA of 4.0 and SAT score of 1600 would presumably be admitted to an institution with these scores, but selective schools are not likely to have an automatic admit category.
review of any applicant who is not accepted based on objective
criteria.

The seemingly attainable policy outlined by the Supreme
Court is inherently flawed, particularly for larger institutions.
Those with multitudinous applicants do not have the luxury of
time for individual review.\textsuperscript{175} LSA's concern that individual re-
view of a large applicant pool is an unattainable goal is a well
founded one. For its 2006 entering freshman class, the Univer-
sity of Michigan received 25,733 applications for its under-
graduate program and accepted 12,196 applicants.\textsuperscript{176} Even small
institutions are deluged with applicants. Bucknell University,
a small liberal arts school with approximately 3,000 students,
received 9000 applications for 915 spots.\textsuperscript{177} Individual review of
these applications is costly, time consuming and a potential
drain of admissions office administrative resources.

To alleviate individual review of all applicants, many grad-
uate and post-graduate institutions with significant numbers of
applicants quietly use automatic admit/reject categories.\textsuperscript{178} The
only constitutional limitation on the practice of setting ceilings
and floors is that the automatic reject and automatic admit cat-
egories remain race-neutral.\textsuperscript{179} Assuming one were to accept
the premise that African-Americans and other minority groups
score lower on the SATs,\textsuperscript{180} an automatic reject/accept policy
with a narrow band of applicants for review would eliminate a
disproportionate number of minority applicants. In order to as-
sure a larger applicant pool, schools must lower the automatic
reject category, thereby increasing the number of minority ap-

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{175} Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003).
\textsuperscript{176} University of Michigan Undergraduate Admissions, Fast Facts, http://
www.admissions.umich.edu/fastfacts.html (last visited September 12, 2006).
\textsuperscript{177} Letter from Mark Davies, Director of Admissions, Bucknell University,
\textsuperscript{178} Sixth Annual APPAM Admissions Directors Meeting Looks at Policies
and Procedures in the Admissions Process, APPAM News (Ass'n for Pub. Policy
\textsuperscript{179} See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978) (holding
the use of setting aside a specific number of class seats based on race or ethnicity is
a quota); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273 (rejecting as unconstitutional LSA's practice of
automatically awarding points to underrepresented minorities to improve the like-
lihood of admittance).
\textsuperscript{180} See supra text accompanying note 36.
\end{footnotes}
Applicants in the individual review category. This widened band of reviewable applicants will mean that admissions offices will need to dedicate more time and resources to their review process.

Automatic admit/reject categories, however, are problematic to the affirmative action cause. Ironically, reliance on objective factors prompted the need for affirmative action in the first place, since admissions programs based on objective factors failed to yield a diverse entering class. Now, almost forty years after the affirmative action seeds were first sown, the Grutter and Gratz decisions, in some ways, place admissions offices back at square one.

The easy response to meeting the demands of the Court’s constitutional requirements is to merely increase the number of admissions officers reading each application. Ideally, each school’s office would be fully staffed with individuals capable and in a position to provide a full review to every applicant. But adding admissions officers is not necessarily practical. Such a decision would require a school to dedicate significant funding for additional personnel. The cost of such funding would most likely be passed to the consumer, which is the applicant.

181. See supra text accompanying note 18.
183. For example, Pace Law School a small, private New York law school receives over 3200 applications each year for approximately 250 spots. The eight members of the admissions committee consider approximately 1100 applications each year. The remainder are rejected or accepted based on the Admissions Director’s decision. Applications are read over a period of five months. A school wishing to offer committee review to the widest possible number of applicants to assure the most diverse entering class, would most likely have to review almost twice as many applications, assuming the automatic accept category remained the same. In order to meet this need, the admissions staff would need to double. A 100% staff expansion would necessitate a 100% increase in the admissions office’s personnel budget. Telephone Interview with Lisa Lancia, Associate Director of Admissions, Pace Law School, in White Plains, NY (Apr. 11, 2006).
184. The courts have recognized that there are significant educational benefits that stem from diversity and raised these benefits to the level of a compelling government interest. At the same time however, the strict “narrowly tailored” requirement will require schools to spend a significant amount of money on staff to review applications as a result of the requirement of individualized review of all applications. In light of the significant benefits that diversity provides to the students, the schools, the American military, American businesses and the country as a whole, the government should assist schools financially to ensure that affirma-
Given the need for additional personnel, the question becomes, who should bear the financial responsibility of meeting the demands of Grutter? Ideally, those who are benefiting from the product (the review of applications) should bear the cost of meeting the Constitutional mandate. By passing along the cost of individual review to the applicant, however, the gatekeeper is effectively closing the gate in front of those whom it seeks to admit. Since many of the applicants that affirmative action admission programs seek to benefit are socio-economically disadvantaged, such a policy would actually have a chilling effect on the applicants that schools are trying to admit in their effort to reach a critical mass of diversity in the classroom.

A different solution to the problem posed by Grutter might be to pass the cost of the additional admissions counselors on to those admitted to the school. Clearly, the Court holds ideal any learning that is conducted in a classroom of diverse viewpoints. Since training through diverse voices has the potential to benefit innocent third parties in the classroom, the value is equal for all students regardless of race or ethnicity. By passing the cost on to students who are admitted to a school with a constitutionally permissible affirmative action admissions policy, the school will be charging them for something of value.

Raising the cost of tuition is also potentially chilling to those who are not in a position to financially afford higher education. Today, most private institutions cost in excess of $40,000 per year. Arguably, the students that affirmative action admission policies seek to admit, with educationally disadvantaged backgrounds, often come from lower socio-economic classes. It is these students for whom higher tuition costs will be most problematic.

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tive action programs can be maintained that provide the required level of review and scrutiny of all applicants.

185. This could be done through a tuition hike.


187. Garfield, supra note 58, at 914.

188. See generally Fiske, supra note 171.

To be fair, the Supreme Court did not require full individual review for each applicant and consequently the need for an increased admissions staff might not be as urgent as is posited. Schools could adopt a two-tiered review process. Under this process, admissions officials would quickly review applicants and flag applications that demonstrate a unique experience or quality of value; a more meaningful individual review is granted to those who make the “first cut.”190 This two tiered process is the next best, and less expensive alternative for providing meaningful review of candidates because it would require less admissions manpower than a full review of every application submitted to a particular school.

While the Gratz court found the process of flagging files problematic, it did not reject the practice outright.191 LSA “created the possibility of an applicant’s file being flagged,” after admissions counselors automatically assigned a point value to the applicant’s file.192 Indeed, reviewing all applications to a school and flagging those of interest, might meet the guarantees of individual review and serve as a practical means of making a first cut for schools with a substantial number of applications. Such a process, however, seems neither logical nor practical. At the outset, it too remains enormously expensive since, at minimum additional admissions officials would have to be available to provide a first read-through of upwards of 20,000 applications. Moreover, initially flagging an application is likely to only minimally decrease the number of qualified applications since

190. This is the policy that Pace Law School uses. See supra text accompanying note 183.
191. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273-74. The Gratz Court was more concerned with LSA's timing of flagging applications than the idea of flagging applications for review purposes. Id. at 274.

Counselors may, in their discretion, flag an application for the ARC to review after determining that the applicant (1) is academically prepared to succeed at the University, (2) has achieved a minimum selection index score, and (3) possesses a quality or characteristic important to the University's composition of its freshman class, such as high class rank, unique life experiences, challenges, circumstances, interests or talents, socioeconomic disadvantage, and underrepresented race, ethnicity, or geography. After reviewing “flagged” applications, the ARC determines whether to admit, defer, or deny each applicant.

Id. at 256-57.

192. Id. at 273. Moreover, flagging was “the exception and not the rule” under LSA's policy. Id. at 274.
most individuals applying to a school demonstrate some type of unique quality that might be of value to the school.

Ultimately, the court’s strict scrutiny test mandates individual review of the broadest number of applicants. Most institutes of higher education must craft new policies, and staff them in a way that facilitates timely and full review of an increasingly large number of applicants. Meeting the Court’s new mandate therefore comes at an expense to the institution and to those it seeks to admit.

IV. Conclusion

Given the stringent requirements of the Grutter and Gratz decisions, meeting the demands of a constitutionally permissible program seems quite demanding. Schools across the nation will be forced to increase their admissions resources or potentially forgo the ability to admit a diverse class. In the short run, it seems likely that schools will meet the challenge, but it will come at a great expense to those that affirmative action seeks to benefit. Not only is the reality of the law problematic to the longevity of affirmative action admission policies, the frailty of the majority opinion in Grutter coupled with the continued national movement against affirmative action pose a threat to even those affirmative action policies that are identical to the Law School model. A further shift to the right in the Court’s ideological make-up could potentially end the ability of schools to adopt race-preference admissions policies. Only five of the nine Justices fully agreed with the majority that the Law School’s policy in Grutter was constitutional and an overwhelming

193. See supra text accompanying note 183.
majority of the Court struck down LSA's program in *Gratz*. Justice O'Connor's departure from the Court and President Bush's nomination of conservative John Roberts is also problematic to its proponents. Finally, recent anti-affirmative action proposals such as Proposition 54 in California (which would have barred bar state agencies from classifying people by race or ethnicity) or I-200 in Washington State (which precludes schools from granting preferential admissions considerations based on race) further illustrate the growing trend against pro-affirmative action policies.

The *Grutter* and *Gratz* decisions provide a bittersweet victory for those who favor affirmative action admission policies. At best, the decision will cause an undue financial burden on applicants and the institutions that seek to admit them. At worst, it will provide an unworkable situation, thereby silencing important voices and viewpoints in many of our nation's elite educational institutions.


The 'Racial Privacy Initiative' (RPI), would bar Golden State agencies from classifying people by race or ethnicity. Its chief architect, University of California regent and anti-affirmative action activist Ward Connerly, crafted the measure to end government's preferential treatment based on race: RPI's passage will signal America's first step towards a color-blind society.