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Attorney Loyalty and Client Perjury—A Postscript to Nix v. Whiteside

Bennett L. Gershman*

Most experienced prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys probably would agree that perjury in the criminal justice system occurs often. Although the frequency of perjury has never been demonstrated empirically, it is not surprising that with so much at stake, prosecution and defense witnesses would be tempted to fabricate testimony to meet the exigencies of the case. Detecting and dealing with perjurious testimony, however, is another matter. Implicated are complex legal and ethical problems for both prosecutors and defense attorneys.1 Moreover, the judiciary’s response to these problems has been largely formalistic and deficient in enunciating sufficiently clear standards to guide future behavior.

For example, prosecutorial tolerance, and even subornation of perjury, usually is analyzed objectively for its impact on the factfinder’s evaluation of the evidence, rather than focusing subjectively on the prosecutor’s willfulness or bad faith.2 For purposes of remedying prosecutor misconduct in the future, such a response is wholly unsatisfactory. That issue, however, is a subject for another essay. The present discussion concerns the extent to which a criminal defense attorney legally and ethically may cooperate with his client in concealing the truth.

Defense counsel’s commitment to truth can vary greatly in the course of counsel’s protecting the interests of his client. At one extreme are acts deliberately designed to conceal the truth, such as secreting evidence, fabricating defenses, and suborning perjury.3 Such conduct can never be justified or condoned. At the other extreme are

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options which legitimately permit suppression of the truth. These include, for instance, advising a client to refuse to testify or comply with a subpoena ordering the production of records, pursuant to a valid claim of privilege. Between these ethical and legal extremes, however, are more nebulous situations, such as “advising” a client of the legal consequences of possessing certain documents, or suggesting the availability of “hypothetical” defenses, knowing full well that the client will engage in conduct or tailor his story to mesh with that advice. Given the adversary system, in which “winning” can overshadow the quest for truth, extremely complex questions arise: Is a criminal defense lawyer required to play the dual roles of “champion” of his client, and “gatekeeper” of the temple of justice? Are these roles really compatible? If so, what are the rules of the game?

Consider in this connection perhaps the most difficult question of all: How much, if at all, can a criminal defense lawyer cooperate in his or her client’s decision to commit perjury? Courts, commentators, and bar committees have grappled with this question for years without offering clear or consistent guidelines. Any principled response must take into account some very hard questions. Under what cir-

5. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(7) (West 1984) (“In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not . . . counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent”); Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(d) (West 1984) (“a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law”); Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(d) comment (“There is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime of fraud might be committed with impunity.”).
7. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986) (lawyer must withdraw or disclose intended perjury); Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978) (withdrawal request predicated on alleged client perjury in middle of bench trial denied client fair trial); United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977) (attorney’s unnecessary disclosure to judge of client’s intended perjury has chilling effect on effective representation).
9. AM. TRIAL LAWYER’S ASS’N CODE Rule 1.2 (1980) (the ATLA Code contains no specific rule on client perjury since the entire matter is subsumed under Rule 1.2 relating to strict attorney confidentiality regarding client perjury); Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(7) (West 1984); Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 1.2(d), 3.3(c) (West 1984); Standards for Criminal Justice 4-7.7 (West 1984).
Attorney Loyalty and Client Perjury

cumstances, for instance, does the lawyer ever really "know" that his client's proposed testimony is false? Is it sufficient if the lawyer simply disbelieves his client's story, or that of his client's witnesses?\(^{10}\) Does it make any difference if the attorney learns of a plan to perjure during the trial, as opposed to prior to the trial? What actions can the lawyer properly take when he believes that his client intends to commit perjury? Is the prevention of perjury more important than loyal and aggressive representation? Can the lawyer simply remain silent, and passively allow the perjury to occur? Can he threaten to impeach his client's testimony? Withdraw from the case? Report his client's actions to the judge?

Last Term, in *Nix v. Whiteside,*\(^ {11}\) the Supreme Court for the first time addressed several of these questions. The Court unanimously agreed, under the facts of the case, that the lawyer's refusal to assist his client's plan to commit perjury did not deprive the defendant of his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, nor of his right to testify in his own defense.\(^ {12}\) A majority of the Court essayed the ethical questions as well and, in *obiter dicta,* concluded that "under no circumstances may a lawyer either advocate or passively tolerate a client's giving false testimony."\(^ {13}\) The majority went fur-

\(^{10}\) A threshold issue in dealing with client perjury is the extent to which the lawyer must be convinced that his or her client intends to commit perjury. Model Rule 3.3(c), for example, advocates a standard of "reasonable belief" rather than actual knowledge that the client's testimony will be false. Many courts and commentators, however, have advocated a much more rigorous standard. *See United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson,* 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977) ("mere unsubstantiated opinion" of attorney insufficient); *People v. Schultheis,* 638 P.2d 8, 11 (Colo. 1981) (mere inconsistency in client's story insufficient); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965) (lawyer should be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that client's testimony will be false); *Rieger, Client Perjury: A Proposed Resolution of the Constitutional and Ethical Issues,* 70 MINN. L. REV. 121, 149 (1985) (same as ABA Opinion).

\(^{11}\) 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).

\(^{12}\) *Id.* at 997. The Supreme Court has never explicitly held, but has consistently assumed, that a criminal defendant has a due process right to testify in his own behalf. *Id.* at 993; *see Jones v. Barnes,* 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (In holding that an indigent defendant has no constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to pursue every nonfrivolous point on appeal, the Court noted that "the accused has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to . . . testify in his or her own behalf."); *Brooks v. Tennessee,* 406 U.S. 605, 612 (1972) (the Court, holding that a statute requiring a defendant to testify at the beginning of the defense's case, if defendant is going to testify at all, is unconstitutional, observed, "Whether the defendant is to testify is an important tactical decision as well as a matter of constitutional right."); *Harris v. New York,* 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) ("Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so." However, the Court held that the privilege to testify does not give a defendant the right to commit perjury.).

\(^{13}\) 106 S. Ct. at 996. The extent to which a lawyer may stand mute, and permit his client to testify in a free narrative fashion, is one of the most controversial issues relating to client perjury. *See infra* note 24.
ther, however, and formulated specific rules of permissible and imper-
missible attorney behavior.

The facts were uncomplicated. Whiteside was tried in an Iowa
state court for stabbing to death a friend, Love, following an argument
over drugs. One of the principal issues was whether the killing was in
self-defense. During pretrial preparation, Whiteside consistently told
his court-appointed counsel that he had not actually seen a gun in the
decedent's hand. About a week before trial, however, he changed his
story, stating that he had seen "something metallic" in Love's hand,
and that "If I don't say I saw a gun I'm dead." Whiteside's attorney
warned him that if he so testified, he would advise the court of the
defendant's proposed perjury, seek to withdraw from the case, and at-
tempt to impeach his client's testimony. Whiteside testified, stating
that he "knew" Love had a gun but had not actually seen a gun in
Love's hand. After the jury returned a murder verdict, Whiteside
moved for a new trial, contending that his lawyer's admonition not to
state that he saw "something metallic" denied him a fair trial. Follow-
ing a hearing, the trial court denied the motion and the Iowa Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that an attorney's duty to his client does not
extend to assisting the commission of perjury.14

Whiteside then petitioned the federal district court for a writ of
habeas corpus, alleging that his counsel's actions denied him effective
assistance of counsel and the right to present his defense. The district
court denied the writ, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed.15 The court found that although a criminal defendant's privi-
lege to testify does not include a right to commit perjury, counsel's
admonition that he would inform the court of the planned perjury
constituted a threat to violate an attorney's duty to preserve client
confidences16 and, as such, a breach of the standards of effective repre-
sentation laid down in Strickland v. Washington.17

The Supreme Court reversed, and reinstated the conviction.18
Every Justice agreed that Whiteside had not been denied effective rep-
resentation under the Strickland test, which requires a defendant to
show that counsel committed such serious professional errors as to

16. Id. at 1330.
Attorney Loyalty and Client Perjury

undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. An attorney's duty to his client, agreed the five-Justice majority, is limited to legitimate conduct and does not include assisting his client in presenting false evidence.

Although not required to, the majority discussed what it believed were appropriate ethical responses for lawyers faced with client perjury. The attorney should attempt initially to dissuade his client from his unlawful plan. If that course is unsuccessful, the attorney is obligated to reveal his client's conduct to the court, even to seek to withdraw from the case. The majority emphasized that under no

19. 466 U.S. at 687-688, 694. The Court in Strickland emphasized that a claim of ineffectiveness has two components. First, a defendant must show that counsel's performance was "deficient" in that he "made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687. Second, the defendant must show that he was prejudiced, in that "counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id. at 687.

20. 106 S. Ct. at 994.

21. "It is universally agreed that at a minimum the attorney's first duty when confronted with a proposal for perjurious testimony is to attempt to dissuade the client from the unlawful course of conduct." 106 S. Ct. at 996. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1314 (1975); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 comment (West 1984).

22. The Court stated: "Indeed, both the Model Code and the Model Rules do not merely authorize disclosure by counsel of client perjury; they require such disclosure." 106 S. Ct. at 995 (emphasis in original). This is not altogether correct. The Model Rules appear to require disclosure only after the client has given false testimony. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 comment (West 1984). Moreover, the Model Code appears to allow, but does not require, an attorney to reveal his client's intention to commit perjury. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (West 1984). Nor is the Court's reliance on DR 7-102(B)(1) correct, since that provision concerns a lawyer's obligation when faced with a client who has already committed perjury. The courts are equally unclear. Compare State v. Henderson, 205 Kan. 231, 468 P.2d 136 (1970) (announced intention by defendant to commit perjury is not within the confidences an attorney is bound to respect) and People v. Salquero, 107 Misc. 2d 155, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1980) (same) and State v. Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 174 (1976) (same) with United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977) (attorney may not volunteer a mere unsubstantiated opinion that his client's protestations of innocence are perjured) and Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844 (D.C. 1980) (unnecessary to betray confidences of client). Moreover, disclosure may impinge on the attorney-client confidential relationship, see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (West 1984), as well as the defendant's right to a fair trial. United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977).

circumstances should the lawyer assist his client in giving, or even passively permit his client to give, false testimony.24 Moreover, counsel's threats to reveal Whiteside's perjury and to withdraw from the case were indistinguishable, according to the majority, from disclosing client misconduct such as tampering with witnesses or jurors.25 "In short, the responsibility of an ethical lawyer, as an officer of the court and a key component of a system of justice, dedicated to a search for truth, is essentially the same whether the client announces an intention to bribe or threaten witnesses or jurors or to commit or procure perjury. No system of justice worthy of the name can tolerate a lesser standard."26

Four Justices concurred in the result, but would have limited their consideration to the constitutional questions involved. These Justices resisted the invitation to enter this "thorny" and "controversial" area and to formulate rigid rules of professional conduct for attorneys. Since Whiteside had no constitutional right to his counsel's assistance in committing perjury, nor to counsel's silence about the plan, no violation under the Strickland test had occurred. That is not to say, emphasized the concurring Justices, that a sixth amendment violation could not be shown in other related circumstances. This showing might depend on the level of the attorney's certainty about the proposed perjury, the stage of the proceedings at which the attorney discovers the plan, or the methods used by the attorney to try to dissuade his client. The concurring Justices cautioned, however, that attorneys who adopt "the role of the judge or jury to determine the facts pose a danger of depriving their clients of the zealous and loyal advocacy required by the Sixth Amendment."27

Defense Lawyer's Conflicting Ethical Obligations to the Court and to His Client, 59 Den. L.J. 75 (1981).

24. Prior to Whiteside, the approach most widely accepted by the courts was the free narrative, whereby an attorney who believed that his client would testify falsely would first inform the court that he advised his client not to testify, and then remain mute while the defendant gave his testimony, without conducting any examination or arguing the testimony to the jury. See Standards for Criminal Justice 4-7.7 (West 1984); Burger, Standards of Conducts: A Judge's Viewpoint, 5 Am. Crim. L.Q. 11, 13 (1966). See also United States v. Campbell, 616 F.2d 1115 (9th Cir. 1980); Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978); Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844 (D.C. 1980); Sanborn v. State, 474 So. 2d 309 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Fosnight, 235 Kan. 52, 679 P.2d 174 (1984); People v. Salquerro, 107 Misc. 2d 155, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1980); In re Goodwin, 279 S.C. 274, 305 S.E.2d 578 (1983).

25. Preventing a client from tampering with witnesses or jurors arguably stands on an entirely different footing than threatening to expose a client's own false testimony. Testimony by a defendant is inextricably connected with constitutional considerations; no such considerations apply to the corruption of witnesses or jurors.

26. 106 S. Ct. at 998.

27. Id. at 1006 (citation omitted).
Attorney Loyalty and Client Perjury

Nix is a troubling decision. As a jurisprudential matter, the case is a peculiar blend of constitutional doctrine and legal morals. The holding is fairly narrow; the dicta is extremely broad. Essentially the Court emphasized, as it has on many previous occasions, that perjury is obnoxious to the justice system, and announced for the first time that a lawyer's refusal to cooperate in his client's plan to lie does not render the lawyer ineffective under the sixth amendment. This result was predictable. Wholly unpredictable, however, was the Court's willingness to enter the ethical twilight zone of attorney-client interaction and to promulgate a code of attorney behavior in the context of client perjury.

Several points are notable. First, this excursion into defense lawyer ethics stands in sharp contrast to the Court's historic unwillingness to impose ethical rules for prosecutors or other government officials. The Court recently wrote: "Nothing in the Constitution vests in us the authority to mandate a code of behavior for state officials." Similarly, the Court observed: "The Due Process Clause is not a code of ethics for prosecutors." And in one recent case in which a prosecutor engaged in outrageous misconduct, the Court, after issuing a few paragraphs of mild reproach, concluded: "[Defendant's] trial was not perfect—few are—but neither was it fundamentally unfair." It became the function of the four dissenting Justices to outline, painfully, the numerous ethical rules which the prosecutor violated. Ironically, in cases involving prosecutorial subornation of perjury and suppression of evidence, the Court has carefully avoided ethical condemnations, stating: "Nor do we believe the constitutional obligation is measured by the moral culpability, or willfulness, of the prosecutor." Unevenhanded ethical jurisprudence promotes cynicism and disrespect, and can even encourage further government misconduct. Aggravating the concerns over such disparate treatment, of course, is the overriding legal and ethical precept that it is the obligation of the prosecutor, rather than that of defense counsel, "not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."

32. Id. at 2473 (citation omitted).
34. See Gershman, Why Prosecutors Misbehave, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 131 (1986).
Moreover, Nix v. Whiteside, as with other decisions involving the role of counsel for indigent defendants, continues a trend which threatens to undermine the fierce and dedicated representation to which such defendants are constitutionally entitled. Just as it is virtually inconceivable that a privately retained lawyer would ever file an "Anders brief" alleging no meritorious issue, it is equally inconceivable that a privately retained lawyer would threaten to impeach his client's proposed testimony, or report his conduct to the judge. It is hardly surprising that virtually all of the decisions dealing with client perjury involve attorneys who are either public defenders, or court appointed. This is not to suggest that a poor defendant has any greater right to commit perjury than does a wealthy one, or that retained lawyers necessarily would tolerate client perjury more readily than lawyers paid by the state would. Nor it is altogether clear that public defenders view the issue of client perjury differently than do retained counsel. However, any attorney who feels that he has to justify to the court the correctness or effectiveness of his representation, or who is inclined to play the role of jury or judge, may, as the concurring opinion in Nix warned, deprive his clients of the zealous advocacy guaranteed by the Constitution.

Finally, to the extent that Nix authorizes defense counsel to engage in conduct which effectively drives his client off the witness stand, it constitutes an insensitive and unwarranted intrusion into a defendant's right to testify in his own behalf. Crucial to notions of civilized justice are concerns for a defendant's individual freedom and dignity. Such concerns ought to be respected, even at the risk of false testimony. Surely the abolition of common law rules of witness disqualification did not imply that defendants thereafter would give only truthful testimony. Thus, shocking as it may seem to some, a defendant probably should be allowed to lie, even though he has no right to lie. The jury, not defense counsel, should be the safeguard against perjury. As Justices Brennan and Marshall observed: "The role of the defense lawyer should be above all to function as the instrument and

36. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); see also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) (indigent defendant has no constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to argue on appeal all nonfrivolous points).

37. To be sure, privately retained counsel may raise the issue from a sincere belief in the ethical considerations. On the other hand, such counsel may raise the issue for tactical reasons, such as in seeking a continuance or engineering a mistrial. See, e.g., Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 731 n.6 (5th Cir. 1978); McKissick v. United States, 379 F.2d 754, 761 (5th Cir. 1967), aff'd after remand, 398 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968).

38. See supra note 12.

39. G. Hazard, supra note 1, at 127-35.
defender of the client’s autonomy and dignity in all phases of the criminal process.”

To be sure, a lawyer should not cooperate in his client’s perjury, assist him in any manner, or use such testimony in argument to the jury. Such conduct, however, is a far cry from the conduct of the lawyer in Nix. He was functioning not as a defense counsel, but as a surrogate prosecutor. Simultaneous commitments to one’s client and to the cause of abstract justice are incompatible. To the extent that bar codes and court decisions mandate such behavior, they demand from attorneys the impossible. If the defendant wishes to lie, the lawyer should sit back and let his client say what he wants to say.

From a tactical standpoint, this may be the worst possible scenario for a defendant. But, that is his choice. Nothing in Nix v. Whiteside prevents state bar associations from enacting ethical rules consistent with this approach.


41. Admittedly, this approach is less extreme than the “full representation” approach proposed by Professor Freedman. See Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1469 (1966). Under the “full representation” approach, which some courts have sanctioned, the attorney argues to the court and jury that which he knows to be false. See Coleman v. State, 621 P.2d 869, 877-878 (Alaska 1980); People v. Blye, 233 Cal. App. 2d 143, 149, 43 Cal. Rptr. 231, 235 (1965).

42. Arguably, a lawyer standing mute and refraining from direct or redirect examination, and then failing to support the defendant’s testimony in closing argument, conveys to the jury a pretty clear signal as to defense counsel’s view of the evidence.

43. The Court stated:

When examining attorney conduct, a court must be careful not to narrow the wide range of conduct acceptable under the Sixth Amendment so restrictively as to constitutionalize particular standards of professional conduct and thereby intrude into the State’s proper authority to define and apply the standards of professional conduct applicable to those it admits to practice in its courts.

106 S. Ct. at 994. Justice Brennan similarly observed: “[T]he Court cannot tell the states or the lawyers in the states how to behave in their courts, unless and until federal rights are violated.” Id. at 1000 (concurring opinion) (emphasis in original).

Thus far, twenty-one states have adopted rules substantially based on the ABA Model Rules; New York continues to follow the ABA Model Code. See 3 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 93 (April 1, 1987); 3 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 190 (June 24, 1987).