Extending Indigenous Rights by Way of the African Charter

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EXTENDING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS
BY WAY OF THE AFRICAN CHARTER

Judith Murphy

I. INTRODUCTION

Indigenous peoples make up 350 million of the world’s population. While the meaning of indigeneity is contentious for both academics and lawmakers, “[t]he term indigenous is derived from the Latin indigena” and connotes societies with longstanding ties to particular areas of the world. Ancestral origins and traditional systems of tenure define customary indigenous relationships with land, relationships that have proven historically to be problematic. Because indigenous peoples organize their society’s access to land communally, their practices are not acknowledged or valued by many national governments. Prevailing “[e]urocentric notions of individual property ownership tied primarily to economic value” foster

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2 Id.


6 Lilian Aponte Miranda, Uploading the Local: Assessing the
“[a]dherence by many states’ legal systems to [notions of] individual property rights” and contribute to a common reality of indigenous peoples being forced off their land “to give way for the economic interests of . . . large-scale development initiatives that tend to destroy their lives and cultures.” Land dispossessio is a major source of difficulty for indigenous peoples. Its implications are acute and, in recent years, there has developed, particularly within the international legal field, human rights discourses related to the protection of indigenous ways of life.

This Note discusses indigeneity through the prism of the Endorois tribe’s experiences in Kenya. The Endorois are an indigenous group whose traditional pastoralist mode of life in the Lake Bogoria region of Kenya’s Rift Valley saw profound changes with the colonization of the British in the late 19th century. The colonial implementation of a legal system anchoring property rights in the colonial Kenyan state had grave implications for the Endorois, as Kenya’s post-colonial adoption of British jurisprudential mores legalized the conversion of their land for state purposes as well as their eviction from the area surrounding Lake Bogoria.

This Note discusses the Endorois’ endeavor to reclaim their land through the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ 2010 decision: Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) v. Kenya. In this case, the African Commission applied provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and afforded the Endorois, vis-à-vis this treaty, legal entitlement to claims of religion, property, culture, natural


van Genugten, supra note 5, at 33.

Id. at 33–34.

Id. at 32.


Id.

Morel, supra note 10, at 56.
resources, and development in their traditional lands.\textsuperscript{14}

Part II of this Note discusses indigenous rights in the historical context. Part III discusses indigenous rights in the African context. Part IV discusses indigenous rights in the Kenyan context. Part V discusses the Endorois rights apropos these discussions. Finally, Part VI draws conclusions, observing that the Endorois’ case represents an extension of developing international law related to indigenous peoples.

II. INDIGENOUS RIGHTS HISTORICALLY

A. The Doctrines of Discovery and Terra Nullis

Legal proscription of indigenous rights to land had its nascence in colonial jurisprudence. When European sovereigns began sending ships overseas on missions of colonization in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, they adopted the Doctrine of Discovery, a legal maxim espousing the idea that “discovering [European] countr[ies] automatically gained sovereign and property rights in the lands” they found.\textsuperscript{15} Discovery conferred title to European nations and, in this respect, it meant that Europeans overwrote patterns of tenancy in land “already owned, occupied, and used” by native peoples.\textsuperscript{16} At first, though “debates ensued regarding the appropriate relationship between . . . [the colonies’ original inhabitants] and [the] colonizing powers . . . [, ultimately, the former] were . . . constructed as irrational, uncivilized savages”\textsuperscript{17} in European systems of thought and, thus, became “legally irrelevant” to European rationales of conquest.\textsuperscript{18} Because native religions did

\begin{enumerate}
\item Robert J. Miller, The Doctrine of Discovery in American Indian Law, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 5 (2005); see also Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 562 (1823) (holding “[d]iscovery [to be] the original foundation of titles to land on the American continent as between the different European nations, by whom conquests and settlements were made.”).
\item Miller, supra note 15, at 5.
\item Miranda, supra note 6, at 425.
\end{enumerate}
not fit within Christian norms\textsuperscript{19} and because native societies “did not resemble the contours of the territorial [European] state, indigenous peoples were not considered [to be the proper] subjects of . . . [the] law.”\textsuperscript{20} According to European jurisprudence, indigenous peoples had no basis for exercising legal authority, as the law itself was applicable only to “civilized states,”\textsuperscript{21} colonial dominion over native lands resting on the “legal fiction that indigenous territory was unoccupied . . . terra nullius,”\textsuperscript{22} or vacant land.

In the African context, the Doctrine of Discovery proved particularly egregious. Although, at the time of European colonization, African societies were already organized into nations defined by ethnic communities sharing common territories, languages, cultures, and traditions,\textsuperscript{23} Africans were construed in the European imagination to be stateless, “‘pre-law' people[s] who were [conquerable as] morally inferior and intellectually immature.”\textsuperscript{24} European colonial powers depicted the African continent to be “a lawless basket case,”\textsuperscript{25} avowing that “Africa had no history prior to direct contact with Europe”\textsuperscript{26} in order to support “the notion that Africa was terra nullius—a no-man’s historical and cultural wasteland ready to

\textsuperscript{19} Robert A. Williams, \textit{The Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the Status of the American Indian in Western Legal Thought}, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1999) (noting that, according to European conceptions, “[t]he State, being of earthly origin and therefore without the ‘power to raise itself above the insufficiency of a piece of human handiwork,’ required the authority of the divinely willed Church ‘to acquire the divine sanction as a legitimate part of that Human Society which God ha[d] willed.”).

\textsuperscript{20} Miranda, supra note 6, at 426.


\textsuperscript{26} Mutua, \textit{Mapping the Boundaries}, supra note 24, at 534.
be taken over.” In 1884, when France, Britain, and Germany initiated the Berlin Conference in order to soothe colonial friction over African territorial disputes, the European sovereigns ended up parsing out title to the continent without reference to its indigenous inhabitants. African peoples, in European law, “were too primitive to understand the concept of sovereignty and, hence, were unable to cede it by treaty” at the Berlin Conference.

Legally, only pacts between European states had import with respect to Africa. Citing notions of terra nullis, “the colonial authorities in Africa bundled together all the incidents of property and assigned them to the . . . control of the state.” Under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890 in British African territories, for example, the crown seized control over all land whether there were native peoples on it or not. Colonial “administrators [asserted] that ‘native law and custom’ was merely a stage in the evolution of Africans societies . . . [that] would wither away as western civilization became progressively dominant in African social relations.” There was, in European eyes, “no need to acknowledge . . . customary [African] land tenure as a system of rights and duties.” Indigenous peoples were irrelevant to European schemes of law and any claims to land they recognized were deemed legally nonexistent and overwritten.

B. Postcolonial Mores and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

After World War II, when colonial governments all over the world began to break up, the lack of recognition for indigenous peoples under the law remained largely unchanged.

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27 Id.
28 See Anghie, supra note 21, at 58.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 78.
33 Id. at 8.
34 Id.
Although new discourses on human rights and self-determination began to appear internationally in instruments like the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, these discourses were “focused on [the rights of] individuals [vis-à-vis states]—in part because talk of minorities and ethnic groups had been tarnished by Nazi ideology.”

Overall, at the beginning of colonial independence in the 1960s, while decolonization projects advanced the right of peoples to shape their own realities, the concept of self-determination “applied only to an overseas colonial territory as a whole, irrespective of pre-colonial enclaves of indigenous peoples existing within the colonial territories and colonizing states.”

Legally, there was no focus on an idea of collective rights for peoples within the territory of discrete nations.

It was not until the last three decades of the 20th century that indigenous peoples began to receive the attention of international lawmakers. In the 1960s and 1970s, after having gained momentum from decolonization and the proliferation of non-governmental organizations,

a great number of indigenous peoples’ organizations[] were established at [both] national and international level[s] . . . [and an indigenous movement was born.] The issues that fuelled the movement ranged from broken treaties and loss of land to discrimination, marginalization, conflict and gross violations of human rights . . . Although most of the activities of the . . . movement took place outside the environs of the United Nations, . . . [in 1971, the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Prevention and Protection of Minorities commissioned a study on ‘discrimination against indigenous populations.’]

The study, named the Cobo Report after Jose Martinez Cobo, the Special Rapporteur to the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, took over ten years to complete, examined the economic, social, cultural, political, and legal circumstances that indigenous peoples faced, and

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35 John R. Bowen, Should We Have a Universal Concept of ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Rights?: Ethnicity and Essentialism in the Twenty-first Century, 16 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 12 (2000).
36 Miranda, supra note 6, at 426.
37 Macklem, supra note 22, at 198.
38 Id.
made recommendations as to their rights to health, housing, education, language, culture, land, politics, religion, and equality.39

Importantly, the Cobo Report established for the first time a working legal definition of indigenous peoples. They became:

those who have a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of societies now prevailing in those territories, . . . and are determined to preserve, develop, and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, as well as their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.40

As a result of the Cobo Report, indigenous peoples began to enter legal parlance and receive greater attention from international law bodies. After reviewing the Cobo Report, the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Prevention and Protection of Minorities established a Working Group of its own on indigenous peoples. For its part, the Working Group undertook a second study on indigeneity.41 Concluding that

no single legal definition could account for the complexity and regional variation of the concept [of indigeneity and] . . . focusing on key factors [such as] . . . priority in time, voluntary perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness, self-identification, and a historic or present experience in subjugation, marginalization, dispossession, exclusion, [and] discrimination [. . .], the Working Group . . . confirmed the . . . definition [of indigeneity] that Cobo had introduced.42

In 1993, as a result of its efforts, the Working Group sent a first draft of what would become the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples through the Sub-Commission to the Commission on Human Rights.43

40 Standard-Setting Activities, supra note 4, ¶ 24.
41 Wiessner, supra note 18, at 1153.
42 Pelican, supra note 1, at 56.
43 Id. at 55.
turn, the Commission revised the draft for submission to the General Assembly. By 2006, the draft was accepted and, by 2007, the Declaration entered into force as a multilateral treaty under international law.

Sensitive to the initial Cobo Report and creating affirmative rights for indigenous peoples in accordance with its recommendations, the Declaration called on states to preserve “the right of indigenous peoples to own, develop, control, and use the lands and territories that they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied.” In addition, the Declaration enshrined “the right of self-determination as its overarching normative commitment.” The treaty’s substantive language declares that “indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination [and states that, by virtue of th[is] right[,] they [can] freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” While it was years in the making, the Declaration thus concretized a legal recognition of indigenous peoples in ways that sharply broke with the principles of law that initially marginalized them.

III. INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT

A. African Mores and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

Despite the positive strides of the Declaration, it was not initially accepted with unanimity. In June of 2006, when the finalized draft of the Declaration came before the Human Rights Council, “it soon emerged that a group of African states . . . took exception to some [of its] formulations.” The African Group, made up of the full bloc of fifty-three African

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44 Id.
45 Macklem, supra note 22, at 200.
46 Id. at 201.
47 Id. at 200.
49 Pelican, supra note 1, at 55.
Union nations,\textsuperscript{50} put together an Aide Memoire that laid out its trepidations about the draft’s offered definition of indigeneity and focus on self-determination rights.\textsuperscript{51} In its Aide Memoire, the African Group took the position that any principle of self-determination exercised by indigenous peoples should apply only to those “under colonial and/or foreign occupation.”\textsuperscript{52} Otherwise, it opined, the right to self-determination could be misinterpreted so as to justify secession and threaten “the political unity and [ ] territorial integrity” of nation states.\textsuperscript{53}

The African Group was not alone in its misgivings. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the highest operating judicial body on the African continent,\textsuperscript{54} issued an Advisory Opinion on the proposed Declaration that highlighted additional concerns.\textsuperscript{55} In its opinion, the Commission emphasized that when it comes to indigeneity, rather than espouse a set legal definition, it is “much more . . . constructive to try to bring out the main characteristics” of indigenous peoples so as not to diminish cultural differences.\textsuperscript{56} For its part, the African Commission defined indigeneity, in contrast to the Cobo Report, simply. Indicating a marked break with the proposed Declaration’s idea of indigenous peoples, the Commission noted that it considered only “self-identification, a special attachment to and use of . . . traditional lands, [and] a state of marginalization” to be legally dispositive.\textsuperscript{57}

\textbf{B. African Mores and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights}

The factious history of the Declaration can be explained by

\textsuperscript{50} Wiessner, \textit{supra} note 18, at 1159. \\
\textsuperscript{51} Pelican, \textit{supra} note 1, at 55. \\
\textsuperscript{52} African Grp., Draft Aide Memoire ¶ 3.1 (2006). \\
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Id.} ¶ 3.2. \\
\textsuperscript{55} Pelican, \textit{supra} note 1, at 55. \\
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Id.} ¶ 12.
Africa’s unique experience with indigeneity itself. In Africa, the concept of indigeneity “differ[s] considerably from its meaning on other continents.”\(^{(58)}\) Lengthy “histories of conquest, assimilation, migration, and movement . . . make the criteria for deciding who is ‘indigenous’ far murkier”\(^{(59)}\) in Africa than elsewhere due to the fact that a “central historical feature of [African] colonialism and decolonization was the [formation] of an African state system established around rigid borders . . . that had little regard to prior existing communities and identities.”\(^{(60)}\) Today, “African societies tend to reproduce themselves at their internal frontiers, . . . [as they are] continuously creating and re-creating a dichotomy between original inhabitants and latecomers.”\(^{(61)}\) Thus, many African governments are opposed to the concept of indigeneity and argue “that all Africans are indigenous and should have equal” rights as such.\(^{(62)}\) Referring to this sentiment specifically in its Advisory Opinion, in fact, the African Commission noted that, “in Africa, the term indigenous populations does not mean ‘first peoples’ in reference to aboriginality as opposed to non-African communities or those having come from elsewhere.”\(^{(63)}\) This understanding, however, was manifested in the Declaration’s final version only vaguely in its preamble, which states: “the situation of indigenous peoples varies from region to region and from country to country.”\(^{(64)}\)

As a matter of law, thus, while regard for African cultural contexts played a great role in shaping the African reaction to the Declaration, it also played a great role in shaping the signing and ratification of another international treaty pertinent to Africa: the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. With the formation of the Organization of African Unity in 1963, “independent African states affirmed

\(^{(58)}\) Pelican, *supra* note 1, at 56.
\(^{(59)}\) Hodgson, *supra* note 3, at 1037.
\(^{(61)}\) Pelican, *supra* note 1, at 52–53.
\(^{(62)}\) *Id.* at 53.
\(^{(63)}\) *Id.*
\(^{(64)}\) Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, *supra* note 48, at pmbl.
their solidarity in the quest for [a] better life of the ‘African peoples.’”

In 1981, this solidarity was implemented through the adoption of the African Charter. The Charter, which takes “an integrated approach towards the concept of . . . rights, enshrining [at once] . . . civil and political rights (libertarian rights); . . . economic, social, and cultural rights (egalitarian rights); and . . . peoples’ or group rights (solidarity rights),” was passed with “a remarkable degree of consensus” on the part of African states. Ratified very quickly, the African Charter entered into force only five years after its initial drafting, all fifty-three member states of the African Union becoming parties to it.

Although Article 1 of the Charter almost forbiddingly provides that state parties are obligated, in binding fashion, to “recognize the rights, duties and freedoms [laid out under the treaty] and . . . [to] undertake to adopt . . . measures to give [them] effect,” African states did not withhold ratification. Because the Charter expressly requires state parties to take “into consideration the virtues of their historical tradition[s] and the values of African civilization[,] which [, the treaty emphasizes,] should inspire and characterize their reflection on the concept of human and [p]eoples rights,” the Charter was, as a whole, set up to be responsive to African contexts in its intents and purposes. Indeed, the Charter’s irresistible “implication . . . is that African traditional values . . . are key to the realization of human rights” under a concept—with pertinence to this Note—much more broadly construed than

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68 Id. at 107.
69 Id.
70 Heyns, supra note 54, at 682.
72 Id. at pmbl.
that of indigenous rights alone.\textsuperscript{73} Although the term “peoples” is nowhere defined in the African Charter, its use within its provisions ensures that “the beneficiaries of the rights enshrined in the [treaty] are both individuals and . . . groups,”\textsuperscript{74} namely the indigenous.\textsuperscript{75}

Despite the Charter’s emphasis on African values, however, the African Charter encompasses “a very expansive approach [with] respect to [its own] interpretation.”\textsuperscript{76} Even as indigenous rights are inherent under the African Charter, they are not exclusive. Ultimately, under the treaty’s provisions, African mores do not function independently of those espoused internationally. Articles 60 and 61 of the Charter “bring the African human rights mechanism within the positive influence of . . . other regional human rights experiences” because these provisions ensure that the Charter’s legal interpretation relies extensively on international sources of law.\textsuperscript{77} For its part, Article 60 requires the African Commission, the judicial body responsible for determining the treaty’s legal scope,\textsuperscript{78} to:

\begin{quote}
draw inspiration from international law on human and peoples’ rights, particularly from the provisions of various African instruments on human and peoples’ rights, the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other instruments adopted by the United Nations and by African countries in the field of human and peoples’ rights as well as from the provisions of various instruments adopted within the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{79}
\end{quote}

Similarly, Article 61 requires the African Commission to:

\begin{quote}
take into consideration, as subsidiary measures to determine [] principles of law, other general or special international conventions, laying down rules expressly recognized by member states of the Organization of African Unity, African practices consistent with international norms on human and people’s
\end{quote}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{73} Juma, supra note 65, at 478.
\textsuperscript{74} Udombana, supra note 67, at 124.
\textsuperscript{75} Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 96; see also REPORT OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION’S WORKING GROUP OF EXPERTS, supra note 5, at 79.
\textsuperscript{76} Heyns, supra note 54, at 688.
\textsuperscript{77} Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 87.
\textsuperscript{78} Heyns, supra note 54, at 693.
\textsuperscript{79} African Charter, supra note 71, art. 60.
\end{flushleft}
rights, customs generally accepted as law, general principles of law recognized by African states as well as legal precedents and doctrine.  

Overall, in construing the Charter, the African Commission is bound to “accept legal arguments with the support of appropriate and relevant international and regional human rights instruments, principles, norms, and standards.”

IV. INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN THE KENYAN CONTEXT

Even as the Charter provides a highly pertinent body of rights, like the Declaration, it was not initially met with unanimity. Although the Charter “suggests [in Article 1] at least a formal commitment by African [s]tates to conform their national law and practice to international standards . . . , most African states have fallen short of what is expected of them” in this respect. Legally, the applicability of the African Charter is determined within the African context at the domestic law level by lingering colonial jurisprudence. While Africans states with a civil law colonial heritage are generally legal “monists [that] insist that international law and internal law are part of the same order, [African states with a common law colonial heritage are legal . . . dualists [that] insist that ‘international law and internal law are two separate legal orders, existing independently of one another.’” In the former British colony of Kenya, where the Endorois tribe was displaced from their land, the enforcement of international treaties like the African Charter “require[s as a prerequisite] the passing of an enabling Act of Parliament” along the lines of Anglophone common law tradition. In Kenya, because such an enabling Act was never forthcoming, British schemes of law proved instrumental to the way in which the Charter impacted, or rather failed to impact, indigenous groups like the Endorois.

Legally, British jurisprudence was first imposed on Kenya.

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80 Id. art. 61.
81 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 93.
82 Udombana, supra note 67, at 107–08.
83 Adjami, supra note 66, at 110.
84 Udombana, supra note 67, at 125.
85 Juma, supra note 65, at 493.
when the country became a protectorate in 1895.\textsuperscript{86} Kenya’s status as a protectorate “conferred on the British . . . the power to exercise full jurisdiction in the colony and to set up a system of government therein.”\textsuperscript{87} Concerned particularly with questions of land ownership, in 1915, the British passed the Native Trust Lands Ordinances, which, taken together,

creat[ed] two separate property domains. The first regime, ‘Crown Land,’ constituted radical title over all ‘waste and unoccupied land’ and vested it in the colonial sovereign. The second regime, ‘Native Areas,’ vested ultimate control of all other land actually occupied by African communities in a Native Lands Trust Board . . . [sitting] in London.\textsuperscript{88}

Under the Ordinances, British authorities exercised full governance over Kenyan territory. Indigenous peoples had claim to their land by trust alone, a fact that remained unaltered even upon independence, as, after the colonial government was dismantled, the British passed title to indigenous reserves into the hands of local Kenyan County Councils, which continued to implement the trust system.\textsuperscript{89}

Indeed, upon independence, Kenya “embraced the political blueprint of colonial territoriality in terms of both space and power.”\textsuperscript{90} Though, during the independence period, Kenyan political parties vied for different approaches to land legislation, ultimately, the colonial model won out. At independence, Kenya became “a one-party state.”\textsuperscript{91} The clash between Kenya’s political parties: the Kenya African Democratic Party (“KADU”) and the Kenya African National Union (“KANU”), ended with KADU’s defeat. Though KADU advocated “for [the] restoration of pre-colonial land spheres that ethnic groups inhabited”\textsuperscript{92} and wanted to “give Kenya’s politics

\textsuperscript{86} Id. at 477.
\textsuperscript{87} Id.
\textsuperscript{88} Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 61.
\textsuperscript{89} Id.
\textsuperscript{91} Id. at 563.
a ‘tribal foundation,’” its policies did not make it to the political fore. KANU, which advocated for a “federal structure of government in which regions were responsible for administration of land in their territories”—and which “derided [KADU] as [being comprised of] tribalists who opposed the broader goals of nationalism”—was better financed and won the pre-independence elections.

After independence, instead of facing KADU’s plans for a Constitution creating six regions operating with their own civil services to implement local legislation, Kenyan indigenous groups, like the Endorois, faced a Constitution that mirrored the laws left over by the British. The Kenyan Constitution read all through the post-colonial period: “trust Land shall vest in the county council in whose area of jurisdiction it is situated.” The Constitution’s express language stated:

> [e]ach county council shall hold the Trust land vested in it for the benefit of the persons ordinarily resident on that land and shall give effect to such rights, interests or other benefits in respect of the land as may, under . . . African customary law . . . , be vested in any tribe, group, family or individual: [p]rovided that no right, interest or other benefit under African customary law shall have effect for the purposes of this subsection so far as it is repugnant to any written law.

Overall, the Kenyan Constitution privileged the state’s right to land over the community’s, as it even further allowed Kenya to set aside and appropriate trust land as a means of serving governmental purposes.

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93 Anderson, supra note 90, at 554.
94 Kanyinga, supra note 92, at 328.
95 Anderson, supra note 90, at 547.
96 Kanyinga, supra note 92, at 561. Moreover, KANU effectively contributed to KADU’s demise, as, after the elections, it “co-opted its leadership by appointing some [of its members] into [its] cabinet [in order to] . . . put the land question under the carpet.” Id.
97 Anderson, supra note 90, at 556.
98 CONSTITUTION, art. 115(1) (2009).
99 Id. art. 115(2).
100 Id. art. 118.
V. INDIGENOUS RIGHTS OF THE ENDOROI COMMUNITY

A. The Endorios’ Postcolonial Experience

Thrust into a disadvantageous Constitutional framework, the Endorois experienced an increasingly unsettled relationship to their land in the postcolonial period. A community comprised of roughly 400 families of Kalenjin-speaking peoples—and a sub-group of the Tugen tribe that traditionally inhabited the Lake Bogoria region of Kenya’s Rift Valley—the Endorois are dependent on their cattle, goat, and sheep livestock for survival.101 Needing to graze these animals in Lake Bogoria’s lowlands during the rainy season and in the Monchongoi forest during the dry season in order to ensure yearlong access to fertile pastures, medicinal salt licks, and the lakefront for their pastoralist and religious practices,102 the Endorois underwent at independence a systematic marginalization from their indigenous ways of life.

While British colonial rule vested legal control over their land in a trust held by the local Baringo and Koibatek County Councils,103 actual “challenges to the Endorois’ . . . rights [to occupy] the Lake Bogoria region were made [upon] the gazetting of the area as a game reserve” during the 1970s.104 In 1973, Kenya removed the Endorois “from their traditional areas so that tourists [could] enjoy game viewing without disturbance by ‘backwards natives.’”105 Without being consulted about the state’s decision to make their land into a protected area and without being notified of the gazetting until after its implementation in 1977, the Endorois were summarily evicted from Lake Bogoria,106 displaced to a semi-arid location that was unsuitable to support their cultural practices,107 and denied compensation for their loss.108

After years of seeking redress and being met only with

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101 Morel, supra note 10, at 56.
102 Id.
103 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 62.
104 Morel, supra note 10, at 56.
105 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 110.
106 Morel, supra note 10, at 56.
107 Id.
108 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 57.
“harassment, arbitrary arrests and intimidation,” eventually, the Endorois brought suit to challenge the legality of their eviction. In 2002, the Kenyan High Court at Nakuru ruled on initial Endorois’ pleadings alleging constitutional violations associated with the restrictive trust management of the Baringo and Koibatek County Councils. In its opinion, the High Court stated that it could not address the community’s collective right to property. Finding (1) that there was “no proper identity of the [Endorois] people who were affected by the setting aside of the[ir] land;” and (2) that “the law does not allow individuals to benefit from . . . a resource simply because they happen to be born close to” it, the High Court dismissed the Endorois’ case without ruling on whether any violations had resulted from their eviction. Relying merely on a statement that the Endorois had no legal claims available to them because the Trust Land Act affirmed a constitutional right under Kenyan law for the state to alienate land, the High Court stated that “it was too late [for the Endorois] to complain,” as they could not establish legal entitlement to territory properly set aside by the government.

In the face of the High Court’s judgment, though the Endorois first considered an appeal, because “the sheer inefficiency of the Kenyan court system conspired to deny the[ir] community further national remedies . . . [, they] sought redress [with] the African Commission” on Human and Peoples’ Rights. As part of Minority Rights Group International’s legal cases program, the Endorois initiated an entirely distinct case with an entirely distinct focus.

109 Id.
111 Id. at 4.
112 Id. at 5.
113 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 63.
116 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 12.
117 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 63.
118 Morel, supra note 10, at 55.
B. The Endorois’ Case Before the African Commission:
Preliminary Matters

In their pleadings before the African Commission, the Endorois put aside domestic Kenyan law and raised the issue of their eviction by way of the African Charter. Focusing on the African Commission case: *Social and Economic Rights Action Centre for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria*, which dealt with Nigerian state actors permitting oil companies to destroy land owned by local citizens, the Endorois argued that the Charter “provides for peoples [legal claims] to retain their rights . . . as collectives.” In their complaint, the Endorois alleged that Kenya violated African Charter Articles 8, which guarantees rights to religion; 14, which guarantees rights to property; 16, which guarantees rights to health; 17, which guarantees rights to culture; 20, which guarantees rights to self-determination; 21, which guarantees rights to natural resources; and 22, which guarantees rights to development, in displacing them from Lake Bogoria. 

Established in 1987, a year after the African Charter came into force, the African Commission represented the best possible forum before which the Endorois could bring suit. Whereas the High Court at Nakuru examined the Endorois’ claims pursuant to domestic Kenyan law, the African Commission did not. For “[t]he main mechanisms employed by the Commission to fulfill its task of supervising compliance with Charter norms,” are not bound by domestic law considerations. As mentioned above, though many African

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119 Id. at 57.
121 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 75.
122 African Charter, supra note 71, art. 8.
123 Id. art. 14.
124 Id. art. 16.
125 Id. art. 17.
126 Id. art. 20.
127 Id. art. 21.
128 Id. art. 22.
129 Morel, supra note 10, at 57.
130 Udombana, supra note 67, at 119.
131 Heyns, supra note 54, at 693.
states, like Kenya, do not enforce the African Charter in their national courts because they do not accept it as a source of binding law absent implementing domestic legislation, the African Commission has

focused on the principle of pacta sunt servanda: simply, the principle that agreements are binding and are to be implemented in good faith. Under this principle, an African state’s ratification of the African Charter creates, for that state, an obligation that demands concrete results . . . A state cannot . . . invoke the provisions of its domestic legislation, including its [C]onstitution, to evade its treaty obligations.\footnote{Udombana, supra note 67, at 126–27; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 311.}

In this respect, the Endorois prevailed at their case’s outset: the Commission was not deterred from hearing their claims. Although Kenya, as the respondent state, initially tried to dismiss the Endorois’ pleadings on the grounds that Article 56 of the African Charter establishes admissibility requirements barring the Commission from hearing a case if local remedies have yet not been exhausted,\footnote{African Charter, supra note 71, art. 56.} the Commission did not find itself constrained. Despite the fact that the Endorois did not try their case on appeal all the way through the Kenyan legal system, the Commission noted that because the Endorois “premised [their claims’] admissibility on two recognized exceptions to [Article 56’s local remedies] rule: the substantial nature of the violations and the non-existence of ‘effective, available and efficient’ remedies within the Kenyan legal system,”\footnote{Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 65.} the local remedies requirement did not apply to their case.\footnote{Heyns, supra note 54, at 695.}

The first substantive aspect of the pleadings that the Commission analyzed, therefore, was the Endorois’ claim to indigenous identity itself. Unlike the Kenyan High Court, the Commission found the Endorois to be a recognizable indigenous group. While noting, at the outset, that “there is no universal and unambiguous definition of the concept” of indigeneity and that the concept of ‘peoples’ under the African Charter is

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{African Charter, supra note 71, art. 56.}
\footnote{Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 65.}
\footnote{Heyns, supra note 54, at 695.}
\end{footnotes}
similarly indefinite, the Commission drew on its adopted Report of the Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities to hold that the African “notion of ‘peoples’ is closely related to collective rights” and that collective rights, in turn, are an important criteria for identifying indigenous groups, as “self-identification as a distinct collectivity” is part of the internationally recognized legal definition of indigeneity under the Cobo Report.

In its opinion, the Commission dispelled Kenya’s argument that indigeneity ought to be narrowly defined and that the Endorois, as a mere Kalenjin-speaking sub-group of the Tugen tribe, could not qualify. The Commission relied on the case of Saramaka People v. Suriname, in which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights recognized—via the American Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees the respective rights of all persons subject to the jurisdiction of the treaty, without regard to national or social origin—the collective land rights of a tribal community, some of whose members did not occupy the same precise history, territory, or customs of the larger super-class of which they were a part. Supplementing the Charter’s notion of ‘peoples’ with international case law, the Commission adopted an expansive definition of indigeneity and found the Endorois to possess legitimate claims to group identity under the African Charter.

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137 Id. ¶ 149.
138 Id. ¶ 150.
139 See id. ¶ 152.
140 Id. ¶ 145.
143 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 162.
C. The Endorois’ Case Before the African Commission: Charter Violations

1. Article 8: The Right to Religion

Upon acknowledging the Endorois as a recognizable indigenous group, the Commission was free to address Kenya’s alleged Charter violations. The Commission started its analysis with Article 8 and the Endorois’ claims that Kenya violated its guarantee of the right to the “free practice of religion” (supra note 71, art. 8) by expelling them from their land and religious sites. Looking to the Human Rights Committee’s interpretation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) (id. ¶ 164)—which states that “everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion” (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18(1), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR])—the Commission first established that the Endorois’ cultural practices constituted a religion under international law. It relied on the Human Rights Committee’s interpretation of the ICCPR, which holds that it “provides for the protection of theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs,” as well as its own jurisprudence in Free Legal Assistance Group v. Zaire, which held, in the context of a case about the state persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses, that religious freedom is associated with groups that assemble “in connection with a belief” under the broad scope of Charter Article 8.

In addition, the Commission relied on its own case law in Amnesty International v. Sudan, about the state persecution of

144 African Charter, supra note 71, art. 8.
145 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 163.
146 Id. ¶ 164.
148 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 168.
149 Id. ¶ 164; accord Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 22, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (July 30, 1993).
151 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 165; see Free Legal Assistance Grp., Commc’n Nos. 25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93, ¶ 45.
non-Muslims,\textsuperscript{152} to hold that any government restriction on religious practices pursuant to Article 8 must be “proportionate to the specific need on which [it is] predicated.”\textsuperscript{153} In terms of the Endorois, the Commission noted that Kenya did not contest the community’s religious claims to the area around Lake Bogoria\textsuperscript{154} and that the state’s reasons for their “complete and total expulsion”\textsuperscript{155} from it were insufficient to show that it had “any significant . . . interest[s] . . . [, as] allowing . . . [the Endorois to] practice [their] religion [on the game reserve] would not detract from [the state’s] goal of conservation or developing the areas [of Lake Bogoria] for economic reasons.”\textsuperscript{156} Thus, in evicting the Endorois from their land, the Commission held Kenya to be in violation of Article 8 of the African Charter.\textsuperscript{157}

2. Article 14: The Right to Property

After having ruled on the Endorois’ right to religion, the Commission proceeded to examine Article 14 of the African Charter and the applicability of its provision stating: “the right to property shall be guaranteed.”\textsuperscript{158} In the face of Kenya’s argument that the creation of the game reserve was legal under domestic Kenyan law,\textsuperscript{159} the Commission accepted the Endorois’ claim that “property rights have an autonomous meaning under international human rights law [that] supersede national legal definitions.”\textsuperscript{160} In its opinion, the Commission looked to its own jurisprudence, to the cases of \textit{Malawi African Association v. Mauritania}, about the state’s discrimination against black Mauritanian ethnic groups,\textsuperscript{161} and

\textsuperscript{153} Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 172; see Amnesty Int’l, Commc’n Nos. 48/90, 50/91, 52/91, 89/93, ¶ 80.
\textsuperscript{154} Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 167.
\textsuperscript{155} Id. ¶ 172.
\textsuperscript{156} Id. ¶ 173.
\textsuperscript{157} Id.
\textsuperscript{158} African Charter, supra note 71, art. 14.
\textsuperscript{159} See Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/2003, ¶¶ 176–77.
\textsuperscript{160} Id. ¶ 185.
\textsuperscript{161} Malawi African Ass’n v. Mauritania, Commc’n Nos. 54/91, 61/91,
Social and Economic Rights Action Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, about the state’s seizure of local land for oil development projects,\textsuperscript{162} to establish that the right to property under Article 14 “includes not only the right to have access to one’s property . . . , but also the right to [have] undisturbed possession, use and control of such property.”\textsuperscript{163}

Supplementing its own case law with that from the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Commission drew on the cases of Doğan v. Turkey and Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua to rule that, under international law, even groups that are unable to produce legal title to land, such as the villagers in the first case\textsuperscript{164} and the indigenous group in the second case,\textsuperscript{165} have rights to property because such rights are born out of possession alone under precepts established by such treaties as the Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms\textsuperscript{166}—which states that “every natural person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions”\textsuperscript{167}—and the American Convention on Human Rights\textsuperscript{168}—which states that “everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property.”\textsuperscript{169}

Indeed, focusing on indigenous case law, the Commission went on to analyze the case of Saramaka People v. Suriname, which discussed Suriname’s failure to recognize tribal rights to


\textsuperscript{163} Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Comm’n No. 276/2003, ¶ 186 (expansively construing the right to property discussed in these cases). See Malawi African Ass’n, Comm’n Nos. 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97 à 196/97, 210/98, ¶ 128; Soc. & Econ. Rights Action Ctr. for Econ. & Soc. Rights, Comm’n No. 155/96, ¶¶ 60–62.


\textsuperscript{166} Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Comm’n No. 276/03, ¶¶ 188–189; see Doğan, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 266.


\textsuperscript{168} Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Comm’n No. 276/03, ¶ 190; see Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty., (ser. C) No. 79, ¶¶ 151, 154.

\textsuperscript{169} American Convention, supra note 141, art. 21.
land under the American Convention,\textsuperscript{170} and held that a state’s failure to recognize such claims “becomes a [wholesale] violation of the ‘right to property.’”\textsuperscript{171} Based on \textit{Saramaka People}, the Commission found that the gazetting of the Endorois’ land was “inadequate” under the African Charter despite domestic Kenyan law.\textsuperscript{172} Noting that the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples “bestows the right of [land] ownership rather than mere access . . . [and] ensures that indigenous peoples can engage with the state . . . as active stakeholders rather than as passive beneficiaries,”\textsuperscript{173} the Commission ruled: “mere access or \textit{de facto} ownership of land is not compatible with principles of international law. Only \textit{de jure} ownership can guarantee indigenous peoples’ effective protection.”\textsuperscript{174}

With respect to the right to property, the Commission also ruled that African legal norms mandate a two-pronged test that Kenya was required to meet before it could legally deprive


\textsuperscript{171} Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 192.

\textsuperscript{172} Id. ¶ 199.

\textsuperscript{173} Id. ¶ 204. See Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 48, art. 8(2)(b) (stating that “[s]tates shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for, [a]ny action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources.”); id. art. 10 (stating that “[n]o relocation shall take place without the free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where possible, with the option of return.”); id. art. 25 (stating that “[i]nigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop their political, economic and social systems or institutions, to be secure in the enjoyment of their own means of subsistence and development, and to engage freely in all their traditional and other economic activities.”); id. art. 26(3) (stating that “[s]tates shall give legal recognition and protection to th[e] lands, territories and resources [of indigenous peoples and that s]uch recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.”); id. art. 27 (stating that “[s]tates shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, open and transparent process, giving due recognition to indigenous peoples’ laws, traditions, customs and land tenure systems, to recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous peoples pertaining to their lands, territories and resources, including those which were traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used [and that i]ndigenous peoples shall have the right to participate in this process.”).

\textsuperscript{174} Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 205; see Saramaka People, (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 110.
the Endorois of their land.\textsuperscript{175} Holding that because Article 14 states that land encroachment must be performed “in the interest of the public need . . . ” as well as “in accordance with appropriate laws,”\textsuperscript{176} the Commission defined the “in the interest of the public need” test as a high threshold.\textsuperscript{177} Drawing on the U.N. Sub-Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, which drafted a report on indigenous peoples positing that “limitations, if any, on the right [of] indigenous peoples to their natural resources must flow only from the most urgent and compelling interest[s],”\textsuperscript{178} the Commission held that limitations on the right to property under the African Charter “should be [interpreted to be] least restrictive.”\textsuperscript{179} In the instant case, the Commission concluded that Kenya’s were not according its own ruling in \textit{Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria,} which held that a state “may not erode a right such that the right itself becomes illusory,”\textsuperscript{180} as the right to property became for the Endorois when they lost access to Lake Bogoria.

Furthermore, in terms of the “in accordance with the law” test, the Commission noted that two requirements are imposed on states like Kenya with respect to appropriated land: one of consultation and one of compensation.\textsuperscript{181} Returning to the logic of \textit{Saramaka People,} which held that the American Convention guarantees indigenous groups the right to preserve their customary relationships with land,\textsuperscript{182} the Commission found that the “effective participation of the members of [indigenous] people [in the governance of their territories must be] in

\textsuperscript{175} Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Comm’n No. 276/03, ¶ 211.
\textsuperscript{176} Id.; accord African Charter, supra note 71, art. 14 (stating that “[t]he right to property shall be guaranteed [and that it] may only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.”).
\textsuperscript{177} Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Comm’n No. 276/03, ¶ 212.
\textsuperscript{179} Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Comm’n No. 276/03, ¶ 214.
\textsuperscript{181} Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Comm’n No. 276/03, ¶ 225.
conformity with their customs and traditions.” Stating that Kenya failed to allow the Endorois to participate in the creation of the game reserve, the Commission relied on Article 28 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and upheld its language affirming that indigenous groups have the right to restitution of or compensation for the lands they traditionally occupied or used. Accordingly, the African Commission found Kenya to be in violation of Article 14 of the African Charter.

3. Article 17: The Right to Culture

Following its discussion of the right to property, the African Commission next analyzed the Endorois’ claim that Kenya denied the group cultural rights under African Charter Article 17. Article 17 states not only that “every individual may freely[] take part in the cultural life of his community,” but that “[t]he promotion and protection of morals and traditional values recognized by the community shall be the duty of the State.” In this respect, the Commission held that the Charter places a burden on African states to preserve the “cultural heritage essential to [indigenous] group identity.” Relying on the Human Rights Committee’s statement—made in reference to ICCPR Article 25, which affirms: “minorities shall not be denied the right . . . to enjoy their own culture”—the Commission held that “culture manifests itself in many forms, including . . . way[s] of life associated with the use of land resources . . . in the case of indigenous peoples.”

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183 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Comm’n No. 276/03, ¶ 227.
184 Id. ¶ 232; accord Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 48, art. 28 (stating that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include restitution or, when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior and informed consent.”).
185 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Comm’n No. 276/03, ¶ 238.
186 African Charter, supra note 71, art. 17(2).
187 Id. art. 17(3).
188 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Comm’n No. 276/03, ¶ 241.
189 ICCPR, supra note 147, art. 27.
190 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Comm’n No. 276/03, ¶ 243; accord Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 23, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. HRI/
Commission then examined the Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities, specifically focusing its attention on its idea that land dispossession is a major threat facing indigenous groups today, and concluded that states like Kenya are bound under international law to “create spaces for dominant and indigenous cultures to co-exist.”

In its opinion, the Commission ruled that Kenya had a high duty towards the Endorois with respect to the creation of the game reserve on their land. The Commission noted in particular that Article 17 lacks a “claw-back clause,” interpreting this fact to mean that the Charter gives African states no leeway for failing to promote cultural rights. Indeed, the Commission found that Kenya’s responsibility to protect the Endorois’ culture was non-derogable and had to be proportionate to its legitimate aims as a state. Explaining the rule of proportionality, the Commission asserted that Kenya deprived the Endorois of the right to culture because it “denied the community access to an integrated system of beliefs, values, norms, mores, traditions, and artifacts closely linked” with Lake Bogoria despite the fact that such access would have posed no harm to the reserve or Kenya’s economic incentives to develop it. All in all, the Commission ruled that Kenya violated Charter Article 17 by failing to adequately protect the Endorois’ indigenous practices.

4. Article 21: The Right to Resources

Once the Commission granted the Endorois cultural rights, it next turned its attention to their resource rights under Article 21 of the African Charter, which states that “all peoples
shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources.”198 Examining Kenya’s claims that the Endorois never fully lost access to their land because revenues from the game reserve went into financing local projects through distributions made by the Baringo and Koibatek County Councils,199 the African Commission drew on the case of Social and Economic Rights Action Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria to hold that indigenous communities have a general “right to natural resources contained within their traditional lands”200 because this case barred state oil drilling companies from destroying local property for economic development initiatives under the scope of Article 21.201

Pursuant to the supplementary authority of Saramaka People v. Suriname—which interpreted the American Convention’s guarantee that “everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property”202 to mean that a state is precluded from interfering with the resources located on indigenous land without first consulting with the indigenous peoples and including them in benefits derived therefrom203—the Commission emphasized that international law holds that indigenous groups “have the [broad] right to the use and enjoyment of the natural resources that lie on and within the[ir] land”204 as long as these resources have some aggregate connection to their territories as a whole.205 Referencing the idea that Kenya had a duty not only to consult with the Endorois about the disposal of the resources found on their territory, but to give them a reasonable chance to participate in any resulting benefits,206 the Commission noted that because Kenya’s appropriation of Lake Bogoria had the composite effect of depriving the Endorois’ of wealth associated with the region,

198 African Charter, supra note 71, art. 21.
199 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Comm’n No. 276/03, ¶ 253.
200 Id. ¶ 255.
202 American Convention, supra note 141, art. 21.
204 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Comm’n No. 276/03, ¶ 257; see Saramaka People, (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 155.
205 See Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Comm’n No. 276/03, ¶ 266.
206 Id. ¶ 268; accord Saramaka People, (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 155.
Kenya was in violation of Article 21.207

5. Article 22: The Right to Development

As the final consideration of its opinion, the African Commission considered Article 22 of the African Charter, which affirms not only that “[a]ll peoples shall have the right to [] economic, social and cultural development,”208 but that “state[s] shall have the duty . . . to ensure” such right.209 Dismissing Kenya’s argument that the Endorois were given development rights because the Baringo and Koibatek County Councils allocated funds from the game reserve to local community programs,210 the Commission held that the right to development is governed by a two pronged test of constitutive and instrumental elements.211 Noting that the right to development, which is still emerging in international law,212 “has been posited to require the fulfillment of five main criteria: that it must be equitable, non-discriminatory, participatory, accountable, and transparent, with equity and choice as important, over-arching themes,”213 the Commission drew on the Working Group on Indigenous Populations’ statement214 that “indigenous peoples [must] not be coerced, pressured or intimidated in their choice of development.”215

Examining the Report of the Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities, the Commission then

207 See Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶¶ 255, 268.
208 African Charter, supra note 71, art. 22(1).
209 Id. art. 22(2).
210 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 274.
211 Id. ¶ 277.
215 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 279; accord Motoc & The Tebtebba Found., supra note 214, ¶ 14(a).
asserted that “its own [legal] standards state that a [g]overnment must consult with . . . indigenous peoples . . . when dealing with sensitive issues [such] as land.”

In its opinion, the Commission ruled that Kenya, by presenting the game reserve to the Endorois “as a fait accompli,” failed to give the group a proper opportunity to have a say in the development of their land. Supporting this analysis by relying on Saramaka People v. Suriname, which held, as noted above, that indigenous groups must have a role in state plans developed for their territories, the Commission ruled that “benefit sharing is key to the development process” under international law. Accordingly, the Commission found that Kenya was obligated under Charter Article 22 not only to allow the Endorois “to reasonably share in the benefits [accrued] as a result of [the state’s] . . . deprivation of their right to use and enjo[y]” Lake Bogoria but to ensure that favorable conditions at Lake Bogoria were protected so that the community could develop of its own accord there in the future.

VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ENDOROIS’ CASE

At the end of Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) v. Kenya, the African Commission found Kenya to have violated African Charter Articles 8, 14, 17, 21, and 22 by evicting the Endorois from Lake Bogoria. Based on this finding, the Commission urged Kenya to:

(a) [r]ecognize rights of ownership to the Endorois and [r]estitute Endorois ancestral land; (b) [e]nsure that the Endorois community has unrestricted access to Lake Bogoria and surrounding religious sites for religious and culture rites . . . ; (c) [p]ay adequate compensation to the community for all loss

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217 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Comm’n No. 276/03, ¶ 281.
218 Id. ¶ 289.
220 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Comm’n No. 276/03, ¶ 295.
221 Id.
222 Id. ¶ 298.
suffered; (d) pay royalties to the Endorois from existing economic activities and ensure that they benefit from employment possibilities within the Reserve; (e) grant registration to the Endorois Welfare Committee; (f) engage in dialogue with the Complainants for the effective implementation of these recommendations; and (g) report on the implementation of these recommendations within three months from the notification.\textsuperscript{223} exhorting the state to comply broadly with its obligations under the African Charter. Indeed, in its opinion, the Commission held Kenya to a high standard, one far surpassing that applicable to the Endorois under domestic Kenyan law alone. Making full use of African Charter Articles 60 and 61—particularly their permissive reinforcement of reliance on legal tenants established in both African and international law\textsuperscript{224}—the African Commission engaged in expansive legal interpretation by granting the Endorois renewed access to their land.\textsuperscript{225}

While the Commission thus provided a liberal basis for the restitution of the Endorois' rights, however, \textit{Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) v. Kenya} did not ultimately come down without limitations. It remains the case that the African Commission is not delegated the power to enforce its judgments vis-à-vis the African Charter under current law. The recommendations urged by the Commission are not effectively binding on Kenya. Because the Commission lacks enforcement mechanisms under the Charter, Kenya is merely encouraged to “adopt measures in conformity” with its

\textsuperscript{223} Id.

\textsuperscript{224} See African Charter, supra note 71, art. 60; id. art 61.

\textsuperscript{225} Indeed, by employing the African Charter, the African Commission engaged in a more expansive kind of legal reasoning than that espoused along traditional lines by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) under Article 38 of the Statue of the International Court of Justice. Article 38, which permits the ICJ to make its decisions, in ranked order, by applying: “a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; [and] d. . . . judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,” is less flexible than African Charter. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
As a matter of law, Kenya is not necessarily bound to carry them out. Despite the unbinding nature of the decision, Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) nonetheless represents a weighty indication of the way in which indigenous rights have advanced within international law. Through its own reliance on international legal authority with respect to indigeneity, the case reveals that “indigenous peoples [can] now allude to international norms supporting . . . claims” and advancing rights on issues extending in scope from religion to development.

Moreover, the Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) decision stands as a particularly salient view of indigenous rights in a broader sense. Though the case has been criticized for failing to explicitly extend the Endorois’ rights to land under the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the African Commission did not need to rely on this treaty in order to rule in favor of the Endorois. In construing the African Charter, the Commission made it clear that the Endorois’ rights as indigenous peoples are extant not because the Endorois are indigenous per se, but because they are peoples under the broad language and scope of the African Charter, a legal mechanism that is simply flexible enough to encompass within its interpretative framework the means for protecting indigeneity as set out under international law. The indigenous, in African jurisprudence anyway, do not need to be separately protected in order to have legally viable claims. On purely rhetorical grounds, therefore, Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) exemplifies a pinnacle of legal recognition for indigenous peoples and a decisive rejection of the kind of lawmaking that once siloed their rights.

226 Heyns, supra note 54, at 695.
227 Id.
229 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 58.
230 See African Charter, supra note 71, art. 19.
231 See REPORT OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION’S WORKING GROUP OF EXPERTS, supra note 5, at 79.