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Conferring Dignity: The Metamorphosis of the Legal Homosexual

Noa Ben-Asher
Pace University School of Law, nbenasher@law.pace.edu

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CONFERRING DIGNITY: THE METAMORPHOSIS OF THE LEGAL HOMOSEXUAL

NOA BEN-ASHER*

The legal homosexual has undergone a dramatic transformation over the past three decades, culminating in United States v. Windsor, which struck down Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). In 1986, the homosexual was a sexual outlaw beyond the protection of the Constitution. By 2013, the homosexual had become part of a married couple that is “deemed by the State worthy of dignity.” This Article tells the story of this metamorphosis in four phases. In the first, the “Homosexual Sodomite Phase,” the United States Supreme Court famously declared in Bowers v. Hardwick that there was no right to engage in homosexual sodomy. In the second, the “Equal Homosexual Class Phase,” the Court in Romer v. Evans cast the legal homosexual as a member of a “class of citizens” whose exclusion from anti-discrimination protections the Constitution could not tolerate. In the third, the “Free Intimate Bond Phase,” the Court shifted its focus in Lawrence v. Texas to an enduring intimate bond involving private sexual acts protected from government intrusion. In the fourth and current phase, the “Dignified Married Couple Phase,” the Court in United States v. Windsor validated the decision of several states to “confer” upon homosexuals “a dignity and status of immense import.”

The heart of the Article is an analysis of this final phase. Although Windsor is an important civil rights victory, the Court’s opinion ushers in important consequences for the legal homosexual. In the process of dignifying the same-sex couple, the Court erased the terms “homosexual” and “lesbian,” cast marriage as an elevated moral state, and, most importantly, promoted a concept that the Article calls a “weak dignity.” Windsor’s dignity is weak

* Noa Ben-Asher, Associate Professor of Law, Pace Law School. For conversations and comments on earlier drafts, I am indebted to Erez Aloni, William Baude, Samuel Bray, Alexander Boni-Saenz, Bennett Capers, Mary Anne Case, Bridget Crawford, Mathilde Cohen, Matthew Collibee, Marc DeGirolami, Elizabeth Emens, Katherine Franke, Cary Franklin, Elizabeth Glazer, Janet Halley, Clare Huntington, Arthur Leonard, Andrew Lund, Linda McClain, Martha Nussbaum, Jason Parkin, Darren Rosenblum, and Ed Stein. I also thank participants at the St. John’s University Faculty Workshop; the Gender, Law, and Policy Colloquium at Boston University School of Law; the Workshop on Regulation of Family, Sex, and Gender at the University of Chicago Law School; and the New York Area Law Professors’ Sexuality and Gender Workshop. For excellent research assistance, I thank Heather Graham, Desiree Solomon, and Amanda Zefi. For her excellent editorial work, I thank Lana Birbrair.
in three ways. First, human dignity was not understood by the Court as inherent in all humans. The Court instead assumed that the State confers dignity upon individuals. Second, Windsor’s concept of dignity is much narrower than theories promoted by contemporary moral and legal philosophers. Third, Windsor adopted a rhetoric of injury and pity that presents all those in same-sex relationships and their children as the wounded and humiliated victims of DOMA. The Article concludes with suggestions on how advocates and courts applying Windsor can employ the concept of equal dignity while moving beyond Windsor’s weaknesses.

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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court’s historic decision in United States v. Windsor\(^1\) is striking for, among other things, the conspicuous absence of the words “homosexual,” “lesbian,” or “bisexual.” In place of these characters, Windsor introduces us to the new legal homosexual: the “same-sex couple.”\(^2\) In June of 2013, in this much-celebrated decision, the Court invalidated Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defined marriage, for federal purposes, as “only a legal union between one man and one woman.”\(^3\) The Court held that this definition violates the Fifth Amendment and interferes “with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages.”\(^4\)

Windsor completed a three-decade transformation of the legal homosexual from an individual whose sexual conduct the state could punish as morally blameworthy,\(^5\) to a couple whose marriage the State can find “worthy of dignity.”\(^6\) What enabled this tremendous moral and legal transition? Why have the terms “homosexual,” “lesbian,” and “bisexual” disappeared with the arrival of Windsor’s dignity? This Article explores the remarkable journey of the legal homosexual over the last three decades, with a particular focus on the legal and cultural meanings of the Court’s recent Windsor decision. The Article reveals how, in three decades, the Court shifted along three key dimensions in its attitude to the legal homosexual: (1) its characterization of the legal homosexual; (2) its moral evaluation of the legal homosexual; and (3) its position on whether and how the state can engage in pure

\(^1\) 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
\(^2\) The “legal homosexual” in this Article refers to the depiction of the homosexual emerging from judicial rhetoric and decisions about homosexual identity and conduct. The Article uses “homosexual” to refer to both gay men and lesbians and alternates between depictions of the homosexual as male and as female.
\(^3\) See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689 (“New York, in common with, as of this writing, 11 other States and the District of Columbia, decided that same-sex couples should have the right to marry . . . .”) (emphasis added); id. at 2692 (“New York sought to give further protection and dignity to that bond. For same-sex couples who wished to be married, the State acted to give their lawful conduct a lawful status.”) (emphasis added); id. at 2693 (“DOMA’s unusual deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage here operates to deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come with the federal recognition of their marriages.”) (emphasis added); id. at 2689 (“Slowly at first and then in rapid course, the laws of New York came to acknowledge the urgency of this issue for same-sex couples who wanted to affirm their commitment to one another before their children, their family, their friends, and their community.”) (emphasis added).
\(^4\) Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012)), invalidated in part by Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675. (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”).
\(^5\) Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
\(^7\) Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
morrors legislation. In these decades, the Court reversed its approach to the legal homosexual: the immoral homosexual sodomite in Bowers has changed into a dignified “same-sex couple” in Windsor. This Article calls this transformation “the metamorphosis of the legal homosexual.”

Windsor’s declaration that several states had “conferred upon [same-sex couples] a dignity and status of immense import”9 marks the peak of this legal and moral metamorphosis. This Article argues that while Windsor is indeed a critical development for equal citizenship, it comes with a severe impediment. Limping beside the Court’s strong concept of equality is what this Article calls a “weak dignity.” Windsor’s use of dignity is weak for three principal reasons. First, the Windsor Court does not present human dignity as inherent in all humans. Instead, dignity is understood by the Court to be conferred by individual states at their discretion. Second, and relatedly, Windsor’s concept of dignity is far narrower than theories of dignity offered by contemporary moral and legal philosophers. Third, Windsor’s presentation of dignity assumes that all those in same-sex relationships—and their children—have been seriously injured and humiliated by laws such as DOMA. This assumption, I argue, reflects a problematic and self-perpetuating politics of injury and pity.

Three Parts follow this introduction. Part I traces the metamorphosis of the legal homosexual from Bowers to Windsor in four phases. The first phase of the Court’s jurisprudence, the “Immoral Sodomite Phase,” is represented by Bowers v. Hardwick,10 where homosexuality was understood primarily through the framework of illicit sex acts and was therefore morally rejected. The Bowers Court famously declared that there is no constitutional right to engage in homosexual sodomy.11 The second phase, the “Equal Homosexual Class Phase,” is typified by Romer v. Evans,12 where the legal homosexual, no longer understood as a sexual outlaw, was cast as a member of a “class of citizens” whose exclusion from anti-discrimination protections the Constitution could not tolerate.13 The Romer majority abandoned the rhetoric of moral condemnation in favor of moral neutrality and articulated the anti-animus principle. The third phase, the “Free Intimate Bond Phase,” was announced in Lawrence v. Texas,14 where the focus shifted to an enduring intimate bond.15 The Lawrence Court for the first time recognized and validated same-sex intimacy and declared that states can no longer engage in pure morals legislation.

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8 By “pure morals legislation” I mean state regulation of behavior that does not harm others, based solely on moral disapproval by the majority.
9 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2681.
11 Id. at 191.
13 Id. at 633.
15 Id. at 567.
The metamorphosis culminates in the “Dignified Married Couple Phase” launched by *Windsor*. In this pivotal opinion, the Court validated the decision of several states to “confer” on homosexuals “a dignity and status of immense import.” The legal homosexual has now turned into a dignified “same-sex couple,” and the terms “homosexual,” “lesbian,” and “bisexual” have virtually disappeared. These four phases mark the progression of the legal homosexual.

Part II examines three conditions that have enabled this moral progress of the legal homosexual: (1) desexualization; (2) privatization; and (3) coupling and reproduction. It shows how these three conditions crystallized in the three post-*Bowers* cases discussed in Part I. Part III critically examines *Windsor*’s weak dignity, exploring both its role in the opinion and its problematic features. The Article concludes with some reflections on how future courts and advocates can apply the landmark decision of *Windsor* to enhance civil rights while sidestepping the weakness of its dignity.

I. A Moral Metamorphosis: From *Bowers* to *Windsor*

From the moral and legal condemnation of homosexual sodomy in *Bowers*, we have arrived at the moral and legal dignity of “same-sex couples” in *Windsor*. How has the morally bad legal homosexual of *Bowers* turned—in three short decades—into the morally good married couple of *Windsor*? This Part examines, in four steps, the metamorphosis of the legal homosexual.

A. Phase One: The Immoral Sodomite

*Bowers* is our starting point. This decision has been condemned as a grave mistake—the *Lawrence* majority even declared it incorrect from the moment it was decided. Yet revisiting *Bowers* is critical for our understanding of the present. The current “goodness” of some forms of homosexuality (e.g., same-sex marriage), as reflected in *Windsor*, can be fully understood only through the past legal and historical “badness” of other forms of homosexuality (e.g., homosexual sodomy), as reflected in *Bowers*.

Three overlapping themes in *Bowers* shape the Court’s understanding of homosexuality. First, the legal homosexual was understood by the *Bowers*
majority primarily through his illicit sexuality, as a deviant sodomite. Second, the Bowers Court, and especially Chief Justice Burger’s concurrence, accepted Georgia’s characterization of homosexual conduct as immoral. Third, the Court perceived statutory moral condemnation of homosexual conduct as legitimate.

1. “Committing that Act”

The Bowers Court viewed the legal homosexual primarily through the lens of sexual conduct. Although sodomy, as defined by the Georgia statute at the time, could have been—and surely was—committed by heterosexual couples, the Court’s portrayal of the crime focused on homosexual sodomy. Notably, in Bowers the distinction between homosexual acts and homosexual identities is far from clear. The Bowers majority at times discussed “the homosexual” as a type of person (an identity), but at other times focused on “homosexual sodomy” (an act). As Janet Halley has argued, Bowers reflects multiple strategic slippages between the framework of homosexual sodomy and that of homosexual identity. Under both para-

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21 For a similar perspective, see also Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 118–19 (1967) (affirming the deportation of an immigrant on the ground that federal law barred entry of those “afflicted with psychopathic personality,” which the Immigration and Naturalization Service interpreted to include all homosexuals) (quoting Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(a)(4), 66 Stat. 163, 182 (repealed 1990)).
22 See Ga. Code Ann. §16-6-2(a)(1) (1984) (“A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another.”)
23 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 200 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s almost obsessive focus on homosexual activity is particularly hard to justify in light of the broad language Georgia has used.”); Janet E. Halley, Romer v. Hardwick, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 429, 439 (1997) (arguing that Bowers was written from a heterosexual standpoint, such that heterosexual sodomy could be deemed invisible or forgotten).
24 For a general distinction between act and identity, see Michel Foucault’s now-famous observation in the first volume of his History of Sexuality: “As defined by the ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a category of forbidden acts; their perpetrator was nothing more than the juridical subject of them. The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life . . . [T]he homosexual was now a species.” Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction 43 (Robert Hurley, trans., Vintage Books ed. 1990) (1978).
25 For a general distinction between act and identity, see Michel Foucault’s now-famous observation in the first volume of his History of Sexuality: “As defined by the ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a category of forbidden acts; their perpetrator was nothing more than the juridical subject of them. The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life . . . [T]he homosexual was now a species.” Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction 43 (Robert Hurley, trans., Vintage Books ed. 1990) (1978).
26 See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190 (“The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time.”) (emphasis added).
27 See, e.g., id. at 187–88 (“In August 1982, respondent Hardwick . . . was charged with violating the Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy by committing that act with another adult male in the bedroom of respondent’s home.”) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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digms, discussion of the legal homosexual in Bowers was infused with a sense of deviant sexuality.28

2. Moral Condemnation of Homosexual Conduct

The legal homosexual was portrayed in Bowers as an immoral legal persona.29 This was made most explicit in Chief Justice Burger’s famous concurrence, which is dedicated in its entirety to justifying the moral condemnation of homosexual conduct.30 Chief Justice Burger underscored the majority’s finding that “the proscriptions against sodomy have very ‘ancient roots,’”31 and that regulation of “homosexual conduct” has been ongoing “throughout the history of Western civilization.”32 Therefore, he concluded, “[t]o hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching.”33 The assumption here was that ancient anti-homosexual moral teachings were still relevant in our times. Otherwise, there would be no problem “casting them aside.”

A similar, though less explicit, moral critique of homosexuality underlay Justice White’s opinion for the majority. Justice White rejected the claim that the Court’s previous privacy jurisprudence should apply to homosexual sodomy.34 He argued that cases like Pierce,35 Meyer,36 Griswold,37 Prince,38 Skinner,39 Loving,40 and Roe41 should not be extended to protect homosexual sodomy; implicit in his argument was the view that those cases involved desirable social values such as family, marriage, and procreation—a category to which homosexuality did not belong:

Accepting the decisions in these cases . . . , we think it evident that none of the rights announced in those cases bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case. No 
connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and 
homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated, either by the Court of Appeals or by respondent.42

Justice White viewed homosexual activity as distinguishable from the truly valuable human domains that were considered by the Court in earlier decisions. Piercer and Meyers protected the parent-child relationship;43 Loving and Griswold involved marriage and procreation;44 and Roew validated choice in matters of procreation.45 Homosexual sodomy, by contrast, bears “[n]o connection [to] family, marriage, or procreation,”46 and therefore was not deemed worthy of the Court’s protection.47

3. The Legitimacy of Morals Legislation

Finally, the Court had to decide whether, in the absence of a “fundamental right to commit homosexual sodomy,”48 the state could show a rational basis for its law. The plaintiffs had argued that there was none, “other than the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable.”49 But the Court was satisfied with moral disapproval of homosexual conduct as grounds for legislation. “The law,” Justice White asserted, “is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.”50 Laws, according to Bowers, may be legitimate when based on moral beliefs of the majority of the population, even when these laws regulate victimless behavior such as consensual sodomy.

45 See generally Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
46 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
47 This narrow definition of privacy was heavily criticized by Justice Blackmun’s dissent and in later scholarship. See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204–05 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 737, 739–40 (1989) (“[T]he fundament of the right to privacy is not to be found in the supposed fundamentality of what the law proscribes. It is to be found in what the law imposes. . . . This affirmative power in the law, lying just below its interdictive surface, must be privacy’s focal point.”); Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1431, 1448–60 (1992).
48 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
49 Id. (majority opinion).
50 Id.
In sum, in three steps the Bowers majority affirmed a state prohibition on sexual sodomy. First, the Court centered its discussion on sexual conduct, describing the legal homosexual as one who commits sodomy. Second, the Court accepted the moral condemnation of the legal homosexual, distinguishing homosexual sodomy from socially valuable activities such as marriage, procreation, and the education of children. Third, the Court affirmed Georgia’s right to engage in pure morals legislation.

B. Phase Two: The Equal Homosexual Class

One decade later, in Romer v. Evans, the Court confronted the legal homosexual again. In this phase, the “Equal Homosexual Class Phase,” three related changes occurred. First, the legal homosexual was now recast as a member of a protected class of citizens. Second, the moral evaluation of the legal homosexual significantly shifted from moral condemnation to moral neutrality. Third, the Court’s previous deference to pure morals legislation was significantly weakened by the new anti-animus principle. I will examine each aspect in turn.

1. The Homosexual Class

A ghost opens the Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans. It is the ghost of Plessy v. Ferguson, invoked through Justice Harlan’s dissenting protest that the Constitution “neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.” At stake in Romer was Amendment 2 to the Colorado Constitution, which repealed discrimination protections on the basis of “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships.” This, according to the Court, subjected an entire homosexual class to “discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation.” As Justice Kennedy explained, “The amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination . . . .” The Court held that Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Something fascinating happened when the legal homosexual turned into a class of citizens. Sexuality faded into the background. The legal homosex-
ual in Romer is no longer the sex criminal imagined in Bowers—one who commits deviant sexual acts that have been condemned for millennia. In Romer, the homosexual becomes plural, a body of public figures, “a class we shall refer to as homosexual persons or gays and lesbians.” Sodomy is not mentioned even once by the Romer majority. Indeed, from Romer onward, the legal homosexual will be consistently de-sexualized.

In Romer, the legal homosexual was transformed from a sexual sodomite into a “class of citizens” and a “single named group.” Ten years after Bowers, the Court portrayed homosexuality not as individual deviant sex acts, but as a “single trait” that causes a distinct group of people to suffer from animus and discrimination. One could argue that this shift of focus from sex acts to class reflects only the different nature of the legal conflicts in Romer and Bowers. But as Justice Scalia rightly pointed out, Romer’s class of citizens is made of the same individuals whose sex acts the state could legitimately criminalize under Bowers. As we shall now see, this shift of focus from homosexual sodomy to a “class of citizens” was not purely semantic—it critically enabled a judicial reassessment of the moral value of homosexuals.

2. Moral Neutrality Toward the Homosexual Class

The Romer majority did not opine on whether homosexuals are morally good or morally bad people. Instead, the Court declared a “commitment to the law’s neutrality where the rights of persons are at stake.” This commitment to neutrality, Romer explains, is grounded in the Equal Protection Clause. The Court pointed to concrete harms of discrimination against the homosexual class, underscoring that Amendment 2 “imposes a special dis-

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59 Id. at 624.
60 But see id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The case most relevant to the issue before us today is not even mentioned in the Court’s opinion: In Bowers v. Hardwick, we held that the Constitution does not prohibit what virtually all States had done from the founding of the Republic until very recent years—making homosexual conduct a crime.”) (citation omitted).
61 Two decades later, in Windsor, the word “homosexual” itself would disappear altogether, a point to which I will return. See infra Part II.A.
62 Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
63 Id. at 632.
64 Id. at 633.
65 See id. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66 In addition, the word “dignity” does not appear even once in Romer. See id. at 620 (majority opinion).
67 Id. at 623.
68 Id. (“Unheeded then, [Justice Harlan’s] words in Plessy v. Ferguson now are understood to state a commitment to the law’s neutrality where the rights of persons are at stake. The Equal Protection Clause enforces this principle and today requires us to hold invalid a provision of Colorado’s Constitution.”).
69 Amendment 2 barred homosexuals from receiving protection through public-accommodations laws, and in transactions involving “housing, sale of real estate, insurance, health and welfare services, private education, and employment.” Id. at 629 (citing
ability upon those persons alone.”70 While all other citizens enjoyed legal safeguards against discrimination, homosexuals, under Amendment 2, did not.71 This stance of moral neutrality fits perfectly with the recasting of the legal homosexual as a member of a class. The Court did not have to assess the moral value of individual, physical, sexual homosexuals, and could focus instead on acts of discrimination against an entire amorphous class.

3. The Anti-Animus Principle

A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.

— Romer v. Evans72

A third conceptual shift occurred in Romer when the Court famously held that animus toward a political group cannot motivate state legislation.73 Amendment 2, according to Romer, “seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects.”74 Thus, “[a] law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.”75 The will to injure another group via legislation will not be tolerated by the Court.

In 1996, with Bowers still a binding precedent, Romer’s articulation of the anti-animus principle depended on the premise that homosexuals constitute a class of citizens and not an aggregation of sodomites. Justice Scalia thus objected by shifting the discussion back to sodomy.76 If moral disapp-
proval of homosexual conduct is a legitimate state interest under *Bowers*, Scalia argued, such disapproval should also be viewed as permissible grounds for state laws such as Amendment 2. The majority did not agree.

In short, the second phase of the metamorphosis of the legal homosexual, the “Equal Homosexual Class Phase,” involved three interrelated shifts. First, the Court now characterized the legal homosexual as a member of a class and not as an individual sexual sodomite. Second, the moral status of homosexuals in the eyes of the Court improved from condemnation to neutrality. Third, the idea that animus cannot motivate state legislation weakened the deference to state morals legislation established in *Bowers*. We will now see how these factors developed in the third phase of the metamorphosis.

C. Phase Three: The Free Intimate Bond

In *Lawrence*, the Court once again considered the validity of a sodomy statute, and this time found it unconstitutional. The Court recognized the liberty interest in an enduring intimate bond. Three related shifts occurred here. First, the legal homosexual was now represented as an enduring intimate bond. Second, that intimate bond was characterized by the Court as socially valuable. Third, the Court undermined the ability of states to enact pure morals legislation.

1. The Enduring Intimate Bond

*Lawrence* famously opens with the declaration that “[l]iberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places.” It is a private liberty. *Lawrence* not only rejected *Bowers*’ framing of the legal issue; it also presented the legal homosexual in an entirely new way. The legal homosexual was now understood as “two persons of the same sex . . . engag[ing] in certain intimate sexual conduct.”

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78 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003) (“A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.”).

79 See id. at 567 (“When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.”).

80 Id. at 562.

81 See infra Part II.B.

82 See supra Part II.B.

83 See *Lawrence*, 539 U.S. at 562.

84 Id.
So while the facts and the legal question in Bowers and Lawrence were seemingly analogous, their characterizations of the legal homosexual were strikingly different. The Bowers Court conceptualized sodomy as individual criminal acts. By contrast, the Lawrence Court viewed it as an act of sexual intimacy. This recasting of the legal homosexual as an intimate bond is conceptually tied to Lawrence’s positing of liberty as a right that protects private conduct from state intrusion. I will return to this point. Let us now see how the new framing of the legal homosexual affected the Court’s moral appraisal of homosexuality.

2. Moral Recognition of the Enduring Intimate Bond

The shift of attention from “homosexual conduct” to an “enduring intimate bond” laid the groundwork for the Court’s rejection of Bowers’ assumption that homosexuality is not socially valuable. Instead, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, emphasized that “our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.”

Quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Justice Kennedy invoked the dignity to make intimate life choices as articulated in the abortion context:

These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not

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86 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. This articulation of liberty is a typical instance of a narrow conception of liberty that philosophers have called “negative liberty.” For an early distinction between negative and positive liberty, see generally Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Four Essays on Liberty, at 118 (1969). Many different accounts of both positive and negative liberty have been proposed since Berlin’s essay was first published in 1969. See generally Charles Taylor, What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty, in The Idea of Freedom: Essays in Honour of Isaiah Berlin, at 175 (Alan Ryan ed., 1979) (distinguishing doctrines of positive liberty, which are concerned with the exercise of control over one’s own life, from doctrines of negative liberty, which focus on one’s freedom from constraints).

87 See infra Part II.B.

88 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986); see also supra text accompanying notes 35–47.

89 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.

90 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (upholding the constitutional right to have an abortion).
define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.91

This vaunted process of intimate self-exploration about the meaning of life is available to the intimate homosexual bond: “Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.”92 *Bowers* was wrong because it “would deny them this right.”93 Moreover, in Kennedy’s rendering here, human dignity is attached to the core definition of liberty, and is possessed by all free persons. The “dignity [of] free persons,” according to *Lawrence*, had been violated by sodomy statutes.94 Interestingly, in *Lawrence*, dignity is paired with the liberty to make intimate personal choices without government intrusion.95 We will soon see how Justice Kennedy in *United States v. Windsor*96 articulated a different, weaker conception of dignity—“equal dignity”97—that is not inherent in individuals but is conferred by the State.

But not all homosexual conduct was considered socially valuable in *Lawrence*. Justice Kennedy’s decision drew a clear line between legitimate and illegitimate sexual conduct. Forms of sex involving minors, injury or coercion, public conduct, or prostitution were all treated as morally and legally blameworthy.98 By contrast, the private conduct of two consenting adults drew no censure.99 Indeed, in *Lawrence*, such private conduct rose to a level of moral validation that is more robust than the simple moral neutrality of *Romer*. With terms such as “dignity,”100 “respect,”101 and the “mystery of human life,”102 the Court signaled moral recognition and validation of a certain type of legal homosexual: the one who has entered an intimate bond with another.

91 *Lawrence*, 539 U.S. at 574 (emphasis added) (quoting *Casey*, 505 U.S. at 851).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 567; see also id. (“The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right” to choose to enter upon relationships “in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.”) (emphasis added).
96 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
97 See infra Part III.
98 See *Lawrence*, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution.”).
99 Id.
100 E.g., id. at 567.
101 E.g., id. at 575.
102 Id. at 574 (quoting *Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey*, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
3. The “End of Morals Legislation”?

The Lawrence majority thus embraced one of the primary claims of twentieth-century legal positivism: the State should not be in the business of pure morals legislation. Even if condemnation of homosexuality is sometimes based on “profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles,” the majority of the population can no longer enforce its moral views through criminal law. The liberty of all prevails over the moral convictions of the many, and “the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.” Thus Bowers was overruled.

Justice Scalia objected. He criticized the majority for taking sides in a “culture war,” and warned that there were many morals-based state laws that would now be hard to defend, including “bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, bestiality, and obscenity.” In fact, he famously protested, “[t]his effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation. If, as the Court asserts, the promotion of majoritarian sexual morality is not even a legitimate state interest, none of the above-mentioned laws can survive rational-basis review.” At least some of the items on Justice Scalia’s list are easily distinguishable from sod-

103 See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 1–6 (1963) (distinguishing laws informed by morality from those motivated purely by moral condemnation but no evidence of harm to others). But cf. Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 113 (1999) (“The harm principle is effectively collapsing under the weight of its own success. Claims of harm have become so pervasive that the harm principle has become meaningless: the harm principle no longer serves the function of a critical principle because non-trivial harm arguments permeate the debate. Today, the issue is no longer whether a moral offense causes harm, but rather what type and what amounts of harms the challenged conduct causes, and how the harms compare. . . . This is a radical departure from the liberal theoretic, progressive discourse of the 1960s.”).
104 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571.
105 Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 850).
106 Id. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
107 Id. at 578.
108 Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 602. But see Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: “You Are Entering a Gay and Lesbian Free Zone”: On the Radical Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other (Post-Queers) [Raising Questions about Lawrence, Sex Wars, and the Criminal Law], 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503, 506 (2004) [hereinafter Harcourt, Gay and Lesbian Free Zone] (“The fact is, there is today a war of sexual projects that is being fought on American soil, and the federal courts, including the United States Supreme Court, are inextricably caught up in the ongoing battles. But what is missing in Justice Scalia’s critique are the important nuances and subtleties that shape these contemporary sex wars, that make them so fascinating and so unpredictable—and that both resignify and ambiguise the purported gay victory in Lawrence.”).
110 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111 Id. (first emphasis added). Although he joined the dissent of Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas wrote separately. He argued not for the legitimacy of morals legislation but for
omy prohibitions, because legislators can identify potential victims that could be protected by regulating activities such as bigamy and prostitution. But Lawrence’s threat to Scalia’s pro-morals legislation approach is nonetheless real in that it recognizes a liberty under the Due Process Clause to engage in forms of private sexual activity that the majority of the population may disapprove of.

In sum, in the third phase of our metamorphosis we find three main developments. First, the depiction of the legal homosexual has transformed into an enduring intimate bond that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, the moral value of this bond has increased from moral neutrality toward the homosexual class, to a moral validation and recognition of the enduring intimate bond. Third, after Lawrence, moral condemnation in and of itself can no longer justify criminal prohibitions on private sexual behavior.112

D. Phase Four: The Dignified Married Couple

In 2013, the Windsor Court struck down Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act as an unconstitutional violation of the Fifth Amendment.113 Windsor is a fascinating social and legal development, even a culmination, in the moral transformation of the legal homosexual. It reflects a three-decade shift of the legal homosexual from a morally condemned persona to a morally good and dignified one. The Court does this mostly through a novel use of the concept of dignity.114

Three shifts occurred in Windsor. First, the legal homosexual is now consistently represented as a “same-sex couple” or a “same-sex marriage,” while the term “homosexual” has virtually disappeared.115 Second, the moral assessment of the legal homosexual has now crossed over from moral recognition to moral praise. Third, states that issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples are now increasingly understood by the Court to be engaging in the opposite of pure morals legislation. Several states now confer dignity—a positive moral value—upon same-sex couples. But before turning to the

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112 Cf. Harcourt, Gay and Lesbian Free Zone, supra note 109, at 503–04 (“For the first time in the history of American criminal law, the United States Supreme Court has declared that a supermajoritarian moral belief does not necessarily provide a rational basis for criminalizing conventionally deviant conduct. The Court’s ruling is the coup de grâce to legal moralism administered after a prolonged, brutish, tedious, and debilitating struggle against liberal legalism in its various criminal law representations.”) (footnote omitted).
114 Whereas some scholars, as we will now see, have focused on the doctrinal meaning of dignity in Windsor, this Article examines dignity as a moral status conferred by the State.
115 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675.
three key elements of Windsor’s contribution to the metamorphosis of the legal homosexual, we must examine the holding of the case.

In the short time since Windsor’s publication, a flurry of views has appeared regarding its exact holding and doctrinal underpinnings. Scholars and commentators have focused their analysis on equal protection, dignity, liberty, federalism, and the right to marry. Windsor’s complicated holding indeed combines elements of federalism, equal protection, and

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117 See, e.g., McClain, supra note 116, at 353 (“In United States v. Windsor, Justice Kennedy employed Romer[‘s Equal Protection rationale] as a template in an opinion on the merits, in which the Court affirmed the Second Circuit judgment that Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was unconstitutional.”) (footnote omitted); Suzanne Goldberg, A One-Two Punch to the Nation’s Most Prominent Antigay Laws, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2013, 2:07 p.m.), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/a-one-two-punch-to-the-nations-most-prominent-antigay-laws/, archived at http://perma.cc/4WYG-NJEX [hereinafter Goldberg, One-Two Punch] (“[W]hat is most striking about the opinion . . . is the direct, clear way that the Court seems to understand why DOMA is such an egregious violation of the constitution’s equality guarantee under the Fifth Amendment.”).

118 See, e.g., Rao, supra note 95, at 29 (arguing that an “unusual [dignity-based] right to recognition . . . forms the basis of the Court’s decision,” and that a “right to recognition, standing alone, has never been part of our constitutional jurisprudence”). But see Young, supra note 116, at 47 (“The right of ‘recognition’ in Windsor, then, was not some untethered judicial creation, but rather an entitlement to federal recognition of state law rights created in the democratic exercise of the states’ reserved powers. That right is utterly familiar—and fundamental.”).

119 See Baude, supra note 116, at 155 (“Windsor contains a second theme as well . . . . The idea is that a state law recognizing or creating a marriage also creates a constitutional liberty interest.”).

120 See id. at 154 (“Windsor uses two lines of reasoning in invalidating Section 3 of DOMA . . . . The latter line of reasoning is the opinion’s much-debated references to federalism.”); Courtney G. Joslin, Windsor, Federalism, and Family Equality, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 156, 158 (2013), http://columbiaalawreview.org/windsor-federalism-and-family-equality/, archived at http://perma.cc/9ADD-S9AL (“[C]ivil rights advocates dodged a bullet when the Windsor Court declined to embrace the categorical family status federalism theory. While its acceptance would have brought along the short-term gain of providing a basis for invalidating DOMA, it also would have curtailed the ability of federal officials to protect same-sex couples and other families.”); Young, supra note 116, at 46 (“Contrary to the emerging narrative, then, the federalism arguments in Windsor amounted to much more than just ‘some blather about traditional state sovereignty and marriage.’” (quoting Sandy Levinson, A Brief Comment on Justice Kennedy’s Opinion in Windsor, BALKINIZATION (June 26, 2013, 11:50 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/06/a-brief-comment-on-justice-kennedys.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Q9KS-P2H6).

121 See NeJaime, supra note 116, at 220 (“Indeed, if we look more closely at Windsor, we see that it is conceptually, if not doctrinally, a right-to-marry case. Justice Ken-
dignity. While equal protection language and precedents appear throughout the decision, these combine with federalism and dignity, as captured in the majority’s conclusion:

The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity. By seeking to displace this protection and treating those persons as living in marriages less respected than others, the federal statute is in violation of the Fifth Amendment.123

Here we see how these three elements of Windsor (federalism, dignity, and equality) merge. This is a federalism decision in the sense that the Court recognizes the historic priority of the states in defining and regulating civil marriages.124 When a state defines who can enter marriages within its boundaries, the federal government must show deference to such a decision.125 The concept of dignity is closely tied to this point.126 The State, according to Windsor, can decide whether or not to grant dignity to same-sex couples by recognizing their marriages.127 A state decision to confer dignity results in...
equality between same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples. Section 3 of DOMA thus interfered with the equal protection and dignity (i.e., the “equal dignity”) of same-sex couples in those states. 128

Why did the *Windsor* majority need this complicated approach when it could have invalidated Section 3 using a pure equality rationale under the Fifth Amendment? The Court could have held that Section 3 of DOMA violated the equal protection of *all* lesbians, gays and bisexuals in the United States. But it did not. 129 It articulated a much narrower class: “[t]he Class to which DOMA directs its restrictions and restraints are those persons who are joined in same-sex marriages made lawful by the State. DOMA singles out a class of persons deemed by a State entitled to recognition and protection to enhance their own liberty.” 130 The protected class includes only those same-sex couples who married in jurisdictions that had enabled them to do so. 131 This narrow framing of the class allowed the Court to avoid a decision much broader in scope and implication. 132 If the Court had framed the class as *all* same-sex couples in the United States and struck down Section 3 of DOMA as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment, an identical logic could have arguably applied to existing state marriage exclusions under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *Windsor*’s combination of principles of federalism, equality, and dignity enabled the Court to invalidate Section 3 of DOMA while leaving its state equivalents intact. 133 Indeed, the dissenters emphasized that, after *Windsor*, it is still legitimate at the state level to confer dignity on opposite-sex couples but not on same-sex couples. 134

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128 *Id.* at 2692 (“[T]he resulting injury and indignity [from DOMA] is a deprivation of an essential part of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment.”) (emphasis added).

129 I thank Linda McClain for a lively discussion of this point with me.

130 *Windsor*, 133 S. Ct. at 2695 (Kennedy, J.) (emphasis added).

131 See *id.* at 2696.

132 See Young, supra note 116, at 43 (“The beauty of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in *Windsor* is that it was able to resolve this difficult issue without resort to judicial fiat. Instead, the Court relied on New York’s own resolution of that question, which was ultimately—and appropriately—a political one.”).

133 See Michael J. Klarman, *Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial Equality*, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 127, 154 (2013) (“[N]either *Windsor* nor *Hollingsworth* forces any action upon the states, some of which continue to have large majorities opposed to gay marriage, . . . *Windsor* did not challenge the constitutionality of section 2 of DOMA, which authorizes states to decline to recognize same-sex marriages lawfully performed elsewhere. Such rulings are unlikely to generate any significant backlash.”).

134 See *Windsor*, 133 S. Ct. at 2720 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“To the extent that the Court takes the position that the question of same-sex marriage should be resolved primarily at the state level, I wholeheartedly agree. I hope that the Court will ultimately permit the people of each State to decide this question for themselves.”); *id.* at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[W]hile I disagree with the result to which the majority’s analysis leads it in this case, I think it more important to point out that its analysis leads no further. The Court does not have before it, and the logic of its opinion does not decide, the distinct question whether the States, in the exercise of their ‘historic and essential authority to define the marital relation,’ . . . may continue to utilize the traditional definition of
Part III will criticize Windsor’s “weak dignity” for reasons wholly different from those of the Windsor dissenters. Let us see now, however, why Windsor should be understood as the culmination of the metamorphosis of the legal homosexual.

1. The “Same-Sex Couple”

In Windsor, the legal homosexual turned into a “same-sex couple.” The majority introduced the plaintiff, Edith Windsor, and her deceased spouse, Thea Spyer, as “[t]wo women then resident in New York [who] were married in a lawful ceremony in Ontario, Canada, in 2007.”135 Edith and Thea appear in Windsor by reference to their biological sex (“two women”) and not their sexuality (two lesbians). Although their sexual relationship began in the 1960s, many years before they were to become “[t]wo women . . . married in a lawful ceremony,”136 the Court portrays their 2007 marriage as the landmark of their lives.137

The glaring absence of references to sexuality and sexual orientation in the Court’s decision is not particular to descriptions of Edith and Thea. Throughout Windsor, the terms “homosexual” and “lesbian” are replaced with “same-sex couples” and “same-sex marriage.”138 The word “lesbian” does not appear in the majority’s decision even once.139 With this rhetorical transition to “same-sex couples” and “same-sex marriage,” Windsor erased the “lesbian” and the “homosexual” in what is, to this point, the most important Court decision in the decade for gay, lesbian, and bisexual rights.

As various scholars have observed, the Court in Romer had erased bisexuals, present in the statute at issue, from the definition of the class vindicated by the decision in the case.140 Although Colorado’s Amendment 2
announced that there would be “No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation.” Justice Kennedy’s decision referred to the “named class” protected by the ordinances “as homosexual persons or gays and lesbians.” Bisexuality was left out. The Court’s erasure of bisexuals in *Romer* was in keeping with a broader societal trend toward what Kenji Yoshino calls “the epistemic contract of bisexual erasure.” In an article by that name, Yoshino argues that self-identified homosexuals and heterosexuals seek to erase bisexual identity because, among other reasons, they have a shared “interest in defending norms of monogamy.” *Romer* is just one instance of this widespread phenomenon.

What the Court did in *Windsor* is even more striking. For the Court in *Windsor* to erase the terms “homosexual,” “lesbian,” and “gay” is culturally anomalous. This move nonetheless fits well within the logic of the Court’s decision. *Windsor* seems to leave us with a new binary: married/nonmarried. For this binary, sexual orientation does not matter. Those who are married, as we will now see, are granted dignity through marriage licenses, while those who are not are left without that blessing.

2. Moral Dignity of Married “Same-Sex” Couples

You know the Catholic hierarchy has been awful, but the Catholic people and the families and friends and people who care as Jesus did about the marginalized and treating them with dignity... I think Jesus is weeping for joy.

— Andrew Sullivan
(CNN interview with Anderson Cooper)

*Windsor* is a pivotal moment in the metamorphosis of the legal homosexual. The legal homosexual, at least in states where same-sex marriage is legally recognized, is portrayed as a *morally dignified person*. As Justice...
Kennedy explained, “[r]esponsibilities, as well as rights, enhance the dignity and integrity of the person.” By granting them the responsibilities and rights of marriage, states “conferred upon [same-sex couples] a dignity and status of immense import,” and “enhanced the recognition, dignity, and protection of the class in their own community.” Section 3 of DOMA took all of that away, and was thus declared unconstitutional.

The Windsor decision assumes that marriage makes the legal homosexual more moral, and that the State affirms this by granting marriage licenses. Unfortunately, Windsor does not explain how marriage licenses elevate the moral status of those who marry. What makes marriage licenses any different from drivers’ licenses or fishing licenses? Why do licenses for driving or fishing not confer dignity on those who obtain them? One cannot reasonably claim, for instance, that the “responsibilities, as well as rights,” that come with a fishing license “enhance the dignity and integrity of the person.” Such a claim would be meaningful only in a legal culture where fishing is an activity of great moral significance.

Two rationales have appeared in the last two decades to support the idea of moral elevation through marriage: One can be characterized as sacralizing (the “sacralizing rationale”) and the other as normalizing (the “normalizing rationale”). While Windsor does not explicitly rely on either rationale, the repeated assertion that marriage enhances dignity is hardly intelligible without them. I will briefly introduce each rationale.

Under the sacralizing rationale, as Michael Warner has aptly observed, both sides of the same-sex marriage debates “seek from state-sanctioned
marriage what is essentially a sacralization.” By this Warner means that marriage recognition is comparable in rhetoric and substance to the kind of respect that individuals often seek from religious institutions. State-sanctioned marriage is thus understood as providing moral validation to individuals. Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, in which the Massachusetts Supreme Court recognized same-sex marriages, provides an excellent example of the sacralizing rationale:

The union of two people contemplated by [the Massachusetts statute] “is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.”

In characterizing civil marriage as sacred and noble, Goodridge echoed Griswold, where the Court justified the constitutional right to privacy through the sanctity of the marital bedroom. Windsor does not tell us how or why marriage enhances the dignity of those who enter it, but the perception of marriage as sacred provides one of the strongest conceptual links to human dignity. Under the sacralizing rationale, marriage enhances the moral dignity of the married legal homosexual because the institution itself is sacred.

154 Michael Warner, Response to Martha Nussbaum, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 721, 729 (2010) (explaining that “[t]he opponents of same-sex marriage are generally more explicit—outside the courtroom, at least—that sacralization is what they are after,” and that, on the other side, marriage equality advocates “more typically describe an effect of sacralization in nominally secular terms, such as ‘special status’ and ‘transcendent significance’”).

155 See Lisa Duggan, Holy Matrimony!, THE NATION, Mar. 15, 2004, at 18, archived at http://perma.cc/WCV6-A3F6 (arguing for abolition of “state endorsement of the sanctified religious wedding” or for “ending the use of the term ‘marriage’ altogether”).


157 Id. at 973 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)) (emphasis added).

158 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (1965) (“Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for the telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?”). A number of other Supreme Court cases also discuss the deep human significance of the institution of marriage. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987) (“[M]any religions recognize marriage as having spiritual significance . . . .”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 12 (1967) (describing the freedom to marry as a right that “has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men” and which is “fundamental to our very existence and survival”); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942) (describing marriage as “an institution more basic in our civilization than any other”).

159 Accordingly, some critics have suggested that states should abolish civil marriage altogether and leave the business of sacralizing unions to religious institutions. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case for Abolishing Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2006) (“It is time to abolish civil marriage. The law should not define, regulate, or recognize marriage. Marriage—the
By contrast, the normalizing rationale is not theological in essence. It is motivated by the more modern necessity to govern large populations effectively. This twofold normalizing rationale centers on how same-sex marriage can potentially (1) facilitate more efficient state governance of same-sex couples and their children, and (2) “improve” the moral behavior of individual homosexual actors. The former is more functional and can hardly be linked with morality or dignity; the latter cannot be understood without them. I will briefly explain.

For the view of marriage as necessary for efficient governance, Goodridge is again exemplary:

Civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones. It is central to the way the Commonwealth identifies individuals, provides for the orderly distribution of property, ensures that children and adults are cared for and supported whenever possible from private rather than public funds, and tracks important epidemiological and demographic data.\(^{160}\)

Civil marriage anchors social order.\(^ {161}\) It helps the government with its primary task of managing the population; it provides a useful structure for distributing property and immigration benefits, ordering the private care of children and adults, and controlling disease.\(^ {162}\)

More importantly, the second part of the normalizing rationale is of crucial significance for the metamorphosis traced here. A well-known argument that marriage could morally improve the sexual behavior of homosexuals was offered by Andrew Sullivan in *Virtually Normal*.\(^ {163}\) Sullivan famously announced a new era of homosexual politics, in which homosexuals will be integrated into the two most important public institutions: the

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\(^{160}\) Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954. See also id. at 965 (“That same-sex couples are willing to embrace marriage’s solemn obligations of exclusivity, mutual support, and commitment to one another is a testament to the enduring place of marriage in our laws and in the human spirit.”).

\(^{161}\) Id. at 954; see also, e.g., Mary Lyndon Shanley, *Just Marriage* 113–15 (2004).

\(^{162}\) Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954; see also Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009); Shanley, supra note 161, at 113–15.

military and civil marriage.\textsuperscript{164} Marriage especially “is the highest public recognition of personal integrity.”\textsuperscript{165} Without it, sexuality is on the loose.\textsuperscript{166} In a disturbing (yet telling) allusion, Sullivan predicted that marriage would be the first step toward the resolution of “the homosexual question.”\textsuperscript{167} Sullivan’s idealization of personal monogamous commitments, which has been subject to extensive scholarly scrutiny,\textsuperscript{168} has also echoed in judicial recognition of same-sex marriages.\textsuperscript{169}

Without explicitly relying on either the sacralizing or normalizing rationales, \textit{Windsor} articulated a direct causal link between civil marriage and an elevated moral recognition of same-sex couples. \textit{Windsor} thus completed the metamorphosis of the legal homosexual into a morally good legal actor. This did not escape the well-attuned radar of Justice Scalia, who harshly criticized the majority for “clums\[il\]y” stepping into a debate that should be resolved through democratic means.\textsuperscript{170} Justice Scalia criticized the majority’s decision...
for labeling opponents of same-sex marriage as “enemies of the human race” and “haters of the neighbor.” Justice Scalia may have anticipated that *Windsor* would be read as the complete inversion of *Bowers* in this regard. If in *Bowers* the legal homosexual was the morally condemned character, in *Windsor* the morally condemned character is the one who does not support same-sex marriage. This scandalous reversal now names as “haters of the neighbor” those who are religiously commanded to “love thy neighbor.” Oddly (or perhaps not), in its invocation of that religious command, Justice Scalia’s dissent converges with Andrew Sullivan’s response to *Windsor* in the epigraph above. “Jesus is weeping for joy,” said Sullivan. The marginalized, stigmatized, shamed minority has been granted moral dignity.

3. “Positive” Morals Legislation

Like the Wizard of Oz, the State now marks the legal homosexual with dignity. Interestingly, in the aftermath of *Lawrence-* ’s “end of all morals legislation,” *Windsor* offers a new type of State morals legislation for the legal homosexual—one that comes in the form of moral praise. Under *Windsor*, states have the power to confer dignity by granting marriage licenses, and, by so doing, to confer positive moral value upon the legal (married) homosexual. Thus whereas it is no longer legitimate to prohibit some forms of private sexual conduct solely based on moral disapproval by the community, it is quite possible, according to *Windsor*, to convey moral approval through marriage licensing. For many readers, this welcome development may not seem puzzling at all; it fits well with our liberal intuitions. But from a perspective of moral and legal transformation, positive morals legislation
is a decisive development and sudden reversal: the sword of the State has turned into a wand. Homosexuals are now blessed with dignity.\textsuperscript{179}

\textit{Windsor} marks the fourth and current phase in the transition of the legal homosexual. In 1986, \textit{Bowers} affirmed the moral condemnation of homosexual sodomy by states.\textsuperscript{180} In 1996, \textit{Romer} declared moral neutrality, concluding that homosexuals constitute a class that deserves equal protection under the law.\textsuperscript{181} In 2003, \textit{Lawrence} went beyond moral neutrality to protect and validate the private intimate decisions of homosexuals.\textsuperscript{182} Finally, in 2013, \textit{Windsor} declared that State recognition of same-sex marriages enhanced the dignity and integrity of same-sex couples.\textsuperscript{183} Figure 1 summarizes these four phases.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|l|}
\hline
& Nature of the Legal Homosexual & Moral Assessment & Role of the State & Primary Constitutional Right/Principle \\
\hline
\textbf{The Immoral Sodomite Phase} & & & & \\
\hline
\textbf{The Equal Homosexual Class Phase} & & & & \\
\textit{Romer v. Evans} (1996) & A Member of a Protected Class & Moral Neutrality & No Animus-Based Legislation & Equal Protection (14th Amendment) \\
\hline
\textbf{The Free Intimate Bond Phase} & & & & \\
\hline
\textbf{The Dignified Married Couple Phase} & & & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{A Metamorphosis of the Legal Homosexual}
\end{figure}


\textsuperscript{183} \textit{United States v. Windsor}, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013).
II. THE CONDITIONS OF MORAL TRANSFORMATION

In Thinking Sex, Gayle Rubin explored the idea that legal and social understandings of “good sex” and “bad sex” shift over time. As Rubin explained, “[m]ost systems of sexual judgment—religious, psychological, feminist, or socialist—attempt to determine on which side of the line a particular act falls.” Acts that are considered good—but only those—are accorded moral complexity. But “sex acts on the bad side of the line are considered utterly repulsive and devoid of all emotional nuance.” Over the course of time, some acts or identities may shift over from the “bad sex” to the “good sex” side of the line. For instance, “if [homosexuality] is coupled and monogamous,” Rubin wrote in her 1984 essay, “society is beginning to recognize that it includes the full range of human interaction.”

Rubin’s theory beautifully captured what would happen to the legal homosexual in the decades to follow. As we saw above, in Bowers the legal homosexual was perceived by the Court as an immoral sexual sodomite, but by the time Windsor was decided, the legal homosexual had become a morally praiseworthy citizen. What did the legal homosexual have to acquire or abandon in order to be accorded moral nuance and complexity? This Part outlines three conditions that proved critical for placing homosexuality on the path to moral praise: (1) desexualization, (2) privatization, and (3) coupling and reproduction. I will discuss each in turn.

A. Bodies: Desexualization

The moral ascent of the legal homosexual over the last three decades has depended on the declining visibility of erotic acts. This reverse relation of sex to morality reflects what has been called “sex negativity,” an attitude that treats human sexuality with suspicion, and “[v]irtually all erotic behavior [as] bad unless a specific reason to exempt it has been established.”

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185 Id. at 151.
186 Id. (“For instance, heterosexual encounters may be sublime or disgusting, free or forced, healing or destructive, romantic or mercenary. As long as it does not violate other rules, heterosexuality is acknowledged to exhibit the full range of human experience.”).
187 Id.
188 Id. (“As a result of the sex conflicts of the last decade, some behavior near the border is inching across it. Unmarried couples living together, masturbation, and some forms of homosexuality are moving in the direction of respectability . . . .”).
189 Id. at 154.
190 Id. at 148. (“This culture always treats sex with suspicion. . . . Sex is presumed guilty until proven innocent. Virtually all erotic behavior is considered bad unless a specific reason to exempt it has been established. The most acceptable excuses are marriage, reproduction, and love. Sometimes scientific curiosity, aesthetic experience, or a long-term intimate relationship may serve. But the exercise of erotic capacity, intelligence, curiosity, or creativity all require pretexts that are unnecessary for other pleasures, such as the enjoyment of food, fiction, or astronomy.”).
Following this theme along the cases that make up the moral metamorphosis traced here—Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor—enables us to see clearly how the legal homosexual has undergone a process of desexualization.191

It began in Romer. With the emergence of the homosexual class, sex acts were no longer discussed. The legal homosexual in Romer had nothing to do with the crimes of sodomy described in Bowers. The homosexual became “a class we shall refer to as homosexual persons or gays and lesbians.”192 As Janet Halley has put it, “Romer, after all, is the decision in which the Supreme Court proposes to take the sex out of homosexuals.”193 One of the effects of Romer’s failure to mention Bowers, according to Halley, is that “Romer reconfigures its audience: it asks not for the differentiated, viscerally implicated, embodied, and identified audience of Hardwick but for a homogenous, reasoning, intending audience.”194 Bowers involved real bodies committing real sex acts,195 whereas Romer created an amorphous, bodiless, class of citizens.196 Turning the homosexual into an amorphous member of a class of citizens proved to be a successful strategy in Romer.

Next was Lawrence, perhaps the most dramatic desexualizing decision to date. Here, the “homosexual sodomite” was recast as an “intimate bond.”197 Recall that the Bowers Court conceptualized sodomy as an individual criminal act. By contrast, Lawrence’s rhetoric involved two people engaging in sexual intimacy. Lawrence, in contrast with Romer, was actually a case about sex,198 and Tyron Garner and John Lawrence were far from an “enduring intimate bond.”199 They were not a couple or even lovers.200 They were only acquaintances, whom police officers claimed to have observed

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191 For an earlier articulation of this theme, see Mary Anne Case, Commentary, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the Legal History of Litigating For Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1643, 1659–60 (1993) [hereinafter Case, Couples and Coupling] (“It is most interesting that two of the most prominent victories in gay rights litigation, Braschi and Kowalski are cases in which the court can bless a couple without blessing their sexual activities. In neither case is the couple functioning as a couple—Braschi’s lover is dead, Kowalski has emerged from a coma severely impaired—so the court can focus on all the wonderful pair bonding without being threatened by the sexual implications of that pair bonding.”) (footnotes and citations omitted).

192 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624.


194 Id. at 435.

195 Id. (“Readers of Hardwick cannot, I think, negotiate the text without making some reference, however fleeting, to these bodies, investments, and identifications.”).

196 See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 624; cf. Boucai, supra note 140, at 452–53 (describing the invisibility of bisexuality in same-sex marriage litigation); Yoshino, supra note 140, at 395–96 (noting the erasure of bisexuals and their sexuality in Romer); supra notes 140–144 (examining the erasure of bisexuality from Romer in relation to Windsor).

197 See supra Part I.C.

198 But see Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct, supra note 85, at 67–74 (arguing that it is unlikely that John Lawrence and Tyron Garner, the two defendants in Lawrence, were actually having sex when the police entered Lawrence’s home).

199 See id. at 61–63.

200 See id.
having illicit sex in Lawrence’s bedroom. But instead of discussing sex, the Court famously took sodomy out of the picture, asserting that the *Bowers* majority had mischaracterized the issue before it. *Lawrence* reasoned that the problem with sodomy laws was that they “seek to control a personal relationship that . . . is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.” The issue was the liberty to engage in private intimate conduct. Homosexual sex was now recast by the Court as intimate private acts.

Finally, in *Windsor*, we find the legal homosexual, this time two married women, stripped of their sexuality and sex acts altogether. In the documentary film, *Edie & Thea: A Very Long Engagement*, Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer discuss their long and exceedingly erotic love story. It is crystal clear, throughout this documentary, and in further interviews, that it was important for Edith and Thea to convey that sex was a meaningful part of their relationship. As Edith Windsor tells fans, “Keep it hot!” was one of the couple’s secrets to a long relationship. The Supreme Court’s version of their lives would not lead the reader to suspect any such thing. The Court’s decision centers on the couple’s 2007 marriage ceremony and lifelong commitment to each other. The only longing captured by the Court’s decision is the couple’s “long[ing] to marry.”

Whereas sex is utterly absent in *Windsor*, the Court mentioned the couple’s concerns about Thea’s health, which led them to marry in Canada in 2007. In fact, Thea’s disability may have been one of the aspects that made Windsor an appealing plaintiff to challenge DOMA, since her disability

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201 Id. at 67–70.
202 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“[The Court’s] statement [that *Bowers* concerned whether homosexuals had a right to engage in sodomy], we now conclude, discloses the Court’s own failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake. To say that the issue in *Bowers* was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.”).
203 Id. (emphasis added).
204 See Teemu Ruskola, *Gay Rights Versus Queer Theory: What’s Left of Sodomy After Lawrence v. Texas?*, 23 SOC. TEXT 235, 236–37 (2005) (discussing the shift from a right to engage in sodomy to a liberty to engage in private intimate conduct, and arguing that *Bowers* got the constitutional question right, even though it answered it wrong).
205 See *Edie & Thea: A VERY LONG ENGAGEMENT* (Bless Bless Productions 2009) [hereinafter *A VERY LONG ENGAGEMENT*].
206 See id. After the decision was published, Windsor told a reporter, “If I didn’t have nice breasts, Thea and I never would have gotten together.” Ariel Levy, *The Perfect Wife*, NEW YORKER, Sept. 30, 2013, at 56.
207 Id. at 54.
209 Id. at 2689.
210 Id. at 2683.
211 See Levy, supra note 206, at 62.
could help to desexualize her. Desexualizing Edith and Thea was apparently a litigation strategy. Shortly after the Court’s decision in *Windsor*, Edith Windsor’s attorney recalled that when she initially took her client’s case pro bono, she made rules for her client: she instructed her not to talk publicly about sex. As Windsor’s attorney explained in a *New Yorker* article with the telling title, *The Perfect Wife*, “All I needed was Antonin Scalia reading about Edie and Thea’s butch-femme escapades.”

B. Space: Privatization

The second condition on the path to moral praise involved a growing emphasis on the *private* legal homosexual. The legal homosexual is perceived as someone who has private (as opposed to public) sex, and lives a private, domesticated life. This perception crystallized in *Lawrence*. The *Lawrence* Court could have declared a liberty to engage in an unfettered sexual life. But it did not. It articulated a liberty to engage in private, consensual, homosexual intimacy. As Justice Kennedy reasoned:

> It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.

The key words here are “their homes,” “private lives,” “intimate conduct,” and “personal bond that is more enduring.” The *Lawrence* majority decriminalized homosexual sodomy, and at the same time confined it geographically to non-public spaces. This private notion of liberty, which Katherine Franke has called a “curious form of liberty,” is “less expansive, rather geographized, and, in the end, domesticated.”

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212 See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, *Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love*, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1307, 1317 (2009) (“While law and norms play matchmaker when it comes to sex and race, the norm surrounding disability has typically been one of utter isolation, or *desexualization* . . . .”).


214 *Id.*

215 See *Lawrence v. Texas*, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government.”).

216 *Id.* at 567 (emphasis added).

217 *Id.*

218 Katherine Franke, *The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas*, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1399, 1401 (2004). See also *id.* at 1400 (“In *Lawrence* the Court relies on a narrow version of liberty that is both geographized and domesticated—not a robust conception of sexual freedom or liberty, as is commonly assumed. In this way, *Lawrence*..."
The spotlight on the private legal homosexual has also been prevalent in contemporary same-sex marriage litigation.\(^{219}\) Interestingly, in *Glorious Precedents: When Same-Sex Marriage Was Radical*, Michael Boucai argues that the gay marriage challenges of the 1970s stand in sharp contrast to our current moment.\(^{220}\) According to Boucai, these early plaintiffs did not advocate private sex, monogamy, or even long enduring commitments.\(^{221}\) Their goal was not assimilation to bourgeois domesticity.\(^{222}\) It was liberation. They wanted to pose a political challenge to a discriminatory institution.\(^{223}\) These “glorious” precedents, all of which failed miserably in courts,\(^{224}\) teach us that marriage equality litigation was not always pursued through the framework of private sex and domestic lives. Even more to the point, for the metamorphosis traced here, it is vital to see how privatization played a role in making the legal homosexual more intelligible—and at the end more moral—in the eyes of the Court.

C. Relationships: Coupling and Reproduction

In 1993, still in the shadow of *Bowers*, Mary Anne Case aptly observed that “the couple, the missing third term between the individual and the community, is an extremely suggestive absence from the [lesbian and gay] litigation history.”\(^{225}\) Case pointed out that the privacy right in *Griswold v. Connecticut*\(^{226}\) was originally granted to the married couple who had sought to use contraceptives—not to individuals.\(^{227}\) Accordingly, Case suggested

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\(^{219}\) See, e.g., *Kitchen v. Herbert*, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1199–1200 (D. Utah 2013) (“The right to marry is intertwined with the rights to privacy and intimate association, and an individual’s choices related to marriage are protected because they are integral to a person’s dignity and autonomy.”); *Griego v. Oliver*, 316 P.3d 865, 885 (N.M. 2013) (“The United States Supreme Court also has described the right to marry as ‘of fundamental importance for all individuals’ and as ‘part of the fundamental “right of privacy” implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.’” (quoting *Zablocki v. Redhail*, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978))).


\(^{221}\) Id.

\(^{222}\) See id.

\(^{223}\) See id.


\(^{225}\) See Case, *Couples and Coupling*, supra note 191, at 1648, 1651 (“[B]y ‘couple,’ I mean two gay men or lesbians together in any intimate capacity, whether it be for a lifetime of domestic partnership or a ‘quickie.’”).

\(^{226}\) 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

\(^{227}\) Case, *Couples and Coupling*, supra note 191, at 1654 (“The right of privacy articulated by the majority in *Griswold* was, after all, first and foremost a relational right, not one centered in the autonomy of the individual. For the *Griswold* majority, that ‘case . . . concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy . . . And it concerns a law which . . . has[s] a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship.’”) (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting *Griswold*, 381 U.S. at 485).
that to establish a gay and lesbian “intimate association” right, “it may be necessary to go back to Griswold, i.e., to a strong pair bond.”\footnote{Id.} This is because courts “have seen their enterprise with respect to heterosexuals in earlier cases as promoting pair bonding, not mere copulation.”\footnote{Id.}

The legal homosexual, suggested Case, had been losing some cases due to an absent pair bond.\footnote{Id. at 1655.} In the sodomy cases, in particular, Case underscored that the plaintiffs often challenged sodomy statutes as individuals, not as couples.\footnote{Case acknowledges though that coupling can serve as a double-edged sword, sometimes leading to defeat. \textit{Id.} at 1666 (“Whether a gay litigant is seen as part of a couple may spell the difference between victory and defeat for him or her. Unfortunately, sometimes being coupled seems to spell victory, at other times defeat.”).} For example, Hardwick challenged the Georgia statute \textit{by himself} and not with his fellow sex-mate, and “this absence of a pair bond to go along with the copulating is what makes Hardwick, otherwise so ideal, an imperfect vehicle.”\footnote{Id. at 1647–48.} Case concluded that in some contexts, especially sodomy challenges, which are already sexualized, “a greater focus on pair-bonding clearly has benefits that outweigh the risks.”\footnote{Id. at 1653 (footnote omitted) (explaining that “[t]here are understandable reasons for the absence of Hardwick’s partner from the litigation—he was a schoolteacher from North Carolina, a married man, and a one-night stand. ‘Please don’t tell my wife . . . I’ll lose my teaching job,’ he begged the officer who arrested them. It was not surprising that he ‘pleaded to lesser charges and split,’ leaving Hardwick alone to fight the case.” (alteration in original)).} Mary Anne Case’s analysis indeed predicted the two later couples-oriented decisions in our metamorphosis: \textit{Lawrence} and \textit{Windsor}. As we saw above, these two cases were entirely oriented toward the couple. Gays (\textit{Lawrence}) and lesbians (\textit{Windsor}) now appear in the Court’s rhetoric as couples or intimate bonds. This, as Case suggested over twenty years ago, has proved a winning strategy in both the sodomy and marriage contexts.

In addition to the same-sex couple already emergent in \textit{Lawrence}, \textit{Windsor} added children to the mix. Despite the fact that Edith and Thea never had children,\footnote{Levy, supra note 206, at 57; see also Redding, supra note 179, at 15 (characterizing Windsor as “queer” for not having children).} the children of same-sex couples are a key presence throughout the \textit{Windsor} decision. The decision discusses, for instance, the humiliating effects of the Defense of Marriage Act on children,\footnote{United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (DOMA “humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples.”).} the importance of committing in marriage before children,\footnote{Id. at 2689 (“Slowly at first and then in rapid course, the laws of New York came to acknowledge the urgency of this issue for same-sex couples who wanted to affirm their commitment to one another before their children, their family, their friends, and their community.”).} and the difficulty “for the children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own fami-
ily.”237 So in Windsor, in addition to the couple, the Court casts children and reproduction as characteristic of the legal homosexual.238

In sum, we see that three conditions are at the core of the transition of the legal homosexual from an immoral sodomite to a dignified married couple. The legal homosexual is commonly perceived as desexualized, privatized, and coupled and reproductive.

III. INCOMPLETE CLOSURE: WINDSOR’S WEAK DIGNITY

The history of DOMA’s enactment and its own text demonstrate that interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a dignity conferred by the States in the exercise of their sovereign power, was more than an incidental effect of the federal statute. It was its essence.

— Justice Kennedy, United States v. Windsor239

The concept of human dignity is not new in the jurisprudence of the Court. It has been especially prominent in decisions authored by Justice Kennedy.240 As Reva Siegel has observed, the normative meaning of human dignity varies from case to case, such that “[a]t different points . . . dignity concerns the value of life, the value of liberty, and the value of equality.”241 In fact, dignity can sometimes support opposing normative positions. For instance, in Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court appealed to human dignity to justify government restriction of abortions,242 whereas in Casey, the Court appealed to human dignity to support a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy.243

What work does dignity do in Windsor? The discussion of Windsor in Part I examined the doctrinal significance of dignity in the Court’s holding.244 This Part argues that Windsor’s dignity is weak for three principal

237 Id. at 2694.
238 Since the 2000s, children of gay and lesbian couples have also appeared in popular culture. See, e.g., The Kids Are All Right (Focus Features 2010); The L Word (Showtime 2004–2009); The New Normal (NBC 2012–2013).
239 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
241 Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 Yale L.J. 1694, 1701–02 (2008); see also id. at 1696 (“[T]he substantive due process and equal protection cases constitutional protections for dignity vindicate, often concurrently, the value of life, the value of liberty, and the value of equality.”); see generally Mary Anne Case, Of “This” and “That” in Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 Sup. Ct. Rev. 75 (2003) (discussing the role of dignity in Lawrence).
243 See also Siegel, supra note 241, at 1696 (“A commitment to dignity structures the undue burden test itself, which allows government to regulate abortion to demonstrate respect for the dignity of human life so long as such regulation also demonstrates respect for the dignity of women.”) (footnote omitted).
244 Supra Part I.D.1.
2014] Conferring Dignity 277

reasons. First, it is conferred by the State and at each state’s discretion. Second, Windsor’s dignity is much narrower in scope than contemporary theories of dignity promoted by legal and moral philosophers. Third, Windsor’s State-conferred dignity comes with unnecessary rhetoric of injured subjects, a rhetoric that could perpetuate an attachment to injury by homosexual couples and other rights-seeking legal subjects.

A. Weak Source: State-Conferred Dignity

The Windsor decision repeatedly affirms that the State is the source of human dignity. Upon arrival of what the Court calls “a new perspective, a new insight,”245 some states have decided to dignify same-sex couples by recognizing their marriages. This “conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import”246 and “enhanced the recognition, dignity, and protection of the class.”247 This novel theory of State-conferred dignity is problematic for at least two reasons.

First, and more importantly, in contrast with God or his derivative institutions, the source of the State’s authority to grant moral dignity is unclear. The State can grant liberal rights such as liberty and equality, but those, at least in their common use, are understood as secular liberal rights. They do not confer moral value on individuals. Windsor seems to locate the power to confer dignity in the formation of consensus within communities.248 Namely, the State confers dignity after the local community has decided to accept a group of previously disapproved-of individuals. But if dignity is a serious human value, it should be guaranteed by the State, like equality and liberty, to all members of society. It should not have to wait for the moral approval of a majority of the population.

Second, it is unclear whether State-conferred dignity can travel across state lines. Under the Court’s rendering, a state decision to recognize same-sex marriages enhances the dignity of that class only “in their own community.”249 So if Amy and Emily marry in Iowa, a state that recognizes their marriage, they will be dignified in Iowa. But when they travel to the neighboring Nebraska, or to Georgia or Alabama, that dignity may have to stay behind, and their marriage may once again be undignified.250 It is strange indeed to imagine losing one’s dignity when crossing state lines.

246 Id. at 2692.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 2692–93 (discussing “the formation of consensus respecting the way the members of a discrete community treat each other in their daily contact and constant interaction with each other” and “the community’s considered perspective on the historical roots of the institution of marriage and its evolving understanding of the meaning of equality”).
249 Id. at 2692.
250 See Baude, supra note 116, at 157 (arguing that “even if courts conclude that some form of interstate recognition is constitutionally required, not all recognitions are

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B. Weak Scope: A Narrow Theory of Human Dignity

Windsor’s theory of State-conferred dignity is significantly narrower than other present and historical conceptions of human dignity. Human dignity has played an important role in international and national human rights movements, and it has provided a basis for much theorizing about social justice. To illuminate just how narrow Windsor’s theory of State-conferred dignity is, let us briefly consider how moral philosophers have treated the concept of human dignity.

Dignity has received growing attention in contemporary moral philosophy and legal theory. For example, Martha Nussbaum’s approach to justice is based on human dignity. Nussbaum has argued that respect for human dignity requires that governments should support central human “capabilities.” Nussbaum defines dignity as follows:

If something has dignity, as Kant put it well, it does not merely have a price: it is not merely something to be used for the ends of others, or traded on the market. This idea is closely linked to the idea of respect as the proper attitude toward dignity; indeed, rather than thinking of the two concepts as totally independent, so that we would first offer an independent account of dignity and then argue that dignity deserves respect (as independently defined), I

the same. One important distinction is between already-married couples who move to a new state that does not recognize their marriage (a “migratory” marriage) and couples who live in a state that does not allow them to marry, but get married on a brief trip outside of that state (an “evasive” marriage).

251 See, e.g., Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl. 1, art. 1, § 1 (Ger.) (“Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.”); Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752–1992, SH No. 1391, § 2 (Isr.) (“There shall be no violation of the life, body or dignity of any person as such.”); Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 3(1)(c), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (prohibiting “outrages upon personal dignity”); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”).

252 For a history of the idea of dignity, see generally Martha Nussbaum, Human Dignity and Political Entitlements, in Human Dignity and Bioethics; Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics 351 (2008) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Human Dignity], available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pbhe/reports/human_dignity/chapter14.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5QTQ-PWLA; see also id. at 352 (“According to the Greek and Roman Stoics, the basis for human community is the worth of reason in each and every human being. Reason (meaning practical reason, the capacity for moral choice), is, in the Stoic view, a portion of the divine in each of us.”) (footnote omitted).

253 See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 70–71 (2006); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 5 (2000). The core capabilities that, according to Nussbaum, should be supported by all democracies are as follows: life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses, imagination and thought, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, other species, play, and control over one’s environment. Id. at 78–80.
believe that we should think of the two notions as closely related, forming a concept-family to be jointly elucidated. 254

Dignity is ultimately bound up with respect, according to Nussbaum, and it is the responsibility of the liberal state to ensure this respect. The state does not grant dignity. Its only function is to safeguard it. 255

Jeremy Waldron has argued for a slightly different understanding of human dignity, connected to what he calls “responsibility-rights.” 256 Waldron’s concept of dignity draws upon the importance of social rank, but with a twist. 257 As he explains, “the idea of general human dignity associated itself [with] the notion that humans as such were a high-ranking species, called to a special vocation in the world, and that in a sense each of us was to be regarded as endowed with a certain nobility or royalty, each of us was to be regarded as a creature of a high rank.” 258 Waldron conceives current liberal societies as societies not without caste, but rather, “with just one caste and a very high caste at that: every man a Brahmin. Every man a duke, every woman a queen, everyone entitled to the sort of deference and consideration, everyone’s person and body sacrosanct . . . .” 259 Given this elevated status of all individuals, a societal commitment to dignity must connect individual rights with social responsibilities toward others. 260

254 Nussbaum, Human Dignity, supra note 252, at 353–54.
255 Id. at 359–60 (“Respect for human dignity is not just lip service, it means creating conditions favorable for development and choice. . . . [I]t is the task of the ‘basic structure’ of society to put in place the necessary conditions for a minimally decent human life, a life at least minimally worthy of human dignity, expressive of at least minimal respect. If we accept such an account . . . this yields the conclusion that government (meaning the basic structure of society) should support the central human capabilities.”).
256 Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 Ariz. St. L.J. 1107, 1116 (2011). The Second Amendment right to bear arms is one example of a responsibility-right. Id. at 1117 (“[T]he way the Second Amendment is drafted presents it as a responsibility right, which admittedly does not obliterate the restraint on government—indeed the citizen militia is supposed to be a potentially anti-government force—but also does not leave it as a simply libertarian entitlement. The responsibility aspect is a way of informing and conditioning the individual possession and exercise of the right.”); see also Noa Ben-Asher, Obligatory Health, 15 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 1, 18 (2012) (characterizing the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act as a praiseworthy obligation of citizens towards the basic health needs of other fellow-citizens).
257 Id. at 1118 (“In Roman usage, dignitas embodied the idea of the honor, the privileges and the deference due to rank or office, perhaps also reflecting one’s distinction in holding that rank or office. And the Oxford English Dictionary still gives as its second meaning for the term ‘Honourable or high estate, position, or estimation; . . . degree of estimation, rank’ and as its third meaning ‘An honourable office, rank, or title; a high official or titular position.’”) (footnote omitted).
258 Id. at 1119. But cf. Franke, Dignifying Rights, supra note 169, at 1178 (arguing that linking rights, responsibility, and dignity may at times require some to “behave[e] responsibly,” turning dignity into “an accomplishment, a normative practice which requires work. It is something you can, indeed must, earn and can risk losing.”).
259 Waldron, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, supra note 256, at 1120 (footnote omitted).
260 Id. at 1136 (“And it is a way of connecting rights with socially important functions, not just seeing them as an individualist limit on the ambit of social functions. It is also, as I have said, an important way of connecting rights with dignity. For these rea-
Both of these approaches, despite differences between them, conceptualize human dignity as something that all individuals possess and that society must protect, defend, and enhance. Under Nussbaum’s approach, all humans have dignity and this translates into a set of obligations for modern states. Under Waldron’s approach, human dignity comes from dignitas, which is a rank that all citizens share in liberal democracies. One need not accept either theory of dignity to agree that, if dignity is to be embraced as a social or legal value, it should not be understood to come from the State. Neither theory of dignity derives human dignity from State recognition. Waldron and Nussbaum’s views usefully illustrate how far afield the Court’s presentation of dignity is from contemporary philosophical accounts.

C. Weak Subjects: Windsor’s Injured Subjects

The word that Kennedy used a lot was dignity . . . and when you are a kid and you figure out you’re gay when you’re seven years old . . . you don’t know about sex or anything like that, but you do know that you’ll never be able to have a life like your mom and dad. Be married. And that’s a huge wound to some kids’ self-esteem, identity, psychological pride, and that wound has been healed a little today. And I think of all the future people who will be less damaged and less wounded, will feel less pain . . . .”

—— Andrew Sullivan, CNN interview with Anderson Cooper

*United States v. Windsor* tells the story of wounded and injured subjects. The Defense of Marriage Act, according to *Windsor*, “demeans the couple, . . . whose relationship the State has sought to dignify.” It “imposes a disability on the class”; it “places same-sex couples in an unstable...
position of being in a second-tier marriage.” Furthermore, the injury, *Windsor* tells us, extends to the children of same-sex couples. DOMA “humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples.” DOMA, thus understood, was powerful legislation that caused immense wounds. These wounds, according to *Windsor*, did not occur as a result of recklessness or even negligence by Congress. The injuries were caused by an intentional act of animus, a statute that was meant to “de-mean” same-sex couples. The majority in *Windsor* claimed that DOMA was designed for that purpose alone: to disadvantage and stigmatize married same-sex couples.

This language of injury resonates with the argument, articulated most fully by Wendy Brown, that contemporary identity politics runs the risk of reinforcing “wounded attachments.” Brown explains,

> In locating a site of blame for its powerlessness over its past—a past of injury, a past as a hurt will—and locating a “reason” for the “unendurable pain” of social powerlessness in the present, it converts this reasoning into an ethicizing politics . . . . Politicized identity thus enunciates itself, makes claims for itself, only by entrenching, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing its pain in politics . . . .

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267 *Id.* at 2694.

268 *Id.* (“[DOMA] makes it even more difficult for the children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family . . . .”).

269 But see id. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“But the majority says that the supporters of this Act acted with malice. . . . I am sure these accusations are quite untrue.”).

270 *Id.* at 2695 (“The principal purpose and the necessary effect of this law are to demean those persons who are in a lawful same-sex marriage.”).

271 *Id.* at 2693 (“The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”). The Court seems to have drawn much of the rhetoric of injury and stigma from the “the voices of [the] children” amici brief, which was submitted to the Supreme Court by multiple groups, including the Family Equality Council and the Child Rights Project at Emory University School of Law. See Brief for Family Equality Council et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2, *Windsor*, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307) and *Holingsworth v. Perry*, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144). One of the brief’s main claims was that DOMA and Proposition 8 stigmatized and delegitimized same-sex parented families. *Id.* at 23–31. The brief asserts that children of same-sex parents are “very much demeaned and stigmatized by being ‘treated differently,’” and that “these feelings of stigmatization, inferiority, and de-legitimization are common themes heard by the amici who work every day with children raised by same-sex parents.” *Id.* at 25. The brief also asserts that this stigmatization “can lead children to have insecurity about their parents’ relationship.” *Id.*


273 *Id.* at 74 (1995). Brown criticizes identity politics as a psychological reflection of Nietzschean *resentment*. Brown sees in the contemporary mobilization of rights claims a troubling directing or channeling of individual feelings of *resentment* toward the other, the perceived injurer.
The problem, according to Brown, arises when a past injury becomes an important constituent of individual and group identity. When this happens, the individual and group identity may become attached to—dependent and responsive to—its past wounds. The identity group becomes unable to articulate new values, new ideas, new morality, and new alternatives. Windsor’s rhetoric of injury risks creating the type of “wounded attachment” that Brown warned about. Windsor posits an entire class of people as demeaned, injured, and humiliated by one piece of legislation that defined marriage as a union between one man and one woman.

Windsor is thus a paradoxical legal moment. At the same time that it cures an injustice, it plants the seed for future feelings of resentment. By invalidating DOMA, the Court has reversed a gross injustice, a law that promoted marriage inequality for seventeen years. But the Court’s vigorous rhetoric of indignity, injury, and humiliation also encourages conceptions of injury and shame in present and future LGBT identity politics. Windsor sends a message to those who live in states that do not recognize marriage equality that they should feel harmed and humiliated.

Advocates should resist this infectious rhetoric of injury in future advocacy and politics by insisting that those who enacted DOMA are the ones who have been humiliated by it. The Court could have avoided this damaging discourse by invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act on straightforward Equal Protection grounds. The Court could have ruled, as it did in Romer, and as the Iowa Supreme Court did in Varnum v. Brien, that treating classes of people differently for no legitimate purpose violates the Equal Protection guarantees of the Constitution. But it did not. Instead, Windsor, hailed as one of the biggest civil rights victories of our times, introduced the prospect of new shame and indignity for those who still cannot marry.

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274 See id. at 68–70.
275 See id. at 70–74.
276 See id. at 52–76; cf. generally Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and Minds of Abortion Discourse, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (2010) (showing how trauma narratives adopted by feminists in the 1970s in relation to rape have re-emerged in recent abortion cases).
277 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009) (“In this case, we must decide if our state statute limiting civil marriage to a union between a man and a woman violates the Iowa Constitution, as the district court ruled. On our review, we hold the Iowa marriage statute violates the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution.”).
278 For a discussion of the likely reasons for the majority’s approach, see supra notes 116–134 and accompanying text.
279 See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 134 (“If Bill Clinton was ‘the first Black president,’ Anthony Kennedy has now firmly secured his place in history as ‘the first gay Justice.’ . . . A hundred years from now, histories of the Court will treat Justice Kennedy w/’t gay rights the way we think of Earl Warren w/’t racial equality.”); Goldberg, One-Two Punch, supra note 117; Scott Lemieux, Two Cheers for the Supreme Court on LGBT Rights, AM. PROSPECT (June 26, 2013), http://prospect.org/article/two-cheers-supreme-court-lgbt-rights, archived at http://perma.cc/K73S-QXGG (describing Windsor as “a historic opinion and a major victory for civil rights”).
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Windsor’s dignity, in sum, suffers from three principal weaknesses: (1) its source as something conferred by the State; (2) its narrow scope; and (3) its rhetoric of wound and injury. Courts, litigators, social movements, and scholars are now charged with rehabilitating Windsor’s dignity.

CONCLUSION

[It should be the questions and shape of a life, its total complexity gathered, arranged and considered, which matters in the end, not some stamp of salvation or damnation which disperses all the complexity in some unsatisfying little decision—the balancing of the scales.]

—Angels in America, Part One: Millennium Approaches

We have experienced a fascinating legal and moral metamorphosis in the last three decades—from Bowers’ homosexual sodomite to Windsor’s same-sex marriages “deemed by the State worthy of dignity.” This Article has traced the road from there to here. In every decade since 1986, the Supreme Court portrayed the legal homosexual with a new and different emphasis. In Romer, the legal homosexual became a protected class; in Lawrence, an enduring intimate bond; and in Windsor, a same-sex couple dignified by marriage. Of course, this is not just a new sport of judicial name-calling. In each of these transformative moments, a constitutional doctrine closely traced the new casting of the legal homosexual. In Romer (the “Equal Homosexual Class Phase”), the homosexual class was granted equal protection; in Lawrence (the “Free Intimate Bond Phase”), intimate, private conduct was granted liberty from government intrusion; and in Windsor (the “Dignified Married Couple Phase”), the married same-sex couple was understood to have been granted “equal dignity” by states who recognize same-sex marriages.

Federal marriage equality is now here. As new marriage equality challenges make their way through the courts, advocates and courts will continue to face the significant task of putting to work Windsor’s ruling on “equal dignity.” Although Windsor will undoubtedly go down in history as a milestone civil rights victory, its concept of human dignity sadly leaves much to be desired. It is a weak dignity. Its source is the State and not the individual. It is narrow in scope, and it comes with rhetoric of injury and humiliation.

What would a stronger dignity look like? It would invoke the concept of human dignity while explicitly resisting the three primary weaknesses of

284 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
Windsor’s dignity. First, and most importantly, advocates and courts applying Windsor should clarify that “equal dignity” means that the State must give equal recognition to the dignity of all individuals and couples. The State grants marriage licenses, and it should grant them equally to all couples. In so doing, the State does not distribute dignity; it acknowledges dignity equally across citizens. Second, and relatedly, advocates should be careful not to imply that human dignity is enhanced by marriage. If dignity inheres in the individual, then neither the state where one resides nor the state of matrimony increases that dignity. Finally, where possible, past injustices, such as DOMA and sodomy laws, should be condemned without assuming that they have injured. A stronger account of dignity would resist portraying all lesbians, gays, and bisexuals and their children as injured subjects who have been humiliated and shamed by unjust laws. But even if advocates may feel compelled to offer every argument that might persuade a court, judges, in selecting among those arguments, have a choice about the language and the light in which they cast the subjects who appear before them.

In 1962, Edith Windsor asked a friend in New York City to take her to “where the lesbians go.” There she met Thea, and they danced for the next forty years. Edith and Thea lived a life of passion and joy. They were engaged in 1967, before any state ever considered recognizing their union. They protested after the 1969 Stonewall riots for justice for lesbians, homosexuals, bisexuals, drag queens, and many others. The sign on their refrigerator said, “Don’t postpone joy.” In 2007, they married. Marriage did not dignify Edith and Thea. They dignified marriage.

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285 See supra Part III.B (discussing these arguments).
286 A VERY LONG ENGAGEMENT. Paradoxically, half a century later, in a decision that bears Edith’s name, the lesbians will have in some significant way disappeared. See supra Part II.A.