This article addresses recent regulatory efforts to proscribe undisclosed conflicts of interest beyond mere scalping, including ownership interests in recommended securities, and the compensation connection between analysts and investment bankers within a firm. Part III of this article traces the history of prior cases imposing liability on industry participants, including investment advisers, analysts and others, for failing to disclose their conflicts of interest when recommending securities. Part IV of this article then examines the question of whether analysts have any civil liability to those relying on their recommendations for failure to disclose actual or potential conflicts of interest. Finally, the author concludes that, in light of the new regulations, analysts should be liable to investors for their undisclosed conflicts of interest.
Jill I. Gross, Securities Analysts' Undisclosed Conflicts of Interest: Unfair Dealing or Securities Fraud?, 2002 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 631 (2002), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/58/.