While many American businesspeople and companies who understand the realities of doing business in foreign countries would likely agree with Siekaczek’s lamentation, the problem with the 11th commandment is that “not getting caught” for bribery is becoming increasingly difficult in the U.S. This is so not only because of the FCPA prevents the making of “corrupt payments” to foreign officials for the purpose of promoting business interests, but because the Department of Justice is strictly enforcing the FCPA by investigating more cases levying extremely high fines in plea bargains, and even performing sting operations through the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Avoiding notice is likely hard enough in a situation where only one individual is paying bribes, but bribery naturally becomes harder to conceal when multiple parties are involved. Such is the case in the world of international project finance. Because the FCPA’s reach is not restricted to the people who physically pay the money or make an improper offer, liability can extend much further than U.S. companies and businesspeople might expect and hope. Consequently, complicated issues of liability exist for many project finance participants because any one project can include many people and entities—lenders, agents, project sponsors, project companies, constructors, operators, and so forth. Thus, rather than hoping to “not get caught,” project finance participants should take active steps throughout the duration of a project to identify potential violations and prevent bribes. This strategy presents participants with the best opportunity for avoiding FCPA liability, possible jail time, and severe economic and other consequences to the project.

In Part II of the article, the importance of the SMEs for the current economy of the UK will be assessed. Together with Part I, Part II will form the prism through which the remainder of the article will be viewed.

Parts III and onwards will analyze the hypothesis stated earlier in the Introduction. They will ask the questions: (1) Would the ratification of the CISG be beneficial for the UK SMEs? and (2) Would the ratification of the CISG be beneficial for the economy of the UK?

Part II of this Article sets up the framework in which the previously mentioned legal question arises. It reviews federal law governing the enforceability of arbitration agreements, including the Federal Arbitration Act, the New York Convention, and McCarran-Ferguson’s reverse preemption scheme as it relates to federal arbitration law. Part III introduces the disagreement between federal courts as to whether McCarran-Ferguson permits states to reverse preempt the implementation of the New York Convention to the extent that it may be applied to the business of insurance. Part IV argues that the methodology of resolving this disagreement—which currently centers on whether or not the New York Convention is a self-executing treaty—inadequately addresses Congress’s purpose in enacting McCarran-Ferguson. It further contends that regardless of the self-executing or non-self-executing status of the New York Convention, McCarran-Ferguson protects state law from preemption by the substantive guarantees of the New York Convention because an Act of Congress, Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, provides the sole mechanism for the enforcement and recognition of international arbitration agreements under the Convention. Part V briefly concludes this Article.

In 2006, the Hong Kong Government appointed Arculli & Associates Solicitor Firm to study issues relating to competition in the auto-fuel retail market in Hong Kong. A test based on contribution margins was recommended, leading to the conclusion that price fixing is not a crime in the industry.

This article examines the problems related to Arculli & Associates Solicitor Firm’s conclusion. First, price fixing is a per se violation (in or by itself) of the anti-trust law in the United States. Second, it is difficult for the courts to evaluate price fixing because the evidence of such activities between corporations is not easily available. Third, the test has applied non-standardized accounting principles, which clash with the accounting industry on numerous grounds.

To combat these problems, this paper proposes a revised and objective “Contribution Margin” test to measure monopolies. Based on general accounting principles, this paper presents a comparative study of contribution margins between listed companies in the United States and Hong Kong.