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The Principle of Resilience

Thesis elaborated under the
advice of Professor Nicholas
Robinson as one of the
requirements for receiving the
Masters of Laws degree in
Environmental Law

PACE LAW SCHOOL

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ABSTRACT

This article departs from the observation of accentuated degradation of ecosystems worldwide to stress the urgency in changing the patterns of occupation of the land, production, consumption and the ecological and ethical goals of environmental conservation. Aiming to achieve these ends, this article proposes the acknowledgement of the principle of resilience in international environmental law. The principle of resilience is articulated herein based on the concept of ecological resilience; the values of *land ethic*; and the existing principles of international environmental law. Later, the article explains how the principle can be applied to adaptive governance; adaptive management; environmental impact assessment; land use legislation; and market incentives for conservation. The article concludes that the principle of resilience is aimed at providing moral and ecological foundation for sustainable development and a green economy; to require judges, administrators and operators of law to consider the long-term consequences of their actions on nature and on future generations, thereby achieving better conservation patterns on a case by case basis; to enlighten legislators on how domestic environmental legislation can be improved; to impose an individual and societal moral obligation to respect and improve nature, and to live in harmony with it. Finally, the article proposes a legal framework for implementation of the principle in domestic and international environmental law.

KEYWORDS

Land ethic – International environmental law – Ecological resilience – Environmental impact assessment – Land use – Market incentives – Sustainable development – Green economy – Adaptive governance

INTRODUCTION

Scientific findings have often concluded that environmental quality levels are getting worse despite efforts towards environmental protection. Such findings demonstrate the need for a change in strategy towards conservation. However, changing the way humans act towards conservation is not an easy task because (1) environmental protection deals with very complex structures, the ecosystems; (2) conservation cannot be addressed solely by one field of knowledge, it requires an interdisciplinary approach; (3) and because it will not be achieved through the efforts of only one sector of society, solely government, market, or individual citizens – it requires a conjugation of efforts among all sectors.

Since humankind started to get concerned about the degradation of nature, we focused our attention on the preservation of specific species of fauna and flora that, for whatever reason, inspired our attraction. Environmental laws also focused on the preservation of landscapes that distinguished themselves by their exceptional beauty, by their importance or because they were the remains of an almost extinct ecosystem or the habitat of some almost extinct species¹. By those means, humankind thought that, by preserving at least samples of each ecosystem and its inhabitant species, they were conserving biodiversity. However, those samples continued to suffer degradation, despite the efforts to guarantee stability and to keep their original state. By studying the causes of this phenomenon, ecologists concluded that ecosystems preserved in only a few restricted areas were collapsing because they were too vulnerable to disturbances. They noticed that this increase in vulnerability has been occurring since human occupation of land around the world increased in extension and intensity, as a result of the expansion of industrialization.

But why did ecosystems get more vulnerable? Because, by eradicating species, by polluting the environment and by changing environmental features, humankind has reduced ecosystem resilience². The increased vulnerability of ecosystems cause them to suffer unpredictable changes. These changes are generally also undesirable for humankind because

¹ In the United States, the preservation of specific ecosystems due to the presence of almost extinct species started in 1972, when the Endangered Species Act was enacted.

² Carl Folke et al, *Regime Shifts, Resilience, and Biodiversity in Ecosystem Management*, in FOUNDATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE 119, 142 (Lance H. Gunderson et al. eds., 2009).

all production of services and goods, and all the features of land use rely on the predictability of basic natural characteristics such as the frequency and intensity of rains, or the geological solidity of mountains over which cities are built, or the chemical composition of the soil. What increases the danger of loss of ecosystem resilience for humans and for the other creatures that inhabit these ecosystems is that, depending on the intensity of the alteration of an ecosystem, the change may turn out to be irreversible.

The concern about resilience is related to the questions “how do we deal with sustainability?” and “how do we address climate change?”. The concept of ecosystem resilience may be a new opportunity to achieve sustainability – which has been pursued without great success since 1987, when the World Commission on Environment and Development (also known as the Brundland Commission) popularized the term and the definition of “sustainable development”³.

The concept of ecosystem resilience also affects how we address climate change because, after all, if ecosystems are currently vulnerable, how are they going to resist disturbances such as climate change and the rise in sea level? In the face of the growing expectation and certainty that ecosystems will be seriously damaged⁴ and that human inaction will only exacerbate the negative impacts of this event, humankind has begun considering what should be done to restore ecosystem resilience and to avoid consequences of even greater proportions.

Scientists concluded that, in order to restore ecosystem resilience, it is not enough to preserve the ecosystem in limited tracts of land - it is necessary to preserve the ecosystem functions, that is, the few natural mechanisms that continuously occur within an ecosystem and that are responsible for maintaining the subsistence of its inhabitant species and the function of the ecosystem as a whole.

The natural mechanisms on which an ecosystem relies are provided by the diversity of species⁵; thus the enhancement of ecosystem resilience requires the conservation of

³ U.N. World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future*, U.N. Doc. A/42/427(Aug. 4,1987).

⁴ See STEFFEN, W., ET AL, *GLOBAL CHANGE AND THE EARTH SYSTEM: A PLANET UNDER PRESSURE* (2004)

⁵ Carl Folke et al., *Biological Diversity, Ecosystems, and the Human Scale*, in *FOUNDATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE*, *supra* note 2, at 151, 154-158.

biodiversity. In fact, this finding does not bring new challenges for the regulation of human activities or for the relationship between humans and nature. In some way or another, humans have always sought to maintain biodiversity because the extinction of species is condemned both by a moral approach – which posits that we should protect species from extinction because we can do it and it is the right thing to do – and by the utilitarian approach, which stresses that the extinction of a species can cause disturbances in ecosystems, therefore harming humans, or can deprive humans of valuable services, such as the cure for mortal diseases that were hidden in some gene of the extinct species⁶.

In order to conserve ecosystem resilience, however, ecologists recognize that it is not sufficient to preserve samples of each species and ecosystem in limited protected areas, presumably to preserve biodiversity: ecosystems should be preserved everywhere⁷. That finding creates a huge impact in the relationship between humans and nature because humans are already reluctant to enforce conservation of nature in a few places, even more so to recognize conservation of nature everywhere.

Folke, Holling and Perrings affirm that the reform of conservation institutions to make them more adaptable to the changing needs of ecosystems' management could contribute to the achievement of the objective of preserving nature everywhere⁸.

As for institutional reform, adaptive governance coupled with adaptive management is regarded as a strong tool to enhance the achievement of resilience when managing an ecosystem. Adaptive governance enhances an institution's capability to deal flexibly with new situations, thus preparing managers for uncertainty and surprise⁹. Adaptive management is the process of learning from experience by monitoring ecosystem responses to actions taken by institutions that manage ecosystems¹⁰.

Although adaptive governance and adaptive management can be useful tools to address resilience, they are not sufficient. The achievement of resilience requires a substantial

⁶ ZYGMUNT J. PLATER, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 432-434 (4th ed., 2010).

⁷ Folke et al., *supra* note 5, at 160; ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 190-194 (Ballantine Books 1970) (1949).

⁸ Folke, *supra* note 5, at 160.

⁹ Carl Folke et al., *Adaptive Governance of Social-Ecological Systems*, 30 ANN. REV. ENV'T RESOURCES 441, 447 (2005).

¹⁰ Barbara Cosens, *Transboundary River Governance in the Face of Uncertainty*, v. 30 n. 5 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 229, 238.

change in the way humankind relates to nature because humans are not used to compromise their activities according to the capacity of the ecosystem to support them. Humankind is used to dominate, not to coexist with, nature. The inversion of this setting cannot possibly be achieved by a simple change in management methodology: it requires a change of values.

According to Aldo Leopold, nature conservation should start first by understanding nature and by setting the values we want conservation to have¹¹. As the law is the tool used to express, systematize and implement the values of organized societies, we believe that law has a role to play in associating the concept of ecological resilience with values humankind should adopt when developing activities that impact nature.

This discussion has exceptional importance now, at the imminence of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, to be held in Rio de Janeiro in 2012. IUCN President Ashok Khosla mentioned that “Rio+20 needs to review 40 years of unfulfilled commitments and explore genuine alternatives to current practices”¹². The principle of resilience developed here is envisioned by this article as one of these alternatives.

The discussion on how the law can enforce new values of conservation is expected to go beyond 2012, in order to influence domestic law-making and decision-making in public and private institutions alike.

This work seeks to develop the role law could play in contributing to the achievement of ecosystem resilience. Therefore, adopting Aldo Leopold’s view of conservation, by which the first step should be to understand nature, this article will begin with a brief explanation of the ecological background to the concept of ecosystem resilience. Next, the article will consider Aldo Leopold’s *Land Ethic* in order to discuss the values we should look for when implementing conservation for resilience. Regarding those values and concepts, the following part of the article will be dedicated to consolidating and contextualizing the legal principle.

In order to carry out a more detailed analysis about how the principle of resilience can be pursued in the application of the law, this work will focus on certain sectors of environmental law and policy making. Those sectors are: adaptive governance; adaptive

¹¹ LEOPOLD, *supra* note 7, at 210.

¹² IISD, *Summary Of The Nineteenth Session Of The Commission On Sustainable Development*, v.5 n.304 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN 16 May 2011, available at <http://www.iisd.ca/vol05/enb05304e.html> (last viewed Nov. 16, 2011).

management; environmental impact assessment; land use and climate change adaptation; and market mechanisms for conserving ecosystem services. The article will be based on cases from different parts of the world. As the adoption of the concept of resilience by law seems to be incipient in the jurisdictions of most countries, we believe that such case studies will be helpful to any jurisdiction in the world where this concept is still not effective.

ECOLOGICAL CONCEPT OF ECOSYSTEM RESILIENCE

Resilience is the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance, to reorganize itself and persist. A system is resilient when, even under impacts, it is able to retain essentially the same initial conditions, tending towards a state of equilibrium. This stable state of a system is called the “basin of attraction,”¹³ “domain of attraction” or “stability domain”¹⁴.

Ecological systems have more than one stable state or basin of attraction¹⁵. The group of basins of attraction related to the same ecosystem is called the “stability landscape”¹⁶. When the ecosystem is already vulnerable to disruptions, and therefore less resilient, and those disruptions force the ecosystem towards the boundaries of its current basin of attraction, the ecosystem may cross a threshold, after which the ecosystem will present a new basin of attraction¹⁷. When the ecosystem changes from one basin of attraction to another, or when the ecosystem moves towards the edge of one basin of attraction, it is understood that a “change in the stability landscape” has occurred¹⁸.

In the case of change in the stability landscape, the resilience of the system can be considered the amount of disturbance the system can absorb before shifting into a different configuration, in other words, shifting to a new stability domain¹⁹.

Instead of moving to another basin of attraction, the ecosystem can also remain in a dynamic disequilibrium in which there is no global equilibrium condition and the system moves in a catastrophic manner between stability domains²⁰.

Some basins of attraction are more desirable than others and, in view of this, human actors may be willing to influence the ecosystem’s movement from one basin to another by

¹³ Brian Walker et al, *Resilience, Adaptability and Transformability in Social-Ecological Systems*, 9(2): 5 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y (2004), available at <http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss2/art5/>.

¹⁴ Folke et al, *supra* note 2, at 119, 121.

¹⁵ Walker et al., *supra* note 13. Craig R. Allen et al., *Commentary on Part One Articles*, in FOUNDATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE, *supra* note 2, at 3, 4.

¹⁶ Walker et al., *supra* note 13.

¹⁷ C. S. Holling, *Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems*, in FOUNDATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE, *supra* note 2, at 19, 29, 30

¹⁸ Walker et al., *supra* note 13.

¹⁹ Lance H. Gunderson, et al., *The Evolution of an Idea - the Past, Present, and Future of Ecological Resilience*, in FOUNDATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE, *supra* note 2, at 423, 425.

²⁰ C. S. Holling, *The Resilience of Terrestrial Ecosystems*, in FOUNDATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE, *supra* note 2, at 67, 92

reinforcing the resilience of the desirable ones – and thus preventing the ecosystem from reaching the threshold of change – or by reducing the resilience of the undesirable basin of attraction. This collective capacity of the human actors in the system to manage resilience is called “adaptability”²¹. There are some circumstances in which the ecosystem will not be able to return to a basin of attraction, even with aid from human interference. These cases of *irreversibility* of the ecosystem status may occur because of changes in the composition of soil or air²².

Human management of natural elements is traditionally directed towards the maintenance of the ecosystem’s stability²³. This view of human interactions with the natural world focuses on equilibrium states, on “maintaining constancy by reducing natural variability”²⁴.

The relationship between stability and resilience represents the natural cycle of any ecosystem: the movement from a stage of slow accumulation of natural capital (stability) towards sudden changes, and releases and reorganization of that released capital (resilience)²⁵. As the two sides of a coin, both stability and resilience are essential to maintain the ecosystem. Besides providing the accumulation of capital, stability allows the different elements of the ecosystem (i.e. species of fauna and flora) to enhance their organization and connectedness. On the other hand, resilience reduces the connectedness and organization of the elements of the ecosystem and releases the stored capital, thereby providing opportunities for change, whereby species can reorganize themselves and find new connections among each other, resulting in the evolution of the ecosystem as a whole.

The dynamics of ecosystem organization are very similar to the dynamics of technological development, as pointed out by Brooks, “as a particular technology matures, it tends to become more homogenous and less innovative and adaptive. Its very success tends to freeze it into a mold dictated by the fear of departing from a successful formula (...)”²⁶. The

²¹ Walker et al., *supra* note 13.

²² C. S. Holling, *Engineering Resilience versus Ecological Resilience*, in FOUNDATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE, *supra* note 2, at 58; Folke et al., *supra* note 2, at 51, 132.

²³ Holling calls this tendency “engineering resilience”. Holling, *supra* note 22.

²⁴ Allen et al., *supra* note 15, at 3.

²⁵ Holling, *supra* note 22, at 52.

²⁶ Holling, *supra* note 20, at 105.

sudden change that occurs during resilience stimulates the ecosystem to “break the inertia” and to innovate.

As the interchanges between stability and resilience play such an important role in the maintenance of ecosystems, human management of ecosystems, which tends towards the abolition of disturbances, is greatly disadvantageous. By trying to avoid disruptions such as floods or fires, humans contribute to the construction of more vulnerable ecosystems, which are expected to suffer even greater crisis after longer periods of time. Holling mentions an enlightening example about the fire-combat in national parks in the United States. According to him, the “suppression of forest fire has been remarkably successful in reducing the probability of fire (...) but the consequence has been the accumulation of fuel to produce fires of an extent and cost never experienced before”²⁷.

Along the same line of reasoning, it is also recognized by Leopold that human control over the health of the land has not been successful²⁸. Leopold understands *land* as the community that includes soil, water, plants and animals²⁹, and *health* as the capacity of the land for internal self-renewal³⁰; therefore, very similar to the current meaning of *resilience*. According to Leopold, the land is sick when soil loses its fertility, or washes away faster than it forms, and when water systems exhibit abnormal floods and shortages³¹. The disappearance of plants and animal species without visible cause despite efforts to protect them, and the irruption of others as pests despite efforts to control them³² are symptoms of the illness of the land.

The loss of biodiversity is both a symptom and a cause of land sickness. Every ecosystem contains a few functions which are essential for the maintenance of the ecosystem’s main characteristics. Those few functions are developed by a wide range of species. Therefore, each function is developed concomitantly by several species, and this is called *redundancy*³³. Redundancy of function adds to the stability of systems because, even if

²⁷ *Id.*, at 83.

²⁸ LEOPOLD, *supra* note 7, at 272.

²⁹ *Id.*, at 239.

³⁰ *Id.*, at 258.

³¹ *Id.*, at 272.

³² *Id.*, at 273.

³³ Allen et al., *supra* note 15, at 14, 15.

the system loses one or a few species, it may keep functioning if at least one of the species responsible for that function remains. However, although the function remains and the ecosystem maintains its main characteristics, the ecosystem has lost resilience, because it is relying on one species only to develop that function. This phenomenon explains why the ecosystem keeps working although it is very vulnerable to disturbances. It also explains why an ecosystem that has survived the extinction of several species suddenly collapses when the last species developing a certain function becomes extinct.

The system also loses resilience by the loss of species because the range of possible connections among species is diminished as are the possible ways the system can reorganize after disturbance³⁴. By presenting fewer possibilities to innovate, the system loses much of its capacity to adapt to changing circumstances.

Therefore, it is possible to conclude that humans reduce ecosystem resilience by removing whole functional groups of species; by altering the magnitude, frequency, and duration of disturbance regimes to which the biota is adapted; and by polluting the environment, thereby changing the dynamics of climate and the composition of water, soil and air³⁵.

However, just as human actors can interfere in ecosystems and reduce their resilience, in the same way they can contribute to the preservation of resilience by adopting a conservationist approach towards nature. According to Leopold, *conservation*

is a state of harmony between men and land. (...) Harmony with the land is like harmony with a friend; you cannot cherish his right hand and chop off his left. (...) The land is an organism. Its parts, like our own parts, compete with each other and co-operate with each other. (...) You can regulate them – cautiously – but not abolish them³⁶.

Therefore, Leopold considers “the first principle of conservation” to be the preservation of all the parts of the land mechanism³⁷. In this context, “parts of the land mechanism” may be interpreted as “functions of an ecosystem”. As scientific evidence points out that those functions are assured by biodiversity, Folke, Holling and Perrings affirm that the conservation of biodiversity cannot be restricted to limited protected areas; it should be

³⁴ Garry Peterson et al., *Ecological Resilience, Biodiversity, and Scale*, in FOUNDATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE, *supra* note 2, at 167, 187.

³⁵ Folke et al, *supra* note 2, at 142.

³⁶ LEOPOLD, *supra* note 7, at 189, 190.

³⁷ *Id.*

addressed everywhere³⁸. The authors explain that, although preserving biodiversity through nature reserves may be an important short-term step, it is not sufficient to solve the problem of biodiversity loss, because nature reserves are embedded in larger environments and species depend on the reserves' surrounding area to maintain themselves. According to Askins, "small reserves lose their distinctive species if they are surrounded by a hostile landscape"³⁹.

Ecologists highlight some measures they deem efficient for the preservation of ecosystems' resilience. Leopold considers that the first step towards preserving ecosystem resilience is the collection of data about how a healthy land maintains itself as an organism. By having this base datum of normality, science may detect what is occurring otherwise which might provide the causes for such change. The author points out some characteristics of healthy lands already abundantly proved by Paleontology: in healthy lands, wilderness maintains itself for immensely long periods; species are rarely lost; and soil is built by weather or water as fast as or faster than it is carried away to the sea. The author also calls attention to the fact that each biotic province needs its own wilderness for comparative studies of used and unused land, as it is impossible to study the physiology of one landscape and apply those findings as a basis for comparison with the current status of a distinct landscape⁴⁰.

Folke, Holling and Perrings consider that, in order to conserve ecosystem resilience, it is necessary to identify the major social and economic forces that are currently driving the loss of functional diversity, and to create incentives to redirect those forces. They propose this to be done in two ways: by the creation of economic incentives that internalize the external costs of biodiversity loss; and by the adoption of measures that apply the idea of preserving biodiversity everywhere to economic analysis. According to them, "we should be stimulating the development of institutions, policies, and patterns of human consumption and production that work in synergy with ecosystem functions and processes"⁴¹.

Referring especially to institutions, Folke, Holling and Perrings consider the development of effective institutions for biodiversity conservation as a precondition for the

³⁸ Folke et al., *supra* note 5, at 160.

³⁹ *Id.*, (quoting R. A. Askins, *Hostile landscape and the decline of migratory songbirds*, SCIENCE 267:1956-1957).

⁴⁰ LEOPOLD, *supra* note 7, at 274, 275

⁴¹ Folke et al., *supra* note 5, at 160, 161.

creation of incentives to prevent the loss of functional diversity. Those institutions should be adaptive, which means that they should be able to respond to environmental feedback before those effects challenge the resilience of the resource base and the economic activities that depend on it⁴².

⁴² *Id.*

THE LAND ETHIC

Aldo Leopold's *land ethic* opposes theories that consider nature as an object totally submitted to human scrutiny. According to François Ost, the idea of nature as an object dates back to Modernity, when Descartes and other philosophers of his time promoted a definitive rupture between humans and nature⁴³. With the advance of science, humans became able to overcome obstacles to their development posed by nature. Humans acquired the belief in their superiority over other species and over nature. From there on, humanity would use science to understand nature's secrets, dominate them and submit nature to human will⁴⁴.

According to Christian belief, by altering the land, planting, fertilizing the soil and erecting buildings, humans are complementing God's creation and assuring prosperity⁴⁵. It is by working the land that humans get title to property, both over the land and over the results of human work. According to this view, nature is no more than storage of resources⁴⁶, whose use by humans is unrestricted.

As the transformation of nature by human interference achieved greater proportions, humankind became simultaneously geologic agent, climate actor and geo-chemical emitter, both influencing and disturbing nature as a whole⁴⁷.

In the post-war world people became aware that the planet is vulnerable; that it contains limited resources; and that those resources are showing signs of exhaustion. François Ost mentions the first view of Earth from space, when satellites first photographed the planet, as the crucial moment for this realization⁴⁸. This moment captures the final triumph of the human race over natural limitations and definitely sets humans in command of "Earth craft"⁴⁹ when, for the first time, they see the Earth as a fragile pearl in the vast universe. From then

⁴³ FRANÇOIS OST, *A NATUREZA ÀS MARGENS DA LEI 30* (Joana Chaves trans., Instituto Piaget ed. 1995).

⁴⁴ *Id.*, at 37, 39.

⁴⁵ According to François Ost, when the biblical chapter *Genesis* does such statement, it is discretely authorizing humans to possess parts of nature. *Id.*, at 64.

⁴⁶ *Id.*, at 10.

⁴⁷ *Id.*, at 297, (quoting C. ALLÈGRE, *ÉCONOMISER LA PLANÈTE*, (1990), at 292).

⁴⁸ *Id.*, at 277-387.

⁴⁹ *Id.*, at 277, (quoting J.P. DELÉAGE, *HISTOIRE DE L'ÉCOLOGIE. UNE SCIENCE DE L'HOMME ET DE LA NATURE*, (1991)), at 224.

on, humans started to consider how vulnerable the planet they depend upon is and, consequently, how vulnerable is the continued existence of the human race as a whole.

Aldo Leopold is one of the representatives of a generation which became aware of the harm humans can cause nature by willing to dominate it. Trying to combat the causes of human destructive behavior in relation to nature, Aldo Leopold advocates the adoption of an ethical treatment of nature, in which humans would express their love and respect for nature.

Leopold sees this ethic as the “tendency of interdependent individuals or groups to evolve modes of co-operation”, which ecologists call *symbiosis*⁵⁰. This ethic started by being associated with the relationship between individuals. Later it evolved to include the relationship between individuals and human society. According to Leopold, a further extension of ethics to include the relationship between individuals and land, fauna and flora is “an evolutionary possibility and an ecological necessity”. Land has been just a property to humans; their relationship has been strictly economic, entailing privileges but no obligations, just as the relationship between citizens and slaves in Antiquity⁵¹.

The extension of ethics to natural elements would, on the one hand, ensure the right of humans to manage natural resources, and on the other hand it would recognize the right of land, water, animals and plants to continue to exist. Thereby, humans would be showing their respect for the other members of nature’s community⁵².

According to Leopold, such a change of perspective requires a change in the human position: from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it⁵³. The conqueror selects which species he deems relevant and which he does not, thereby eliminating species whose function within the ecosystem he does not fully understand. The result is usually catastrophic, because often the realization that certain species had a main role within the ecosystem often occurs when the species is already eliminated from that environment. By becoming members of the land-community, humans get in harmony with nature, and this is what Leopold considers to be the meaning of *conservation*⁵⁴.

⁵⁰ LEOPOLD, *supra* note 7, at 238. See also OST, *supra* note 43, at 290 (stating that the land humans exploit and pollute is much more than an object, in fact, is the mother-Earth, with which we live in symbiosis).

⁵¹ LEOPOLD, *supra* note 7, at 239.

⁵² *Id.*, at 240.

⁵³ *Id.*

⁵⁴ *Id.*, at 189.

Leopold acknowledges that we probably are not going to achieve full harmony with the land. He places such a goal among other aspirations such as absolute justice or liberty for people, which are important to strive for, but not necessarily achievable⁵⁵.

Leopold recognizes that modern people have lost much of their connection with the land, and this constitutes an obstacle in the way of conservation, as you cannot simply inject the idea of striving for harmony with the land cannot simply be injected into one who has no relationship with the land⁵⁶. In order to solve this problem, Leopold recognizes the need for education in conservation, which should be primarily based on promoting curiosity about land mechanisms and building ethical support for land economics. The author believes that, if this is set in place, conservation will naturally follow.

The lack of education in conservation and knowledge about land mechanisms is also an obstacle for to the development of a land ethic. For Leopold, the establishment of an ethical relationship with land requires love, respect and admiration and a high regard for land's value. A person cannot love, respect and admire something he or she does not know. That is why the land ethic requires some understanding of ecology. It also requires social approbation of right actions and social disapproval of wrong actions. According to Leopold, the path to determine the "right" and the "wrong" actions is the following:

Quit thinking about decent land-use as solely an economic problem. Examine each question in terms of what is ethically and esthetically right, as well as what is economically expedient. A thing is right when it tends to preserve integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. it is wrong when it tends otherwise.⁵⁷

Leopold says that, without an ethical relationship with nature, conservationists are obliged to look for economic values to justify efforts to conserve natural elements. Therefore, people strive to identify how a function developed by certain species can help human economic activities and how the loss of such service provided by nature would harm the economy.

By recognizing the role of economic values in ecological functions in trying to conserve some species, Leopold calls attention to the conservation of species that are not useful to the economy, either because their function is still unknown or because their function

⁵⁵ *Id.*, at 210.

⁵⁶ *Id.*

⁵⁷ *Id.*, at 262.

supports the ecosystem as a whole, but not a specific human activity. According to him, conservation directed by the market does not cover such species, and this can result in their extinction and therefore in an increase the vulnerability of an ecosystem⁵⁸.

Another problem of conservation as driven by markets is that it does not provide an education for conservation. People take measures towards conservation as long as they are going to receive something in return. As soon as the economic incentive is withdrawn, the conservation measure is discontinued. Market incentives for conservation also fail to promote a sense of right and wrong. Even though contributing to conservation, the individual who receives a payment to conserve a species or an ecosystem service is driven by self-interest, not by a sense of obligation or by the sense that it is the right thing to do⁵⁹.

Leopold believes that economic incentives for conservation also present the problem of depending too much on government for implementation. He believes that expecting that governments will be able to promote conservation everywhere through economic incentives or even with traditional regulation is to raise expectations to a level that exceeds governments' possibilities. Governments have inherent limitations and cannot be everywhere all the time. In such a context, by internalizing in people the sense of right or wrong in relation to nature, the land ethic would promote conservation even where governments cannot reach⁶⁰.

⁵⁸ *Id.*, at 246.

⁵⁹ *Id.*, at 244 - 245.

⁶⁰ *Id.*, at 251.

ECOSYSTEM RESILIENCE IN THE LAW

The law is the system employed by organized societies to declare, systematize and implement the essential values of a society. The law contains certain inherent characteristics and methods that can lead to innovative solutions to common problems. As mentioned by François Ost⁶¹, the law operates by systematically considering all relevant points of view, putting them in proportion and comparing them. Most importantly, in an ideal situation, the law is capable of taking into account all pertinent facts and divergent interests, balancing them, and reaching a reasonable and desirably just decision⁶².

The capacity to balance divergent interests is being introduced more and more in the elaboration of policies and decisions by agencies through the advent of “public participation in decision making”. Although inserting public participation in such matters is necessary for democratic governance and for preventing social and environmental damage caused by the implementation of ill-planned policies, mechanisms for public participation are mostly not binding and are restricted to the procedural obligation of hearing divergent interests. Therefore, the agency usually is obliged to hear the interested parties, but not to take their concerns into account when reaching a decision; this obligation remains exclusively reserved to the Judicial branch.

Even when agencies are able to provide substantive public participation in decision making, they cannot accomplish the task of defending the interests of those who are not present in the process: nature itself and the future generations. Differently, the law can ensure representation of those interests during its weighing and balancing process, especially if so directed by a legal principle.

Due to the need to enforce consideration of all the interests at stake and the interest of nature itself and of future generations, management for resilience, so called *adaptive management*, cannot be implemented solely by agencies and executive planning and

⁶¹ OST, *supra* note 43, at 19-22.

⁶² Corruptive legal systems do not reach such result. This article will assume the function of a non-corruptive legal system.

procedures; it requires the guidance of a legal principle and enforcement by the Judicial branch.

This article will analyze how environmental law may influence human decisions guided towards the achievement of ecosystem resilience. It will do so by consolidating a new principle of law, the principle of resilience, and by applying this principle to relevant areas of environmental law.

The origins and content of the principle of resilience

The concept of ecological resilience radically changes the manner by which humankind manages natural resources because it annuls the premise that management should seek stability. In order to guide the public administration and individuals in dealing with this change of mindset, this article proposes consolidation of the principle of resilience as a new principle of international law.

As will be demonstrated in this topic and in the topic “The principle of resilience in International Environmental Law”, the foundations of the principle of resilience already exist in International Environmental Law. It is already buried within other principles of environmental law. However, it must be acknowledged and must become an independent principle in order to guide humankind on how to stop degradation of global nature and how to attend to growing population needs in the context of climate change and other natural disturbances in a manner that will stop degradation and strengthen global nature.

The importance of systematizing a new principle to address ecosystem resilience relies on the function principles exercise in the international sphere. Principles of international law designate fundamental legal norms and values that should be pursued by the whole international environmental law system. Principles also indicate essential characteristics of legal institutions, and provide the rationale for the law and the general orientation to which positive law must conform⁶³. The principle may be included in States’ practices and in national laws, and may be referenced by judges as guidance for interpreting or filling the gaps

⁶³ See ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 89 (2007).

in national or subnational law. It provides a framework for negotiating and implementing new and existing agreements and may be incorporated in legally binding international instruments. Moreover, it provides the rules of decision for resolving transboundary environmental disputes. Finally, the principle may assist the integration of international environmental law into other fields of international law⁶⁴.

But what would be the meaning of the principle of resilience?

Several factors would influence the shape of such a principle, including: the ecological concept of resilience; the link between management of ecosystems and resilience; the values that the human community wants conservation to have; and the existing principles and concepts of environmental law, especially the concept of intergenerational equity.

From the ecological concept of resilience we conclude that resilience requires the preservation of biodiversity and the preservation of nature everywhere. Keeping in mind that the goal of preserving biodiversity for resilience is to keep the functions of the ecosystem and the land mechanism working with their original quality, we conclude that resilience requires biodiversity to be preserved in its original habitat and that each species be represented by a quantity of individuals sufficient to ensure the execution of the ecosystem function they are responsible for⁶⁵.

As previously mentioned, the goal of preserving nature everywhere brings quite a challenge to environmental conservation. Some may argue that nature conservation is already done everywhere, because environmental laws are applied in the whole territory of a country's jurisdiction. In favor of such argument, it is possible to argue that environmental law regulates not only reserved protected areas, but also the use of natural resources outside protected areas, in landscapes that have been intensively transformed by humans and where the emission of pollutants may threaten human health and environmental quality, or where the killing of a certain species can cause the extinction of that species.

⁶⁴ DAVID HUNTER ET AL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 469, 470 (2007).

⁶⁵ Referring to the preservation of biodiversity, it is interesting to read a passage of Aldo Leopold speaking about the extinction of species: "When the species is gone we have a good cry and repeat the performance. (...) We console ourselves with the comfortable fallacy that a single museum-piece will do, ignoring the clear dictum of history that a species must be saved *in many places* if it is to be saved at all." LEOPOLD, *supra* note 7, at 194.

There are no doubts about the validity of such arguments. However, we should have in mind that when we discuss resilience we are not talking about the maintenance of *some* natural resources everywhere; we are talking about the preservation of the *whole* land mechanism everywhere. The concept of resilience is based on the idea that every land mechanism – that means, every ecosystem function and every natural element of an ecosystem (which includes fauna, flora and inanimate elements) – is important to keep the ecosystem resilience. Therefore, such thinking requires a much more complex and broader view of conservation than the one currently applied to non-reserve-protected areas, where environmental law is very segmentally applied to preserve some individual endangered species or just the inanimate elements of the environment (soil, water and air). As conservation seeks to preserve very complex structures such as ecosystems, it is not possible to attribute to conservation a simplistic or segmented view. Conservation for resilience must take into account the interconnections between the various components of an ecosystem and it must include in the concept of “land” not only the forests and preserved landscapes, but also the landscapes intensely modified by humans.

The dichotomy that determines a place for nature, where conservation is needed, and a place for humans, where conservation is not needed, must be abolished. Humans are part of nature and nature is everywhere. And if it is not everywhere, it should be. It should be in the cities, in the houses, in the industries, keeping the ecosystem functions alive, interconnecting the elements of the natural world. If every house in a city has a garden with the same species that compose the ecosystem in which the city is located, the fauna and flora present in each garden may interconnect with each other and keep the functions which make that ecosystem unique. The wider the area where nature is conserved and the more connections with fauna and flora are kept, the more resilient the ecosystem will be.

Along this line of reasoning, the concept of ecological resilience nurtured the concept of the “social-ecological” system, which emphasizes the interconnectivity between humans and nature and stresses that the delineation between social and ecological systems is artificial

and arbitrary since social-ecological systems have powerful reciprocal feedbacks and act as complex adaptive systems⁶⁶. The concept of adaptive governance is based on this premise.

In order to determine the values that conservation for resilience should have, this work will be based on the values promoted by Aldo Leopold in *land ethic*. Therefore, the principle of resilience is guided by the aspiration of getting in harmony with the land - *all* the land, not just some elements of it. According to the principle of resilience, humans are members of the land-community, not conquerors of it, and they should get to know the land mechanism as much as possible, in order to respect and love the land. This principle also includes social approbation of actions that tend to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community, and social disapproval for actions that tend otherwise. The principle refuses to address land-use as a solely economic issue and to rely only on the government or on the market to take conservation measures.

Aldo Leopold also believes that humankind should cultivate love and respect for the land mechanism. Based on this statement, this article interprets the land ethic as requiring humans to *enhance* the land mechanism the maximum they can, and not to merely *prevent and mitigate* the aggressions imposed upon nature that the law mandates individuals to address. That means that besides the legal obligation to do no harm to the environment, humans have the ethical obligation to improve environmental quality.

By improving the environment wherever possible, we humans demonstrate that we are conscious of the burden we inflict on the land mechanism; we respect the land mechanism that supports our existence; and we assume our ethical responsibility to aid the land mechanism in any way we can in return for what it provides us. This duty is not only individual, but also societal.

The ethical obligation to live in harmony with the environment and to improve environmental resilience characterizes an ethical principle. According to Taylor, to be considered so, a moral principle must present six formal characteristics⁶⁷: it must be general in form, meaning that its applicability is not restricted to a limited group of people, rather, it is addressed to the global audience; it must be universally applicable to all moral agents,

⁶⁶ Folke et al., *supra* note 9.

⁶⁷ PAUL W. TAYLOR, *RESPECT FOR NATURE* 25-33 (Princeton University Press publ., 1986)

meaning that the rule cannot defeat itself if everyone attempts to comply with it; it must be intended to be applied disinterestedly, meaning that compliance with the principle is required even when it is against the moral agent's interest; it must be advocated as a principle for all to adopt, meaning that whoever adopts it approves its adoption by all others; it must override all non-moral norms or concerns.

One of the major aims of the principle of resilience is to provide guidelines for a governmental policy pursuant of the maxim: "Do not solely mitigate: improve". In order to improve the environment and at the same time ensure essential economic activities, the principle of resilience will push governments towards innovative environmental management solutions that proportionately balance environmental and economic activities, in order to do not prioritize one interest and suffocate the other. Such solutions are called "innovative" because they provide new guidelines for the operation of the law; for example, by stimulating different patterns of production and consumption, or different governmental goals, or unusual rules for land use and planning.

Incorporating the background provided by ecology and ethics, the principle of resilience can be established as follows:

- *The land mechanism has inherent value.*
- *Every person has the right to use natural resources as long as such use does not impair the use by others or the persistence of the original setting of mutually reinforcing processes and structures of an ecosystem.*
- *Every person has the moral duty to respect nature and to pursue a way of living in harmony with the land mechanism.*
- *In order to ensure ecosystem resilience to natural or human-made disturbances, the human management of natural or urban landscapes shall preserve ecosystem functions through:*
 - *the preservation of all species everywhere;*
 - *the preservation of natural cycles;*
 - *and the preservation of chemical composition of soil, air and water.*
- *The lack of scientific understanding regarding the function of land mechanisms and the role developed by single species in such mechanisms shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to enhance ecosystem resilience.*

- *States shall ensure that the younger generation receives education on the function of natural mechanisms and that the government officials receive training in identifying human activities and natural phenomena that may impact ecosystem resilience.*
- *Governments are responsible for identifying the factors that put ecosystem resilience at risk and addressing such factors.*
- *Management for resilience requires the adoption of adaptive management techniques, or other techniques that comprise monitoring of results, evaluation of policy performance and review of policy measures according to the assessment of results and changes of circumstances.*
- *Patterns of production and consumption in synergy with ecosystem function shall be stimulated.*
- *The resilience of ecosystems shall be considered in the assessment of costs and benefits of any activity or policy that affects the environment.*

The principle of resilience in International Environmental Law

Basic elements of the principle of resilience are already present in international environmental law.

The Preamble of the Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 1972, recognizes that protection and improvement of the human environment is the duty of all Governments⁶⁸. The enhancement of resilience is a matter of protecting and improving the environment and that is why Governments have the duty to consider resilience when managing natural resources.

Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration declares that “man ... bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations”. Therefore, the duty to improve the environment is not solely governmental, but also individual.

⁶⁸ United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Swed., June 5-16, 1972, *Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment Preamble*, U.N. Doc. A/ CONF.48/14/Rev.1. [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].

The first part of Principle 19⁶⁹ of the Stockholm Declaration highlights the role education for conservation has to play in protecting and improving the environment.

The World Charter for Nature, 1982⁷⁰, contains several elements of the principle of resilience. Among the principles of conservation, it proclaims that:

Preamble: every form of life is unique, warranting respect regardless of its worth to man, and, to accord other organisms such recognition, man must be guided by a moral code of action

1. Nature shall be respected and its essential processes shall not be impaired...
4. Ecosystems and organisms ... shall be managed to achieve and maintain optimum sustainable productivity, but not in such a way as to endanger the integrity of those other ecosystems or species with which they coexist...
6. In the decision-making process it shall be recognized that man's needs can be met only by ensuring the proper functioning of natural systems ...
9. The allocation of areas of the earth to various uses shall be planned, and due account shall be taken of the physical constraints, the biological productivity and diversity and the natural beauty of the areas concerned.
10. (d) Non-renewable resources which are consumed as they are used shall be exploited with restraint, taking into account ... the compatibility of their exploitation with the functioning of natural systems.
11. (d) Agriculture, grazing, forestry and fisheries practices shall be adapted to the natural characteristics and constraints of given areas;
11. (e) Areas degraded by human activities shall be rehabilitated for purposes in accord with their natural potential and compatible with the well-being of affected populations.
15. Knowledge of nature shall be broadly disseminated by all possible means, particularly by ecological education as an integral part of general education.
19. The status of natural processes, ecosystems and species shall be closely monitored to enable early detection of degradation or threat, ensure timely intervention and facilitate the evaluation of conservation policies and methods.

The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992, recognizes that human beings are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature (Principle 1). At Principle 4, the Declaration determines that environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it. At Principle 8, the Declaration guides States to reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and consumption⁷¹.

The need to build ecosystem resilience not only to reduce the risk of disaster, but also due to its importance in providing sustainable livelihoods, flow of goods and services and

⁶⁹ "Education in environmental matters, for the younger generation as well as adults, giving due consideration to the underprivileged, is essential in order to broaden the basis for an enlightened opinion and responsible conduct by individuals, enterprises and communities in protecting and improving the environment in its full human dimension." *Id.*, Principle 19.

⁷⁰ GAOR, *World Charter for Nature*, Preamble, Oct. 28, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/7

⁷¹ United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, *Rio Declaration on Environment and Development*, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992).

reducing vulnerability to climate change is explicitly expressed in international documents, such as the United Nations, 2009 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction⁷².

Foundations of the principle of resilience can also be found in other principles of international environmental law.

The principle of sustainable development requires present generation to meet its needs “without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”⁷³. This idea requires humankind to stop exploiting natural resources at a rate greater than their capacity for regeneration, the so called sustainable yield. However, despite the recognition of sustainable development as a basic principle of environmental protection and national planning, humans still consider that they have the right to take from nature a little more than the sustainable yield threshold, thereby gambling with nature.

The sustainable development movement did not succeed in inserting in people’s minds the idea that ensuring continuity of natural resources is more important than individual short-term profit. Neither did it convince people that personal ambition has to yield in face of environmental limitations or the survival of future generations will be at risk.

By trying to please all concurring interests at once, the sustainable development movement did not make it clear that, in order to keep the “health of the land”, humans often need to prioritize values and goals, which not so rarely will result in restricting economic activities and economic growth where the land mechanism cannot support it any longer. The implicit meaning commonly attributed to “sustainable development” by business and even by countries is that private initiative will protect the environment as long as such protection does not impair economic activity. While the sustainable development movement succeeds on raising awareness about the need to conciliate environmental protection and development, it fails to provide guidance on the following ethical questions: when economic activity and environmental protection cannot be conciliated, which interest should be prioritized and under what circumstances? The vacuum left by the concept of sustainable development is repeatedly filled by business interests, who have a quick answer at the tip of the tongue to the

⁷² U. N. ISDR, *Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction*, (2009).

⁷³ Our Common Future, *supra* note 3.

abovementioned question: economic growth ALWAYS has priority over environmental protection concerns.

Such an omission leaves the establishment of priorities to be determined on a case by case basis, with no overarching directive guideline. Thereby, the legal framework has assigned an equal treatment both to environmental and economic interests. However, such “equal” treatment hides a fundamental injustice when one considers that environmental and economic interests are not balanced because the latter counts on much greater political power. Therefore, following the lesson given by Aristotle, the aspiration for justice requires the law to treat equally the equals and unequally whoever is in an unequal position⁷⁴. This primary function of the legal system can be developed by the application of the principle of resilience, which fills the vacuum left by the sustainable development concept by advocating that ecosystem resilience and continual provision of ecological functions must be preserved, even if it requires a reduction of economic growth and economic profits. Thus, the principle of resilience prioritizes environmental protection, artificially balancing a situation that is naturally unbalanced. By this means, the principle of resilience improves the legal system as a whole by correcting an ongoing injustice in the management of natural resources and planning for development.

The principle of resilience does not acknowledge rules for prioritizing concurring interests solely because it is necessary to enforce sustainable development under an ethical and legal point of view: it does so also because it is a factual necessity. Several works affirmed that human society has to learn how to develop socially and manage natural resources without relying on economic growth⁷⁵. Such works reinforce the need to give priority to environmental protection when it is not possible to conciliate it with economic growth. Considering the green economy’s goal to generate wealth through sustainable

⁷⁴ JOSÉ AFONSO DA SILVA, CURSO DE DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL POSITIVO 213, (25th ed., 2005) (quoting ARISTOTLE, *Éthique à Nicomaque*, V, 6, 1131a, in POLITIQUE (Marcel Prélôt, trans., PUF publ., 1950)).

⁷⁵ PETER A. VICTOR, MANAGING WITHOUT GROWTH: SLOWER BY DESIGN, NOT BY DISASTER (2008). Tim Jackson, *Prosperity without growth? The transition to a sustainable economy*, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION, (Mar. 2009), <http://www.sd-commission.org.uk/publications.php?id=914>, (U.K.). Andrew Simms and Victoria Johnson, *Growth isn't possible*, NEF, (Jan. 25 2010), <http://neweconomics.org/publications/growth-isnt-possible>.

exploitation aiming to eradicate poverty⁷⁶, the idea of developing without growth should apply to developed countries and countries that have already accumulated enough wealth to combat poverty. The green economy cannot be green if deprived of the understanding that the economy should be kept in a steady state if economic growth cannot be achieved within the limits imposed by the sustainable yield of natural resources.

The concept of *common concern of humankind*, for example, determines that, as the planet is ecologically interdependent, humanity has a common interest in protecting the environment and may have a collective interest in certain activities that take place, or resources that are located, wholly within State boundaries⁷⁷. Therefore, as a consequence of this concept, States share the responsibility not to cause harm to issues of common concern and to address common concerns⁷⁸. By attributing common responsibilities and interests to all States, this concept creates obligations *erga omnes* both to prevent and to address the harm done to common concerns. Those obligations have procedural implications, as explained by Kiss & Shelton:

In traditional international law, only an injured state could bring a claim against the state which caused the injury in violation of international law. Where the common interest is infringed, however, all states may be considered to have suffered a legal injury, with the obligations designated as obligations owing to all states, i.e., as obligations *erga omnes*.⁷⁹

Although the concept encloses an important procedural consequence, the downside of classifying the protection of the environment as a whole as a common interest is that it attributes a strong legal classification to too broad a subject, which has the negative effect of non-compliance. The principle of resilience can have an important role to play in this regard by providing a more detailed interpretation of the concept of the common concern of humankind. This interpretation would show that the object of the common concern of humankind is the preservation of ecosystem functions and the preservation of biodiversity in a space as extensive as possible.

⁷⁶ U. N. Environmental Programme, Towards a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication 548, (2011),

<http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy/GreenEconomyReport/tabid/29846/Default.aspx>.

⁷⁷ HUNTER ET AL., *supra* note 64, at 489, 490.

⁷⁸ U.N. Environmental Programme, Training Manual on International Environmental Law 36, (2006), http://www.unep.org/law/Publications_multimedia/index.asp [hereinafter UNEP Training Manual]

⁷⁹ KISS & SHELTON, *supra* note 63, at 15.

The concept of intergenerational equity focuses on future generations as rightful beneficiaries of environmental protection. It encloses the notion of fairness both among the individuals of the present generation and between present and future generations. The concept of intergenerational equity is composed of three elements: conservation of the diversity of natural and cultural resources by maintaining alternative resources within each category; conservation of environmental quality by preventing the exhaustion of higher quality resources; and equitable or nondiscriminatory access to Earth's resources⁸⁰. This last element guides the distribution of access to natural resources both for present and future generations. As for the conservation of diversity and the quality of resources, the aim is to implement equitable access to resources by guaranteeing future generations' capacity of choice among alternative resources, and by guaranteeing access by future generations to resources of the same level of quality as the resources exploited by present generations.

This concept requires that present generations use the resources sustainably and avoid irreversible environmental damage⁸¹. In this context, the principle of resilience increases the applicability of the concept of intergenerational equity by restraining the present generation from weakening a non-resilient ecosystem. As mentioned before, a non-resilient ecosystem is so vulnerable to disturbances that, when passing through movements between basins of attraction, the passage to a new basin of attraction may be irreversible and the regeneration of the original features of an ecosystem may be impossible.

Furthermore, the principle of resilience contributes to the application of the second component of the concept of intergenerational equity – the conservation of environmental quality – by requiring the preservation of integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community.

The precautionary principle prescribes the need for taking anticipatory actions in order to avoid environmental harms, even when the scientific understanding of a specific threat is not yet complete. The principle of resilience also contributes to the implementation of the precautionary principle: first, because it seeks to enhance the resilience of ecosystems in order

⁸⁰ Edith Brown Weiss, *Implementing intergenerational equity*, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 100, 100-102 (M. Fitzmaurice, et al. eds.) (2010).

⁸¹ HUNTER ET AL., *supra* note 64, at 491.

to prevent their vulnerability and degradation; and, second, because it proposes the conservation of all ecosystem functions, even those that are not yet fully understood.

The principle of non-regression determines that the creation of norms that contribute to the degradation of the environment is considered a violation of several international instruments whose aim is to protect the environment⁸².

The principle of non-regression is based on three theoretical elements. First, it is based on the assumption that environmental law seeks to prevent the degradation of the environment by constantly improving environmental quality. Second, it is based on the premise that the present generation cannot impose its laws on future generations. According to Michel Prieur, if present generations gradually adopt less protective environmental laws, they will prevent future generations from fully exercising their right to a healthy life⁸³. Third, the principle of regression relies on the application of the concept of intangibility of human rights to environmental regulation. The concept of the intangibility of human rights is implicit in human rights conventions and stands against the regression of those rights. It is transposed to environmental law because of the effect that the degradation of environmental laws may have on the exercise of human rights.

The principle of non-regression, in national law, guides the creation of norms by both the Legislative and the Executive branches and is enforced by adjudicatory authorities, which are responsible for the control of the legitimacy of acts perpetrated by the other Powers.

The principle of resilience can assist the application of the principle of non-regression by providing guidelines to assist judges in determining whether a norm represents regression of environmental conservation or not.

Some may argue that the principle of resilience would be redundant and dispensable in guiding judges in deciding whether a norm increases or decreases the level of environmental protection because the principle provides the same criteria that could be provided in court by ecologists' testimonies. However, this kind of criticism constitutes an incomplete interpretation of the principle of resilience by considering solely the ecological aspect of the principle. This argument fails to realize that the principle of resilience comprehends not only

⁸² See Michel Prieur, *De l'urgente nécessité de reconnaître le principe de "non régression" en droit de l'environnement*, 1 IUCN ACAD. ENVTL. L. E-J. 26, (2011) <http://iucnael.org/en/e-journal/current-issue-.html>.

⁸³ See *Id.*, at 33, 34.

an ecological concept, but also the relation of the ecological concept to the law and to the ethics that govern the relationship between humankind and nature. The principle of resilience commits the ecological concept of resilience to the protection of future generations' interests and to the ethical goal of living in harmony with nature. This principle also introduces the concept of ecological resilience to the legal framework not as a mere judicial finding based on scientific data, but as a full legal principle of environmental law, which, as such, must be used to guide the creation and the interpretation of any environmental norms or any policies or norms that generate environmental consequences.

The principle of non-regression is truly effective in achieving improvement of environmental quality only if it is applied to *all* norms that generate consequences to the environment. In other words, the principle of non-regression should be applied not only to environmental, but also to economic, policies and norms that affect the environment, and the same applies to the principle of resilience.

The principle of resilience is also strongly influenced by three environmental principles that deal with governance for conservation: the subsidiarity principle; the public participation principle; and the principle of good neighborliness and duty to cooperate. These three principles guarantee the participation of local levels of government, the affected public and the international community in the decision-making process related to environmental issues.

The subsidiarity principle reflects a preference for making decisions at the lowest level of government or social organization where the issue can be effectively managed. This principle has a procedural nature: it determines the level of the policy-making hierarchy in which the decision should be made, but it does not guide the kind of decision that should result. The final decision will be taken not only by balancing local interests, but also by balancing national or international priorities.

The public participation principle exists because environmental issues are best handled by the participation of all concerned citizens at the relevant level. However, individuals cannot appropriately participate in decision making if they do not receive the relevant information on the issue. Therefore, the public has the right of access to information held by public authorities regarding the environment, and the State has the duty to encourage public awareness and participation by making information available. In order to exercise their right,

individuals should also have equal access to justice, through the judicial and administrative proceedings provided by the State.

The principle of good neighborliness and duty to cooperate determines that international environmental issues be handled in a cooperative spirit by all countries⁸⁴. This principle is binding because it derives from a general principle expressed in Article 1.3 of the United Nations Charter, which sets among the purposes of the United Nations the achievement of international cooperation in solving international problems.

The three above mentioned principles for environmental governance are very relevant for the achievement of ecosystem resilience especially because they expand the range of stakeholders involved in efforts for conservation. Such principles abolish the idea that environmental conservation is to be promoted only by national governments. Therefore, the application of these principles prevents the situation criticized by Aldo Leopold whereby conservation efforts implemented only by the government are deficient because they do not internalize in the public the ethical value of conservation and because they only reach places where the governmental structure is present.

The principle of resilience is also an essential part of the duty to assess the environmental impact of proposed activities, policies, or programs to integrate environmental issues into development planning. Before implementing activities or policies, the State has the duty to fully identify and consider their environmental effects and to give the affected citizens the opportunity to understand the proposed project and to express their opinions about it through public participation in decision making.

As the duty of the State is to fully identify and consider environmental effects, it is very clear that such a duty applies to the identification and consideration of any impact the project may cause to the resilience of the ecosystem. From this conclusion it is extracted that the governmental entities must understand the concept of ecological resilience and must be trained to include assessment of impacts on ecosystem resilience in the environmental impact assessment. In order to fully exercise their right to participation in decision making, individuals and citizen organizations should also seek to understand the meaning of ecosystem resilience.

⁸⁴ Stockholm Declaration, *supra* note 68, Principle 24.

The implementation of the principle of resilience through the use of environmental impact assessment procedures will be considered in greater detail in the section of this article “Applying the principle of resilience”.

Legal status of principles of International Environmental Law

The principles of international environmental law have their origins in a wide variety of sources, which include: environmental treaties; soft law instruments; the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions; arbitral decisions; judicial decisions of the International Court of Justice; expert commentary⁸⁵; application of general principles of international law to environmental issues⁸⁶; and customary international law⁸⁷.

Soft law instruments⁸⁸, the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, and expert commentary do not bind States. Arbitral and judicial decisions bind only the States under litigation and only if such States accept the jurisdiction of the arbitral commission or of the International Court of Justice. Environmental treaties may create obligations to signatory States. General principles of international law create binding obligations to all States.

According to UNEP, the legal status of international environmental law principles and concepts is varied: some are firmly established, others are emerging and gradually gaining acceptance; some have the nature of guidelines or policy directives and do not give rise to specific rights and obligations. The juridical effect of principles and concepts may change from one legal system to another, depending on the context of the case, the activity at issue, the actors and the geographical region⁸⁹. In other words, environmental principles and concepts may be binding or not binding, depending on the circumstances of the case, on the countries involved and on the nature of the principle or concept.

⁸⁵ HUNTER ET AL., *supra* note 64, at 464.

⁸⁶ *Id.*, at 469.

⁸⁷ KISS & SHELTON, *supra* note 63, at 89.

⁸⁸ Soft law is an international instrument other than a treaty containing statements of expected behavior, such as principles, norms, and standards. Training Manual in International Environmental Law, *supra* note 78, at 8.

⁸⁹ *Id.*, at 24.

Both binding and non-binding principles of international environmental law play primarily a role of anticipation rather than reaction to environmental problems⁹⁰. In other words, the true purpose and capability of international environmental norms is to prevent environmental hazards on a global scale, not to punish States that violate these norms. As a matter of fact, this tendency is noticeable not only in international environmental law, but also in public international law as a whole.

Common obligations of international environmental law can be shared by all the States when they have an *erga omnes* characteristic, or when these obligations can be shared by several States, when they are established by multilateral agreements. The target of such obligations is to diffuse potential threats to the world as a whole, rather than to a specifically injured State. There is some controversy among the experts whether each State has an automatic right to react on behalf of the common interest against any breach of common obligations.

Benedetto Conforti argues that States not directly injured by the violation of the international obligation are not automatically entitled to react. This is different from directly injured countries, which have the right to seek measures such as reparation and reprisal⁹¹. On the other hand, Oscar Schachter states that every party to a multilateral agreement would have a sufficient legal interest to sustain standing to redress⁹².

The differences in the analyses promoted by both authors are motivated by their different focus: Conforti focuses on countries' reactions to violation of international law, which include self-help measures; on the other hand, Schachter limits his interpretation to the judicial reaction, stating that uninjured countries would have sufficient legal standing to bring claims on behalf of the common interest.

⁹⁰ KISS & SHELTON, *supra* note 63, at 90. Even environmental norms included in treaties are subjected to non-compliance mechanisms that assist parties to meet their obligations rather than punish non-compliers. See Training Manual in International Environmental Law, *supra* note 78, at 11.

⁹¹ See BENEDETTO CONFORTI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS 188-189 (René Provost & Shauna Van Praagh trans.) (Martinus Nijhoff publ., 1993) (explaining what is "reprisal" and "reparation" in International Law).

⁹² OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 210 (Martinus Nijhoff publ., 1991).

As noted by Michel Prieur in an interview given to a Brazilian journal⁹³, the current punishment for a violation of an international obligation regarding environmental issues hardly goes beyond moral condemnation or the symbolic finding of violation. This is due to the nonexistence of a court of justice specializing in international environmental crimes.

Summarizing, although countries not injured directly have no right to pursue unilateral measures to react to a violation of international environmental law, they have standing to bring claims to adjudication. However, as there is not yet an appropriate court where such claims can be filled, the violation of international environmental norms remains largely susceptible to mere moral and political condemnation.

⁹³ Michel Prieur: O meio ambiente precisa da globalização. Available at <http://www.sinpro-rs.org.br/extraclasse/mai05/entrevista.asp>, last viewed on June 11, 2011.

APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF RESILIENCE

The applicability of the principle to sectors of a country's legal system requires the prior development of a conceptual framework for decision-making based on the principle of resilience.

Any country seeking to apply the principle of resilience needs, first of all, to recognize it as a moral principle. Therefore, the country must recognize the inherent value of nature and guide its decisions towards the accomplishment of the goal to live in harmony with nature.

As noted by Aldo Leopold, the goal to live in harmony with nature is not necessarily achievable, but it is something we should strive for⁹⁴. Also, it is useful to remember that the acceptance of the goal to live in harmony with the land mechanism as a moral principle presupposes that compliance with this duty is required even when it is against the moral agent interest⁹⁵.

Employing the principle of resilience in decision-making requires that it be recognized as a legal principle, after it has been recognized as a moral principle. In order to ensure enforceability of the legal principle, it is important to incorporate it into a Code or into a country's framework environmental legislation. A country's framework environmental legislation represents "an integrated, ecosystem-oriented legal regime that permits a holistic view of the ecosystem, the synergies and interactions within it, and the linkages in environmental stresses and administrative institutions"⁹⁶, which is precisely what the implementation of the principle of resilience requires.

After being acknowledged in a statute, the legislature or the resource management institutions should create a procedure for the implementation of the principle of resilience. It is recommended that the government analyze where the principle of resilience can be incorporated into existing procedures related to legal protection of the environment. The recommendations addressed in the section dedicated to Environmental Impact Assessment

⁹⁴ LEOPOLD, *supra* note 7, at 210.

⁹⁵ TAYLOR, *supra* note 67, at 25-33.

⁹⁶ UNEP Training Manual, *supra* note 78, at 16.

and to the incorporation of adaptive management into the circle of risk management (Adaptive Management section) are good examples of how this can be done.

In other circumstances, the fulfillment of the principle of resilience's aims will require the creation of new procedures. The organization of workshops for adaptive management and the creation of development rights to address the loss of real property to the sea in coastal areas (Land use section) are examples of innovations in procedural rules.

Besides incorporating the principle of resilience into procedural rules, the government should set penalties for lack of compliance with these rules. As for penalties for noncompliance with the principle of resilience, it is interesting to note that the concept of ecological resilience reveals another level of environmental degradation: the destruction of ecosystem resilience. When the action perpetrated by a project is responsible for eliminating the resilience of an already vulnerable ecosystem, the damage this project caused to the environment is much graver than the damage produced by the same action in a resilient ecosystem. For example, if a project is responsible for eradicating one single pollinizer species, the consequence of this impact will be much graver for an ecosystem that counts on no other species to fulfill the pollination function than in an ecosystem that has many other species providing this service.

In this context, a pertinent question for the legislator would be: should the penalty for whoever destroys the resilience of a certain ecosystem be greater than the penalty applied to whoever perpetrates the same action, but does not produce this result?

In setting the penalties, legislators should seek to employ the penalty as a means to achieve concrete results in improving environmental quality through measures of education for environmental conservation; restoration of an ecosystem's resilience; collection of information for adaptive management; enhancement of sustainable consumption and production patterns.

These kinds of goals are found in the *Writ of Kalikasan*, in the Philippines. This writ was created to enforce the individual constitutional right to a "balanced and healthful ecology". The remedy can be claimed by any natural or judicial person acting on behalf of persons whose environmental right was or is in danger of being violated. The writ awards no damages to individual petitioners; rather its reliefs include directing the respondent to

permanently cease the action or activity that gave cause to the violation of environmental laws; and to restore the environment⁹⁷.

In the State of Amazonas Environmental Court in Manaus, in Brazil, alternative penalties have been proposed by Judge Adalberto Carim Antonio to violators of environmental laws, according to the transgressions. Instead of jail or fines, respondents can opt to restore the environment and to bring additional benefits to the affected community, to take classes in environmental education, or to act as volunteers in environmental protection organizations, among many other innovative penalties⁹⁸.

In order to ensure compliance with the principle, governments should establish who will enforce attainment to the principle guidance and to its procedural rules. The enforcement can be provided by citizen suit provisions, by environmental courts, or by a specific governmental institution vested with special rights to sue violators - such as the Brazilian *Ministério Público*⁹⁹.

Adaptive governance

Adaptive governance is a method that employs the understanding of how ecological resilience works to the governance of decision making within resource management institutions, thereby enhancing the mutual influence of social and ecological systems. That is why adaptive governance seeks to increase the adaptability of the social actors in order to enhance their capacity to reorganize social systems within desired states in response to disturbing events, such as changing environmental conditions¹⁰⁰.

⁹⁷ Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, 3 A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Rule7 (2010) (Phil. S.C.).

⁹⁸ GEORGE “ROCK” PRING & CATHERINE “KITTY” PRING, GREENING JUSTICE 85,86 (2009).

⁹⁹ *Ministério Público* is an institution created by the Brazilian Constitution to defend the legal order; the democratic regime; social interests; and inalienable individual interests. It is vested with rights to investigate and suit whoever violates these interests and values, – be it an individual, a private organization or a governmental organ. In order to ensure *Ministério Público*’s political freedom to control the legality of actions perpetrated by other branches of the government, the Constitution granted *Ministério Público* with functional freedom in relation to the Executive Power, where it is located. Therefore, the Executive Power has no interference on the development of *Ministério Público*’s functions, on its organization or on the selection of its members. See SILVA, *supra* note 74, at 598, 599.

¹⁰⁰ Walker et al., *supra* note 13

“Adaptive governance conveys multi-objective reality when handling conflicts among diverse stakeholders and, at the same time, adapts this social problem to resolve issues concerning dynamic ecosystems”¹⁰¹. In the end, adaptive governance orients how decisions will be made having in regard the information collected by adaptive management and the divergent social interests influencing certain issues whose roots are social and resource management related.

The adoption of patterns of consumption and production that work in synergy with ecosystem functions and processes is an application of adaptive governance. In this matter, the example of the project “Alcântara: sustainable city”¹⁰², in Brazil may be mentioned. In this project, the aim of enhancing the economic growth of the city was joined to the concern of producing a commodity that would improve ecosystem quality and the functioning of society. Due to the national potential for producing biofuels, ethanol was the commodity chosen to boost Alcântara’s economic growth. However, instead of using the rural area of Alcântara to introduce crops of sugar cane, which are not native and are not adapted to the local ecosystem, the project’s proponents decided to produce ethanol from “maripuera”, a byproduct of the local production of cassava flour, which contains cyanide. Instead of merely developing an economic activity with the least impact on the surrounding ecosystem, this project actually improved the environmental quality of the region, as the cyanide had previously been dumped anywhere to seep into the ground.

Adaptive governance in international law

Adaptive governance is an efficient way of implementing Principles 17 and 13 of the Stockholm Declaration, which deal with governance for enhancing environmental quality. Principle 17 declares that “appropriate national institutions must be entrusted with the task of planning, managing, or controlling the environmental resources of States with the view to enhancing environmental quality”. Principle 13 declares that “States should adopt ...

¹⁰¹ Folke et al., *supra* note 9

¹⁰² Report 1, IBRADES – Instituto Brasileiro de Desenvolvimento Sustentável, Alcântara Cidade Sustentável, (Jun. 16, 2011) (on file with author).

development planning so as to ensure that development is compatible with the need to protect and improve the human environment”¹⁰³.

There are now discussions about introducing some features of adaptive governance techniques into institutions on the international level. The need for a flexible institutional framework for sustainable development in order to address new and emerging issues has been recognized by most of the countries attending the Second Preparatory Meeting of the United Nations Convention on Sustainable Development of 2012¹⁰⁴. Many countries called for: greater participation of stakeholders in the environmental institutional framework; integration of mechanisms at the national, regional and international levels; and enhanced coordination and cooperation among all international organizations, agencies and conventions to ensure implementations of commitments and promote synergies¹⁰⁵. Such intentions show a clear trend toward shaping international environmental governance according to the propositions of adaptive governance.

The trend towards the adoption of adaptive governance at the international level is stressed by the intent of several countries to strengthen the monitoring of policies and programs aimed at implementing multilateral environmental agreements. Such an intent is expressed by the countries’ statement in favor of the enhancement of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), which is seen as the only forum in which sustainable development is addressed in an integrated fashion¹⁰⁶. CSD is responsible for reviewing and monitoring progress in the implementation of Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, as well as providing policy guidance to follow up the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation at local, national, regional and international levels¹⁰⁷.

¹⁰³ Stockholm Declaration, *supra* note 68.

¹⁰⁴ International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), *Summary of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the UN Conference On Sustainable Development*, v.27 n.3 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN 11 March 2011, available at <http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb2703e.pdf> (last viewed Nov. 16, 2011).

¹⁰⁵ Co-Chairs’ Summary of the Second Preparatory Committee Meeting, RIO + 20 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, <http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/content/documents/Co-Chairs%20Summary%20of%20PrepCom%202.pdf>.

¹⁰⁶ *Id.*

¹⁰⁷ UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/csd/csd_aboutcsd.shtml.

Adaptive governance in domestic law

Adaptive governance is profoundly influenced by a country's approach to decision-making. The relationship of the principle of resilience to the main approaches to decision-making is analyzed below.

Cost-benefit Analysis

The cost-benefit approach provides that government agencies conduct a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) before enacting major regulation. CBA requires a quantitative and qualitative accounting of the effects of regulation, in which the reasons for action must be explained when costs exceed benefits. CBA is based on the premise that the accounting of regulation effects can give citizens and officials a full sense of what is at stake when making decisions¹⁰⁸.

CBA seeks to test the efficiency of government actions. Efficiency is the term employed by Economy to designate economic transactions that generate greater benefits than costs to society. Economic efficiency provides us with criteria to evaluate the functioning of government¹⁰⁹, because regulation and governmental decisions are unlikely to promote social welfare if the costs are high and the benefits are low¹¹⁰. Therefore, CBA avoids the diversion of government resources from their most beneficial uses to less beneficial ones¹¹¹.

Besides evaluating and enhancing the efficiency of government actions, CBA also assists in overcoming cognitive problems that can lead people to misunderstand the magnitude of the risks, thereby putting things in perspective and preventing government from being indifferent to dangerous threats or from giving exaggerated attention to small problems

¹⁰⁸ CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY & REGULATION 154, (2nd ed., 2009)

¹⁰⁹ See JOSÉ L. CARVALHO ET AL, FUNDAMENTOS DE ECONOMIA: VOL. 1 MACROECONOMIA 108, (José L. Carvalho trans., Cengage Learning Publ., 2008).

¹¹⁰ RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL, *supra* note 108.

¹¹¹ DANIEL FABER ET AL, DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 272 (2nd ed., 2006) (quoting Steve P. Calandrillo, *Responsible Regulation: a Sensible Cost-Benefit, Risk versus Risk Approach to Health and Safety Regulation*, 81 B. U. L. REV. 957 (2001)).

that cause great public commotion. Thus, CBA can increase or decrease attention to safety compared with the *status quo*¹¹².

The benefits of governmental actions are often immaterial and must be translated into monetary values to be considered in the cost-benefit analysis¹¹³. In CBA, economists try to mimic the operation of the market in order to provide the monetary evaluation of the benefits of life, health and nature itself¹¹⁴.

Through CBA, life, health and nature itself lose their ethical value and are subsumed into a monetary amount during the weighting of governmental policies. Worse, as such benefits are felt in the long term and time affects the value of financial resources, nature, life and the health of future generations tend to weigh very little to present generations¹¹⁵. In this context, prevention of fatalities that would occur in the long-term are just worthwhile when their number is very large or the cost of precautions is very low¹¹⁶. Discounting future benefits and foisting threats on future generations underestimates humanity's care about their progeny, which is a basic moral value of any human culture.

The cost-benefit approach treats individuals solely as consumers¹¹⁷, whose interests and rights are determined by their capacity to pay. In this context, nature is just one of many benefits that can be achieved for a certain price. Under this approach, it is impossible to get away with the notion that the relationship between human and nature is marked by domination. The maintenance of the cost-benefit approach towards the management of natural mechanisms makes building harmony between humans and the land mechanism most unlikely.

The CBA tends towards an expertise-dominated approach, which is akin to the *irrational weigher theory*. Under this theory, individuals rely solely on their visceral and affective reactions to recognize risks when they lack information or when they are presented

¹¹² RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., *supra* note 108.

¹¹³ FABER ET AL., *supra* note 111, at 270.

¹¹⁴ FABER ET AL., *supra* note 111, at 276, 277 (quoting Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, *Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection*, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553 (2002)); PLATER, ET AL., *supra* note 6, at 573.

¹¹⁵ FABER ET AL., *supra* note 111, at 270; (Aspen Publishers ed., 2nd ed., 2006). PLATER, ET AL., *supra* note 6, at 572.

¹¹⁶ FABER ET AL., *supra* note 111, at 271.

¹¹⁷ *Id.*, at 277 (quoting Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, *Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection*, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553 (2002)).

with any other limit on their ability to engage in more considered assessments. The proposed regulatory approach for this theory is based on shielding law from the “distorting” influence of emotion and public irrationality by delegating regulatory power to politically insulated experts who evaluate costs and benefits in a reasoned fashion¹¹⁸.

The expertise dominated approach is criticized for not respecting individuals’ factual beliefs and for shielding regulatory law from citizens’ visions of the good society¹¹⁹, which is an insult to citizens’ dignity¹²⁰ and obviously against democratic values. Contrary to what the expert dominated approach would suggest, emotion is not a substitute for information, but rather a type of evaluative judgment by someone who has already had access to information and time to reflect about it. According to the cultural evaluator theory, emotions enable the individual to identify the opinion most appropriate to his or her individual commitments, values, and ideals. The integration of emotions with risk perception equips decision makers to discern issues of justice and ethical values, which cannot be assured by any set of procedures¹²¹.

The cost-benefit analysis approach seems to tend towards less regulation. Empirical studies have demonstrated that costs are often substantially overestimated in the cost-benefit analysis elaborated prior to regulation, probably because cost estimates often originate from the regulated industries themselves, who have great interest in defeating regulatory initiatives¹²². Also, cost-benefit analysis usually does not anticipate innovation and gains in efficiency stimulated by regulation. Therefore, the method tends to overestimate the costs and to underestimate the benefits of any environmentally protective regulation. This may explain the common perception that U.S. experts and policymakers – who adopt the cost-benefit approach – favor less conservative environmental, health, and safety measures than their European counterparts – who adopt the precautionary approach¹²³.

¹¹⁸ *Id.*, at 255-261, (quoting Dan M. Kahan, *Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation*, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (2008)).

¹¹⁹ *Id.*

¹²⁰ Douglas A. Kysar, *It Might Have Been: Risk, Precaution, and Opportunity Costs* 28, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (2006).

¹²¹ FABER ET AL, *supra* note 111, at 257-262 (quoting Dan M. Kahan, *Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation*, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (2008)).

¹²² PLATER, ET AL., *supra* note 6, at 574.

¹²³ Kysar, *supra* note 120, at 4.

In the absence of a regulation forbidding or imposing greater burdens on environmentally harmful activities, governments that seek to stimulate environmental protection usually resort to the creation of economic incentives in order to encourage the adoption of environmentally friendly solutions when there are cheaper alternatives in the market. In this context, the adoption of a cost-benefit approach, the reduction of regulation and the increasing deployment of market incentives are connected and mutually reinforcing.

In the United States, the tradition of adopting cost-benefit analysis to evaluate risks and alternative mitigation measures dates back to 1981, during the Reagan Administration¹²⁴. President Nixon's Executive Order 12,866¹²⁵ provided that in deciding whether and how to regulate, agencies should assess all the costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives, including the alternative of not regulating; and choose the approach that maximizes the net benefits.

It is possible to identify a recent tendency towards the pragmatic approach in the cost-benefit American tradition after the enactment of President Obama's *Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review Executive Order*¹²⁶. The pragmatic approach is a reorientation of the cost-benefit approach which attempts to introduce the consideration of values that society holds in high regard into the cost-benefit analysis. Therefore, the pragmatic approach recognizes the limits of technical expertise and the role of social values in decision-making considerations. Such an approach is centered on statutory priorities and on justifying why particular policies are preferable to others¹²⁷. President Obama's Executive Order reviews the cost-benefit analysis in the American federal government by strongly emphasizing public participation in the process and encouraging consideration of benefits that are difficult to quantify such as "equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts"¹²⁸.

The application of a cost-benefit approach in determining the appropriate response to risks hampers the deployment of adaptive management techniques in governmental agencies

¹²⁴ Dan Farber, *Obama's Cost-Benefit Executive Order*, LEGAL PLANET (Jan. 24, 2011), <http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2011/01/24/obamas-cost-benefit-executive-order/>.

¹²⁵ 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981).

¹²⁶ Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011).

¹²⁷ RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., *supra* note 108, at 161-164 (quoting Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, *Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic Reorientation*, 32 HARVARD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW 433 (2008)).

¹²⁸ Farber, *supra* note 124.

because of the difficulty of assessing with a high degree of certainty the costs and benefits of measures to mitigate the risk of a natural event. The risk of a natural event can hardly be estimated from the historical record because of the variability of natural systems. In addition, the harm caused by a natural event is partly a function of human siting decisions as well as precaution and response systems, which may be difficult to assess¹²⁹.

Besides the difficulty of assessing the risks of a natural event, and the benefits that adaptive management would generate in preventing them, the CBA for an adaptive approach is spoiled by a common misinterpretation of the costs of environmental regulation. One of the costs governmental agencies include in CBA for environmental regulation is the amount of benefits that society will lose by restricting or prohibiting an economic activity. The issue observed in this context is that the benefits of environmentally harmful activities are usually known before their costs to the environment and to society are fully assessed, because the assessment of benefits is in the interest of the entrepreneur, who has the greater knowledge about the activity being developed. Corroborating this is the fact that sometimes the downside of an activity has a latency period, during which the negative effects cannot be assessed. Many examples can be given of this phenomenon, such as the Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PCB) substance largely used in industrial and commercial applications from 1929 to the 1970's due to its non-flammability, chemical stability, high boiling point, and electrical insulating properties¹³⁰. Only after fifty years of usage was the substance banned in the United States and other countries due to its devastating health effects¹³¹.

Because the benefits of a new activity or product tend to be assessed prior to its costs, the cost-benefit analysis of regulatory agencies is most likely to conclude that the activity presents high benefits and uncertain costs. Based on this finding, the agency is likely to decide on regulatory inaction because the regulator will lack safety arguments for imposing a regulatory burden on an activity that presents a mere hypothetical possibility of generating

¹²⁹ FABER ET AL, *supra* note 111, at 274 (quoting Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, *Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection*, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553 (2002)).

¹³⁰ United States Environmental Protection Agency [U.S. EPA], *Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs)*, <http://www.epa.gov/epawaste/hazard/tsd/pcbs/index.htm>.

¹³¹ See *Id.*; *Industry and Economics Chemicals Branch*, UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME DIVISION OF TECHNOLOGY, http://www.chem.unep.ch/pops/pops_inc/proceedings/bangkok/fiedler1.html; AUSTRALIAN WORKERS HEALTH CENTRE, <http://www.workershealth.com.au/facts012.html>.

costs that outweigh its benefits to society. An example of this situation was observed in the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's review of nanoparticle-containing sunscreens, when the agency treated situations of deep uncertainty regarding the potential impacts of novel technological processes as unworthy of regulatory attention¹³².

In summary, the adoption of cost-benefit analysis as the sole approach to the decision-making process of weighing alternatives hampers the creation of protective environmental regulation; the adoption of adaptive management by agencies; and the consideration of ethical values in decision-making, such as the inherent value of nature, and the goals of living in harmony with nature and caring about future generations.

On the other hand, cost-benefit analysis makes for government efficiency, which is an important value of administration and cannot be forsaken. However, even solely examining the contributions of cost-benefit analysis to governmental efficiency, it is fair to say that this method is not sufficient to address governmental efficiency because it is too much centered on efficiency in the short term. Its techniques for discounting the future, its limitations on predicting the benefits of protective measures (which include both protective regulation and adoption of adaptive management) and its overestimation of the costs of environmental protection prevent it from being taken as a complete tool to address governmental efficiency in the long term.

Ensuring efficiency in the long term for the management of natural resources is the aim of green economy and a requirement of sustainable development and of the principle of resilience. If cost-benefit analysis cannot provide efficiency in the long term, it obligatorily must be coupled with other approaches to decision making that are compromised with it.

The need for combining cost-benefit analysis with other approaches to decision making also appeals as a matter of justice. Cost-benefit analysis employs an economic method for solving disputes between economic and environmental interests. Of course such a method is more appropriate to quantify economic interests than any other sort of interest and clearly the method itself will contribute to the achievement of decisions that tilt towards economic interests.

¹³² Kysar, *supra* note 120, at 17.

Due to this trend, the recognition of the principle of resilience as a legal principle and the commitment of procedural rules with the achievement of justice requires cost-benefit analysis to be just one of the phases of decision making, and not the entire process.

The application of the principle of resilience to the decision making process points towards the introduction of a weighing phase, where the administrative organ has to weight the experts' opinion (represented by the result of the cost-benefit analysis) with input from public participation and with environmental conservation values recognized in statute. In this context, the recognition of environmental conservation values by the law is extremely important because the courts' power of review over agencies' decisions is usually restricted to reviewing the legality of the act – the court cannot decide on questions of merit, in respect to the Separation of Powers. If the law does not require the agency to consider certain conservation values in its decisions, the courts cannot oblige the agency to do so.

One may argue that weighing ethical values in decision making is not part of the functioning of many governmental agencies nowadays and, for that reason, the fulfillment of this requirement can endanger agencies organization and good functioning. For this reason, education and training of government personnel on environmental conservation and its values is very important. Education for conservation extended to the whole society is also important to provide citizens with tools to exercise oversight of agencies' actions through citizen suit provisions or others means of public participation in decision making.

Also, it might be interesting to consider the establishment of a separate entity to opine how a proposed project or policy might endanger the interests of next generations and nature itself. This entity could be created based on the Hungarian ombudsman for next generations. The Hungarian ombudsman can address constitutional complaints regarding violations of Hungarians' right to environmental protection and a healthy environment; promote research on topics of interest; and do parliamentary advocacy, for example, by pointing out how legal drafts can impact the interests of next generations¹³³.

Precautionary principle

¹³³ Interview with the Hungarian Ombudsman for Future Generations, WORLD FUTURE COUNCIL, http://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/hungarian_ombudsman.html.

The precautionary principle guides decision makers to take precautionary measures when an activity can cause serious or irreversible harm to human health or the environment, even if cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically¹³⁴.

The advent of the precautionary principle is related to a common deficiency in the application of the preventive principle. According to the preventive principle, when an activity has been scientifically proven to cause harm, the proponent must take measures to prevent, mitigate or compensate for the harm. However, the lack of reliable monitoring data on the long-term cumulative and combined effects of harmful activities on complex ecosystems often leads to uncertainty regarding the scientific assessments of environmental impacts¹³⁵. The lack of scientific certainty of cause and effect relationships was the motive for the creation of the precautionary principle in order to guide decision-makers in the very frequent occasions where they are required to decide how to address potential, uncertain or even hypothetical threats, which can make the consequences of inaction serious or irreversible¹³⁶.

The precautionary principle acknowledges the complexity of ecosystems and the limits of human understanding of natural mechanisms. That is the reason why the principle adopts an ecosystem approach, rather than fragmenting environmental protection in single-species or single-natural-function approaches¹³⁷. That is also the reason why the relationship between the precautionary principle and science is marked by a culture of humility about the sufficiency and accuracy of existing knowledge when dealing with environmental, health, and safety regulation¹³⁸.

Even though the precautionary principle acknowledges scientific uncertainty when there is not sufficient evidence regarding ecosystem functioning, or on the probabilities of

¹³⁴ Kysar, *supra* note 120, at 5.

¹³⁵ Minna Pyhälä et al, *The precautionary principle*, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 203, 205, 212 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice et al. eds., 2010)

¹³⁶ See KISS & SHELTON, *supra* note 63, at 95. See also Kysar, *supra* note 120, at 14.

¹³⁷ See ROSIE COONEY, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION AND NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 30, (IUCN Policy and Global Change Series n. 2, 2004). See also Pyhälä et al, *supra* note 135, at 220.

¹³⁸ Kysar, *supra* note 120, at 22.

adverse outcomes, nonetheless, the principle attributes an important role to science. Science recognizes and quantifies environmental problems, thereby reducing management uncertainties; science provides key evidence to guide decision makers as to which risks are graver and on which management actions should be prioritized; experts also provide decision makers with alternatives for action and assess which alternative is safer under a scientific point of view¹³⁹.

Decision making attendant to the precautionary principle is not made solely based on the information provided by science; the precautionary principle is applied on a case-by-case basis, where scientists inform decision makers, who weigh up the scientific knowledge with value judgments of a moral, cultural, economic and political nature¹⁴⁰. If decision makers do not chose the alternative that scientists have considered the safest one, decision makers must justify their choice¹⁴¹. This rule allows decision makers to diverge from scientists while at the same time providing the public with means to evaluate the legitimacy of decision makers' choices.

Along with the scientific knowledge and during the weighing process, decision makers are also advised by the FAO technical guidance on the precautionary approach¹⁴² to consider traditional, indigenous and local resources users' knowledge of how the ecosystem functions. These groups have an intense and long-lasting relationship with the surrounding environment, through which they construct an empirical knowledge that often covers longer periods of observation than scientific studies do¹⁴³. The importance attributed to non-scientific forms of knowledge in the design of public policies is another consequence of the acknowledgement that science is not absolute.

The precautionary principle recognizes the importance of the well-being of non-human entities, the intrinsic value of ecological systems and, therefore, the moral obligation

¹³⁹ Pyhälä et al, *supra* note 135, at 214-218.

¹⁴⁰ *Id.*, at 221; COONEY, *supra* note 137, at 36.

¹⁴¹ Pyhälä et al, *supra* note 135, at 219.

¹⁴² U. N. Food and Agriculture Organization, *Precautionary Approach to Capture Fisheries and Species Introductions* § 64, FAO TECHNICAL GUIDELINES FOR RESPONSIBLE FISHERIES N. 2 (1996).

¹⁴³ "Ecological systems often exhibit frequency behavior on the scale of decades or even centuries...it is hardly conceivable that there would ever be an extensive enough range of data to allow for a comprehensive description using statistical methods". William C. Clark et al., *Lessons for Ecological Policy Design*, in FOUNDATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE, *supra* note 2, at 331, 346-47.

of humankind to protect vulnerable or critical natural systems¹⁴⁴. In this respect, the principle is much aligned to the premises of the *land ethic*.

The precautionary principle is guided by the premise that society must not be paralyzed by the lack of scientific knowledge and, therefore must take action to protect health and the environment¹⁴⁵ even when facing uncertainty. Thus, the precautionary principle guides decision makers to respond to deficiencies of understanding by constantly reevaluating and improving learning and knowledge¹⁴⁶. Consequently, the precautionary principle requires a high degree of information and monitoring¹⁴⁷.

The recognition of limited knowledge and the emphasis on taking action and on learning leads to the conclusion that error in environmental management is highly possible. In order to protect the environment from such errors, the precautionary principle recognizes the need for preparedness to provide ecological space for recovery from potential policy mistakes. Preparedness against errors can be achieved by leaving a margin of error when establishing harvest limits¹⁴⁸.

The precautionary principle challenges the current legal, political, social and economic system on many grounds. First, the principle deals with uncertainty, while traditional legal systems rely on certainty and predictability. Second, the moral obligation to protect the environment contradicts the modern western belief that human interests, such as material growth, always have pre-eminence over non-human interests. Third, as above mentioned, the principle requires leaving a margin of error when establishing harvest limits, which is against the market logic to maximize the revenue by exploiting all available resources. Forth, the principle requires long-term economic and social considerations, in order to prevent decision makers from taking no notice of the abundant benefits of preventing irreversible damages that would be felt in the medium and long-term future. Fifth, the principle challenges policy

¹⁴⁴ Pyhälä et al, *supra* note 135, at 215.

¹⁴⁵ *Id.*, at 219.

¹⁴⁶ Institute of the Environment University of Ottawa, *Practicing Precaution and Adaptive Management* B-10, (Jun. 2005), http://www.uottawa.ca/ie/English/Reports/JBPP_Final_Report.pdf

¹⁴⁷ COONEY, *supra* note 137, at 30.

¹⁴⁸ *Id.*

makers to promote an inter-disciplinary consideration of factors that influence decision making when weighing the information available about an uncertain threat¹⁴⁹.

The precautionary principle is abundantly present in soft and hard law agreements (Rio Declaration, UNFCCC, CBD, Stockholm Convention on POPs, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, European Community – Treaty of Rome) and in state practice and judicial opinion. However, it has not been fully applied in rulings of international courts¹⁵⁰.

When there are concerns regarding unknown but potentially devastating threats to natural systems that are thought to be of fundamental and irreplaceable importance to humanity, the precautionary principle guides decision makers to assess what would be the worst possible outcome and to align their decisions to prevent the occurrence of such event. That guidance is called the *maximin principle*. However, the applicability of the *maximin principle* is limited and it is not recommended for times when the costs of precaution become immoderate or unacceptably large. When an activity can pose serious threats to the environment, but the costs of prohibiting it are too burdensome, the precautionary principle advises governments and private actors to “do the best they can” to mitigate the negative impacts of such activity¹⁵¹. This commitment is implied in United States pollution control statutes which require the installation of the best available pollution abatement technology¹⁵².

The precautionary principle entails a shift in the burden of proof onto proponents and developers. This measure aims to prevent the environment or human populations from bearing the burden of uncertainty. The shift in the burden of proof corrects a defect of traditional legal systems that disallow claims for compensation for accidents and acts of God, which disincentive developers from taking adequate precaution measures¹⁵³.

The precautionary principle provides a few guidelines for decision makers to consider during the weighing process. First, decision making should be transparent and it should allow

¹⁴⁹ Pyhälä et al, *supra* note 135, at 203.

¹⁵⁰ *Id.*

¹⁵¹ Kysar, *supra* note 120, at 24.

¹⁵² The best available technology is required by the Clean Water Act [CWA], 33 USC §§1251 (2010), for new sources discharges of conventional pollutants and for all sources of toxic pollutants and non-conventional pollutants, see 33 USC §1314(b)(2) (2010). The best available technology is also required by the Clean Air Act for new discharge sources installed in National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) attainment areas, see 42 USC §7410(a)(2)(J) (2010).

¹⁵³ Pyhälä et al, *supra* note 135, at 213.

public participation¹⁵⁴. Second, decision makers must consider the proportionality of protective measures in relation to the level of security to be achieved¹⁵⁵.

Adaptive management is also often referred to as a means to implement the precautionary principle¹⁵⁶ in risk management, although some authors understand that adaptive management and the precautionary principle are incompatible¹⁵⁷. Adaptive management is a useful tool for the precautionary principle because it stands for taking action for conservation even when there is no complete understanding as to which would be the most appropriate protective measure. Adaptive management, such as the precautionary principle, recognizes the value of learning from experience and of monitoring policy effects, keeping risk regulation to a perceived threat updated over time¹⁵⁸. Also, other tools of the precautionary principle, such as the shift of the burden of proof, can provide a valuable aid to the adaptive management learning process by incentivizing research and understanding by developers and activity proponents on imperfectly characterized threats¹⁵⁹.

Besides the affinity with adaptive management, the precautionary principle shares other premises and values held by the principle of resilience. Therefore, the precautionary principle can make a great contribution to the implementation of the principle of resilience, especially regarding the reconciliation of adaptive management, public participation, legal predictability and legitimacy, and the ethical and ecological values of the principle of resilience.

The precautionary principle reinforces the notion that political communities retain special responsibility to evaluate the effects of their decisions not only on themselves, but also on those is not involved in the decision process, such as other societies, future human generations and nature itself¹⁶⁰. Thereby, besides being an opportunity to maximize welfare functions, the policy making process becomes a forum for discussions regarding the

¹⁵⁴ COONEY, *supra* note 137, at 38-39.

¹⁵⁵ COONEY, *supra* note 137, at 36.

¹⁵⁶ *Id.*, at 30; Institute of the Environment University of Ottawa, *supra* note 146; Pyhälä et al, *supra* note 135, at 220.

¹⁵⁷ COONEY, *supra* note 137, at 31; Pyhälä et al, *supra* note 135, at 220.

¹⁵⁸ Kysar, *supra* note 120, at 34.

¹⁵⁹ *Id.*, at 26 (quoting Amy Sinden, *Cass Sunstein's Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics for Liberals*, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 191, 194 (2004)).

¹⁶⁰ Kysar, *supra* note 120, at 12.

obligation of the regulating body towards these non-represented groups¹⁶¹. Acknowledgement of such a responsibility attributes a collective moral identity to social choices¹⁶². By this means, the precautionary principle establishes the correlation between policy choices and ethics.

Like the principle of resilience, the precautionary principle acknowledges that humankind's obligation to protect the environment has a moral justification. However, the principle of resilience goes further, acknowledging that society must not only protect the environment, but also adopt ways of life that are in synergy with ecosystem functions, especially regarding patterns of production and consumption.

Besides recognizing these societal moral duties, the principle of resilience also recognizes the individual moral duty to respect nature and to pursue a way of living in harmony with the land mechanism. The precautionary principle promotes the saying "do the best you can" regarding activities that cause environmental impacts but that are, nonetheless, necessary and irreplaceable for society. In the same way, the principle of resilience acknowledges that humans have a moral responsibility to do their best to aid the land mechanism to maintain its mutually enforcing processes as a recompense for the benefits the environment provides us and for the unavoidable burdens we inflict on the land mechanism.

Also common to both principles is the idea that humans must take action to comply with the moral obligation to protect the environment, even when the scientific knowledge on impacts and their solutions is not yet complete. Therefore, unlike cost-benefit analysis, both the principle of resilience and the precautionary principle point towards regulatory action in the face of uncertainty.

Adaptive management decisions should demonstrate the adoption of the policy alternative that presented the greater synergy with ecosystem functions. If such an alternative is not adopted, policy makers must justify the reason priority was given to the other value. The lack of justification or the lack of sufficient evidence to support the decision may motivate judicial review of the agency's decision.

¹⁶¹ *Id.*, at 47.

¹⁶² *Id.*, at 12.

Some interpretations of the precautionary principle attribute particular importance to the preservation of fundamental ecosystems functions, such as the proposal to employ “safe minimum standards” to Earth’s life-support systems facing potentially devastating threats, in order to protect them whatever the cost¹⁶³. This application of the precautionary principle can enforce the ecological goal of the principle of resilience to preserve ecosystem functions and prevent irreversible changes in stability domains.

Because the information available prior to decision making is not complete or conclusive, the precautionary principle places great responsibility and discretion on decision makers to do the weighing process. In order to prevent the process from becoming opaque, thereby losing legitimacy, the precautionary principle requires enhanced means of public participation and accountability of the decision makers within a public administration¹⁶⁴.

Besides the lack of conclusiveness of any scientific evidence, some authors mention other aspects of management in the face of uncertainty that can impoverish legitimacy. Barbara Cosens observes that adaptive management requires the expansion of agencies’ discretion to decide and to change strategies based on the assessment of results. In addition, this approach ascribes to scientists a key role in interpreting the data and in recommending solutions. Because in a democracy legitimacy is achieved by the government of representatives elected by citizens, the concentration of power on non-elected representatives is seen as a reduction of decision-making legitimacy¹⁶⁵.

Nevertheless, agencies already had substantial responsibility for decision making before the implementation of the precautionary principle and the advent of adaptive management. Since recognition of the need to prevent environmental impacts and the adoption of the preventive principle, agencies were required to prove the potential impact of an activity in order to justify environmental regulation¹⁶⁶. Besides that, the enlargement of agencies’ decision power is also due to their expertise in making decisions on complex issues

¹⁶³ *Id.*, at 24.

¹⁶⁴ Pyhälä et al, *supra* note 135, at 214.

¹⁶⁵ Barbara Cosens, *Resilience and Administrative Law in Transboundary River Governance*, STOCKHOLM RESILIENCE CENTRE (Nov. 17-19, 2010), <http://www.stockholmresilience.org/research/researchnews/attheintersectionoflawandresilience.5.4d177c5b12cd2f8876080003697.html>.

¹⁶⁶ Pyhälä et al, *supra* note 135, at 205.

and in solving issues about the interpretation of statutes faster and with a greater level of detail than Congress¹⁶⁷, which was a reality even before the precautionary principle arose.

Therefore, part of the impoverishment of legitimacy caused by the implementation of the preventive principle is remedied by the precautionary principle, since the influence of scientists in decision making is controlled by political decisions taken by the heads of agencies during the weighing process. On the other hand, the impoverishment of decision making legitimacy due to the transfer of decisions from the legislature to agencies can be addressed by ensuring that there is enough publicity and public participation in the decision-making process. In addition, such problems can be addressed by greater Congressional and Judicial oversight of agencies and by the employment of mechanisms proposed by Economic Law literature to prevent agency capture.

Besides legitimacy, the law also makes claims for predictability, which is a very challenging goal when dealing with uncertainty and adaptive management. Theorists on adaptive management usually reject the use of regulation in the face of uncertainty¹⁶⁸ and management approaches that seek to replace the uncertainty of resource issues with the certainty of a process¹⁶⁹.

It is true that surprises are inevitable and that institutions managing for resilience must be flexible. It is also true that the uncertainty of a management problem cannot be replaced by a procedure. However, it does not mean that flexible institutions cannot observe any procedure. As pointed out by Cosens, procedural rules provide legitimacy to acts of public administration governed by the Administrative Law¹⁷⁰. Therefore, public administration cannot simply get rid of procedure. By the same token, agencies can act only within the limits of power delegated by Congress. The limitation of agencies power and agencies' obligation to follow the rules determined by Congress and by the agency itself ensure to Congress and to society that the agency will not exceed those limits and, if it does, that it will be reprimanded for that. It is not possible to have Congressional, Judicial or citizen control over agencies if it

¹⁶⁷ PLATER, ET AL., *supra* note 6, at 215-238.

¹⁶⁸ Craig R. Allen et al. *Commentary on Part Three Articles*, in FOUNDATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE, *supra* note 2, at 301, 305.

¹⁶⁹ Lance Gunderson, *Resilience, flexibility and adaptive management – antidotes for spurious certitude?*

CONSERVATION ECOLOGY vol. 3, n. 1, art. 7 (Jun.30, 1999), <http://www.consecol.org/vol3/iss1/art7/>

¹⁷⁰ Cosens, *supra* note 165.

is not perfectly clear which rules and procedures they must submit to. Without this control of one governmental branch over the other, it is not possible to maintain a republican state. A proposal of institutional design cannot ignore such basic legal premises and rules of power distribution in national states; otherwise it risks never being adopted and implemented at all.

The delegation of power to agencies and the establishment of a procedure for adaptive management can be formulated in a manner to attend to both the legal need for predictability and procedural legitimacy, and the need to establish a method to guide the long-term process of adaptive management. Aiming to attend to those two interests, this article proposes a general roadmap for regulation for adaptive management.

The norm enacted by Congress which delegates power to an agency can provide guidelines for the structure of policies and norms that should be created by the agency. For example, the norm can establish that every policy created must define: goals; actions; predicted results; time frame to launch actions in short, medium and long term; methods of monitoring; the entity competent to do monitoring; deadlines for collection of monitoring data and for release of monitoring results; and penalties for not complying with deadlines and guidelines determined by the delegation statute.

Through the design of an adaptive management model coupled with basic regulation, agencies have a certain freedom to determine the content of policies, while the regulation structures a method. The establishment of a method is essential because it attends demands of legal, political and scientific levels. From a legal perspective, the pre-determination of a procedure attributes greater legitimacy to the process, ensures legal predictability, and facilitates oversight by the legislature, by the Judiciary and by the public.

From a political perspective, the establishment of a procedure ensures the continuity of the process even if the agency personnel change along with changes in government. It is widely known that changes in government are a major cause for discontinuity of policy measures and plans. The determination of a procedure can aid in the solution for this aspect by forcing the agency to create long-term planning and goals, which will ensure the continuity of management measures and which will have to be considered by the next generation of decision-makers.

From a scientific perspective, the establishment of a procedure or method is natural to the beginning of any research project or of any policy analysis. Therefore, such a measure is

useful because it conciliates the need for legitimacy and predictability with the scientist's interest in flexibility in determining the content of the policy.

Ecologists usually consider that regulation is not best suited to guide the management of ecosystems with regard to unknown threats because this kind of management does not provide the flexibility required for dealing with the unexpected¹⁷¹. For such cases ecologists suggest the use of adaptive management tools.

Although this work recognizes the value of adaptive management as a way of rendering environmental regulation more flexible, it supports the view that the implementation of an adaptive management process not supported by environmental regulation is inconceivable. The reason for this is quite simple: the management of ecosystems necessarily requires the imposition of restraints on actions perpetrated by private actors, because every ecosystem supports anthropic activities which will be affected by a regulation aimed at enhancing ecosystem resilience. As the actions of private actors can only be constrained by rules of law, an adaptive management not supported by regulation would have very limited implementation and efficacy.

The authors who advocate adaptive management usually prefer market incentives to command-and-control regulations, as if they were independent of each other. However, in order to be successful, any market incentives depend on the scarcity of whatever is tradable. As the market does not naturally attribute value to an ecosystem's functions or services, market incentives always depend on a command-and-control regulation aimed at internalizing environmental costs and attributing scarcity and value to the ecosystem's services. Therefore, adaptive management will always require some basic regulation.

Adaptive Management

The change in stability domain can motivate several human reactions: humans can do nothing and wait to see if the system will return to some acceptable state; or they can actively manage the system and try to return it to a desirable stability domain; or they can admit that

¹⁷¹ Allen et al., *supra* note 168, at 305.

the system is irreversibly changed and, hence, that the only strategy is to adapt to the new altered system¹⁷². The first reaction – to do nothing – is hardly an option because human activities and human lives depend on the ecosystem and the choice for inaction can represent not only economic losses, but also the loss of lives. Therefore, humans need to manage ecosystems sometimes for a return to a past condition, sometimes to adapt to an unavoidable new condition. Due to the complexity of ecosystems, humans often lack complete understanding about the processes that lead towards changes in stability domain. That is why resource managers usually have to deal with uncertainty.

Literature recognizes adaptive management as the most suitable approach for dealing with ecosystem complexity and the uncertainty generated by unknown threats¹⁷³. This management method is centered on feeding ecological knowledge into management organizations by constantly improving understanding of ecosystem dynamics through the interpretation of data periodically collected by observation and monitoring¹⁷⁴.

Adaptive management is a result-based approach to management by agencies; its final goal is to continuously enhance environmental quality. The adaptive management process mainly consists in specifying objectives when addressing a management problem, articulating a policy and evaluating the performance of the policy¹⁷⁵. Adaptive management has great potential for dealing with ecosystem resilience because this method relies on the observation and interpretation of essential processes and variables in ecosystem dynamics¹⁷⁶, constantly using this knowledge to reevaluate and modify the management strategy. During the evaluation process, a critical understanding of the effects of the policy creates an experience platform upon which informed policy designs and meaningful choices can be based in the future¹⁷⁷.

Adaptive management distinguishes itself from conventional management because it focuses on managing essential ecological processes that sustain the delivery of harvestable

¹⁷² Gunderson *supra* note 169, at 4.

¹⁷³ *Id.*; Allen et al, *supra* note 168, at 305; C. S. HOLLING ET AL, ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (C.S. Holling ed., 1980).

¹⁷⁴ Folke et al., *supra* note 9, at 448.

¹⁷⁵ Clark et al., *supra* note 143, at 364.

¹⁷⁶ Folke et al., *supra* note 9, at 445.

¹⁷⁷ Clark et al., *supra* note 143, at 381.

resources and ecosystem services at multiple temporal and spatial scales¹⁷⁸, while the conventional approach focuses on the assessment of the maximum sustainable yield of an individual species at a single scale¹⁷⁹. The protection of groups of species that develop the same function at different scales reinforces the resilience of that function and enables that function to be maintained despite sudden variations within specific scales¹⁸⁰.

Obstacles to the adoption of adaptive management

There are a few characteristics of risk perception that may influence political mobilization towards the adoption of adaptive management measures. It has been noticed that involuntary exposure to risk is regarded by the public as less tolerable than voluntary exposure. This might be explained by the fact that voluntary exposure presupposes that people have both the knowledge about the risk and the freedom to choose to undertake the risk, thus acknowledging people's autonomy, equality and individual power – ideals most valued by modern society. In the same sense, involuntary exposure to risk is seen as a signal of uncontrollability and uncertainty¹⁸¹, which is usually condemned by modern society.

Probably for this reason, resource managers try to reduce the public perception of uncertainty towards risks of natural disasters. They do so by ignoring most uncertainty; by breaking the problem into trivial questions, thereby achieving a spurious certitude; or by replacing the uncertainty of resource issues with the certainty of a process¹⁸².

Differently from the above mentioned reactions, adaptive management recognizes the uncertainties of risks and confronts them¹⁸³, which may give the public the false impression that under adaptive management there is greater uncertainty than under other sorts of management methods. In this context, the environmental principle of information plays an important role in order to inform the public about the uncertainties inherent in any

¹⁷⁸ RESILIENCE ALLIANCE, http://www.resalliance.org/index.php/adaptive_management.

¹⁷⁹ Folke et al., *supra* note 9, at 443.

¹⁸⁰ Peterson et al., *supra* note 34, at 182-85.

¹⁸¹ FABER ET AL, *supra* note 111, at 252 (quoting Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Court and Agencies, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1027 (1990)).

¹⁸² Gunderson *supra* note 169.

¹⁸³ *Id.*

management method, thereby dissipating the false impression. It is expected that the potential reluctance of public opinion to accept this method can be defeated by showing that adaptive management is more suitable for dealing with uncertainty precisely because it does not hide uncertainty.

The perception of risk also poses obstacles to adaptive management because natural disasters get less attention than human-made events¹⁸⁴; therefore there is less public pressure towards the prevention of natural disasters than towards the prevention of terrorists' attacks, for example. When dealing with disasters, people are concerned not only with safety, but also with responsibility and guilt, and as natural disasters are not considered to be caused by humans, they are thought of as nobody's responsibility¹⁸⁵. Adaptive management hardly will be able to change this perception, unless the increase in collection of information enables managers to identify which specific human-made actions caused certain environmental hazards.

Experience shows that the presence of certain circumstances can block the development of adaptive environmental assessment and management or can make it not recommendable. It occurs when an ecological system completely lacks resilience; institutions lack flexibility; designing experiments presents technical challenges; natural resources present certain characteristics that make experimentation impossible; or design analysis concludes that the risks of failure are socially and legally unacceptable¹⁸⁶. These circumstances affect a manager's capacity to experiment and learn from experience, which is a decisive feature of adaptive management¹⁸⁷. Also, because adaptive management needs room for experimentation, it goes against market logic because it proposes the maintenance of a minimum level of untouched and/or economically unused resources in order to preserve the ecosystem's ability to reorganize itself.

There is still reluctance among environmental agencies to implement adaptive management. It is a method too complex, time consuming and often expensive – factors very

¹⁸⁴ FABER ET AL, *supra* note 111, at 254.

¹⁸⁵ *Id.*, at 252-53 (quoting Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Court and Agencies, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1027 (1990)).

¹⁸⁶ Gunderson *supra* note 169, at 6.

¹⁸⁷ Folke et al., *supra* note 9, 447.

common to processes that involve scientific investigation and democratic debates with insights from public participation.

As administrators pursue short term efficiency in their management methods, they usually employ first the simplest management alternatives and leave adaptive management to be used as the tool of last resort, when none of the others were effective¹⁸⁸. The downside of this reality is that adaptive management is employed when ecosystems are already very distressed – at such a time, adaptive management cannot provide substantial aid because it is not appropriate for ecosystems that have no resilience left.

The latency and irreversibility of some risks deny managers the fruits of trial-and-error, because, under these circumstances, the effects of an action are only identified years or decades after implementation, when actions cannot be corrected anymore¹⁸⁹. It is expected that by enhancing the resilience of the ecosystem, managers will reduce the probability of irreversible effects because the ecosystem will have wider capability to adapt to different circumstances. However, if the ecosystem totally lacks resilience, managers will not be able to rely on adaptive management for dealing with risks with potential latency and irreversibility because adaptive management entails experimentation.

Certain legal measures can be taken to attenuate or remove the obstacles to the implementation of adaptive management. These measures are explained below.

EIA and related tools

The EIA related tools can contribute to the transfer of information required by the implementation of adaptive management by predicting the potential impacts of policies; by assessing the alternatives; and by ensuring public access to information and participation in the decision process.

¹⁸⁸ Johnson, B. L., *The role of adaptive management as an operational approach for resource management agencies*, CONSERVATION ECOLOGY vol. 3 n. 2 art. 8 (1999), available at <http://www.consecol.org/vol3/iss2/art8/> (last viewed Nov. 16, 2011).

¹⁸⁹ FABER ET AL, *supra* note 111, at 252 (quoting Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Court and Agencies, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1027 (1990)).

Tools such as strategic environmental assessment or area wide assessments are of even greater importance in enhancing adaptive management considering that most of the surprises, classified as local and cross-scale¹⁹⁰, could be predicted and monitored through the integration of information of local and regional scale.

EIA can also help in implementing adaptive management at the project level by requiring, during the process of renewal of the license, the reevaluation of an activity's impacts and of its mitigation measures. Therefore, instead of renewing environmental licenses without further questioning, agencies could evaluate whether the mitigation measures that condition the license were efficient and whether new mitigation measures are needed.

Aiming to prevent the repeated incidence of such situations, several measures tending to simplify the adaptive management process can be employed. First, environmental departments should unify the methodologies employed in the collection of ecosystem data within the several EIA related tools – such as the EIAs itself, the SEAs, and the EMSs – because lack of standardization is often a reason why available data cannot be used in modeling and why it has to be recollected by adaptive managers¹⁹¹. By this means, the environmental department will focus on managing and analyzing the available data rather than on collecting it. Second, the models developed by managers to aid in the understanding of the functioning of the ecosystem have to be kept as simple as possible and the predictions of the need for new data should be constantly reviewed in order to prevent the collection of irrelevant data¹⁹².

Risk evaluation, disaster preparedness and recovery

¹⁹⁰ The concept of “scales” is very important when dealing with resilience, and especially when dealing with adaptive management. That is so because the same event that may cause uncertainty at one scale can be deemed a predictable event at another scale. According to Gunderson, uncertainty is usually caused by three types of surprise: local; cross-scale; and true novelty¹⁹⁰. Local surprises are created by broader scale processes for which there is little or no previous local knowledge. This kind of surprise can be solved by broader scale observation and historical accumulation of knowledge. Cross-scale surprise occurs when a larger scale fluctuation intersects with slowly changing internal variables to create an alternative stable local system state. This is often the source of policy crises. True novelty occurs when new variables and processes transform the system into a new state. In these surprises, little or no experience exists for either understanding the transformation or structuring management actions. Gunderson *supra* note 169, at 2.

¹⁹¹ I.B. Marshall et al, *National and Regional Scale Measures of Canada's Ecosystem Health*, in *ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY AND THE MANAGEMENT OF ECOSYSTEMS* 117, 126 (Stephen Woodley et al. eds., 1993).

¹⁹² HOLLING ET AL, *supra* note 173, at 50-51.

Disasters are the impacts that hazardous events have on people and property. Such impacts are determined not only by the magnitude of the event, but also by human interaction with nature and by our choices about where and how we live¹⁹³. No disaster is completely natural because the degree of impact that a natural event causes to humans is highly determined by human exposure and vulnerability to risk, which is a product of cultural patterns influenced heavily by law¹⁹⁴. Therefore, law has an important role to play in preventing emergencies, especially through the elaboration of emergency plans and land use regulation. The success of disaster law is judged by its results in minimizing disaster costs as a whole, as well as minimizing disparate impacts on vulnerable communities¹⁹⁵.

In summary, disaster law is the legal area dedicated to eliminating or reducing the disturbance caused by known and unknown threats. As for unknown threats, there is an area of overlapping between adaptive management and disaster law that justifies the application of the principle of resilience in this legal field.

There is a clear interconnection between vulnerable ecosystems and natural disasters. The increasing vulnerability of ecosystems noticed in the last decades has been followed by records that cause concern regarding the intensification of impacts caused by natural hazards¹⁹⁶.

Therefore, enhancing ecosystem resilience is an efficient way to achieve greater levels of safety regarding natural disasters. This fact has already been recognized by the best literature on disaster management. Faber et al acknowledges that land use planning that exacerbates disaster risk; failure to maintain green infrastructure; and climate change are among the main causes for the recent increase in disaster occurrence¹⁹⁷. The United Nations Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2009 listed among the strategies for

¹⁹³ FABER ET AL, *supra* note 111, at 3.

¹⁹⁴ *Id.*, at 9.

¹⁹⁵ *Id.*, at 4.

¹⁹⁶ Every ten years, property damage from natural hazards in the United States doubles or triples in cost. *Id.*, at 3. From 1990 to 2007, worldwide mortality risk from floods increased by 13 percent and the economic risk posed by floods increased by 33 percent. Half of the most deadly disasters since 1975 occurred between 2003 and 2008. Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction, *supra* note 72, at 5.

¹⁹⁷ FABER ET AL, *supra* note 111, at 10.

protecting green infrastructure the need to build ecosystem resilience and to promote integrated planning, in which both environmental and disaster risk considerations are factored into land use and development planning¹⁹⁸. The 2011 version of the UNISDR Report mentioned that investing in green cities may be a more cost-effective means of reducing urban flooding than expensive investments that increase storm drainage capacity¹⁹⁹.

By the same token, disaster management would be enhanced by the insertion of concerns with ecosystem resilience, in the same way that environmental protection would be much enhanced by the introduction of ecosystem resilience into disaster law. That is so because often measures taken for emergency response are potentially harmful to the environment and could be replaced by more environmentally friendly alternatives, if decision makers were considering the environmental effects of their actions.

The relationship among flood occurrence, land use patterns and the construction of levees is an example of this kind of situation where disaster management can choose between a sustainable or an unsustainable solution. Both land use regulation and levees are means to control flood risk: the former prevents the formation of ecologically sensitive areas²⁰⁰; the latter exacerbates the risk of flooding downstream in catastrophic events when the levees are overtopped²⁰¹. Consequently, the avoidance of floods by land use regulation represents a disaster mitigation measure that is both environmentally friendly and more efficient in preventing natural disasters.

Disaster planners should be aware that concerns about ecosystem resilience and ecosystem services prevent the occurrence of disasters altogether, thus generating benefits not solely to the environment, but also to property safety and, more importantly, to human lives.

However, the assessment of the United Nations Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2011 shows that national policy worldwide²⁰² has been tending otherwise: less progress was made integrating disaster risk management into environmental policies in

¹⁹⁸ Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction, *supra* note 72, at 162-165.

¹⁹⁹ U. N. ISDR, *Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction* 154, (2011).

²⁰⁰ FABER ET AL, *supra* note 111, at 29.

²⁰¹ *Id.* at 28. Levees contribute to the destruction of coastal wetlands through the reduction of the natural flow of rivers freshwater and sediment to wetlands, by funneling water directly to the ocean. The destruction of wetlands increases the vulnerability to floods because wetlands dissipate storm surge and absorb flood waters. *Id.* at 54, 55; Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction, *supra* note 199, at 45.

²⁰² Except in middle-income countries.

2009-2011 than in 2007–2009²⁰³. This is the result of overlapping responsibilities and legislation which hamper governmental efficiency in addressing environmental and disaster-related problems.

The application of the principle of resilience to disaster management expands the reach of disaster law concerns: besides considering solely the impacts hazardous events cause to human and property safety, disaster law is supposed to also consider the impacts such events cause to ecosystems. The inclusion of environmental concerns in disaster preparedness goals was already acknowledged by 168 States in 2005, when the Hyogo Framework for Action was adopted. This Framework aims to achieve a substantial reduction of disaster losses, in lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets of countries and communities by 2015.

Governmental and legal responses to disasters rely on the circle of risk management, which is composed of mitigation, emergency response, compensation, and rebuilding²⁰⁴. Mitigation involves prevention and protection against the impacts of major events on lives and property, which might include preventive measures such as investigations regarding the full nature and source of the threat, or disruption of illegal activity, and protective measures aimed at reducing the vulnerability of critical infrastructure or key resources in order to deter, mitigate or neutralize major disasters. Protection also includes elevated awareness, identification and promotion of effective sector-specific protection practices. Emergency response involves the activities that address the short-term, direct effects of an incident. Compensation and rebuilding are elements of the emergency recovery phase, which also involves long-term care and treatment of affected persons and the development, coordination, and execution of site and services restoration plans²⁰⁵.

The application of the principle of resilience to disaster law will be facilitated if adaptive management concerns and procedure are included in the circle of risk management. Once the vulnerability of ecosystems to disturbances is itself a risk to human health and human activities, the assessment of ecosystem resilience should be employed in the mitigation

²⁰³ Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction, *supra* note 199, at 88.

²⁰⁴ FABER ET AL, *supra* note 111, at 3.

²⁰⁵ UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GUIDELINES 42-43 (2007)

process, as a means of investigating the full nature and source of an unknown natural threat. Information on the functioning of ecosystems, collected by environmental impact assessments and consequent monitoring, can be employed for this purpose, and also for structuring an adequate and up-to-date emergency preparedness plan. Data produced through the observation of ecosystem reactions to environmental policies can be used during the emergency response phase, in order to avoid allowing decision makers to opt for policy solutions that might weaken ecosystem resilience during rebuilding and recovery.

The circle of risk management can be put to work for the benefit of the principle of resilience even when adaptive management is not yet adopted by environmental agencies. This is so because the occurrence of a hazardous event can highlight to the public errors in management that have resulted in greater vulnerability to catastrophes. When a failure in management is noticed, decision makers are more likely to emphasize learning and to support a change in policies and methods than when the policy applied seems to be working perfectly²⁰⁶. Under those circumstances, the adaptive management procedure has higher chances of being accepted and adopted if it is proposed during the recovery phase of the circle of risk management because there will be greater political will to implement innovative solutions.

The perception of risk influences the political will to adopt adaptive management. However, that is not the sole factor that influences decision making regarding risks. Governments are also subjected to procedures and directives guiding which measures and regulations can and cannot be taken to address certain risks. The influence of governmental governance on the adoption of adaptive management will be analyzed in the following section, dedicated to adaptive governance.

Environmental Impact Assessment

²⁰⁶ Gunderson *supra* note 169.

Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is a procedure for “evaluating the likely impact of a proposed activity on the environment”²⁰⁷ prior to the commencement of a project. This procedure is aimed at providing the necessary knowledge to decision-makers to prevent environmental harm before it occurs²⁰⁸. Although the EIA aids informed decision making by identifying the environmental risks of an activity, it does not determine whether a project should proceed and how it should be regulated; such decisions are assigned to public authorities, who will balance the information provided by the EIA with other national or regional concerns²⁰⁹. The duty to promote an EIA is essentially procedural because public authorities’ decision is not bound by the findings of the EIA²¹⁰.

The EIA contributes to the implementation of national policies on sustainable development and precautionary action. The EIA procedure provides information on environmental risks to the public and offers the opportunity for public participation in decision-making regarding environmental issues²¹¹.

Both in the international and in the national sphere, the EIA provides governments with the information needed to evaluate whether the benefits of an activity exceed the activity’s negative consequences to the environment. Depending on the result of this balancing process, the activity may be enjoined, restricted, or otherwise regulated in order to oblige the proponent to: change the initial project, mitigate the expected impacts or pay for the environmental costs his activity will cause society.

The strongest and most comprehensive elaboration of the states’ duty to promote environmental impact assessment is stated in Rio Declaration Principle 17:

²⁰⁷ Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, art. 1(vi), Feb. 25, 1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309 [hereinafter Espoo Convention].

²⁰⁸ PATRICIA BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 165; KISS & SHELTON, *supra* note 63, at 98; PLATER, ET AL., *supra* note 6, at 319-352.

²⁰⁹ PATRICIA BIRNIE ET AL., *supra* note 208.

²¹⁰ PLATER, ET AL., *supra* note 6, at 319-352.

²¹¹ According to Principle 17 of the UNEP Goals and Principles of Environmental Impact, the public, experts and interested groups should be allowed appropriate opportunity to comment on the EIA. U.N. Environmental Programme, Goals and Principles of Environmental Impact Assessment, UN Doc. UNEP/GC/Dec./14/25 (June 17, 1987). The requirement of public participation in EIA procedure is also present in legally binding agreements; article 14 (1)(a) of the Convention on Biological Diversity, for example, requires appropriate public participation in EIA procedures related to projects that can cause significant impact to biodiversity. Several national laws on EIA have similar provisions. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter CBD].

Environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a competent national authority.

However, this was not the only international document that required the elaboration of EIA: it is required under other non-binding instruments²¹². The EIA is also required under several binding international conventions²¹³. The EIA is required by multilateral financial institutions²¹⁴ and the government's duty to elaborate the EIA has been referenced in international judicial decisions²¹⁵. The EIA procedure is also considered an obligation imposed by the "do no-harm" or "good neighborliness" general principle of International Law to the State that is proposing an activity that can cause transboundary environmental harm²¹⁶.

The duty to promote environmental impact assessment is so well established in international environmental law that it can be regarded as a general principle of law or even a requirement of customary law²¹⁷.

The great majority of countries in the world have adopted the EIA as mandatory regulations or, at least, informal guidelines²¹⁸. The elaboration of EIAs is usually a prerequisite governments require from project proponents before granting them permits necessary for the initiation of project.

²¹² Stockholm Declaration, *supra* note 68, at principle 14 and 15; UNEP Goals and Principles of Environmental Impact, *supra* note 211; Agenda 21, Sep. 28, 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1; volume 1; the European Commission Directive 85/337/EEC as amended by Directive 97/11/EC; and the Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context. See Olufemi Elias, *Environmental impact assessment in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW* 227 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice et al. eds., 2010)

²¹³ Such as the U.N. Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks on Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Sixth Session, New York, U.S., July 24 –Aug. 4, 1995, *Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks*, U. N. Doc. A/CONF.164/37 (Sep. 8, 1995) [hereinafter Convention on Straddling Stocks]; the CBD, *supra* note 211; the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U. N. T. S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]; Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, Feb. 17, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 546 (1978) [hereinafter MARPOL]; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter UNCLOS]; the European Union law, see KISS & SHELTON, *supra* note 63, at 98-99.

²¹⁴ World Bank-funded projects have been screened for their potential domestic, transboundary and global environmental impacts since 1989, when the Bank issued its first Environmental Assessment Directive. See BIRNIE ET AL., *supra* note 208, at 167.

²¹⁵ See *Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case*, 1997: para. 140; *Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain*, 2001: para. 67; *Arbitral Tribunal in the Iron Rhine Arbitration*, 2005: para. 59.

²¹⁶ UNEP Training Manual, *supra* note 78, at 53; Elias, *supra* note 212, at 228.

²¹⁷ Elias, *supra* note 212, at 227 (quoting PATRICIA BIRNIE ET AL., *INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT* 131 (2002)).

²¹⁸ UNEP Training Manual, *supra* note 78, 26.

EIA Procedure beneficial characteristics

Although the principle of resilience is essentially substantive, this article proposes that the principle has a procedural facet, in order to facilitate implementation. The application of the principle of resilience to the EIA procedure can comply with this need.

As EIA obliges the consideration of environmental issues prior to every project that can cause significant environmental harm, it is an important tool to include concerns regarding ecosystem resilience in activities that incidentally affect and are affected by the environment, but that are not directly focused on environmental management.

The introduction of the principle of resilience in EIA procedure recognizes the State's duty to identify the factors that put ecosystem resilience at risk and to address such factors in a way that creates greater resilience. In this duty is implicit the idea, also present in many international agreements, that States should seek to enhance environmental quality (not only to mitigate impacts). Also, a natural and procedural consequence of such a duty is that government officials should receive training in identifying human activities and natural phenomena that may impact ecosystem resilience.

Since everybody has the right to use natural resources in a way that does not impair the perpetuation of ecosystem features, the EIA has an important role in predicting and preventing such impairment. Also, once a proposed activity could harm the environment solely by increasing the vulnerability of the ecosystem to disturbances, it is a logical conclusion that the assessment of ecosystem vulnerability and, therefore, ecosystem resilience should be included in every EIA. Thus, the inclusion of concerns about improving ecosystem resilience in EIA procedures would contribute to the completeness of the environmental impact assessment and enhance its capacity to predict and prevent all possible impacts.

If the EIA identifies an activity that can impair the continuing exercise of an ecosystem function and the government authorizes this activity, the implementation of the activity can result not only in the collapse of the ecosystem as a whole, but also in the collapse of the economic activity itself, which depends on the regular functioning of the ecosystem to keep going. Therefore, the introduction of the evaluation of ecosystem resilience in environmental impact assessments is important not only to increase EIA's capacity to prevent

environmental harm but also to increment EIA's value to society, by alerting officials and preventing ecological consequences that can result in loss of investments. In order to illustrate the kind of losses entrepreneurs can suffer due to ecological consequences of ill-planned human activity, it is possible to mention the case of the blueberry growers, Bridges Brothers Ltd., who claimed that spraying fenitrothion to control outbreaks of spruce budworm in the Canadian forest caused the death of pollinating bees and, consequently, damaged the blueberry crop. The loss of the crop over the period of 1970-1971 resulted in an assessed loss of \$1,331,693.14²¹⁹.

The EIA can also stimulate the alteration of the project design in order to increase the adoption of patterns of production in synergy with ecosystem function. This goal can be achieved by using raw materials naturally provided by the ecosystem where the facility is located instead of introducing crops of alien species or importing raw materials from other places (disposal of which will introduce alien substances into the ecosystem, potentially causing disequilibrium in ecosystem function).

The fact that every EIA requires a background study of the ecosystem where the proposed activity will be located and the study of the impacts the activity can cause on species and on ecosystem functions provides environmental agencies a great quantity of information on the environmental status of a region and on the activities developed there. This information is necessary to assess the resilience of an ecosystem and would be too costly to be produced by the government alone. Also, the fact that the generation of such information is mandatory is an advantage because it makes this a secure source of information to agencies as it is not subject to the lack of funding or other issues that can retard or disable the collection of data by public or private research programs.

The EIA also provides an opportunity for interdisciplinary discussion regarding a project during its elaboration and when decision-makers balance the environmental concerns presented in the EIA final report with other interests to decide whether a project should be implemented.

EIA Procedure limitations and how to address them

²¹⁹ Bridges Brothers Ltd. v. Forest Protection Ltd. (1972). 5 N.B.R. (2d): 585-591.

Foreseeability of the harm

The obligation to do an environmental impact assessment is limited in scope in two ways. First, a threshold of foreseeability of harm must be met before the obligation arises. Under most treaties, the obligation to do one EIA and to notify states endangered by the activity arises only once it is previously known that the harm is likely to occur²²⁰. This EIA limitation is negative for the implementation of the principle of resilience because most harmful consequences of weakened resilience are unpredictable and are noticed only after they have already occurred.

The need for a threshold of foreseeability of an activity's impacts on ecosystem resilience is particularly difficult to achieve due to the existing uncertainty regarding how ecosystem functions are distributed among the different species and which kind of disturbance would cause the ecosystem to collapse.

There are some possible solutions to this limitation of the scope of EIA obligation regarding the need for a threshold of foreseeability. One is to rely on the precautionary principle when interpreting references to the likelihood of harm in Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration, in order to lower the threshold of risk required for the EIA obligation to arise. One application of such an approach, adopted by the Antarctic Protocol, is to require for all activities, except in *de minimis* cases, an "initial environmental examination" to determine whether the expected impact is more than minor²²¹.

Another solution is to distribute the requirement to assess environmental impacts between the prior impact assessment, which we regularly understand by EIA, and the post impact assessment, which is referred to as *post impact monitoring* or just *monitoring*. The prior impact assessment would be responsible for revealing predictable impacts and imposing measures to mitigate them, while the post impact assessment would identify and address unpredictable impacts and inefficiencies of the mitigation measures proposed by the prior assessment.

²²⁰ BIRNIE ET AL., *supra* note 208, 171.

²²¹ *Id.*

This approach, which is classified as adaptive, recognizes that prior assessment is not capable of predicting the totality of impacts and providing certainty²²². Monitoring shifts the EIA procedure's priority from prediction and control to adaptability and responsiveness. Approaches to operating in chaotic and complex environments that evolve and change in parallel with the ecosystem are more likely to be effective in coping with uncertainty²²³. By managing ecosystems for uncertainty, the adaptive approach transforms the EIA procedure into an ongoing investigation rather than a one-time prediction of impacts²²⁴.

Monitoring provides the opportunity to determine the causes of change and whether such change is a consequence of the project or of another type of action²²⁵. This procedure also assesses a project's compliance with regulations, agreements or legislation and provides agencies with proper information to assess the effects of the project's mitigation policy in order to determine if further action should be taken to prevent environmental harm²²⁶. The assessment of compliance with legislation coupled with the gathering of information about the progress of a particular project increase the transparency and accountability of proponents' mitigation actions, as the procedure assesses whether mitigation actions are actually reducing impacts.

Monitoring enables managers to identify potential negative trends at an early stage and to better understand the complex relationships between human actions, and environmental and social systems²²⁷. This understanding enables the construction of scientific knowledge about how to enhance the ecosystem's capability to recover rapidly from disturbances.

The greater transparency and oversight of the results of mitigation actions made possible by monitoring increases the likelihood of proportioning environmental improvements through human activities. Therefore, monitoring provides a tool for expanding the meaning of management beyond the mere mitigation of impacts towards the continuous improvement of

²²² Studies on environmental impact statements demonstrate that most of EIA are often wrong, failing to accurately forecast the direction and magnitude of the actual harm. See PLATER, ET AL., *supra* note 6, at 346.

²²³ DAVID P. LAWRENCE, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT 440 (2003).

²²⁴ See HOLLING ET AL., *supra* note 173, at 1-25.

²²⁵ See Keith Storey & Bram Noble, *Increasing the utility of follow-up in Canadian environmental assessment: a review of requirements, concepts and experience*, CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AGENCY (2004), <http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=081671C7-1&offset=2&toc=show>.

²²⁶ *Id.*; BIRNIE ET AL., *supra* note 208, at 424.

²²⁷ Storey & Noble, *supra* note 225.

environmental quality. The adoption of this broader perspective on management strategies is needed if sustainable development is truly a goal of EIA procedure²²⁸.

Therefore, the procedural background of the principle of resilience is enhanced by the recognition of the legal obligation to monitor environmental conditions and to employ the monitoring procedure to guide actions aimed at creating positive environmental effects by human activities.

In order to provide the tools for environmental improvement, one important part of the post-impact analysis is auditing the information obtained through monitoring. While monitoring is the observation, measurement and recording of information about specific aspects of the project²²⁹, auditing is a later stage of the process when accounts and records are examined and verified in order to show trends and compare the results to the targets, thereby assessing how close the actual situation comes to meeting the situation initially predicted²³⁰.

Auditing is effectively an evaluation of the EIA process: investigating whether or not predicted impacts have actually occurred; whether methods used to make these predictions were reliable, whether recommendations were followed; and whether safeguards were effective²³¹.

In order to provide an impartial assessment of the environmental quality achieved by a project or by a policy, auditing is supposed to be done by a party not involved in the project or policy²³².

In the international sphere, the regulation of monitoring is very limited. It is regulated under the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention), which was signed mostly by European countries²³³. At Article 7, the Convention recognizes the close relationship between prior EIA and subsequent monitoring but does not mandate the elaboration of monitoring for every likely significant transboundary impact. The concerned Parties are supposed to decide, upon request, if a post-project analysis will be carried out and under which conditions.

²²⁸ *Id.*

²²⁹ IAN THOMAS & PAUL MURFITT, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT – PROCESSES AND PRACTICES FOR AUSTRALIA 185 (2nd ed., 2011)

²³⁰ *Id.*, at 238.

²³¹ *Id.*, at 185.

²³² *Id.*, at 239.

²³³ United States of America signed and Canada signed and ratified the Convention.

The monitoring of the implementation effects of plans and programs is required under Article 12 of the Kiev Protocol and article 10 of the European Commission 2001 Directive in order ‘to identify at an early stage unforeseen adverse effects, and to be able to undertake appropriate remedial action’.

In summary, European regional law requires monitoring of plans and programs likely to cause significant adverse transboundary impact, but it does not require monitoring at the project level, except when the concerned countries decide so²³⁴. At the international level, the obligation to promote monitoring is non-existent.

At the national level, statutes requiring the elaboration of a monitoring plan within the environmental assessment procedure are present in Canada and Brazil.

In Brazil, every EIA is required to present a monitoring plan²³⁵. However, the execution of this plan is much prejudiced because the federal regulation does not provide deadlines and penalties for project proponents who do not provide periodic monitoring reports. Besides that, the elaboration of monitoring reports is not a prerequisite for the renewal of an environmental license. In addition to the execution of the monitoring plan, the environmental agencies can require private entities to provide any kind of information regarding the potential or actual environmental impacts of their activities²³⁶. Therefore, the enforcement of the monitoring plan is left to the discretion of environmental agencies. As in most countries, Brazilian environmental agencies deal with the constant problem of excessive work load exercised by reduced personnel, which contributes to the lack of enforcement of monitoring provisions.

Additionally, monitoring in Brazil is also exercised by the government during frequent inspections of industrial and commercial facilities by environmental agents to identify environmental impacts not covered or predicted by the project’s environmental license²³⁷. Therefore, the monitoring is usually limited to the assessment of compliance with permits and

²³⁴ As for Canada, the only non-European country to ratify the Espoo Convention, it is bound by the Convention, but not by the Protocol, which it did not sign. Therefore, it is not required to monitor plans and programs likely to cause significant transboundary impact.

²³⁵ Resolução CONAMA [Res. CONAMA] n. 001/1986, art. 6, IV (Braz.).

²³⁶ Lei n. 10650/2003, art. 3 (Braz.).

²³⁷ MINISTÉRIO DO MEIO AMBIENTE [MMA], PROGRAMA NACIONAL DE CAPACITAÇÃO DE GESTORES AMBIENTAIS: LICENCIAMENTO AMBIENTAL 67, (2009) (Braz.).

legislation. If environmental agencies learn of supervening grave risks to the environment or to human health²³⁸ caused by the project, they are able to modify or cancel the environmental license.

The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act assigns to the environmental agencies the obligation to design and ensure the implementation of a follow-up program when a project is required to promote mitigation measures²³⁹. When a project is not likely to cause significant impact, the agency has discretion to decide whether a follow-up program is appropriate²⁴⁰. Follow-up requirements rarely are determined until after project approval is granted with the result that little attention is paid to specific arrangements for follow-up in the assessment or the EIS²⁴¹.

In the United States, there is no obligation to monitor impacts at the federal level within the EIA procedure. Monitoring is utilized to assess compliance with permits and legislation, especially regarding the presence of contaminants in water and air²⁴². Monitoring elaborated under an ecosystem approach is applied to National Parks²⁴³ and to projects of restoration of wetlands²⁴⁴. The policy of wetlands mitigation banking allows developers to compensate for wetlands that will be destroyed through development by ensuring the restoration of wetlands in another location²⁴⁵. The monitoring is used to verify whether the restoration actually occurred in order to permit the compensation.

EIA effectiveness reviews demonstrate that monitoring is more the exception than the rule. The same can be said about accurate forecasts and the use of confidence limits (as a means of acknowledging uncertainties)²⁴⁶.

Significant impact on the environment

²³⁸ Res. CONAMA n. 237/1997, art. 19 (Braz.).

²³⁹ Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (S.C. 1992, c. 37) (Section 38) (2) (2011) (Can.).

²⁴⁰ *Id.*, (Section 38) (1).

²⁴¹ Storey & Noble, *supra* note 225.

²⁴² Air Pollution Prevention and Control, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7619 (2010); Safety of Public Water System, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-7 (2010).

²⁴³ National Park Service Management, 16 U.S.C. § 5934

²⁴⁴ Navigation and Navigable Waters, 33 U.S.C. § 2330a.

²⁴⁵ PLATER, ET AL., *supra* note 6, at 610.

²⁴⁶ LAWRENCE, *supra* note 223, at 424; Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency & International Association for Impact Assessment, *Environmental Assessment in a Changing World: Evaluation Practice to Improve Performance* 103, (1996), (Barry Sadler).

The second limitation on EIA scope refers to the fact that the procedure is solely applied to activities that will probably have a significant impact on the environment. Therefore, the procedure is not required for activities whose impact is deemed small or transitory²⁴⁷.

Ecosystem resilience can be threatened by activities that generate irrelevant impacts if considered separately, but that are capable of weakening ecosystem resilience if considered collectively. The process of loss of resilience is cumulative because the inability to replenish coping resources propels a region and its people to increasing criticality²⁴⁸. If the environmental evaluation scheme relies only on project-based environmental impact assessment, the detection of impoverishment of resilience can be seriously affected. That is why it is important to treat ecosystem resilience both as a direct and indirect impact on activities.

The evaluation of indirect impacts is not exempt from the EIA procedure. Direct impacts on the physical environment, as well as indirect impacts arising from other types of induced activity, the interrelatedness of environmental impacts and cumulative impacts need to be assessed²⁴⁹.

However, due to their nature, indirect impacts are better detected through the use of differentiated methods able to link EIA to related projects and activities, such as legislative proposals, policies, programs and plans. According to Lawrence, such a link can be established through the elaboration of SEAs (strategic environmental assessment), the grouping activities over space, the integration of EIA with sectorial and spatial policies, area wide assessments and EIA systems based on natural boundaries²⁵⁰.

This article supports all the actions proposed by Lawrence to link EIA with related activities in order to facilitate the detection of indirect impacts, except the “grouping activities over space” technique, understood as the method to place together similar activities due to the similarity of their impacts. This technique seeks to easily detect indirect impacts of an activity

²⁴⁷ BIRNIE ET AL, *supra* note 208, at 171.

²⁴⁸ Folke et al., *supra* note 9.

²⁴⁹ CHRISTOPHER WOOD, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT 89 (1995).

²⁵⁰ LAWRENCE, *supra* note 223, at 48-50.

and to reduce the uncertainty of predictions by excluding the occurrence of different impacts that may interact in unpredictable ways. The compromise to ecosystem resilience requires the repudiation of this idea because this technique increases the intensity of a single kind of impact, whose adverse effects will repeatedly concentrate on the same ecosystem function. It is expected that if a certain ecosystem function is too frequently and intensely impacted by human activities, this function is likely to collapse, which can cause the entire system to collapse. On the other hand, if the ecosystem suffers impacts of lower intensity affecting different functions, the ecosystem is more likely to recover from such impacts and be more resilient. Therefore, instead of grouping similar activities in the same places, ecosystem managers should diversify the activities' zoning.

The link of EIA procedure with strategic environmental assessment, sectorial and spatial policies, area wide assessments and EIA systems based on natural boundaries is an important means of enhancing the capacity for adaptive management, and therefore, for the enhancement of ecosystem resilience, because it provides the opportunity to cross-analyze the information gathered by these mechanisms of data collection.

Strategic environmental assessment is the process by which environmental considerations are required to be fully integrated into the preparation of governmental plans and programmes potentially harmful to the environment before their final adoption²⁵¹. Because SEA is done prior to the elaboration of the overall policy, it is undertaken much earlier in the decision-making process than environmental impact assessment, which is done at the project level²⁵².

Although the Espoo Convention does not explicitly require the application of SEA procedure, it does require the Parties to undertake EIA at the project level and to apply EIA principles to policies, plans and programs²⁵³. In 2001, the European Commission adopted a Directive on SEA, according to which the strategic environmental assessment is to be

²⁵¹ *Strategic Environmental Assessment*, U.S. EPA (2011), <http://www.epa.ie/whatwedo/advice/sea/>.

²⁵² *Protocol on SEA*, U.N. ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE (2011), http://live.unece.org/env/eia/sea_protocol.html.

²⁵³ Espoo Convention, *supra* note 207, art. 2(7).

undertaken ‘during the preparation of a plan or programme and before its adoption or submission to the legislative procedure’,²⁵⁴.

The EIA system can also link to corporate environmental management systems²⁵⁵ (EMS). An Environmental Management System (EMS) is a set of processes and practices that enable an organization to reduce its environmental impacts and increase its operating efficiency²⁵⁶. EMS’s benefits involve increased ability to differentiate the impacts of specific industries and individual producers in a region and the capacity to measure environmental performance and impacts and to target responses²⁵⁷.

The elaboration of EMSs usually occurs due to the free choice of industries encouraged by the reduction of costs and the increase of efficiency and control over environmental impacts. However, governments can stimulate industries to adopt EMS by providing additional benefits, by leading by example with the development of EMS in agencies and departments, or by requiring EMS in legislation. The strategy of leading by example was adopted by Australia, where the procedure was adopted by the Australian Agency for International Development; by Canada, where the Canadian Ministry of the Environment is encouraging departments to adopt EMS; and by the United States, which will require federal agencies to adopt EMS²⁵⁸.

Case study: spruce budworm

The case of the management of the spruce budworm in Canada was abundantly analyzed in the specialized literature²⁵⁹. The analysis promoted by this article will focus on

²⁵⁴ Council Directive 2001/42, art 17, 2001 O.J. (L 197) 30 (EC); See Elias, *supra* note 212, at 227, 233.

²⁵⁵ LAWRENCE, *supra* note 223, at 49.

²⁵⁶ THOMAS & MURFITT, *supra* note 229, at 191; *Environmental Management Systems*, U.S. EPA, <http://www.epa.gov/EMS/>.

²⁵⁷ THOMAS & MURFITT, *supra* note 229, at 191

²⁵⁸ *Id.*, at 203; Exec. Order No. 13,148, “Greening the Government Through Leadership in Environmental Management” 65 Fed. Reg. 24,595 (Apr. 26, 2000).

²⁵⁹ A. D. Pickett, *A Critique on Insect Chemical Control Methods*, Vol. 81, No. 3 CANADIAN ENTOMOLOGIST 67 (1949), available at <http://pubs.esc-sec.ca/doi/abs/10.4039/Ent8167-3?journalCode=ent>; William C. Clark et al, *Lessons for ecological policy design: A case study of ecosystem management*, Vol. 7 Issue 1 ECOLOGICAL MODELLING 1 (1979), available at <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0304380079900085>; HOLLING ET AL, *supra* note 173; Asaf Rashid, *Compromising the Environment? - The Spruce Budworm, Aerial*

how the principle of resilience and, more specifically, the recommendations addressed in this section would apply to this case.

The spruce budworm is a defoliating insect that attack trees of the boreal forests in North America. The insect is constantly present in the forest in reduced numbers, except during periodic outbreaks as a consequence of these outbreaks, a large portion of the mature forest can die, causing an impact on the forest industry, which is the major economic activity of great part of the area covered by the forest²⁶⁰. The tree species preferred by the budworm is the same species preferred by the pulp industry: the balsam fir²⁶¹. Therefore, the budworm case represents a situation of direct competition between the insect and human activity.

The budworm outbreak is a natural event that contributes to forest renewal and maintenance of species diversity. It has been occurring in the region over the last centuries without great disturbance to humans until 1930, when the pulp industry found it had to compete with the budworm for fiber²⁶².

An historical overview of the management of forests in Canada shows that since colonization there was a trend to harvest a specific species of tree at each time, thereby changing the composition of the forest: from the late 1700s to mid-1800s there was high grading extraction of eastern white pine for ship masts; from the mid-1800s to early 1900s there was high grading extraction of large red spruce; and from colonial times to nowadays, the forest came to present low abundance of eastern hemlock, which was originally very abundant. This factor is relevant because each species presents a different vulnerability to the spruce budworm. The eastern hemlock, for example, only experiences spruce budworm damage in very rare cases. On the other hand, the balsam fir and the Douglas fir are the favorite targets of the insect²⁶³. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the original setting of the forest was more resistant to the insect, because the higher concentration of less vulnerable trees probably created a barrier to the physical dispersion of the insect.

Insecticide Spraying, and the Pulp and Paper Industry in New Brunswick, 3 FES OUTSTANDING GRADUATE STUDENT PAPER SERIES (2003), <http://www.yorku.ca/fes/research/students/outstanding/docs/AsafRashid.pdf> .

²⁶⁰ HOLLING ET AL, *supra* note 173, at 143.

²⁶¹ *Id.*, at 149.

²⁶² *Id.*, at 147.

²⁶³ Rashid, *supra* note 259, at 19-21.

Since the 1920's several authors have recommended the utilization of silvicultural practices to fight the recently frequent budworm outbreaks²⁶⁴. However, until 1995 knowledge of the effectiveness of silvicultural control was still deemed "fragmented" and the method was never tried as a means to address the spruce budworm outbreaks²⁶⁵. On the other hand, the tactic of spraying insecticides, employed since 1951²⁶⁶, was not abandoned even when fenitrothion, the substance used until 1998, was proved to cause human health problems²⁶⁷ and a great mortality of songbirds²⁶⁸ and bees²⁶⁹.

Thus, it is possible to conclude that, first, when the spraying was first adopted, the knowledge about the technique was not yet complete and the collateral effects of the substance employed by the management plan were not predicted. Therefore, if the managers had no complete understanding neither of silvicultural measures nor of spraying, why did they adopt the latter, which carried a greater risk of environmental impacts in case of failure? Governmental protection of the pulp industry may explain such fact.

In fighting the budworm, the forest management plan and the pulp industry were seeking a "definitive" solution which could provide certainty for the economic activity. Besides that, the solution should provide the pulp industry the possibility to expand its forestry activities, which could not be provided by silvicultural techniques. That is why managers opted for the most aggressive option, spraying, neglecting silvicultural management, which was deemed an uncertain solution.

The use of spraying became such a tradition in forest management for fighting the budworm that the possibility of not using insecticides became non-existent. This situation can be seen in the "Environmental impact assessment of experimental spruce budworm adulticide trials". When discussing the effects of phosphamidon, the insecticide employed by the Program, on forest avifauna, the EIA simply compared the results of this insecticide with

²⁶⁴ F.C. Craighead, *Relation between mortality of trees attacked by spruce budworm and previous growth*, 33 J. AGRIC. RES. 541, 541-555, (1925); Thomas F. McIntock, *Silvicultural Practices for Control of Spruce Budworm*, vol. 45 n.9 J. FORESTRY 655, 655-659 (1947); Pickett, *supra* note 259; J.D. Tothill, *Notes on the Outbreaks of Spruce Budworm, Forest Tent Caterpillar and Larch Sawfly in New Brunswick*, 8 PROC. ACADIAN ENTOMOLOGICAL SOC'Y 173, 173-182 (1922).

²⁶⁵ Rashid, *supra* note 259, at 30.

²⁶⁶ HOLLING ET AL, *supra* note 173, at 143.

²⁶⁷ See Friesen et al v. Forest Protection Ltd, (1978) 22 N.B.R. (2d) 146-171.

²⁶⁸ See Rashid, *supra* note 259, at 35.

²⁶⁹ See Bridges Brothers Ltd. v. Forest Protection Ltd. (1972). 5 N.B.R. (2d): 585-591.

those produced by other kind of chemicals, the larvicides. The EIA analysis is exhausted by showing that phosphamidon is the chemical less harmful to birds²⁷⁰. However, the EIA does not discuss the alternative of *not* using chemicals at all.

The adopted management plan, which was supposed to provide certainty, inevitably created unpredictable impacts, such as: the spread of outbreaks to areas previously not affected by the budworm because spraying expelled the survivor insects to the neighborhoods; dependence of the forest on the insecticide; and the risk of even greater outbreaks due to the increasing resilience of the budworm. It is possible to infer that this policy created a perverse final result which increased the resilience of the parasite and diminished the resilience of the forest.

The analysis of the budworm case through the perspective of the principle of resilience shows a sequence of management mistakes. First, the environmentally less aggressive option to address a management issue cannot be excluded from the environmental impact assessment. EIA provides decision makers with information about the alternatives to a management issue. If the less aggressive option is not assessed, decision makers hardly will be able to adequately weigh that option against the others available.

Second, decision makers must be guided by the principle of resilience to prioritize the environmentally less aggressive option of management. The priority can be set by imposing on the decision makers the obligation to publicly justify why a more aggressive management option is preferred to the less aggressive one. However, it is possible to notice that if this way of establishing the priority had been adopted in the case of the budworm, decision makers would simply state that the silvicultural technique was not yet sufficiently developed to be adopted. In this case, the imposition of another obligation on the decision makers would be recommended: if a less aggressive management option is not adopted as the main measure to address the problem, the technique should be employed in a limited area in order to test if the reason why this solution was neglected is observed in reality. The employment of monitoring would be essential to implement this recommendation.

²⁷⁰ B.B. McLeod & R.L. Millikin, *Environmental impact assessment of experimental spruce budworm adulticide trials: Effects on forest avifauna*, (1982), available at <http://cfs.nrcan.gc.ca/publications/?id=8774>.

Third, the ambition for greater profits from an economic activity that is already under way cannot be pursued to the detriment of the ecosystem where the economic activity is located. Every government and economic actor must internalize the idea that the capacity for growth of a certain activity is limited by the ecosystem's capacity to support this activity. In the budworm case, the pulp industry pushed the forest beyond its capacity to support the forestry activity. That is why the industry rejected the silvicultural techniques, which would have increased the concentration of tree species that are important for the health of the forest, but that are not interesting for the pulp industry. The industry wanted to keep the high concentrations of balsam fir and Douglas fir, which was the closest they could get to a monoculture for pulp extraction.

Forth, under the principle of resilience, managers are required to analyze the long-term effects of their decisions, in order to protect the interests of future generations and of nature itself, which can be understood as the preservation of the ecosystem capacity to reorganize and maintain itself. This precept was not followed in the case of the budworm:

The budworm analysis explicitly focuses on a time horizon determined by the slowest variable in the system, i.e., tree regeneration and growth. It does not consider long-term evolutionary changes that can trigger competitive shifts in tree species composition. Similarly, short-term benefits of a management policy might be followed later by unanticipated surprises that, being unanticipated, become crises²⁷¹.

In order to enable decision makers to predict and to weigh the long-term effects of a decision, this article recommends the use of monitoring techniques because long-term effects are hardly assessed by prior environmental impact assessment. Therefore, the commitment to the preservation of nature and to future generations' interests requires constant assessment of the results obtained by management policies associated with adaptive management techniques.

Land use and climate change adaptation

Land use and zoning regulations are usually created by local or regional governments. The zoning plan analyzes the existing land uses and determines community development

²⁷¹ HOLLING ET AL, *supra* note 173, at 170.

directions by establishing: different zone district categories, each one with different specifications regarding the range of permitted uses, densities of constructions, and structural characteristics; an official zone map which maps out the districts on the ground; and a zone enforcement agency which interprets and applies the zone requirements²⁷². Through land use and zoning regulations, local governments prohibit certain uses within certain areas²⁷³, thereby imposing limits on the use of property.

Land can be destined for economic uses (such as commercial, industrial, agricultural and pastures), residential, recreational, conservational. Land use exercises a great influence on how resources are managed because it determines or influences: the location of facilities, residences and natural lands; the size of tracts of developed land; the amount of land conversion; the distances between facilities and the dependence on means of transport. In other words, land use regulation can influence production and consumption patterns. That is why land use is intimately related to sustainable development.

By heavily influencing production and consumption patterns, land use regulations greatly influence ecological resilience. Additionally, land use can contribute to the conservation of biodiversity everywhere, in its original habitat. Also, as mentioned previously (Adaptive Management section) ill land use planning can exacerbate the risk of disaster by concentrating population in risk-prone areas and by failing to keep green infrastructure²⁷⁴.

The principle of resilience requires that land use regulations must prioritize ecological resilience and safety, even if it limits economic growth in certain circumstances. This application of the principle might appear to undermine the economy; rather, it is only going against the short-term pursuit of profits. In reality, this measure provides a deeper understanding of economy, as it is necessary for keeping the existence of natural resources in the long-term, and for protecting society from disasters to which humankind has given cause through centuries of mismanagement of natural resources. By these means, it is expected that the principle of resilience will, in fact, benefit the economy in the long-term, by preserving the resources and the people it depends on.

²⁷² PLATER, ET AL., *supra* note 6, at 361, 362.

²⁷³ Amy L. Edwards, *An Overview of Institutional Controls*, in ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF REAL ESTATE AND COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 345, 353 (James B. Witkin, ed.) (2004).

²⁷⁴ FABER ET AL, *supra* note 111, at 10, 25.

There are some policy measures, to be explained below, that can use land use as a tool for implementing the principle of resilience by strengthening ecological resilience and disaster preparedness.

Transferable development rights in coastal areas

Recently, zoning regulations concerned with environmental protection in the United States have been adopting the concept of *transferable development rights* (TDRs). TDRs consist in unused development density at one site being transferred and sold to other sites that wish to build beyond standard regulatory limits²⁷⁵.

TDR programs aim to direct development away from environmentally sensitive land to land more suitable for development by creating a market for development rights. Logistically, TDR programs achieve this result by quantifying the development potential of sensitive properties ("sending sites"), and providing that this development potential may be sold to landowners to increase building density in areas suitable for development ("receiving sites")²⁷⁶.

The transferable development rights create the advantage of avoiding the frequent windfalls and wipeouts from land use regulation that both bar development in some places and allow it in others. "TDRs promote sharing of the benefits generated and burdens imposed by development restrictions. The restrictions make the TDRs more valuable both by reducing harmful spillover effects and by requiring those with property eligible for development to purchase development rights from other landowners"²⁷⁷.

In other words, transferable development rights seek to attenuate the harmful effects of land use regulation. Nonetheless, the concept has been continuously criticized. Some argue that, even though the TDRs provide economic value to the land targeted by the regulation, such value does not compensate the landowner for loss of personal use of the property and ends up by disappointing significant investment-backed expectations²⁷⁸.

In American law, regulatory restrictions on the use of land maintain that it may be considered an unlawful taking if the land's economic value is totally wiped out by the

²⁷⁵ PLATER, ET AL., *supra* note 6, at 366.

²⁷⁶ Good v. U.S., 39 Fed. Cl. 81, 107 (2007).

²⁷⁷ Richard J. Lazarus, *Litigating Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency in the United States Supreme Court*, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 179, 188.

²⁷⁸ *Id.*, at 190, 193.

regulation. Even the distribution of TDRs has not prevented the filing of suits claiming takings. Litigants seeking to impair such land use regulations go to courts on the grounds that “although the positive economic value of TDRs mitigates the ‘economic impact’ of a restriction on land use, such value is relevant only to the question of whether a landowner has received ‘just compensation’ for ‘taken’ property”²⁷⁹. In summary, according to such critics, the distribution of TDRs does not mean that there has been no taking in the first place.

On the other hand, zone enforcement agencies argue that transferable development rights, instead of eliminating land property rights, are indeed reinforcing them. The zoning rules enhance the property rights of all landowners in the area covered by the zoning plan because those rules seek to preserve the characteristics that make the region attractive for development. In *Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency*²⁸⁰ a zoning plan was set in place to harmonize the protection of the Lake Tahoe basin and the development of the region. When defending the building restriction on a piece of land especially important to the maintenance of ecosystem functions, the local agency argued that the restricted property would be worth even less if the restriction and the TDR mechanism were not in place, because the environmental quality and the scenic beauty of the region as a whole would be degraded.

Transferable development rights have been maintained by the American courts, which have been considering that, if the land still has any economic value, it follows that it has not suffered a regulatory taking²⁸¹.

Transferable development rights constitute a good mechanism to organize sustainable development by steering development into parcels that are most environmentally suitable and economically profitable and by sharing the economic benefits and burdens of environmental restrictions more equitably among all landowners within a certain region.

This mechanism might also be applied to another situation that tends to be increasingly common: the loss of land to the sea. A few cases of coastal line change by hurricanes and loss of land property to the sea have been brought to American courts and the rule applied is that the owner alone bears the loss of land to the sea. In *Severance v.*

²⁷⁹ *Id.* at 201.

²⁸⁰ See 520 U.S. 725 (1997).

²⁸¹ See *Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council* 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) and *Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York* 438 U.S. 104 (1978).

*Patterson*²⁸², a hurricane had changed the beach shoreline, submerging the public easement area protected by the Open Beaches Act, the state regulation that prohibits private property of tidal lands so as to assure public access to Texan beaches. The Court decided that landowners of coastal properties must assume the risk of losing their land to the sea and must be conscious of the obligation to maintain the public easement covering the area between the property and the wet beach. In that particular case, the landowner had her property reduced in order to allow public access. The conclusion is that the public trust doctrine is more adaptable to the changing location of the coast than to property rights because the first is dynamic, being determined by the flexible water boundaries, and the second is static, being determined by stable public records.

It is clear that coastal properties need to receive a more flexible legal treatment; otherwise it is possible that land owners of entire cities could be totally deprived of their land property rights for short periods of time. This kind of consequence would generate very disadvantageous results: first, it would threaten legal security, because the assurance of safe property rights is one of the most important functions of modern legal regimes; second, it would also threaten environmental quality, because it is commonly agreed that environmental protection requires strong property rights. The sudden loss of properties in coastal areas may result in disorganized occupation of country side areas with no respect for environmentally protected areas or for zoning restrictions.

That is why governments should seek to relax property rights in coastal areas through the application of the transferable development rights regime to coastal properties. Therefore, if the sea covers part of the property, the landowner would be entitled to the right to develop another place. In this case, there would be no claim of takings because it would give to landowners a right they did not previously have. This solution might increase the offer of development rights, which, in turn, would reduce the value of such rights. However, this effect can be corrected by strengthening the zoning regulations in all places (and not only in coastal cities) so the new restrictions would function as the creation of a market for development rights.

²⁸² See 54 Tex. Sup. J. 172, (2010).

Rise of the sea and reallocation of coastal ecosystems

In the context of climate change, land use and zoning may be used to ensure that coastal ecosystems will have enough space to restore themselves in the new coastal lines that are going to be defined by the rise in sea level.

The rise of the sea will require coastal ecosystems to readapt to the new ecosystem features and to change their location to other places with similar ecological conditions. In order to strengthen the resilience of such ecosystems, it would be necessary to carry out in-depth studies regarding the current and previous features of coastal ecosystems in order to maintain records of how they are organized now. These records will be essential to guide human efforts to contribute towards the reconstruction of such ecosystems in other places and to verify that the future coastal ecosystems keep the same functions currently developed by the present coastal ecosystems. Studies should also take into account the ecological features and natural history evidence in order to identify where the new coastal lines are expected to be and where the new coastal ecosystems are more likely to form. Based on that information, governments should restrict the use of land where ecosystems are expected to form, because, if such places are completely watertight or otherwise unavailable to receive fauna and flora, their coastal ecosystems will be fated to extinction. Those restrictions in use may be achieved by the distribution of TDRs when possible, or through expropriation, when the restrictions would totally abolish the economic value of the property.

Conservation easements

Conservation easement is “a legally binding agreement that restricts the development and future use of the land to ensure protection of its conservation values”²⁸³. Through conservation easement, the landowner voluntarily removes from his property right certain elements, generally rights to develop and mine²⁸⁴. The conservation easement can be sold or donated to the government or to a

²⁸³ Julie Ann Gutanski, *Protecting the land: conservation easements, voluntary actions, and private lands*, in PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS, PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 9, 9 (Julie Ann Gutanski & Roderick H. Squires ed., 2000)

²⁸⁴ *Id.*, at 15.

non-profit organization, which thereby will acquire a non-possessory interest in the protection of natural or historic values of the property²⁸⁵. The easement can be created to last a limited or unlimited period of time, during which affirmative obligations attached to the real property are enforced over the grantor and his successors by the holder of the easement²⁸⁶. If the holder fails to enforce the easement related obligations, they can be enforced by a third party indicated in the easement instrument or by the attorney general²⁸⁷. The holder of the easement is responsible for undertaking long-term monitoring of the easement and stewardship of the property²⁸⁸.

In the early 1980s, the Congress of the United States enacted tax subsidies for conservation easement donations, which resulted in an increase in the number of such agreements²⁸⁹. However, this measure also contributed to the concentration of conservation easements in more affluent regions, where wealthy donors could take maximum advantage of tax incentives. Conservation easements are currently viewed as a tool for environmental protection, concurring with regulation and public land acquisition. Conservation easements present a lower cost than public land acquisition in the short-term; however, they might be considered more expensive in the long-term due to expenses with monitoring, enforcement, and defense²⁹⁰.

Due to climate change, conservation easements might acquire new uses, as an alternative to TDRs for preserving areas that are expected to be the new coastal lines during the rise in sea level. This tool would be efficient both to maintain private properties in areas that will not be lost to the sea and to protect coastal ecosystems' resilience by keeping undeveloped areas that are expected to acquire an essential ecological role in preventing the extinction of coastal ecosystems during the next decades.

“Reserva florestal legal”

In 1965, the Brazilian federal government enacted the country's Forest Code, which obliges every rural property to reserve a parcel of the land, which may range from 20 to 80

²⁸⁵ BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 586 (Bryan A. Garner, ed., 9th ed., 2009); *Id.*, at 11.

²⁸⁶ Gutanski, *supra* note 283, at 11.

²⁸⁷ Todd D. Mayo, *A holistic examination of the law of conservation easements*, in PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS, PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE, *supra* note 283, at 26, 48.

²⁸⁸ *Id.*, at 31.

²⁸⁹ Jeff Pidot, *Reinventing Conservation Easements*, POLICY FOCUS REPORT 5 (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy publ., 2005).

²⁹⁰ *Id.*, at 32-34.

percent of the property, for the protection of the original flora²⁹¹. The land protected under this rule is called *reserva florestal legal*.

Reserva legal was created to promote the sustainable use of natural resources; the conservation and regeneration of ecological processes; and the conservation of biodiversity, by preserving the native flora that shelters native fauna²⁹².

The localization of *reserva legal* within the rural property is determined by the landowner and must be approved by the environmental agency at the landowner's request. Once the localization is established and the *reserva legal* is registered, it imposes perpetual conservation obligations on the landowner and his successors.

Reserva legal is an administrative limitation imposed on the use of private property²⁹³. This obligation intends to shape the rural private property in order to ensure that it accomplishes its social function²⁹⁴. According to the Brazilian Constitution, every private property must fulfill its social function²⁹⁵, which requirements are established by the Constitution. As for rural property, the constitutional requirements are the following: rational and adequate enjoyment of the land; adequate employment of available natural resources and environmental protection; compliance with labor laws; exploitation in such a way as to ensure the welfare of owners and employers²⁹⁶.

If the landowner fails to use the land in such a way as to accomplish its social function, the government can expropriate the property, by compensating the owner. This penalty, however, has not been applied to rural properties in non-compliance with environmental laws. In fact, for several decades, since the establishment of the obligation to create *reserva legal*, there was no concrete penalty for a landowner's failure to register this protected land. This situation was changed in 2008, when the federal government established daily monetary fines for every rural property that fails to register its *reserva legal*²⁹⁷.

²⁹¹ CÓDIGO FLORESTAL [C. FLOR.] [FOREST CODE], Law n. 4771/1965, art. 1, § 2, III (Braz.).

²⁹² *Id.*

²⁹³ ÉDIS MILARÉ, DIREITO DO AMBIENTE 753, (2009)

²⁹⁴ JOSÉ DOS SANTOS CARVALHO FILHO, MANUAL DE DIREITO ADMINISTRATIVO 754, (22nd ed., 2009)

²⁹⁵ CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art.5, XXIII (Braz.).

²⁹⁶ C.F., art. 186.

²⁹⁷ Decree 6514/2008, art. 55 (Braz.).

The regulation caused strong public debates between farmers and environmentalists because the farmers believe that the government is attributing to them an excessive share of the burdens of environmental protection. In part due to these debates, proposals for reform of the Brazilian Forest Code are currently being analyzed by the Brazilian Congress. Rural landowners are pressing the government to reduce the percentages of land the law requires to be registered as *reserva legal* and to expand the range of land uses at the *reserva legal* allowed by the law. Environmentalists have been calling on the government representatives to apply the non-regression principle in order to prevent the reduction of environmental protection around the country.

Currently, Brazilian law holds the landowner responsible for maintaining the forest in *reserva legal* by planting native trees when necessary according to the legal requirements and the guidance provided by the federal environmental agency²⁹⁸. The landowner is allowed to promote sustainable use of the forest preserved as *reserva legal*, as long as his Plan of Use is approved by the environmental agency²⁹⁹. The landowner can exploit resources taken from the trees and even cut down selected trees, by promoting silvicultural studies and reforestation efforts in order to keep the main characteristics of the flora³⁰⁰. Besides the right to sustainably use the forest resources, the landowner is also entitled to total exemption from federal tax related to the *reserva legal* area³⁰¹.

Reserva legal has some similarities with conservation easements, because both policies promote environmental conservation on private properties; provide tax benefits to the landowners; and impose obligations that are attached to the real property and enforceable on the current land owner and his successors.

Unlike the conservation easement, the establishment of *reserva legal* is mandatory, which prevents the downside of having environmental conservation concentrated in wealthier areas. For this reason, this might be a better solution for environmental policies in developing countries. On the other hand, *reserva legal* is less adaptable than conservation easements to the circumstances of the case because there is no voluntary agreement by which the owner can

²⁹⁸ C. FLOR. art. 44, I.

²⁹⁹ Decree n. 5975/2006, art. 2 (Braz.).

³⁰⁰ Decree n. 5975/2006, art. 11 (Braz.).

³⁰¹ Decree 9393/1996, art. 10, § 1, II, a (Braz.).

choose the rights of property he is weaving through the conservation easement. Also, in mandatory for all rural properties, *reserva legal* is more able to ensure the conservation of biodiversity everywhere.

Restrictions on farming methods

Currently agriculture alone is responsible for 85% of water consumption, covers 35 to 40% of world land and accounts for 30% of global greenhouse gases emission³⁰². These resources are mostly used to grow food for the world's population, which is an essential economic activity that cannot be impaired. However, in many cases, crops are cultivated in non-sustainable ways, greatly contributing to the rapid depletion of water and soil around the world³⁰³. Therefore, it is expected that better management of the use of natural resources by agriculture can generate a meaningful reduction of the consumption of resources and of environmental impacts at the same rate as improvements in the provision of ecological services.

New methods of sustainable agriculture have been developed in order to enhance soil nutrient cycling and reduce the need for fertilizers and pesticides.

Recent studies have pointed to permaculture as a very successful sustainable method of cultivating the soil. This method tries to recreate the functional diversity of ecosystems by using stored rainwater to support the growth of multiple functional groups of species – such as atmospheric nitrogen absorption, soil fixation, and shadow – in order to create an indefinitely self-sustained agriculture³⁰⁴. That is why the method's name derives from “permanent agriculture”. This method reduces aridity; soil impoverishment by erosion; salinity and

³⁰² Jonathan Foley, *A Global Crisis of Land Use and Agriculture*, STOCKHOLM RESILIENCE CENTER (June 1st, 2010), <http://www.stockholmresilience.org/5.58f663a12dd939780a80001819.html>.

³⁰³ The Aral Sea shrank 300 kilometers since the 1960s, when the soviets started diverting water from its two tributaries for crop irrigation. The Colorado River, in the United States, does not reach the Ocean anymore because of excessive water diversion for agriculture in the desert. *Id.* Soil problems, such as salinity, erosion, acidification and tree decline are symptoms of ecosystem breakdown. Oliver Holmgren, *Weeds or Wild Nature*, PERMACULTURE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL (1997), <http://www.holmgren.com.au/frameset.html?http://www.holmgren.com.au/html/Writings/weeds.html>

³⁰⁴ P. A. YEOMANS, *WATER FOR EVERY FARM*, (1973).

acidification³⁰⁵. Indeed, mixing crops has been achieving very successful results in pushing back the desert and increasing per capita food production in African countries along the Sahara's edge, such as Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, Burkina Faso and Kenya³⁰⁶. Similarly good results were observed in Jordan³⁰⁷. In Honduras, sustainable agriculture developed through the employment of traditional knowledge reduced the impacts of hurricanes in the Quezungal region³⁰⁸.

Permaculture and other sustainable agriculture initiatives could be encouraged through governmental regulation of land use or incentives such as tax deductions in order to reduce environmental impacts and improve the provision of ecosystems services within agriculture. Adaptive management initiatives could implement these sustainable agriculture techniques in pilot-projects to test which of them are more adequate for certain regions. The success of these initiatives can also work as a showcase to encourage nearby farmers to adopt them.

Local land use or other natural resource management regulations can prohibit crops that are totally inadequate to local ecosystems, such as lettuce and alfalfa - high water demanding crops – in deserts³⁰⁹. For example, in the United States, states that apply the prior appropriation doctrine for water uses³¹⁰ could push for more sustainable uses of water in

³⁰⁵ Holmgren, *supra* note 303.

³⁰⁶ Lim Li Ching, *Sustainable agriculture pushing back the desert*, INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE IN SOCIETY, <http://www.i-sis.org.uk/desertification.php> (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).

³⁰⁷ Geoff Lawton, *Greening the desert* (Dec. 13, 2009), <http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=fvwp&v=wTZ0LbvUoOY&NR=1>; *Jordan Valley Permaculture Project*, PERMACULTURE RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AUSTRALIA, http://permaculture.org.au/project_profiles/middle_east/jordan_valley_permaculture_project.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).

³⁰⁸ *Combating land degradation for sustainable agriculture*, UNITED NATIONS (2008) <http://www.un.org/events/desertification/2008/combating.shtml>; J. Hellin et al, *The Quezungal System: an indigenous agroforestry system from western Honduras*, 46 AGROFORESTRY SYSTEMS 229 (1999), available at <http://www.springerlink.com/content/h32160q2363x1376/fulltext.pdf>.

³⁰⁹ Such practice is seen in the Arizona desert, in the United States. See Foley, *supra* note 302.

³¹⁰ Prior appropriation is the legal regime that governs the right to use water in many states in the West of the United States. Through this regime, individuals can acquire a vested right to use water by appropriation and can keep this right by applying the water to a beneficial use. In this legal regime, "beneficial use is the basis, measure, and limit of the right". J.B. RUHL ET AL, *THE LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES* 119 (2007); JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL, *LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES* 124-126, (4th ed., 2006).

agriculture by enacting regulatory provisions that classify as non-beneficial the use of water to irrigate crops that are inappropriate to the local climate³¹¹.

“Global zoning”

The idea of “global zoning” for agriculture was based on a proposal suggested by Jonathan Foley³¹². When discussing solutions to feed a growing population with limited and already over-exploited natural resources, Foley suggested focusing on existing fields to select places where the production of each crop is more prolific and to verify in which other place around the globe the same kind of climate and soil is found. By comparing such physically similar places, it is possible to verify where land management is deterring food production. With such data in hand, an international organization such as FAO could create “global zoning” to assess which crop has greater potential in each region. By these means, it would be possible to assess which parties from which parts of the world would benefit most from partnerships among government’s agencies and/or economic actors for interchange of management experiences. As noticed by Foley, this method presents the risk of encouraging the expansion of monocultures, which is a result that totally goes against the idea of sustainable agriculture. In order to prevent such a risk, the international organization should focus its assessment on the most effective combination of certain climate and soil and a certain *mix of crops* (instead of individual crops).

Market mechanisms for conserving ecosystem services

The payment for ecosystem services is a manner of both valuing and preserving the benefits ecosystems generate to humans. It is a tradeoff where the user of the ecosystem

³¹¹ “The classification of water use in beneficial or non-beneficial necessarily changes with changing conditions”. *State, Dept. of Parks v. Idaho Dept. of Water Admin.*, 96 Idaho 440, 447, 530 P.2d 924, 931 (1974) (Bakes, J., concurring). Water scarcity coupled with extreme weather conditions requires a redefinition on what is “beneficial” to society.

³¹² Foley, *supra* note 302.

service pays the value of the service to the owner of the natural capital that provides the service. The payment for ecosystem services stimulates the owner of the natural capital to preserve the natural mechanism thereby generating an economic activity guided towards preservation and designed to compete with the economic activities that would result in the destruction of the natural capital.

Payment for ecosystem services is mainly based on the traditional market theory and on Hardin's *Tragedy of the Commons*³¹³. The market theory relies on the following assumptions: economic actors are rational and selfish and the demand for resources is determined by the price, not by the finitude of resources. A market for ecosystem services must provide benefits that exceed the costs of trade, that is, informational and transaction costs. Besides that, as investments tend to go where they can generate more income, payment for ecosystem services should be greater than the profits that would be received by the owner of the natural capital if he were to develop the land.

From an economic perspective, ecosystem services present the following characteristics: they are positive externalities, in the sense that their effects cross the boundaries of the land where the natural capital is located to benefit the economic actors located in the proximate area; it is difficult to exclude a user's access to the services and, by this reason, such services are very susceptible to free riders (term used to designate the person who enjoys an economic benefit without having to pay for it); ecosystem services are not usually traded in the market and, for that reason, their price has to be determined by mechanisms that mimic the market (such as the mechanisms employed in cost-benefit analysis to measure the benefits of protecting the environment).

Garrett Hardin has put light on the application of the market theory to environmental protection in the *Tragedy of the Commons*³¹⁴. Hardin's model describes the common

³¹³ Garrett Hardin, *The Tragedy of the Commons*, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).

³¹⁴ *Id.* The *Tragedy of the Commons* illustrates the issues that may arise from the private use of jointly owned resources. Hardin gives the example of a common field used by multiple owners to feed their cattle. One owner notes that if he or she increases the number of animals, he or she will be able to yield more profit while maintaining the same costs. In this case, the "costs" are the weight loss of each animal. The additional animals included in the herd will eat the grass that was being eaten solely by the primary animals. It means that each additional animal introduced will cause a reduction in the weight of its companions. Thereby, the profit earned by the owner that increased his or her herd is supported by the weight loss of the animals belonging to other owners. That is how the cost of somebody's profit is *externalized* to others. If all owners decide to act in that

evolution of events when private benefits are obtained from finite and common resources. Unlike the market theory, Hardin's model assumes the finitude of resources. As the market theory, however, Hardin believes that economic actors act in a selfish manner. Hardin's conclusion is that environmental protection is obtained only by two means: private property or regulation to internalize externalities. Hardin's theory is only adequate for explaining the results of exploitation of common resources where access cannot be excluded. The main criticism of this theory is that it does not account for social norms as an alternative means for addressing environmental protection³¹⁵.

Following Hardin's lead, payment for ecosystem services does not consider the importance of social norms in addressing environmental protection. On the other hand, the principle of resilience recognizes the importance of social norms, especially moral norms, in protecting the environment. It is due to this distinction that the principle of resilience will establish limits to the application of the payment of ecosystem services as a tool for implementing environmental protection.

The first limitation the principle of resilience creates to the payment for ecosystem services refers to private initiatives for creating a market for ecosystem services, which shall be called *private payment for ecosystem services* from now on in this article. Ruhl et al exemplify the creation of such a market through private initiative when there are a large number of economic actors both on the service users and on the natural capital owners' sides. In this situation, the common pathway would be: a sufficient number of natural capital owners need to identify each other, agree to threaten to eliminate the natural capital, evaluate the ecosystem service benefits, identify the service users, develop a strategy for negotiating with them, and devise a method for allocating any payments received among the group³¹⁶.

way, the weight of each animal will be greatly reduced and each owner will end up having less benefit than he or she had in the first place. Therefore, the decision made by one person with an individualistic point of view will worsen everybody's situation. Even if each of the owners could predict the others' action and consequently the bad result, he or she probably would act in the same way because there would not be any guarantee that his or her inaction would be followed by the others.

³¹⁵ Elinor Ostrom et al, *Revisiting the commons: Local lessons, global challenges*, vol. 284 n. 5412 SCIENCE 278.

³¹⁶ See RUHLE ET AL, *supra* note 310, at 73. See also James Salzman et al, *A policy maker's guide to designing payments for ecosystem services* DUKE UNIVERSITY 22,

http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2703&context=faculty_scholarship (last visited Nov. 16, 2011) ("If the forest were not threatened by development, PES would seem nonsensical since the consumers would continue to receive the service of water provision with or without payments").

Such a pathway towards the payment of ecosystem services raises concern under the principle of resilience because it departs from the idea that whoever owns the natural capital needs to threaten the ecosystem before receiving payment for maintaining it. If high-lighting the *threat to the ecosystem* element is not sufficient to show the obviously unethical character of such a pathway, it might be useful to compare this strategy to one used by a criminal who takes someone as a hostage and promises to kill the hostage if he does not receive the money he required. The structure of thinking is the same in both situations. One may argue that the first situation is not as grave as the second because it refers to plants, animals, and the biotic community as a whole, while the second refers to people. Of course this is a valid argument and this article does not seek to affirm that people are less or as important as other members of the land mechanism - human life is always above other ethical values. Rather, this comparison is based on the assumption that both human lives and nature have an inherent value and a good of their own³¹⁷, which means that both are entities deserving of moral concern and consideration and, therefore, “all moral agents have a prima facie duty to promote or preserve the entity’s good as an end in itself”³¹⁸.

The moral obligation to respect every forms of life was already recognized by the United Nations General Assembly, that affirmed: “every form of life is unique, warranting respect regardless of its worth to man, and, to accord other organisms such recognition, man must be guided by a moral code of action”³¹⁹.

The theory of *private payment for ecosystem services* contains several aspects that evince lack of respect for nature. Besides threatening nature as a requirement for creating markets by private initiative, by attributing a monetary value to the benefits nature brings to humankind, the model for commercialization of ecosystem services unavoidably treats nature as a product. Studies such as the Stern Report, which calculates the total value of Earth’s ecosystem services, might be useful for evincing the importance of nature for economic actors. However, this kind of assessment contributes to eroding in people’s minds the idea that some things have values that cannot be totally translated into monetary amounts. In other

³¹⁷ TAYLOR, *supra* note 67, at 73-75.

³¹⁸ *Id.*

³¹⁹ World Charter for Nature, *supra* note 70, Preamble.

words, treating nature as a product is antithetical to the aim of attributing an inherent value to nature and respecting nature.

Also, *private payment for ecosystem services* attributes no value to ecosystem services that do not benefit humans because they are located far away from human populations³²⁰. Therefore, the theory shows no consideration for ecological functions that are provided for the sole benefit of wild beings. According to Paul Taylor, this attitude demonstrates no respect for nature, even if it has the potential to benefit nature in many situations:

People who have an exclusively human-centered view-point in environmental matters may at times perform actions that in fact further the good of wild creatures. But their actions do not express the attitude of respect for nature because they are not done for the sake of the wild creatures themselves. The underlying aim is to benefit humans, either immediately or in the long run³²¹.

Due to the lack of respect for nature noted as the basis of the theory of *private payment for ecosystem services*, this form of payment should be refrained from all together, because the attitude of respect for nature entails being disposed to refrain from certain kinds of action because of their inherent qualities or future consequences³²². Following Leopold's thinking, aiming for a state of harmony with nature means seeking harmony with the whole land mechanism³²³; one cannot claim to respect nature if one accepts the adoption of legal or economical mechanisms that disregard the moral obligations humans must have towards the land mechanism.

Private payment for ecosystem services generates not only moral issues, but also ecological issues. By being human-centered, payment for ecosystem services results solely in the preservation of ecological functions that are important to humans (not in the protection of ecological functions that are important only to the land mechanism)³²⁴. Also, payment for ecosystem services tends to rely on the minimum parcel of the land mechanism necessary for

³²⁰ "Even if a restored wetland provides the same biophysical level of services as the filled wetland, the services may have little or no value if they are not delivered to a population that needs them" James Salzman & J. B. Ruhl, "No net-loss" – *Instrument choice in wetlands protection*, in TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 21 (Sep., 2005), <http://ssrn.com/abstract=796771> . "Because ecological functions are counted as ecosystem services only where and when humans are benefited, the ecosystem service value of any ecosystem function depends not only on the ecological and geographic variability of ecosystems across space and time but also on where people are, when they are there, and their respective levels of demand for different services" RUHL ET AL, *supra* note 310, at 77.

³²¹ TAYLOR, *supra* note 67, at 85.

³²² *Id.*, at 82.

³²³ LEOPOLD, *supra* note 7, at 189.

³²⁴ *Id.*, at 246.

maintaining the service, therefore focusing on the keystone species that represent the different functional groups and guarantee the basic functioning of the ecosystem³²⁵. However, the maintenance of keystone species cannot ensure the continuity of the ecosystem. In order to strengthen the resilience of the ecosystem, it is necessary not only to preserve the keystone species, but also the redundant species, because those will be the “insurance capital” which guarantees the continuity of that specific function in case one of the keystone species is extinct from the ecosystem³²⁶. Therefore, payment for maintaining the keystone species can erode ecological redundancy and weaken ecosystem resilience.

Is it possible to create a market for ecosystem services through private initiative that does not incur the ethical wrong of threatening nature? The only situation this work envisions that would be exempt from this wrong doing would be the case where the user offers to pay for the ecosystem services before the owner of the natural capital considers destroying the ecosystem to develop the land. This might seem an unusual situation because, due to the difficulty in excluding access to natural services, the user probably will be already enjoying the service for free before any transaction is made with the owner of the natural capital³²⁷. Thus, the user hardly would spontaneously offer to pay for something that he takes for granted.

However, although a voluntarily offer to pay for ecosystem services might not be the rule, it may occur under certain circumstances. It is the case when the natural capital exists but does not generate the ecosystem service due to mismanagement by the owner. In this case, the potential user might assess the reason why he is not receiving the service and offer to pay for the owner of the natural capital to correct the management problem in order to make the provision of ecosystem services possible. This situation occurred in the municipality of Extrema, in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais.

In Extrema, the municipality noticed that the water bodies that supplied water for the city presented a decrease in water quality because farmers upstream allowed their cattle to

³²⁵ Allen et al., *supra* note 15, at 12.

³²⁶ Folke et al., *supra* note 5, at 152, 155; Peterson et al., *supra* note 34, at 175.

³²⁷ RUHLE ET AL, *supra* note 310, at 81. Service users tend to enjoy the services for free and only notice the effects of missing such services when the natural capital is already gone, when it may be too late to restore the stock of natural capital.

walk in the water bodies, thereby increasing erosion³²⁸. In order to improve water quality and reduce costs of water treatment in the supply system, the municipality paid the farmers to fence off the water bodies that passed through their properties in order to prevent erosion, both by blocking the access of cattle and by reforesting the margins of headwaters.

In another situation, the user of an ecosystem service that is currently being provided might also decide to voluntarily offer payment for the service when he notices that the service is fundamental to the continuity of his economic activity and that he will be better off paying the service and ensuring its continuity rather than taking the risk of losing the service in case the owner of the natural capital decides to develop the land.

Except those situations where the user of the service voluntarily offers to pay for the ecosystem service, this article envisions no other means through which the creation of a market for ecosystem services by private initiative would not compel the user to enter into a contract due to an immoral threat by the owner of natural capital.

Although payment for ecosystem services raises several reasons for concern, this tool has a major benefit that justifies its consideration it as a valid and useful means of promoting environmental protection: when implemented, payment for ecosystem services inverts the legal and economic trend noticed throughout history to incentivize the development of the land and the destruction of ecosystem services³²⁹. That is why it is often presented as a useful tool for conservation.

Seeking to promote the benefit generated by the payment for ecosystem services without incurring the wrongdoing of threatening nature, this article accepts the employment of such a preservation tool in the following cases: when service users voluntarily propose to pay for the ecosystem service; or when the trading program is used as a tool to encourage compliance with regulations that oblige the preservation of the ecosystem in certain parcels of land.

The first model, which can be called the *voluntary payment for ecosystem services*, does not solve the problem of preserving solely ecosystem functions that are useful to humans or of adopting a human-centered perspective that undermines the attitude of respect for

³²⁸ Janice Kiss, *As águas vão rolar*, 293 GLOBO RURAL (Mar., 2010), available at <http://revistagloborural.globo.com/GloboRural/0,6993,EEC1708927-1641-1,00.html> (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).

³²⁹ RUHL ET AL, *supra* note 310, at 102-09.

nature: these issues can be addressed by applying the *voluntary payment for ecosystem services* in conjunction with the second model - that can be called *regulatory payment for ecosystem services*. The ecosystem-broad regulation of the *regulatory payment for ecosystem services* regulates the preservation of ecological integrity in a determined portion of land, therefore adopting a bio-centered perspective that ensures the preservation of every ecological function, both those that help the ecosystem to maintain itself, and those that are useful to humans.

Therefore, voluntary payment for ecosystem services can be adopted only when there is already in place an ecosystem-broad regulation which, with or without a system of regulatory payment for ecosystem services, provides protection to whole ecosystems in a minimal area able to guarantee the maintenance of their resilience. In this context, voluntary payment for ecosystem services covers *additional* protection of nature, never being used as a single tool to promote environmental protection. The stem of environmental protection and preservation of ecosystem resilience must rely on a regulation that requires the preservation of all ecosystem functions within a minimum extension of preserved land.

Another important feature of relying on regulation as the stem of environmental protection is that every landowner is presumably obliged to conserve nature while in private or voluntary payment for ecosystem services the landowner is presumed to have no such obligation. That is why in markets initiated by regulation, the landowner who does not preserve is obliged to pay somebody else for it in her name, while in private and voluntary markets the landowner who develops the land does not have any obligation while the one who preserves receives a payment for it. The first mindset is much more coherent with the principle of resilience's moral premise that everybody should respect and preserve the land mechanism.

The municipality of Extrema, in Brazil, is an example of both voluntary payment for ecosystem services and regulatory payment for ecosystem services. That is so because the municipality voluntarily offered to pay for the preservation of vegetation around the headwaters, which is already required by Brazilian law³³⁰. Therefore, Extrema is an example of *regulatory payment for ecosystem services for stimulating conservation on-site*. There is

³³⁰ C. FLOR., art. 2, c, & art. 3, §5.

also *regulatory payment for ecosystem services for stimulating conservation off-site* when conservation on-site is not recommended, for which it is possible to mention as examples wetland banking in the United States and *servidão florestal* (in English, environmental servitude) in Brazil.

In the United States, filling wetlands requires a prior permit from the Corps of Engineers³³¹. The Corps guidelines for giving the so-called 404 permits attend to the following order of desirability: the developer should avoid filling wetlands; he should minimize the adverse impacts to wetlands that cannot be avoided; and he should provide compensatory mitigation for unavoidable impacts. In order to be allowed to fill the wetland, the developer must prove that no reasonable alternatives exist to the development of the wetlands³³². Compensation for the impacts can be implemented on-site or off-site, but off-site mitigation banking is preferred over on-site because of the greater efficiency, scale effects, and environmental protection³³³.

The Brazilian restriction on rural private property known as *reserva legal* (see the Land use topic) presents some market mechanisms to relax the legal obligation to preserve native forest in every track of rural land. If the property has no native forest, the Brazilian Forest Code allows the landowner to buy a new tract of land to establish the *reserva legal*, or to establish it on a third party land, through *servidão florestal* or *Cotas de Reserva Florestal*³³⁴. The compensation is allowed only if the land is located in the same micro-watershed, has the same size and same physical characteristics as his land³³⁵.

Both wetlands mitigation and *servidão florestal* are market instruments employed for promoting the restoration of the whole ecosystem in the most economically feasible place. In both countries, priority is given to the preservation of the ecosystem where it is located because the market instrument is applied only when keeping the ecosystem on-site would impair the economic activity (i.e. the development of wetlands is allowed if the developer proves to have no reasonable alternative, which means that the destruction of the wetland is

³³¹ CWA, §404.

³³² Salzman & Ruhl, *supra* note 320, at 4.

³³³ Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of Mitigation Banks, 60 Fed. Reg. 58,605, 58,607 (Nov. 28, 1995)

³³⁴ MILARÉ, *supra* note 293, 759-60.

³³⁵ C. FLOR., art. 44, III.

avoided solely to the extent that it does not impair the economic activity) or would be environmentally disadvantageous and more expensive (i.e. the establishment of *servidão florestal* is only allowed when the developed land has no remaining native vegetation, evincing the priority given to the preservation of an existing forest rather than planting a new forest where it was previously destroyed). Once it is not possible to keep the ecosystem in its original place, wetlands mitigation gives priority to off-site mitigation due to greater efficiency in evaluating compliance, while *reserva legal* gives priority to near-site compensation, in order to ensure the existence of protected land in every micro-watershed and to prevent the creation of “hot spots” of developed land.

The obligation to preserve the whole ecosystem takes away concerns such as the monetization of nature and the utilitarian selection of protected ecosystem services and species, which can be found in *private payment for ecosystem services*. *Regulatory payment for ecosystem services* abolishes the monetization of nature because it promotes a change in perspective: while in the *private payment for ecosystem services* the determination of the price of ecosystem services is focused on the monetization of the benefits ecosystems generate to humans³³⁶; the determination of the price paid in *regulatory payment for ecosystem services on-site* is focused on how much the regeneration of the ecosystem will cost to whoever assumes the responsibility for it, because whoever pays for the maintenance of the ecosystem (probably the government) is not directly the user of the service. The existence of the regulation prior to the development of a market for ecosystem services demonstrates that the society in question already values conservation; otherwise, it would not create the regulation for conserving the ecosystem.

In this setting, accounting for ecosystem benefits is not as useful, because citizens do not need to be reminded of the importance of conservation by giving monetary values to ecosystem services. In such a legal environment, payment to whoever preserves the natural resources is not a source of profit: rather, it would be better characterized as a compensation

³³⁶Ruhl et al affirm that natural capital can be economically valued by computing the benefits it provides and comparing to the profit the owner of the natural capital can receive if he develops the land. RUHL ET AL, *supra* note 310, at 63. James Salzman affirms that the assessment of costs of building physical capital to replace ecosystem services is an effective method of valuing ecosystem services. James Salzman, *Valuing Ecosystem Services*, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 887 (1997).

for the costs that person undertook in preserving resources that will contribute to the greater good.

One may argue that if *regulatory payment for ecosystem services on-site* brings no profit to the owner of the natural capital, payment for ecosystem services will not achieve its intent; that is, to provide an economic incentive substantial enough to discourage the landowner from developing his land. However, it is necessary to remember that the owner of natural resources is obliged by regulation to keep the natural capital.

It is clear that the downside of such a measure, and of any regulation for environmental protection, is to discourage conservation beyond the level determined by the law. Conservation beyond the level required by the law in each tract of land will be achieved in settings that allow the owner of the natural capital to obtain profit: the voluntary payment for ecosystem services; and the regulatory payment for ecosystem services for stimulating conservation off-site³³⁷.

The commitment of the principle of resilience to long-term efficiency in the management of natural resources requires mechanisms that ensure the perpetuity of preserved lands. Market mechanisms associated or not with regulations must be designed in a way that prevents the easy conversion of currently protected land into developed land when the economic incentive ends³³⁸. There is lack of certainty regarding the permanence of wetlands protected under the wetland banking system, which is one of the main disadvantages of this market mechanism. In Brazil, this issue was addressed by characterizing *reserva legal* as an obligation *propter rem*: a permanent restriction on the usufruct of the land, which must to be respected by every future owners³³⁹. However, if the compensation of *reserva legal* is made through the use of *servidão florestal*, there are no guarantees that such vegetation will be

³³⁷ The regulatory payment for ecosystem services for stimulating conservation off-site causes preservation of ecosystems above the level required by law if considered the land of the owner of natural capital alone. If considered the whole national territory covered by that ecosystem, there will be no net-gain because the conservation above legal requirements at the land of the owner of natural capital was compensated by the loss of natural capital in the land of the developer. If, however, the national law requires that compensation off-site is done in a tract of land larger than the land that gave cause to the compensation (for example, 100 acres of land protected off-site, for each 50 acres of developed land), then the regulatory payment for ecosystem services for stimulating conservation off-site will generate a net gain.

³³⁸ LEOPOLD, *supra* note 7, at 244 - 245.

³³⁹ MILARÉ, *supra* note 293, at 753-54.

protected after the ending of the servitude, because the servitude is not required by law to be permanent³⁴⁰.

The obligation to preserve the whole ecosystem prevents the utilitarian selection of protected species and ecosystem services because whoever manages the natural resources will be forced by the agencies' guidelines to preserve all species, not only the ones that have economic value.

In conclusion, the payment for ecosystem services is compatible with the principle of resilience solely as long as it is preceded by a regulation that ensures the preservation of the ecosystem in an area where conservation is well-known to be needed to fulfill ecological requirements for keeping ecosystem resilience. Voluntary payment for ecosystem services can be used to promote protection in areas where the importance of preservation is secondary, or where the results of preservation are being tested by adaptive management decisions.

³⁴⁰ Law n. 6938/1981, art. 9-A, *caput* (Braz.).

CONCLUSION

Sustainable development is essentially a means to implement the *land ethic*. Failure in doing so risks reducing the concretization of sustainable development to mere duplication of old development, so called the kind of development that gives sole consideration to economic growth, not to environmental preservation.

The acknowledgement of the principle of resilience fills the vacuum existing in the operationalization of the principle of sustainable development regarding situations where environmental protection cannot be conciliated with economic growth. The principle of resilience prevents this vacuum from being filled by the most powerful interest in the conflict – the economic – by providing greater legal protection to the weakest interest in the balance – the environmental. The principle of resilience consolidates justice in a situation of natural inequality by prioritizing the preservation of the environment in decision making. Thereby, the principle assists the Law to fulfill its most prominent function of applying justice to concrete cases.

The principle of resilience also obliges decision makers and operators of the law to consider the long term effects of their acts on nature and on present and future generations. By infusing ecological long-term concerns with patterns of occupation of land, consumption and production, the legal principle of resilience guarantees that old unsustainable patterns are not replicated during rebuilding after natural disasters and relocating displaced people. The ultimate result is the prevention of disasters and the avoidance of repetition of palliative measures.

The principle of resilience provides an ecological foundation to economy which stresses the value of replicating components of ecological resilience in economy. The principle enhances the enforcement of sustainable yield by acknowledging that economic growth must be restrained when deemed necessary to prevent total exhaustion of natural resources. Therefore, the application of the principle to economy calls attention not only to restrictions on the exploitation of natural resources but also to the need to close the life-cycle

of materials through “reuse and recycle”³⁴¹. In a broader sense, the principle acknowledges that humans must live in such a way as not to impair the maintenance of ecological functions that ensure the provision of resources and services which both society and the economy depend upon to continue existing. As the final result of this effort is the maintenance of subsidies for a balanced society and a stable economy, it is possible to affirm that the principle of resilience provides greater economic efficiency in the long term and a deeper understanding of economy.

The inclusion of ecological concepts in the functioning of the economy can accelerate the adoption of green economy and make it more resilient because the principle of resilience provides not only an ecological foundation, but also a moral background to the green economy, which is essential to prevent this concept from being sidetracked by traditional economic interests during implementation.

As demonstrated, the use of the principle of resilience will have tangible and practical benefits for society. However, this article does not espouse the principle of resilience only for its utilitarian benefits, but also for its values and for the benefits it will generate to nature itself. Therefore, it is a basic premise of the principle of resilience that its ethical values be enforced even when no utilitarian benefits are expected to arise from it.

The social enforcement of individual and moral obligations generated by the principle of resilience requires education for conservation in order to enable people to internalize the inherent value of nature and the goal to live in harmony with the land mechanism. Education for conservation also provides people with the necessary knowledge to identify how resilience is being harmed and what they can do to prevent despised effects on nature.

³⁴¹ The idea of closing the life-cycle of materials is already present in some countries’ experience. In China, the National Development and Reform Commission is seeking to implement the concept of circular economy, whereby “one facility’s waste, including energy, water, materials - as well as information - is another facility’s input”. László Pintér, *International Experience in Establishing Indicators for the Circular Economy and Considerations for China* 1, IISD (May 2006), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/measure_circular_economy_china.pdf (quoting NDRC, *The Circular (Recycling) economy in China*, (2006)). In the United States, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) adopts the “cradle to the grave” approach, which tracks hazardous waste from generation to disposal requiring waste generators and transporters and on owners of treatment, storage and disposal facilities to sign and keep a record on the waste characteristics, origins and final disposal. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 USC §6922(a)(5). See PLATER, ET AL, *supra* note 6, at 743-772.

Because the principle of resilience addresses moral obligations vested with legal enforcement, it cannot be considered a sectoral principle, applied solely to conducts practiced by environment agencies; rather, it is a cross-cutting principle that must be applied at the highest level of private and public institutions in order to influence decision making in every sector³⁴².

This article repeatedly demonstrated that the foundations of the principle of resilience are already present in International Environmental Law and, consequently, that this is already a general principle of International Law. Although the principle already exists buried within other principles, we can only enjoy its benefits and apply it to legal procedures when it becomes expressly recognized and systematized in the international level. Thus, the principle can be incorporated in future treaties and influence the interpretation of existing international agreements; it can also be recognized in domestic law, thereby shaping new regulations and influencing the interpretation of domestic law by judges and administrators.

Since the adoption of Agenda 21, States have come to understand and to apply sustainable development³⁴³. In twenty years, environmental problems became worse. The patterns of deterioration show that conservation without resilience is not enough. That is why this article concludes that, after the recognition of the principle of resilience in the international legal system, the next step for ensuring implementation of the principle in the international sphere is to infuse Agenda 21 with the principle of resilience.

³⁴² The cross-cutting applicability of the principle of resilience is in consonance with concerns repeatedly expressed during the discussions about desirable features of policies on sustainable consumption and production held at the Intergovernmental Preparatory Meeting (IPM) for the nineteenth session of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD 19). See, *Summary of the Intergovernmental Preparatory Meeting for the Nineteenth Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development*, vol. 5 n. 293 EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN, 6-8, available at <http://www.iisd.ca/csd/ipm19/> (last visited Nov. 16, 2011) (quoting Toolseeram Ramjeawon, *Sustainable Consumption and Production efforts in SIDS*, Intergovernmental Preparatory Meeting for the Nineteenth Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development, New York, U.S., Feb. 28 - Mar. 4, 2011).

³⁴³ "Humanity stands at a defining moment in history. We are confronted with a perpetuation of disparities between and within nations, a worsening of poverty, hunger, ill health and illiteracy, and the continuing deterioration of the ecosystems on which we depend for our well-being. However, integration of environment and development concerns and greater attention to them will lead to the fulfillment of basic needs, improved living standards for all, better protected and managed ecosystems and a safer, more prosperous future. No nation can achieve this on its own; but together we can - in a global partnership for sustainable development". United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., Juen 3-14, 1992, *Agenda 21*, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1(Vol.I), Preamble 1.1.