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To the victims of the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis in Northeast Japan in March 2011
Governing Employees: A Foucauldian Analysis of Deaths from Overwork in Japan

Yoshio Shibata

Abstract
This article explores the institutional causes of karoshi (death from overwork) and karojisatsu (suicide induced by overwork and work-related depression) in Japan. Rejecting the culturalist explanations of these health problems, this study discusses the management-labor struggles of postwar Japan and their impacts on the institutional modes of labor relations. It specifically examines the institutional features of internal labor markets that are closely linked to karoshi and karojisatsu by exploring how the Japanese employees are driven to overwork at the micro level. Drawing on the Foucauldian idea of governmentality and utilizing a sociological approach, this research treats these institutional forms of labor relations as part of the governmental technology that has adversely affected the everyday working lives of employees and has compelled them to overwork.

Author’s Bio
Yoshio Shibata earned his M.S. in applied social research from Hunter College of the City University of New York (CUNY) in 1994 and his Ph.D. in sociology from the Graduate Center of CUNY in 2007. He once taught at CUNY’s Queens College and City College. Beginning in 2012, he will teach a course on sociology of work at Ritsumeikan University in Japan. Email: ys.sociology@gmail.com
Governing Employees: A Foucauldian Analysis of Deaths from Overwork in Japan

Yoshio Shibata

1. Introduction: The Reality of Karoshi and Karojisatsu
The relentless job demands on employees in Japan is most strikingly illuminated by the so-called karoshi (death from overwork) and karojisatsu (suicide induced by overwork and work-related depression) syndromes. Sudden deaths from stroke and heart disease caused by overwork were first recognized in the late 1970s. The term karoshi was coined by a group of labor lawyers in 1988 when they established the National Defense Counsel for Victims of Karoshi and started the “Karoshi Hotline” to provide consulting services and to draw attention to the problem. They received some 2,500 calls in the first three years, including calls from victims’ relatives, and helped them to file claims for compensation with the Labor Standards Inspection Offices. Since then, karoshi has been officially recognized as a workplace injury eligible for compensation. The victims’ families sometimes sued the corporations and the Labor Standards Inspection Offices when their compensation claims were rejected. Since the late 1990s, labor lawyers and activists have drawn attention to karojisatsu syndrome, which was also officially recognized as a workplace injury (Kawahito, 1998). The spread of job-related depression, whether or not ending in suicide, has become a serious problem not only for Japanese workers but also for the corporations.
It is difficult to determine precisely the scale of karoshi and karojisatsu. Since 2003, the number of formal karoshi claims has exceeded 300 each year and only 50% of the claims resulted in some form of compensation. The number of claims for work-related mental illness skyrocketed from 13 in 1995 to 927 in 2008, and the rate of official recognition was around 15% in the past decade. The number of karojisatsu claims increased from 10 in 1995 to 164 in 2007 (Kumazawa, 2010: 19). However, these figures are no more than the tip of the iceberg because most victims and survivors never filed any claims (ibid.). The National Defense Counsel for Victims of Karoshi estimates as many as 10,000 Japanese workers to have died from karoshi annually.  

Although many labor lawyers and activists have expressed concern over the fast-growing cases of karoshi and karojisatsu since the late 1980s, the institutional arrangements blamed by the lawyers and activists for causing the problems remain unchanged. According to many labor scholars, the problems have only worsened (Kumazawa, 2010; Morioka, 2004, 2005; Nakano, 2006; Ogoshi, 2006). In 2006, a national magazine even called Japan Karōshi Taikoku (Karoshi Empire). The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare has set 80 hours of overtime per month as the “karoshi line.” Causal relationships between overwork and illness can be identified when the amount of overtime exceeds 80 hours for at least two consecutive months. According to the official statistics, the number of employees working beyond the karoshi line increased from 4.8 million in 2002 (i.e., 11.9% of the employees working 200 days or more annually) to 5.4 million in 2007 (i.e., 12.7% of the employees working 200 days or above) (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2008: 19).

Karoshi and karojisatsu are found among workers in all jobs and all age groups (Kumazawa, 2010). A tendency specific to Japan is that much of overtime work is unpaid. The scope of unpaid
overtime, commonly known as sābisu zangyō (service overtime), is not easy to grasp because it never appears in the government statistics. However, Morioka Koji (2009), a leading expert on Japan’s work hours, estimates the average “service overtime” per each full-time employee in 2006 to be as high as 247 hours a year. By eliminating this astonishing amount of service overtime, it is estimated to be able to create more than four million new jobs.

How has this situation come about? Karoshi and karojisatsu cases are not exceptional in Japan but they appear to be exceptional in international comparison (Kumazawa, 2010). Such a Japanese “national specificity” attracts some culturalist explanations. This study, however, argues that the causes of deaths from overwork are deeply embedded in the entire institutional arrangements of labor relations in postwar Japan. Both karoshi and karojisatsu cases reflect more serious structural problems of domestic labor relations. The seemingly separate problems such as the job insecurity faced by contingent workers, the lack of collective bargaining power, and the expansion of neoliberal economic reforms are indirectly but profoundly related to the problem of karoshi. Therefore, we can challenge those ahistorical culturalist explanations by examining the institutional idiosyncrasies of Japanese labor relations, in particular, the historical process in which the current institutional arrangements took shape.

The following analysis draws on a Foucauldian perspective to conceptualize these institutional forms as a technology of power that indirectly affects the everyday working lives of Japanese employees. This investigation is not simply an attempt to clarify the direct and observable causes of deaths from overwork. Instead, it seeks to shed light on some general institutional problems of labor relations in Japan, the history of management-labor struggles, and the ways in which Japanese employees are exploited and governed institutionally.
2. Labor Relations in Postwar Japan: From Struggle to Compromise to Institutionalization

Four interrelated institutional characteristics of labor relations in contemporary Japan are closely linked to karoshi and karojisatsu instances: (1) the discriminatory treatment of non-regular workers; (2) the person-based pay system with ambiguous merit evaluation; (3) the dysfunction of the general labor market in providing the life-chances to working people; and (4) the ultra-cooperative enterprise-based labor unions. These institutional arrangements have arisen from the complex history of management-labor struggles of postwar Japan. Once placed in this historical context, it is possible to understand the rise of labor unions’ moderate demands in the early postwar period, the Japanese managers’ reactions towards and their compromises with the labor sectors, and the subsequent institutionalization of labor relations (Figure 1).

a. Workers’ Demands in the Early Postwar Years

Although the extremely cooperative enterprise-based labor unions have characterized Japan’s labor relations, the labor movements of the early postwar years were much more contentious and confrontational. Shortly after the end of the Second World War, labor unions proliferated; in March 1946 alone, about 3,300 unions were formed and nationwide union membership approached five million at the end of the year (Gordon, 1985; Nimura, 1984). Some unions took control of factories and resumed production that had been halted since the end of the War. Factories were managed through a direct and participatory workplace democracy (Nimura, 2001; Otake, 1994; Yamamoto, 1983). While most union members were based in specific workplaces, they actively participated in the industry-wide federations of unions and coordinated their demands at the societal level (Takagi, 1982).
Figure 1: The History of Management-Labor Struggles in Japan

- **Prewar and Wartime Periods**
  - Workers' failure to establish working class public sphere
  - State's repression of industrial democracy
  - State's wartime labor policy

- **Postwar Period**
  - Managers' reactions
    - Workplace Control
      - Dividing workers
      - Inciting individual competition
    - Weakening industry-wide federation of unions
    - External labor flexibility
    - Internal labor flexibility
  - Compromises and institutional results
    - Acceptance of individual evaluation
    - Giving up equal pay for equal job principle
    - Discrimination of female employees
    - Temporary workers are excluded from unions and discriminated
    - Person-based pay system
      - Long-term individual evaluation with ambiguous criteria
    - Managers' freedom on the issue of job transfer
    - Excluding radical workers by ambiguous evaluation
    - Ultra-cooperative enterprise-based unions
    - Acceptance of overtime

- **Workers' demands**
  - Abolishing Discriminatory Treatment of Blue-collar workers
  - Livelihood Wage
    - Male breadwinner salary
    - Wage determined by age and family size
  - Job security for male employees within the current corporation
  - Participatory workplace democracy
  - Industry-wide federation of unions
  - Lack of general labor market with job-based wage system
    = Balkanization into internal labor markets
  - Power mechanisms that cause karoshi

- **State's repression of industrial democracy**
- **State's wartime labor policy**
- **Weakening industry-wide federation of unions**
- **Excluding radical workers by ambiguous evaluation**
- **Lack of general labor market with job-based wage system**
  = Balkanization into internal labor markets
- **Lack of general labor market with job-based wage system**
- **Weakening industry-wide federation of unions**
This labor activism is essential for understanding the socioeconomic orientation of blue-collar workers because they spearheaded the early postwar labor movements and greatly influenced the subsequent institutional arrangements of labor relations. These postwar unions had three specific demands: (1) the abolition of the discriminatory treatment of blue-collar workers; (2) the pursuit of a “livelihood wage”; and (3) the protection of job security. The concern about the discriminatory treatment should be understood against the backdrop of harsh prewar discrimination against industrial workers. Blue-collar workers were pejoratively called *shokkō* (manual laborers or factory hands) and discriminated against not only in wages and promotion but also in a whole range of working conditions (e.g., being housed in the poor company dormitories under strict supervision and eating poor-quality food at company dining rooms). They were treated as second-class members of the enterprises and belonged to the category of “lower society” (Gordon, 1985; Kumazawa, 1996; Nimura, 1984, 1987).

The pursuit of a “livelihood wage” was to seek a new wage system that would approximate the life-cycle needs of workers such as expenses for marriage, raising and educating children, and retirement benefits. In concrete terms, it demanded the guarantee of automatic wage increases based on workers’ age and family size. Such benefits were only provided to white-collar workers in the prewar period. Thus, the pursuit of a livelihood wage was closely related to the unions’ demand for fair and equal treatment of blue-collar workers. A few words should be said about the livelihood wage system.

First, the system expected male employees to earn breadwinner wages. While wages under this system were unambiguously determined by one’s age and family size regardless of gender, female employees were expected to quit working upon marriage; the unions generally accepted such gender discrimination
in the workplace (Nimura, 1994). Both managers and unions shared the assumption that the proper place for married women was the household. Second, the wage system was incompatible with the principle of “equal pay for equal work,” which presupposed a job-based wage system. A livelihood wage was determined by workers’ age and family size, not by the job nature. Third, while the unions insisted on the guarantee of a “livelihood” portion of the wage, they accepted and even requested the “ability-pay” component of the wage to be determined by the evaluation of workers’ performance (Nimura, 1994; Nomura, 1994). This reflected the anti-discrimination demand of the prewar period because many blue-collar workers resented the old management practices that had relegated industrial workers to lower wages and status regardless of their ability (Nimura, 1994). At least for some workers, the “abolition of discrimination” meant that the management would give white- and blue-collar workers the same opportunity of career advancement and recognize their resulting wage differences (Nimura, 1994; Nomura, 2003).

We can see some ambivalence in these wage demands: they were both egalitarian and competition-minded. Moreover, the managers’ right to evaluate employees was taken for granted. The unions neither requested the managers to publicize the evaluation process nor constructed a set of acceptable criteria for assessment. The unions also failed to push the managers to inform each employee of the evaluation outcomes and to allow the unions and their members to challenge the outcomes (Endo, 1999; Nomura, 1994).

The pursuit of job security was the most contentious. The postwar labor unions engaged in numerous prolonged disputes with the managers under the slogan of “totally against dismissal,” but they did not attempt to establish an orderly procedure for layoffs of employees as the labor unions had done in the U.S. For
Japanese workers, job security is “all or nothing” (Gordon, 1985; Nomura, 1994). The unions’ pursuit of job security has always been closely connected with the demand for a “livelihood wage.” Under this livelihood wage system, the Japanese corporations prefer hiring young and single workers whose wages are lower than older and experienced ones, unless the unions intervene into the hiring practices and challenge any age discrimination (which they seldom do). Once a middle-aged worker with a family to support loses his job, finding a new job at a comparable wage is very difficult. The age and family size components of this wage system certainly have ensured the livelihoods of those workers who are already in the internal labor market, but this system fails to maintain the livelihoods of those workers who move from one company to another. In other words, the livelihood wage system has presupposed the job security of workers.

The rationale used by the unions to justify these demands can be traced to the prewar and wartime eras. Harsh discrimination against industrial workers in prewar Japan was first effectively contested not by labor organizations, which were violently suppressed by the state, but by the wartime government itself. The military state needed to increase its industrial outputs in times of total war but to do that, reducing the high turnover of industrial workers and establishing a “harmonious relationship” between management and labor were crucial. Hence, the state intervened in the labor relations by providing blue-collar employees with a seniority-based livelihood wage and calling for better treatment of workers (Kurokawa, 1964).

The ideological reason for doing so during wartime had nothing to do with the principle of fair exchange between labor and compensation (i.e., equal pay for equal job). This concept of fair exchange was firmly rejected by the state as a selfish mode of transaction, symbolizing individualism, liberalism and other
“Western cultural traits” and endangering the “collectivist” cultural traits and national identity of Japan (Fujino, 2000). Instead, the widespread ideology of Kōkoku kinrōkan (The Imperial Work Ethic) advocated that as long as the laborers worked diligently to serve the nation, they deserved respect and treatment as equal members of an “enterprise family” and of the Japanese Empire (Kurokawa, 1964; Saguchi, 1991).

In reality, workers of prewar Japan lacked an autonomous, alternative means to raise their status other than living at the mercy of the militarist state. They did not have the time and resources to develop what Geoff Eley (1990) calls a “working class public sphere”—a domain of social communication among workers that are supported by working class communities. As a result, Japanese workers could not fully develop their class identity, distinctive values, philosophy, culture, and supporting organizations and networks. Nor could they overcome the state’s suppression of industrial democracy. The state never recognized workers’ rights to organize themselves and bargain collectively (Saguchi, 1991). Without a sense of working class solidarity and an institutional framework of industrial democracy, workers had to rely on the “egalitarian” drive of nationalist ideology and the wartime government’s labor policies (Kurita, 1994; Saguchi, 1991).

While the wartime state failed to boost productivity mainly because of the managers’ reluctance to treat their workers better, the prewar ideology and labor policies continued to shape the rationale of workers’ demands during the early postwar era. Abolishing discrimination and implementing a livelihood wage were what the wartime state promised, and the postwar unions continued to fight for these aims. Paradoxically, popular attitude towards the gender division of labor at home and the rejection of the principle of equal pay for equal work were also embedded in the union’ demands. The unions justified these claims under the old wartime slogan of
“equality as jyūgyōin (employees)” (Kumazawa, 1996) or what Andrew Gordon (1985) calls “full membership rights” within the same enterprise. The term jyūgyōin could simply be translated as “employee(s)” but implies a certain sense of “membership” in a collective body. Their primary identity was the “membership” of the workplace and enterprise, not the role of “workers” in society at large (Miyake, 1991). The jyūgyōin unions often claimed to lead the reconstruction of national industries and called for the better treatment and career advancement of workers, a claim similar to the wartime state’s labor mobilization (Saguchi, 1991). This strategy of claiming equality resolved around the idea of a collective identity—a claim for belonging to a collectivity within which this labor “equality” was to be ensured.

b. Managers’ Reaction and Emerging Compromises

While the early postwar labor movements were ambivalent about their political orientation, they did exercise workplace democracy and establish industry-wide affiliations. Because of the fear of labor activism, Japanese managers sought to regain control of the workplace and to contain trade union activities within an enterprise by weakening any industry-wide workers’ federations. As a result, the extremely cooperative enterprise-based unions, for which Japanese labor relations are famous, emerged.¹⁴

Weakening the leftist federations of unions was an objective shared by the managers, the Japanese government, and the U.S. Occupational Authority throughout the Cold War. In 1950, the Japanese government, with the approval of the U.S. Occupational Authority, purged Communist Party officials from public office. The “Red Purge” spread throughout the public and private sectors, dismissing over 12,000 workers deemed to be Communists or Communist sympathizers (Gordon, 1985: 333). The unified management class also prohibited the intra-enterprise unions from
delegating the rights of collective bargaining to any third party (i.e., an industry-wide federation) and acknowledged only the intra-enterprise unions as the legitimate collective bargaining party (Miyake, 1995).

At the enterprise and workplace levels, the tactics to which the management had resorted since the early 1950s nurtured, often secretly, informal loyalist groups to penetrate the unions, to spread the idea of “cooperation between management and workers,” to take control of the existing unions, and to launch the cooperative second unions (Gordon, 1998; Saito, 1990). In this process of co-optation, the managers greatly utilized the ambiguous merit evaluations to marginalize the workers. According to Andrew Gordon (1998), “the labor division made sure that merit evaluations favored the informal group members, who could argue with conviction to workmates that supporting the group was a wise career move” (81). Struggles continued throughout the 1950s, but by the 1960s, the management had not only re-established workplace control but also confined union activities, now more amenable to the managers, within the boundary of each enterprise.

While the unions gradually lost their sense of activism, the managers and union activists managed to reach some compromises. In order to protect the workers’ job security, many unions accepted the practice of hiring temporary employees and subcontractors during the 1950s and 1960s (Gordon, 1985: 390, 400). This marked the beginning of the two employment categories in Japan’s labor market: seiki jyūgyōin (regular employees) and hi-seiki jyūgyōin (non-regular employees). Since then, the non-regular employees have become a “buffer” to protect the employment of regular employees in times of economic downturn. This is one of the clearest signs that the early postwar confrontational unions either had been replaced by the “cooperative” second unions or had been transformed into “cooperative” ones since the former would not
allow managers to hire temporaries (Gordon, 1985: 404). There were other compromises in exchange for the regular employees’ job security. Since the 1950s, the unions tried to protect the employment statuses of regular workers within a corporation, and the managers in large corporations began to entertain their demands provided that the unions had accepted the reassignment of the employees in a fast-changing job structure (Gordon, 1985: 390-393).

As a result, it has become an unwritten agreement that the managers should do their best to retain the regular workers, but they enjoyed almost unrestrained discretion over job transfer and personnel issues (Kumazawa, 1996: 147). In exchange for the job security, the unions also accepted overtime work. A certain amount of overtime came to be seen as necessary so that the amount of overtime, not the number of workers, could be reduced during the economic downturns. This has legalized the practice that workers need to put in overtime in order to gain the job security they seek (Hamaguchi, 2009).

As for the wage issue, the managers tried to place efficiency at the center of wage calculation, which contradicted the unions’ insistence on nearly automatic and across-the-board wage increases. As a compromise, the workers’ wages, at least those paid by the large corporations, came to be determined by a combination of individual “ability” based on the managers’ assessment and one’s seniority, which replaced age in the livelihood wage (Gordon, 1985). The nature of ability pay was likewise transformed. In pushing for efficiency-based pay, the managers attempted to impose short-term incentives and output pay in the late 1940s and early 1950s. But faced with the unions’ resistance and technological changes that had made rate setting in production more difficult, the managers found the indirect incentive of the long-term, periodic evaluation of each worker to determine salary raise and promotion a superior way of motivating the workers (Gordon, 1985: 382). This system was widely
Governing Employees

adopted by most of the large enterprises throughout the late 1960s and the 1970s, and the “ability” factor in determining wage increase and promotion has grown in influence ever since (Kumazawa, 1996; 1997).

c. The Institutional Characteristics of the Postwar Labor Relations

Blue-collar workers in early postwar Japan fought fiercely to become full members of the enterprises and they have largely achieved this goal. Male regular employees, both white- and blue-collar, and their families are often seen as belonging to the “salaryman” stratum, the large middle stratum in Japan (Kumazawa, 1997: 32; Morioka, 2009a: 142). While the enterprise-based unions became more amenable to the managers, they left the female and non-regular employees behind and treated them as the secondary members. These unions also accepted harsh working conditions that drove regular employees to overwork. The following institutional forms of labor relations directly resulted from the compromise between management and labor, and the causes of overwork were embedded in them.

i. The Discriminatory Treatment of Female and Non-regular Workers

The discriminatory treatment of non-regular employees (i.e., part-timers, temporary workers with a fixed contract, agency-dispatched workers) and the rapid growth of the working poor population have worsened in Japan over the past decade. Since most victims of karoshi and karojisatsu are male regular employees, the problem of karoshi and that of non-regular workers appear to be separate. However, the situations of these two categories of employees are mutually constitutive; it is necessary to understand how the discriminatory treatment of non-regular employees leads to
karoshi-inducing overwork among regular employees.

Since the livelihood wage system presupposed gender division of labor at home and the female regular employees were expected to quit upon marriage, women have not been placed in important positions and their wages have been lower than the male counterparts (ibid.). The gender discrimination prevailed in the 1970s when the number of housewife part-timers grew rapidly. Since most of these women were financially dependent on their husbands, it was thought that they only needed “supplementary income for their families” (Kimoto, 1995, 1995a; Ogoshi, 2006; Osawa, 1993). Such reasoning could only be justified because the equal pay for equal work principle was never enforced in the Japanese labor market. The flip side of the gender discrimination is that the male regular employees are expected to devote the whole life to their jobs, not only because they receive a breadwinner salary but also because they are supposed to be completely free from the housework, leaving all the burdens to their wives (Kimoto, 1995, 1995a; Osawa, 1993). Thus, both the low wage of non-regular employees and the expectation of hard work on regular employees have been institutionalized along the gender line (Nakano, 2006).

The employment safety-net system in Japan reveals the same gender bias as it is modeled on a family composed of the main breadwinner as a regular employee (i.e., the husband) and the spouse (i.e., the wife) as a non-regular employee for supplementary income. Since non-regular female workers are thought to depend on their husbands’ income, unemployment allowance is designed only for regular employees (Nomura, 1998; Osawa, 1993). For this reason, non-regular employees have difficulty applying for social insurance and unemployment allowance (Hamaguchi, 2009; Nakano, 2006; Yuasa, 2008). Once the low wage and the lack of the safety-net support of non-regular employees are established along the gender line, both male and female non-regular employees have become
disadvantaged. At the same time, the female employees are discriminated against within each employment categories as well. The two types of discrimination clearly appear in the wage levels of each group. Combining these regular/non-regular and male/female comparisons, each group’s average hourly wage level in 2008 is shown in Table 1.19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Regular employees</th>
<th>Non-regular employees</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fulltime</td>
<td>Part-time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2,608 (100%)</td>
<td>1,471 (56%)</td>
<td>1,071 (41%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1,847 (71%)</td>
<td>1,128 (43%)</td>
<td>975 (37%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Currency Unit: Japanese Yen (Male regular employee=100%)

The extent of wage gaps in terms of gender difference and employment categories in Japan are unusual among the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries.

The number of non-regular employees has increased considerably as shown in Table 2. In the past two decades, the figure has more than doubled and now one out of three Japanese workers is non-regular employee. More than half of female workers hold non-regular positions. In contrast to the female workers, most male workers still hold regular positions. One research finding shows, however, that among young male workers (15 to 34 years old), 23.1% were non-regular employees in 2007, a rapid increase from 10.5% in 1992 (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2008: 34). This has led to the rapid growth of the working poor population that is made up of households without a single regular employee among the family members (Nakano, 2006; Yuasa,
Yet most of them cannot even apply for unemployment allowance. The irony is that those less fortunate who need the protection of social safety-net and employment provisions most have the least public support.

Table 2: The Number of Regular and Non-regular Employees and the Proportion of Non-Regular Employees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (quarterly)</th>
<th>Number of employees (10,000 employees)</th>
<th>Proportion of non-regular employees (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employees in total</td>
<td>Regular employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 (Feb)</td>
<td>4,369</td>
<td>3,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 (Feb)</td>
<td>4,780</td>
<td>3,779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997 (Feb)</td>
<td>4,963</td>
<td>3,812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 (Feb)</td>
<td>4,903</td>
<td>3,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 (Annual average)</td>
<td>5,007</td>
<td>3,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 (Jan-Mar average)</td>
<td>5,071</td>
<td>3,363</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Non-regular workers have long served as a “buffer” to protect the job security of regular employees (Nomura, 1998; Ogoshi, 2006). The rapid growth of non-regular employees in the past two decades, however, represents a gradual replacement of regular workers by non-regular ones, going far beyond the level of a buffer. More core tasks once handled by regular employees are now performed by non-regular workers. As part of the employers’ strategy to reduce labor cost, this trend of development has been made possible by the neoliberal labor policies of the Japanese government since the late 1990s such as the deregulation of the Labor Law (Nakano, 2006: 68; Ogoshi, 2006: 182). The corporations are now
filling permanent positions with low-paid and easily dismissible non-regular workers by renewing their short-term contracts over and over again (Honda, 2009; Nakano, 2006; Ogoshi, 2006). Japan is one of the very few OECD member states where such an exploitative employment practice is allowed publicly (Hamaguchi, 2009). The difficult condition of non-regular workers is one of the causes of the karoshi and karojisatsu syndromes among regular employees as shown below.

ii. Person-based Pay System with Ambiguous Merit Evaluation

The labor unions’ utter failure to push the equal pay for equal job principle and their acceptance of the long-term merit evaluation have given rise to a person-based pay system in which the wage is attached to the person, not to the job. This person-based wage system has a strong institutional consistency with the discretionary power of management over job transfer. While constant job transfers lead to unstable wages for workers under a job-based wage system, the person-based wage system makes workers accept job transfers, willingly or not (Nomura, 1994; 1998).

The person-based wage system has given the managers great advantages: it has saved tremendous amounts of time for constant job analyses that would be necessary under the job-wage system; as a result, the rationalization of production that constantly creates new jobs can proceed smoothly and the tasks that one employee has to perform can be left ambiguous (Nomura, 1998). Furthermore, the acceptance of this wage system among regular employees and the availability of non-regular employees have made possible a “post-Fordist” labor flexibility; a combination of internal (or functional) labor flexibility (i.e., flexible deployment of labor within the internal labor market) and external (or numerical) labor flexibility (i.e., procurement of contingent workers from the external
labor market) (Harvey, 1990; Kumazawa, 1995b). The “Just-in-time” (JIT) production system or the “lean production” system has been built on these advantages of internal labor flexibility (Coriat, 1992; Delbridge, Turnbull and Wilkinson, 1992; Nomura, 1993; Ōno, 1978).

By making each worker familiar with multiple tasks and by organizing workers into flexible work teams, the production system can be constantly adjusted not only in response to fluctuating market demands but also to reduce the number of workers for the purpose of “waste elimination” (ibid.). The system leaves no single worker idle. Personnel reduction made possible by internal labor flexibility intensifies the production process and prolongs the working time of each employee. This contributes to the karoshi and karojisatsu syndromes.

As the managers enjoy these economic and strategic advantages over the workers, they have institutionalized the person-based wage system as Shokunō Shikaku Seido (Skill-based Grading System) throughout Japan since the 1970s and 1980s. All regular employees are classified into the broadly defined “skill” and “ability” grades. The system grades workers, not their jobs, by seniority and “ability,” and the wage level is largely determined by one’s grade, regardless of the nature of the assigned job. Largely due to the lack of job analysis and the absence of a job-based wage system, the criteria for evaluating each employee’s “ability” are very ambiguous and subjective (Endo 1999; Kumazawa, 1993, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2010).

Since the middle of the 1990s, more Japanese corporations have implemented a result-oriented (seika shugi) wage and evaluation system as part of the neoliberal economic reforms. Although the new evaluation system claims to be more fair and objective, no efforts have been made to establish any objective evaluation criteria (Hamaguchi, 2009; Kumazawa, 1997, 2010; Ogoshi, 2006; Saito and Tokyo Manager’s Union, 2005). On the
contrary, the new wage system has enlarged the loosely defined “ability” and the ambiguous “result” portion, and has much reduced the seniority portion, which is a person-based yet clear and objective factor. Thus, the overall wage determination mechanism has become more ambiguous than before (ibid.). Since then, the average salary of regular employees has declined, the peer competition has been intensified, and the salary gap among regular employees has widened (Hashimoto, 2009; Kumazawa, 2010; Morioka, 2009; Nakano, 2006; Ogoshi, 2006).

While the regular workers’ employment is securer than that of non-regular workers, their job security is becoming shakier as more regular employees can be easily replaced by non-regular ones. Even though the regular workers enjoy certain degree of legal protection, the Japanese corporations have dismissed a large number of middle-aged regular employees through various forms of restructuring since the mid-1990s (Ogoshi, 2006; Saito and Tokyo Manager’s Union, 2005). In this hostile working environment, most regular employees are worried about the negative evaluation of their performance and the possibility of dismissal.

iii. The Dysfunction of the General Labor Market in Providing Life Chances to Working people
Given the exploitative nature of the person-based pay system (i.e., the lack of equal pay for equal job principle), the fragmentation of labor unions into enterprise units and the lack of standardization of working conditions at the industry-wide level, there is virtually no institutional framework that acknowledges individual workers’ work experiences and job-based skills outside each internal labor market. Consequently, the middle and upper strata of the Japanese labor market have been balkanized into a series of internal labor markets. While there is frequent labor mobility at the lower stratum of low-paid non-regular positions and that of employments in small
enterprises, there is very limited horizontal and upward labor mobility at the middle and upper strata (Figure 2) (Hamaguchi, 2009; Ogoshi, 2006).

**Figure 2: Labor Market Structure in Japan**

![Labor Market Structure in Japan](image)

One specific hiring practice of the Japanese corporations has directly contributed to the balkanization of labor market. The entrance to an internal labor market is largely limited to the blanket hiring of new school graduates every April (Honda, 2009). This is very different from hiring practices in the U.S., where multiple entry points in each company are accessible from the external labor market and where age discrimination is legally prohibited (Miyasaka, 2002; Takeuchi, 1994). With the presupposition of internal labor flexibility, the Japanese enterprises choose suitable applicants according to the perceived “latent ability” rather than their concrete skills (Honda, 2009). When a position becomes vacant, an employee already in the internal labor markets is chosen to fill
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that position.

This institutional arrangement limits the career prospects of both non-regular and regular employees. If a new school graduate fails to obtain regular employment and becomes a non-regular worker, he or she will be confined to non-regular or low-paid regular employment in small enterprises for the rest of his or her life. One research finding suggests that among young workers (15 to 34 years old), 64.7% of them who become non-regular workers within a year after graduation still hold non-regular positions. The research was conducted in 2009 when only 18.7% of those who obtained regular positions within a year after graduation were non-regular workers (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 2010: 18). In other words, once a young person becomes a non-regular worker, that employment status tends to be an ascribed one. Regular employees, in contrast, are given career opportunities but only within his or her current enterprise. Once dismissed, a former regular employee may only find a non-regular position. Therefore, in practice, regular employees do not have an “exit option.”

This situation places many regular employees at the managers’ mercy and force them to accept the need to work overtime. While the person-based pay system within the internal labor market is one of the reasons for the balkanization of labor market, the dysfunction of the general labor market obscures the wage determination mechanism within each internal labor market. In Europe and the U.S., the “market prices” of labor in each job category function as the criteria of determining wage within the internal labor market. Since there is no established job-based “market price” of labor outside of Japan’s internal labor markets, there is no fair and objective criterion for determining wage (Ogoshi, 2006).
iv. The Characteristics of the Japanese Enterprise-based Unions

The ultra-cooperative stance of the enterprise-based unions in Japan was once seen as a mere expression of the traditional group loyalty. This culturalist view completely ignores the importance of institutional constraints. Once the labor union activities are confined to an enterprise, the institutional arrangements have framed the interests that workers could realistically have and the strategies that they could feasibly use. Since advancing within the current company is the only feasible strategy for the regular employees to maintain and enhance their livelihood, the long-term well-being of the enterprise by winning inter-company competition through collaborating with the managers becomes their priority (Kumazawa, 1996:147).

When the postwar labor unions lost their confrontational stance, they retreated from many workplace issues, especially the better treatment of individual employees. They rarely intervened in issues concerning evaluation, overtime work, job transfer, noruma (work quotas) set by the managers, and personnel reduction (Kumazawa, 2010). Given the unions’ unwillingness to intervene in these labor issues, individual employees are left defenseless as they are driven to compete and overwork, sometimes literally to death. In many karoshi lawsuits, the enterprise unions often side with the management and defend the corporations, insisting that the corporations bear no responsibility for the overwork of the victims (ibid.). Historically, the labor unions have paid high prices for workers’ job security and steady wage increases through compromising with the management. However, the unions have become so “cooperative” that they cannot contest even when the promises of job security and steady wage raises are unilaterally discarded by the managers in the recent neoliberal reforms (ibid.).

Most enterprise-based unions do not concern themselves
with the exploitation of workers by subcontractors even when the parent corporation makes a large profit by imposing unreasonable demands on subcontractors. The enterprise unions also tend to exclude non-regular employees from their union membership and pay no attention to the discriminatory treatment of non-regular workers. The current predicaments of working people in Japan have originated from the managers’ attempts at rationalization and labor cost reduction. This working logic of capitalism, however, is universal and the enterprise-based unions should share the blame for allowing these management strategies to go unchecked (ibid.).

3. The Governmental Technology built into the Institutions of Labor Relations

Focusing on the structural features of the institutional arrangements of labor relations alone cannot fully explain the karoshi and karojisatsu syndromes. The Japanese corporations should not be seen as labor camps where people are forced to work to death. Then why do the Japanese employees work as hard as they do? The answer lies in their subjective orientations towards the workplaces. What follows is a critique of the longstanding culturalist explanation of the work ethics of Japanese employees. The critique re-conceptualizes the exploitative institution of labor relations as a technology of power that influences the employees’ subjective orientation.

a. Is Japanese Culture Killing Employees?
The subjective orientation of hard work among the Japanese employees has often been attributed to their “loyalty to the corporation,” “collectivism,” and “sense of belonging to the corporation.” Ronald Dore (1982), for example, contrasts the Japanese workers with their British and American counterparts:
Toyota workers “belong to” their firm; British and American workers “work for” their firm—have an employment contract with it (X hours a week performance of Y of job function for Z pounds or dollars). … A [Japanese] worker’s willingness to offer his ideas and extra efforts to promote the company’s success depends in part on a sense of belonging to the firm, on the ability of the firm to mobilize what one might call “membership motivation” as opposed to “market motivation” … (xxvii - xxviii).

This “sense of belonging” or “membership motivation” assumed to exist among the Japanese has often been explained culturally in the context of *nihonjinron* (Japaneseness Debate) until the middle of the 1990s. 27 According to Nakane Chie (1967), the Japanese prioritize the group to which they belong over individual statuses and professional qualifications. The institutional specificities such as job security and seniority-based wage within the Japanese corporations are thought to sustain the employees’ sense of belonging and loyalty.

Critically speaking, Ronald Dore’s interpretation of the “membership motivation” is ambivalent. On the one hand, he indicates that such form of motivation is fostered and mobilized by institutional arrangements and managers’ intent. On the other hand, he suggests that such group-orientated “national character” may be derived from “cultural difference,” and he uses the notion of the “Confucian virtue of benevolence” as one possible explanation for this uniquely Japanese style of authority (Dore, 1982: xxix-xxxi). An explicitly *nihonjinron*-type of discourse has lost much of its popularity since the mid-1990s. However, this culturalist framework that emphasizes the importance of Japanese collectivism is still shared even by the critics of karoshi syndromes. Most notably, Inoue Tatsuo, a leading liberal political philosopher, relates karoshi
to the “excessive communal cohesion” of corporation, which embodies “the more general communitarian character of Japanese society” (Inoue, 1993: 539, 2001: 61-62).

What is common in the culturalist discourse is that certain ethos and psychological traits are deduced from the observable behaviors and thought to be nation-specific. These “cultural” traits are implicitly assumed to be deep-rooted and residing outside of history, and they are viewed as the ultimate causes of various concrete social phenomena and specific institutional characteristics. Generally speaking, this culturalist frame of reference filters out two interrelated perspectives essential for understanding the social reality: history and power relations. What the culturalist perspective overlooks are the complex and contingent historical processes of struggles that have shaped the current institutional forms and power relations within these modern institutions, and that continue to affect the behaviors and subjective orientations of individuals.

Are the Japanese regular employees really “collectivists” with a strong sense of “membership motivation”? If so, what kind of “collectivists” are they? Should they be blamed for causing karoshi? When the early postwar unions claimed “equality as the same members of the corporation,” the idea was strongly influenced by the hegemonic wartime nationalist ideology. The unions employed this ideological rationale as a strategy to push their demands rather than as an expression of their cultural values. Moreover, as several scholars of nationalism suggest, the spread of modern nationalist discourse has a tendency to emphasize cultural uniqueness over individual agency, but this discourse turns out to be part of the state’s deliberate attempt at mobilizing the population for modernization and nation-state building. The problematic claim about cultural uniqueness should be viewed as an integral part of the modernizing process (Balibar, 1991; Brass, 1991; Breuilly, 1982; Calhoun, 1993, 1994; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Hobsbawm
and Ranger eds., 1983; Nairn, 1977; Nishikawa, 1995). Whether the discourse of “membership” and “cultural collectivism” is utilized by the state or by vulnerable groups such as industrial workers, the spread of such a discourse has strong political and strategic implications because it is not necessarily a mere expression of traditional culture; it is often an instrumental rational means in the process of power negotiation among different political sectors.28

Seen from this perspective, I reject the dualism of power and subjectivity, and the widespread misconception of karoshi syndrome as being resulted from “collectivism” and “communal cohesion.” My study regards this culturalist discourse as part of the labor management technology that justifies the karoshi and karojisatsu syndromes. While the employees’ willful hard work is certainly involved in the cases of karoshi and karojisatsu, this does not mean that the working of power is absent. According to Kumazawa Makoto (1997, 1998, 2010), the Japanese employees are driven to overwork through a powerful mechanism of kyōsei sareta jihatsusei (coerced volunteerism or forced spontaneity):29 “the fusion of self-motivated action with a compulsion of which they [employees] are only dimly aware” (1996: 68). Along this line of reasoning, I draw on the Foucauldian perspective of disciplinary power and governmentality to analyze the Japanese labor relations.30

Michel Foucault (2003, 2007) defines the term “government” as “conduct of conduct,” that is “a more or less methodical and rationally reflected ‘way of doing things’, or ‘art’, for acting on the actions of individuals, taken either singly or collectively, so as to shape, guide, correct and modify the ways in which they conduct themselves” (Burchell, 1993: 267). Here, the fundamental character of government as a mode of power is to presuppose the freedom of the governed (Foucault, 1982: 221). This perspective overcomes “the dualism of freedom and constraint, consensus and violence” and
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draws attention to indirect techniques of leading and controlling individuals (Lemke, 2002: 60). With this perspective in mind, employees’ willful hard work does not need to be reduced to their “cultural ethos” that exists outside of power relations. This analytical insight opens a way to examine the possible influences of labor management techniques on employees even when they voluntarily work themselves to death.

b. The Evaluation System as a Panopticon

Given the absence of a general labor market, the fate of each employee is largely determined within the internal labor market of each corporation. Peter B. Doeringer and Michael J. Piore (1971) argue that the internal labor market should be “distinguished from the external labor market of conventional economic theory” because it is “an administrative unit ... in which the pricing and allocation of labor is governed by a set of administrative rules and procedures” (1-2). More specifically, the evaluation system in each internal labor market determines each employee’s career. In the Japanese corporations where the evaluation criteria are ambiguous, what is being evaluated is the whole person, not just his or her skills (Kumazawa, 1997: 47). While the criteria remain ill-defined, it is the conventional wisdom among salarymen (i.e., male regular employees) that the criteria include “sociability,” “willingness to work hard and flexibly,” and “showing loyalty to the company at the expense of private life” (Kumazawa, 1995a). Kumazawa Makoto (1993, 1995a, 1996, 1997) highlights the notion of seikatsu-taido, literally translated as “life-attitude,” as the focus of evaluation. Therefore, the salarymen are expected to organize their entire lives around the company.

These expectations are implicitly communicated through company rituals and symbolic devices such as company mottos, company songs, company badges and logs, and even shabo
(company cemeteries) (Sataka, 1991, 1996).\textsuperscript{3} Graham Sewell (1998) calls this form of indirect labor management through organizational values “ideational control”: “Those who share these values can deduce from general statements almost limitless number of rules and targets to guide their own behavior under changing conditions” (408). This is typical of “post-bureaucratic” control in which the shared meaning “obviates the need for the principles of hierarchy and explicit rule-governed procedure” (ibid.).

However, the Japanese managers used a more general discursive resource for ideational control at least until the early 1990s. The extremely popular discourse of \textit{nihonjinron}\textsuperscript{3} served as an implicit evaluative criterion in the corporate settings. This discourse refers to \textit{shūdanshugi} (collectivism) and \textit{chūseishin} (loyalty to one’s corporation) as the central qualities of Japanese employees and identifies the corporation as a kind of \textit{Gemeinschaft}. Yoshino Kosaku (1992) treats \textit{nihonjinron} as a social phenomenon by looking at how and by whom the discourse has been transmitted and consumed, respectively. He finds the Japanese business elites and educators to have played the prime role in consuming and reformulating the discourse, and disseminating it to employees and to the public (ibid.). Sometimes, writings on \textit{nihonjinron} are put on the list of recommended readings for new employees (ibid: 139). Lectures on this “collectivist” Japanese culture are given during the first few training seminars. Moreover, some leading managers publish on this topic, and the corporations (often the personnel departments) have incorporated the \textit{nihonjinron} discourse in their textbooks, handbooks and glossaries (ibid: 170-176).\textsuperscript{3}

Why do the managers spend so much time and effort propagating this discourse among the employees? During the early job training sessions, the newly hired young salarymen do not learn so much about their actual job. They do not even know what job will be assigned to them after the training period. Instead, they focus on
learning the most desirable attitude of a good salaryman. It is over-simplistic to assume that newcomers are brainwashed into believing in the *nihonjinron* discourse. However, the young recruits can easily infer the corporate messages from the lectures on “Japanese culture.” They surely learn, and the managers expect them to learn, about what “life-attitude” the corporation values most for career advancement. Therefore, the young salarymen understand that this discourse is an important ideology of the corporation by which they are to be evaluated. If the evaluative criteria of job performance implicitly shown in the discourse are explicated, it will be as follows: “have a sense of belonging to the company *Gemeinschaft*, show your loyalty to this collectivity, devoting yourself to your job while sacrificing your private life and leaving all the family and community matters to your wife, and be flexible and willing to take whatever job you are ordered to do, then we will promote you.” Simply put, the powerful discourse functions as what Foucault calls a “normalizing discourse” (Foucault, 1995).

The young salarymen are to be evaluated by the managers according to these stereotypes of “normal” employees as “collectivist,” hard working, and loyal. In my view, the whole evaluation system under this normalizing discourse works as what Foucault calls a “panopticon.” There is no physical, architectural structure of panopticon in the evaluation system. But the system produces panoptic effects—employees’ heightened awareness of the constant and ubiquitous possibility of being watched and evaluated by their superiors for the explicit results of their given tasks and for every of their actions and attitudes. The more ambiguous the evaluative criteria are, the more extensive the field of panoptic vision is. The employees are well aware of the possibility of being evaluated when wondering if they do overtime without reporting it, and whether they participate “willingly” and “enthusiastically” in the Quality Control (QC) and other officially “voluntary” activities
organized by the corporation. Once they participate in these “voluntary” activities, they are still being evaluated; such activities result in the extension of the panoptic gaze; this mechanism of discipline and control is self-perpetuating and permeates every level of labor relations.

While this type of employee control mechanism can be called “post-bureaucratic,” we should not overlook the clear bureaucratic hierarchy that determines who evaluates whom and that structures a chain of panoptic surveillance. Apart from those employees at the bottom and at the top of the hierarchy, most salarymen have to be both the evaluator and the evaluated. The panoptic mechanism is embedded in the chain of human relationships among salarymen. While this mode of surveillance is common in any bureaucratic organizations, a salaryman has to discipline his subordinates according to their “life attitudes,” including their willingness to work overtime at the expense of private and family life, and he knows that he will be evaluated by his superiors in the same way.

It is hard to recognize the exclusive source of power in such workplace relations. While the bureaucratic hierarchical order in the chain of evaluation clearly shows the asymmetric power relations among salarymen, each salaryman is simultaneously a target and a wielder of power. This chain of power relations with the expected disciplinary role of supervisors is a major source of harassment in the workplace. In 1999, a thirty-six year-old engineer burned himself to death in the wake of enormous overtime and constant harassments by his superior, who repeatedly told him to take his wedding ring off on the job and not to bring family issues to the workplace. According to the harasser, such actions showed his lack of “yaruki” (enthusiasm and dedication) (Kumazawa, 2010: 309). Yet Kumazawa Makoto’s penetrating analysis reveals that the offenders in many harassment cases are themselves the victims of stringent labor management (ibid: 274-275).
The efficacy of this labor management technology lies in its indirect way of leading employees to do unpaid overtime. It is a common strategy for the Japanese corporations to blur the distinction between “mandatory” and “voluntary,” and between working and off-work hours (Fuchini and Fuchini, 1990; Kumazawa, 1996, 2010; Weathers and North, 2009). As shown in the previous example, even when a salaryman is pressured by his superior to do excessive amounts of overtime, it often takes a form of disciplining his own “life attitude” rather than an explicit order. When the employees “voluntarily” do unpaid overtime and participate in the Quality Control activities that are officially labeled as “voluntary” and “off-work” (i.e., unpaid), the corporation can easily save enormous labor costs. This is justified because no explicit directive to get involved in these activities has been given to the employees. This logic has repeatedly presented by the corporations in their defenses in several karoshi lawsuits. The corporations dismiss any responsibility for the karoshi victims by claiming that the enormous amount of overtime the victims had done before their death was not ordered by their superiors and could not even be classified as “work,” and therefore the overtime was not under the supervision of the corporations.\(^3\)\(^5\) Thus, the indirect technique to induce the employees to unpaid overwork is a very effective means of labor cost reduction. But this indirect technique often blinds us from recognizing the operation of power mechanisms and leads to extremely tragic outcomes.

c. The Game to Accumulate Membership Capital
While the Japanese labor management technique appears to be a panopticon, it differs from the disciplinary power exercised in total institutions such as prisons, army barracks and labor camps where a direct disciplinary power is combined with panoptic surveillance (Foucault, 1995). The panoptic gaze of evaluation in the Japanese
corporations is designed to determine winners and losers through intense peer competition within the given internal labor markets. This technique works insofar as the employees have an interest in winning the competition. Therefore, it is a technique to govern the employees indirectly through a competitive game, utilizing their willingness to participate in the game. In the Foucauldian terms, this mode of control is typical of “neoliberal government”:

*Homo œconomicus* is someone who pursues his own interest, and whose interest is such that it converges spontaneously with the interest of others. From the point of view of a theory of government, *homo œconomicus* is the person who must be let alone. With regard to *homo œconomicus*, one must *laissez-faire*; he is the subject or object of *laissez-faire*. ... [*H*omo *œconomicus*, that is to say, the person who accepts reality or who responds systematically to modifications in the variables of the environment, appears precisely as someone manageable, someone who responds systematically to systematic modifications artificially introduced into the environment. *Homo œconomicus* is someone who is eminently governable. From being the intangible partner of *laissez-faire*, *homo œconomicus* now becomes the correlate of a governmentality which will act on the environment and systematically modify its variables (Foucault, 2008: 270-271).

Following this line of reasoning, Thomas Lemke (2001) explains that the neoliberal governmental technique “focuses not on the players, but on the rules of the game, not on the (inner) subjugation of individuals, but on defining and controlling their (outer) environment” (10). In the governmental technology widely adopted in the Japanese workplaces, the role of surveyor is entrusted to the employees themselves who discipline their
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subordinates in order to win the peer competition. In my view, this control technology cunningly combines a direct disciplinary power with the neoliberal government to form a neoliberal disciplinary power. The methodological task here is to analyze the dynamics of such competitive game through which the employees are governed. By studying the competitive game at its distinctive level of institutional reality (i.e., without reducing it to individual ethos and national culture), it is necessary to combine Pierre Bourdieu’s “field theory” with the Foucauldian perspective.

According to Pierre Bourdieu, a “field” is a unit of game in which a field-specific species of “capital” is distributed and pursued by the game players in accordance with its specific rules. While the social space of Japanese corporation as a field does not determine each and every practice within it, the field differentiates those successful practices of the field-specific goals from those unsuccessful ones. This conveys to the game-players certain job strategies while excluding others. In this case, both the evaluation system and the discourse of collectivism serve as a panopticon that defines the available strategies in the field and structures the competitive game.

In Bourdieu’s perspective, spreading the cultural nationalist discourse and other organizational values should be understood as a form of “symbolic violence” that determines what counts as “high” in the “capital” in this field. The accumulation of such symbolic capital is believed to generate more positive evaluations for the employees. I would like to propose the term “membership capital” to analyze such competitive practices within the Japanese corporations as a field. My argument is that the salarymen are induced to accumulate “membership capital,” a form of nameless and formless resources, in order to win the game. The salarymen have a dull but sure sense of understanding about certain degrees of “membership” within the corporations. Whoever can “prove” to be
most deeply belonging and loyal to the corporations will acquire the highest membership capital and deserve promotion.

But what constitutes one’s membership capital in Japan’s corporations? Any occupational ability that contributes to profit-making is counted towards one’s membership capital. However, the obscurity of this game is that occupational ability alone is not good enough to win the game. Seniority also constitutes part of the membership capital. “Enthusiastic” participation in any unpaid corporate-related activities after work “proves” a person as a “loyal company man,” and this is the most straightforward way of accumulating the membership capital. Doing overtime work without reporting it (i.e., service overtime) and “sacrificing” one’s private and family life are included too. All the activities express the notion of collectivism most valued by the corporations. The largest Japanese corporations are rife with these practices.

Yokota Hamao (1997), who has worked for a major Japanese bank for more than ten years, presents some extreme cases. If a salaryman shows even the slightest interest in his family, his evaluation will suffer considerably (90). The bankers are also involved in a game of displaying their “self-sacrifices” conspicuously. Once a private railroad union went on strike, some of the bankers used the opportunity to show their “loyalty” by finding other ways of getting to work. One banker left his home at 03:00 am, spending hours walking to the office. Other bankers, learning about the strike next day, did not go home the night before and slept in the office (Yokota, 1998: 226-232). Showing one’s absolute “devotion to work” by coming to the office with a high fever always won the admiration of their supervisors (Yokota, 1999: 149-152). Inhumane as it seems, doing “service overtime” is almost taken for granted as being a good salaryman (Yokota, 1995: 27, 1996: 242, 1999: 224).

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organizational values in the Japanese corporations often invoke employees’ subjective “inner world,” and assume the unity of action and motivation. But what are actually evaluated are the public actions and behaviors of employees. To the extent that the employees are willing to play the game, they have to be sensitive to others’ evaluative gaze and to act consciously as “hardworking salarymen”; they have to pretend to be “loyal to the company” on the “front stage.” This is exactly what Erving Goffman (1959) calls “dramaturgical” action for “impression management.” Jurgen Habermas (1984) distinguishes the Weberian concept of “rational action” into communicative action (i.e., action oriented towards reaching “understanding”) and strategic action (i.e., action oriented towards “success”) (341). With this distinction in mind, Habermas stresses that the Goffmanian dramaturgical action can be sincere, presenting the actor’s subjectivity in social action or in strategic action aimed at achieving other goals (Goffman, 1959: 17-18; Habermas 1984: 93-94). Insofar as the salarymen play the game willingly, their dramaturgical action will remain strategic.

In other words, we should not accept salarymen’s “loyalty to the company” as their deepest motivation as claimed by the culturalist explanation. There is no doubt that some salarymen try to keep a double consciousness—distinguishing their “true self” (the self that is true to them) from their “acting self.” Indeed, many salarymen perceive a sharp gap between honne (true motive) and tatemae (a formally-established principle) (Sugimoto, 1997). While this gap can be discerned in the corporate settings worldwide, the gap in the Japanese corporation is the widest because of the fundamental contradiction in the salarymen’s actions and orientations induced by the labor management technique. In order to benefit personally, salarymen have to act out their “selfless” devotion to the corporations: the ends and the means to achieve the ends assume totally opposite forms.
Living with this double consciousness can cause considerable strains as revealed in this tragic case of karojisatsu. A twenty-three year-old male salesman committed suicide after considerable overwork. He left a suicide note: “I have made myself pleasant to others all the time [in the workplace]. Such a life is not worth living” (Kumazawa, 2010: 266). This young salesman were always under pressure to do “emotional labor” not only towards his clients but also towards his co-workers by forcing himself to be “pleasant,” which he could no longer stand. So far as the employees cannot show their “true self” and communicate candidly with each other, it will be extremely difficult for them to develop genuine relationships and solidarity among themselves. They are painfully isolated even in their everyday face-to-face interactions.

Then, what kinds of “collectivists” are the salarymen who are willing to play the game to accumulate their membership capital? Kumazawa Makoto (1995a, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2010) has consistently argued that what has characterized the Japanese workplace since the 1970s is the existence of individualistic, egotistic, and harsh competition as opposed to the workers’ autonomous collectivism in Great Britain, where workers defended themselves collectively against the management’s divisive policy such as individual evaluation and incitement of competitions. I refer to this type of workers’ autonomous collectivism as collectivism from below, which is very weak in Japan. I characterize the egotistic game to show one’s “loyalty to the company” under the panoptic gaze of evaluation as collectivism from above.

In the egotistic game, the loudest “collectivist” voice (i.e., “we have to do this for the company!”) often comes from those who most egotistically aspire to “make it” individually and who eagerly prove their loyalty by secretly reporting to the managers any coworkers critical of the management (Yokota, 1997, 1999). This form of collaboration sustains the pervasive web of surveillance networks.
The Quality Control group activities, sometimes seen as an “expression of Japanese collectivism,” illustrate the absence of autonomous solidarity among workers. These group activities are aimed at reducing staffing levels through rationalization and at depriving fellow workers of jobs. For example, a major union in Japan’s iron industry accepted a productivity-indexed wage system in which the fruits of personnel reduction were returned to the remaining workers as part of their wages (Kumazawa, 1996). In contrast, American workers at a U.S. Matsuda auto plant rejected such an idea: “I’m not against worker involvement or improving quality, and [sic] I wouldn’t make a suggestion that would take away someone’s job” (Fuchini and Fuchini, 1990: 212). The Japanese blue-collar workers clearly exhibit weaker “collectivism from below” than their American counterparts.

This does not suggest that collectivism from below is completely absent in the Japanese workplace. In reality, the two types of “collectivism” are intermingled and often hard to distinguish. When a salaryman works overtime every day and sacrifices his private life, it may be because he is motivated by his aspiration for promotion or conversely because he genuinely cares about his colleagues and tries to lessen their workloads. In the latter case, the two opposing orientations do not appear as contradictory and thus, the salarymen seldom need to or cannot distinguish their own different motivations. This failure to separate the two types of orientations in one’s subjective understanding and practice reinforces the efficacy of collectivism from above.

The two opposing types of collectivism clearly manifest when the employees are dismissed. A telling example is a middle manager who was ordered by the upper managers to dismiss several of his subordinates (Yukan Fuji, 2001: 151-153). The upper managers usually prefer to have their employees “voluntarily” quit in order to elude a labor law that restricts the conditions of dismissal. So the
middle manager constantly hounded the targets of dismissal until the subordinates decided to quit. He believed that he himself would not be dismissed if he faithfully carried out the superiors’ order. There was growing discontent among the remaining employees with the company’s harsh dismissal policy. Upon completing his task and assuming the onus of the harsh treatment of employees, the middle manager was fired. The middle manager was trying to “save his own skin” (egotistic direction), but the meaning of his action to carry out the management’s order and to betray his co-workers was justified by himself under the pretense of “showing loyalty to the corporation.” He naively expected the superiors to interpret his action in this way so that he could stay on his job, but he had clearly misjudged the situation.

The “collectivist” discourse and the system to judge the employees’ loyalty had shaped this middle manager’s way of thinking. He adhered to the strategy of showing loyalty available to the employees, but sadly, the management dictated this strategy and could always twist it to advance the corporate interests. After being fired, the middle manager deeply regretted his previous action, explaining that he should have joined his subordinates to protest the company’s inhumane dismissal policy (ibid.). He acknowledged confronting two completely opposite options: (1) saving his own skin by showing loyalty to the company (i.e., adhering to collectivism from above), and (2) remaining loyal to his co-workers as concrete individuals, developing solidarity and collectively opposing the dismissal policy (i.e., expressing collectivism from below).

Given the difficulty of distinguishing these two types of “loyalty” among the Japanese workers and the pressure for them to display their “membership motivation,” they were trapped in very obscure institutional conditions. When the culturalist discourse was employed to reinforce the harsh evaluation system, the
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governmental technology would structure the whole game for the employees to accumulate their membership capital. Then, the producers of the culturalist discourse would look at the salarymen’s everyday demonstration of their commitment and loyalty as the “empirical evidence” of their “collectivist” tendency. The culturalist discourse and the governmental technology not only strengthened one another, but also created a vicious cycle of workplace interactions and a powerful mechanism of control within the Japanese corporations until the early 1990s. Once placed in this perspective, it is misleading to overlook these institutional factors and identify the salarymen’s “motivational orientation” as a mere expression of the Japanese “national character.” The culturalist perspective also obscures the complexity of historical process in which the Japanese workers’ “collectivism from below” has been replaced by “collectivism from above” in the postwar management-union struggles. This has been a gradual but decisive change which gives rise to the frequent occurrences of karoshi and karojisatsu.

d. The Enterprise Culture Discourse and the Neoliberal Reforms
Starting in the mid-1990s, the Japanese managers began to utilize a new discourse that is seemingly the exact opposite of the culturalist discourse. In 1995, the Nikkeiren (1995), a powerful association of the Japanese corporation managers, called on its members to reduce the number of regular employees by hiring more non-regular employees, to reduce the significance of seniority in determining regular employees’ wage levels, and to use a more result-oriented evaluation. At the same time, the Nikkeiren encouraged the managers to respect their employees’ individuality and to help them establish ko no shutaisei (individual autonomy), jiritsusei (independence), and sekininkan (a sense of responsibility) (23-35). Faced with the intense global competition, the Japanese corporations
need creativity, which can be developed only through each employee’s *jijo doryoku* (relying on one’s efforts) (3), and *ishiki kaikaku* (reforming one’s consciousness) (48).

This new managerial discourse is almost identical to the “enterprise culture” discourse propagated by Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain and Ronald Reagan in the U.S. Emphasizing individual initiatives, independence, boldness, self-reliance and willingness to take risks and to accept responsibility for one’s action, this discourse is concomitant with the growing criticisms of a welfare state blamed for creating the “culture of dependency,” and with the neoliberal policies of bringing market-based logic of competition to various social areas that have hitherto been seen as outside of the economic (Keat, 1991; Heelas and Morris, 1992; Slater 1997: 34-38; Slater and Tonkiss, 2001). But there is a noticeable difference. While the same discourse in Great Britain and the U.S. severely criticize the state’s welfare policies as too benevolent and inefficient, the Nikkeiren targets the “dependency mentality” of the Japanese regular employees. In other words, the longstanding benefits of job security and steady salary increases have to be eliminated in order to promote a sense of independence among Japanese workers.

A number of scholars have drawn on Foucault’s study of “governmentality” to show that the spread of the “enterprise culture” discourse has been accompanied by the “neoliberal governmentality” as a new way of reorganizing power mechanisms and of regulating and utilizing the “autonomy” of individuals (Barry, Osborne, and Rose eds., 1996; Dean, 1999, 2002, 2002a; Gordon, 1991; Lemke, 2001, 2002; Miller and Rose, 1992; Valverde, 1996). Besides its indirect technique of governing people through a game, the main characteristic of this governmental rationality is to influence how individuals govern themselves. This is exactly what Foucault calls the “technologies of the self” (Burchell, 1993; Cruikshank, 1993;
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Foucault, 1988, 1993; Lemke, 2001, 2002; Valverde 1996). Here, the Japanese managers criticize the salarymen’s wrong way of governing themselves (e.g. “dependency mentality”) for causing the decline of the corporations’ performance, and urge them to “reform their consciousness.”

The new managerial discourse justifies the elimination of the job security and steady wage rise for regular employees, the further reduction of labor cost (Ogoshi, 2006: 134-135), and the new attempt at raising the productivity of regular white-collar employees (Kumazawa, 1997). Against this backdrop, the “result-oriented” evaluation system is introduced and the most popular institutional mechanism is called the “Management by Objectives” (MBO) system. 70% of the Japanese corporations have adopted this system (Joe, 2004: 26). This system sets aside specific work targets for each employee in the annual or biannual interview with the supervisor, who assesses whether the targets are fully achieved at the end of each evaluation period. The supervisor determines each employee’s work targets in relation to the overall objectives of the corporation, and he quantifies these targets in measurable terms such as the profit made by the employee (Kumazawa, 1997: 63-66; Joe, 2004: 24-29).

We can discern a clear neoliberal rationality in the new managerial discourse and evaluation system. Under the intense competition, achieving individual objectives and making profit for the corporation would “profit” the salaryman. The salaryman is expected to be “entrepreneurial” in the internal labor market, which is supposed to obtain the quasi-market mechanism due to the reduced significance of seniority. On the other hand, as a “responsible” person, the salaryman should accept the consequences of his own failure to achieve the assigned job targets (i.e., lower wages and even dismissal), and should not blame the corporation, let alone collectively intervening in the corporation’s
policy of labor management. His failure of job performance has to do with his failure of self-governance. Thus, all the salarymen are instructed to calculate their own profits and costs, a practice that could motivate them to work more efficiently and to seek better ways of achieving the job objectives. In this way, any control from outside, especially the direct and detailed instructions from the supervisors, are expected to be replaced by the “technology of the self.”

There are considerable differences in how the MBO system is used in Japan and the U.S., where this system originated. Unlike Japan, the MBO system in the U.S. is not always directly linked to the performance appraisal. In addition, the system is usually applied to only exempt employees (i.e., managers and professionals) in the U.S., but it is applied to the rank-and-file employees in Japan (Ogoshi, 2006: 250-256). Furthermore, due to the person-based nature of the wage system, the lack of job analysis and that of established “market prices” of labor, there is no objective criterion about whether the assigned job targets are reasonable or not (ibid.: 250-256, 285).

Since the mid-1990s, the neoliberal governmentality of the Japanese corporations should be viewed as a continuous intensification of the neoliberal disciplinary power. From the 1970s onwards, the labor management technique has embodied a neoliberal character—the indirect government of employees through a competitive game. The panoptic mechanism of evaluation remains intact. Whether the employees are judged to be “collectivist” or “entrepreneurial” enough, they are still assessed according to their “life attitude.”

The mechanism of evaluation encompasses many MBO interviews. Nominally, the supervisors are not supposed to impose the measurable objectives on their subordinates. Instead, the subordinates are supposed to decide on these objectives themselves.
But the supervisors often positively evaluate and praise the subordinates’ willingness to challenge difficult targets (Kumazawa, 1997: 66; Mizoue, 2004: 254-255). From a Foucauldian perspective, the MBO system in Japan is typical of a governmental technology that induces a harsh “technology of the self.” Once the employees identify their job objectives, they feel compelled to achieve these difficult targets. After all, they decide these goals themselves. If they fail to accomplish the tasks, they are the one to blame. After fulfilling specific targets, the employee are expected to set more challenging targets for the next round of evaluation. Given the lack of objective standards, the level of targets is to be raised infinitely (Ogoshi, 2006: 285).

Through the MBO system, therefore, the managers can induce their subordinates to accept unreasonable quotas (noruma) with impunity. In case the quotas are not met and overtime work incurs additional labor cost, the employees risk being labeled “incompetent,” receiving lower wages and being dismissed (Nakano, 2006: 26). Under the MBO system, the fear of unemployment has driven the employees to accept overtime work, and this has worsened the problems of karoshi and karojisatsu (Kumazawa, 2010: 169).

Has the old game to accumulate the membership capital vanished since the hegemonic discourse of management switched from the ideology of cultural nationalism to the new enterprise culture? The new managerial discourse proclaims that the salarymen are not required to be loyal to the corporation anymore; they should be loyal to their jobs only, and they ought to be autonomous, responsible and “empowered” individuals (Mizoue, 2004: 125-126). Yet the change in the hegemonic discourse does not necessarily mean that the game to accumulate the membership capital has ceased to exist. As more regular employees are being replaced by the non-regular ones, the regular workers are
repeatedly warned: “There are agency-dispatched workers who can do your job at half of the salary you are receiving now!” (Nakano, 2006: 66)

With the rapid growth of the low-paid non-regular workers, the regular employees are pressured to prove that they deserve their full membership status by doing unpaid overtime willingly. Meanwhile, the secondary membership status of the non-regular employees, who have job insecurity and low wages, is rationalized by the higher demands on those regular employees with full membership. The burden of justifying the categorical discrimination of the non-regular employees has fallen on the regular employees, who have to accept heavier workloads and the exploitation of the low-paid, part-time staff. The result is what Nakano Mami (2006) calls “labor dumping”; both the regular and non-regular employees are forced to compete in lowering the price of their labor. But the form of their labor dumping depends on the employment category. While the non-regular workers’ overall wage has declined, the regular workers are driven to overwork and unpaid overtime. The postwar history of labor relations has shown that the experience of regular employees and that of non-regular employees are not exclusive but rather mutually constitutive of each other.

e. The Overall Mechanism to Drive Regular Employees into Overwork

The neoliberal disciplinary power works so far as the employees are willing to wager on the competitive game in the internal labor market. The orientation of *homo œconomicus*, or economic human, who pursues one’s interest in winning the game and becomes “eminently governable” through the game (Foucault, 2008: 270), has to be formed outside of the game. At least two major incentives motivate the regular employees to wager on the competitive game within the internal labor market. One of these incentives is the
notion of status competition aimed at achieving an idealized “modern family” lifestyle—the chūryū (middle status) consumption lifestyle and the gender division of labor at home. This type of status competition emerged in early twentieth-century Japan when the white-collar workers or the “salarymen” stratum, portrayed as the most “civilized” segment of the population, strove to achieve an idealized image of “modern family” as promoted by the state agencies and the department stores (Koyama, 1999; Takeuchi, 1996, 1997; Terade, 1994; Yamada, 1994). The negative portrayal of the blue-collar stratum was in sharp contrast with that of salarymen stratum, and this resulted in the harsh discrimination of the blue-collar workers.  

Under these circumstances, there was hardly any space for the development of a “working class public sphere.” Consequently, the blue-collar workers could not reject such negative stereotypes and develop their own distinctive lifestyle with pride and esteem. In the early postwar period, the blue-collar workers demanded the same salarymen status and they achieved it to some extent in the midst of “high economic growth” from the late 1950s to the mid-1970s.

Owing to this development, the social imagery of sharp status distinction lost its currency in the postwar era. The other side of this equalization of aspirations for upward social mobility was that everyone was expected and pressured to achieve the same idealized lifestyle regardless of one’s economic position (Kumazawa, 1996, 2010). The mass media disseminated countless images of an idealized family consumption lifestyle with many “must-have” household items. The status competition became a race in terms of who could realize such an economic ideal first; it was a competition in terms of time.  

When a sizable part of the population had realized the ideal, the mass media upgraded the image of idealized consumption
lifestyle with a new set of “must-have” items. The status competition was transformed into an endless “seesaw game of differentiation and homogenization” among Japanese families (Sato, 1990: 150). The corporations also encouraged their employees to pursue a similar family consumption lifestyle and to divide labor at home along the gender line. \(^4\) \(^2\) The gender division of labor was idealized and embedded in the whole institutional arrangements of Japan’s labor relations. This development not only severely limited female employees’ chance to pursue occupational success, but also pressured male regular employees to be primary breadwinners. These economic desires and pressures have led the male regular employees to wager on the competitive game in the internal labor market. \(^4\) \(^3\)

Even when a salaryman abhors the game of showing “loyalty to the corporation” in the workplace, it is difficult for him to withdraw from the game. Yokota (1999), who disliked the intense competition in his bank and consequently quit, reflects on why he had felt compelled to gamble on the contest for promotion. He imagined how miserable he would be in his forties and fifties if his other \(dōki\) (salarymen hired in the same year with him) members were promoted over him and gave him orders. The sense of “misery” would be exacerbated by the differences in their salaries and consumption style. While other \(dōki\) members wore expensive suits and drove luxury cars, Yokota would have to tolerate wearing cheaper suits and driving economical vehicles. He envisioned how miserable his family members would be if they continued to live in the company housing. Other salarymen’s wives would despise his wife because of his career failure, and his children would be bullied at school too (256-259).

Trying to save family members from such misery of shame constitutes an important part of salarymen’s “family responsibility.” Yokota abhorred the whole salarymen’s game for promotion. Yet, he
had no choice but to try to win the game because of the extensive material, social and psychological sanctions placed on the losers and their families. His ambivalence represents the “anguish of being a salaryman that can hardly be expressed in words” (259).

In the current condition, even Yokota Hamao’s “anguish” sounds idyllic. The sanctions placed on the “losers” do not just symbolize the failure to maintain an idealized family lifestyle because of no salary raise and promotion. They also represent a sudden relegation to the status of working poor as a result of the dismissal. Thus, the perpetual fear of falling from their current social and economic position has driven many regular employees to wager on the competitive game in the internal labor market. Japan’s general labor market rarely allows the regular employees to maintain the same livelihood when they change their employers. Once getting dismissed from a job at middle age, the former regular employees are most likely to find non-regular employment only. But the non-regular workers are the most unfortunate ones as widely reported in mass media: when they are suddenly dismissed, some of them become homeless. The regular employees are acutely aware of this harsh reality. The more regular employees accept the wretched conditions of the non-regular workers, the more they fear falling into the status of working poor (Honda, 2009). Furthermore, due to the discrimination of female employees in the workplace, the wives of male regular employees receive no or little supplementary income. Most Japanese households never function as an institution of economic security. The news media and TV dramas have countless stories of family breakdown after the husbands lose their regular jobs. The job dismissal is indeed a life and death issue for the Japanese male regular employees.

The economic desire and the fear of unemployment have driven the regular male employees to strategically subordinate themselves to the neoliberal disciplinary power of the internal labor
market (Figure 3). Ever since the “high economic growth” period, the homogenized aspiration for consumption has reinforced the regular employees’ strategic subordination. After the burst of the bubble in the early 1990s and the implementation of subsequent neoliberal reforms, the fear of job insecurity has grown. The regular employees are driven to adapt to the intense competition in a desperate attempt to survive (Kumazawa 2010: 363). The strategic subordination certainly represents a type of social actors’ agency, a trend of development praised by the advocates of neoliberalism. Insofar as the employees’ agency is only limited to this individualistic competitive form, however, the more they exercise their agency, the deeper their subordination to the neoliberal disciplinary power becomes.

Figure 3: The mechanism of strategic subordination

![Diagram](image-url)
f. The Development of Governmental Technology
The technology of governmental power in Japan’s labor market has been historically grounded. The wartime state mobilized and governed the population through an ideology that demanded absolute loyalty to the Japanese nation and that penalized anyone disloyal to the Empire. The same form of power was grafted onto the postwar corporate sector. Institutionally, the unwritten agreement of job security created a relatively stable relationship between the corporations and its members similar to that between a nation-state and its population. How the Japanese corporation governed its (regular) employees is almost identical to how the wartime state employed nationalism to integrate the population.

It is not a coincidence that the postwar managers appropriated the same nationalist discourse as part of their labor management strategy. Whether a “nation” or a “corporation,” the collectivity that serves as the object of loyalty is an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1983); this discursively constructed abstraction enables its “members” to imagine their belonging regardless of their concrete, direct relationship among one other (Calhoun, 1991). The power to impose an imagined community in Japan’s corporate world has actually driven the employees to compete against each other and to show the depth of their belonging to the collectivity.

The early postwar labor unions should be partially blamed for this transplantation of the governmental technology. While they demanded the equal treatment for blue- and white-collar employees under the wartime slogan of “full membership of the corporation,” they excluded the temporary and female workers from full membership status in their negotiations with the managers. The underlying logic of such exclusion was that the different level of “selfless devotion” to the “collectivity” required a different degree of “belonging to” the “collectivity” and therefore, justified
differential treatment. The managers’ use of the evaluation system and the cultural nationalist discourse further institutionalized the whole game of accumulating one’s membership capital.

Consequently, the industrial workers needed to “prove” their loyalty to the “company collectivity” as the white-collar counterparts had done, and more deeply than the “secondary members.” But, since the mid-1990s, the managers saw this mode of governmental technology as too costly mainly because of the unwritten agreement of job security. Then, they switched to the enterprise culture discourse in order to further reduce the labor cost. This change was part of a larger reconfiguration of the hegemonic discourses in Japan.

From the 1970s to the burst of bubble in the early 1990s, the cultural-economic nationalism (nihonjinron) was the hegemonic discourse. After the burst of the bubble, this culturalist discourse gave way to neoliberalism which idealized American capitalism. The neoliberal disciplinary power within each internal labor market was modified to fit into the new discourse and became widely utilized. The rapid growth of the working poor has worsened the effects of this disciplinary power on the regular employees. To put in extreme terms, the Japanese workers have only the choice between the two extreme evils (i.e., karoshi or poverty).

4. Conclusion
This article has investigated the causes of karoshi and karojisatsu in Japan within the context of the country’s troublesome history of labor relations, the emergence of institutional specificities in labor control, and the impact of governmental technology embedded in these institutional arrangements on the everyday working life of people (Photo 1). The study re-conceptualizes what seemed to be the “cultural tendencies of the Japanese” as the effects of a modern technology of power. This technology of governmentality has
created a widespread misconception that karoshi is only caused by Japan’s “communal tendencies.” By utilizing Jürgen Habermas’ distinction between the “system” (the domain of instrumental rational action that integrates social actions through delinguistified steering media of “power” and “money”) and the “lifeworld” (the sphere of everyday communicative action aimed at mutual understanding) (Habermas, 1984, 1987), I argue that this technology of power belongs to the “system” while camouflaging itself as part of the “lifeworld” (i.e., as “cultural ethos”). In doing so, this power has encroached on the Japanese employees’ “lifeworld” and has pitted them against each other. 4 7

Photo 1. Family members of the karoshi victims at a press conference 4 8

What I call the “neoliberal disciplinary power,” whether combined with the “collectivist” or “enterprise culture” discourse, has spread to other countries such as the U.S., Great Britain, Hong
Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, and Mainland China. As a type of power technology, this mechanism of control is as transferable as any scientific technology. In Japan, the neoliberal disciplinary power on employees is deeply embedded in the specific institutional arrangements of labor relations. What has taken place in the U.S. and Great Britain over the past few decades is the process of institutional restructuring known as the “Japanization of labor relations.” The process is characterized by the deliberate attempts to expand the “single union agreements,” to move factories to the “greenfield sites” for confining union activities into “cooperative” directions, and to reduce job categories for internal flexibility and “Just-in-Time” production system. The institutional base of enforcing the technology of power has been firmly established in Japan and elsewhere.  

In East Asia where the “traditional Confucian value” is often invoked, the business corporations and other socio-economic institutions have embraced this technology of power as the totalizing cultural discourse. This study does not deny the influence of traditional cultures on the operation of modern societies and corporations. Nevertheless, one should not mistake the effects of modern technology of power for the prolonging influence of traditional cultural ethos. Otherwise, people in these Asian countries will never resolve the problems of karoshi and karojisatsu. The misunderstanding of karoshi as solely caused by the traditional culture leads to a wrong solution. When some Japanese liberalist thinkers regarded the tendency of employees to totally submit themselves to the corporation as motivated by their “communal” tendencies, they failed to comprehend the working of modern technology of power. As a result, their call for promoting more independent selves became similar to the enterprise culture discourse, and possibly justified the neoliberal reforms which had in turn intensified the frequent occurrences of karoshi and karojisatsu.
What is needed to mitigate the predicaments of working people in Japan are not abstract calls for changing the employees’ subjectivity, but concrete institutional changes. Because the practice of karoshi-inducing overwork among regular employees and the wretched condition of non-regular employees are mutually constitutive, the institutional changes should be initiated to counteract the discrimination against non-regular employees and the governmental technology driving employees to karoshi. The countermeasures are as follows:

1. To implement a “comparable worth” principle to reduce the discriminatory treatments of non-regular and female employees by linking job analysis to wage determination;
2. To make evaluative criteria more objective, explicit, and gender-neutral against the panoptic gaze of evaluation;
3. To provide “career ladder” opportunities to both regular and non-regular employees;
4. To allow employees to switch from full-time to part-time positions and vice versa without lowering hourly wages;
5. To close the wage gaps among employees by controlling the influence of individual evaluation on wages;
6. To establish a society-wide system that fairly acknowledges each individual’s job experience and skills by standardizing job analysis procedures across the corporations;
7. To set an upper limit on working hours and implementing “work-sharing” policies to shorten working hours and create new employments; and
8. To reform the employment security system to cover the non-regular employees as beneficiaries, and to link that security system to job placement supports and occupational training.
Some of these recommendations may not be new. The organized workers and feminists worldwide have been fighting for these goals for decades. Many member states of the European Union have enforced these measures. Once the “cultural specificities of the Japanese employee” are demystified, the same institutional reforms can be implemented in Japan. However, these institutional changes can be possible only if the working people in Japan actively debate these issues both in workplaces and in the larger public sphere, establish consensus among them, and intervene into the labor management practices through “collectivism from below” and industrial democracy. Given the nature of globalizing capital, it is also important to develop the global networks of working people or to perform what Jeremy Brecher and Tim Costello (1998) call “globalization from below.” In Japan and elsewhere, the global agendas of working people should concern not only salary raise and job security, but also the way their working lives are governed. Implementing collective countermeasures against the governmental technologies globally is the key to our common struggle, protecting us from karoshi and karojisatsu, and making our working lives worth living.
Postscript

When I finalized this article, the massive earthquake and tsunami hit Northeast Japan on March 11, 2011. The devastated areas are still assaulted by many aftershocks and the nuclear crisis is still immanent at this very moment. It is shocking and heartbreaking to see the hideous devastation and tragedies. At the same time, it is very heartening to witness the strong display of solidarity among the afflicted people in the devastated areas and to see people at home and abroad extending their helping hands to the sufferers.

The long-term effects of the calamities on the Japanese society and economy have begun to show themselves. In those industries directly and indirectly damaged by the calamities, many employers have dismissed their employees, especially the non-regular workers. Many non-regular employees are laid off without compensation and knowledge of whether and when they can return to work. Some employers not clearly affected by the devastation have dismissed both regular and non-regular employees because of the dim economic prospects. Many corporations have cancelled the assurance of hiring new school graduates. This historic natural disaster is likely to exacerbate the growth of non-regular employees, inequality, and poverty. In certain industries, the employees are working hectically to meet the new demands suddenly raised by the labor and resource shortages after the disaster. Constructors are bound to be busy during the whole reconstruction process. Even in other economic sectors, the reduction of employees to financially cope with the economic downturn is likely to worsen the problem of overwork among the remaining employees.
I fear that the problems of karoshi and karojisatsu may become more serious among people who have not lost their jobs. Most of the Japanese employees do not mind working hard to rebuild the devastated regions and to improve the wellbeing of the country. But the management should not take advantage of this public sentiment to justify the longstanding practice of unpaid overwork. The reconstruction efforts and the overall economic recovery should not lead to more karoshi and karojisatsu cases. Otherwise, the disaster victims and their surviving family members will continue to endure these man-make tragedies as they had experienced the historic calamity on March 11, 2011.

The unprecedented scale of destruction and suffering faced by Japan this time is next to that of the Second World War. As with the early postwar society, it is perhaps the time to reexamine the whole social, economic and political systems of Japan in relation to
its overall recovery policy. Insofar as the exploitative institutional arrangements of labor relations remain intact, the effects of the devastation and the pressure for recovery are bound to intensify the problems of karoshi and poverty. In a time of economic stagnation, working hard does not necessarily help the victims because it may take away someone’s job. The reconstruction efforts have to be understood in both economic and social terms. More people should be allowed to participate in the recovery process through job creation programs. Existing work should be shared by as many people as possible, especially those refugees who lost the means of livelihood in the disaster. Therefore, service overtime should be eliminated and a policy of work-sharing ought to be enforced in order to make jobs available for everyone. At the same time, the discriminatory treatment of non-regular and female employees must be banned and more just labor policies should be put in place. These recommendations are essential for the recovery of the devastated communities and the country at large, and for mitigating the longstanding problems of karoshi and poverty.

It may not be easy to deal with the karoshi and karojisatsu syndromes because of the need to address their complex institutional causes. But if the degree of human tragedy and their causes are clearly understood, people may show solidarity to mitigate the problems as we can see the same kind of solidarity that the public have displayed to help the disaster victims. After this historic disaster, people in Japan, including myself, are unlearning our atomized selves and relearning the vital importance of mutual help. Hopefully, this sense of empowering solidarity will lead us to overcome the gap between wealth and poverty, the atomization of working people, and the suppression of the working class identity by the technology of governmental power.
Glossary

chūryū 中流
chūseishin 忠誠心
dōki 同期
hi-seiki jyūgyōin 非正規従業員
honne 本音
ishiki kaikaku 意識改革
jijo doryoku 自助努力
jiritsusei 自立性
jyūgyōin 従業員
karojisatsu 過労自殺
Karoshi 過労死
Karoshi Hotline 過労死 110 番
Karōshi Taikoku 過労死大国
ko no shutaisei 個の主体性
Kōkoku kinrōkan 皇国勤労観
kyōsei sareta jihatsusei 強制された自発性
nihonjinron 日本人論
nōryoku shugi 能力主義
sābisu zangyō サービス残業
seika shugi 成果主義
seikatsu-taido 生活態度
seiki jyūgyōin 正規従業員
sekininkan 責任感
shabo 社墓
shokkō 職工
Shokunō Shikaku Seido 職能資格制度
shūdanshugi 集団主義
tatemae 建前
The National Defense 就労死弁護団全国連絡会議
Counsel for Victims of Karoshi はるか
yaruki やる気
Notes

1. I wish to express my gratitude to Joseph Tse-Hei Lee and Ronald K. Frank of Pace University for their comments and suggestions.
3. According to the Institute of Labor Administration (2010), 63.5% of the interviewed enterprises had at least one employee absent from work due to mental disorders for a month or more in 2010.
5. For a persuasive discussion of the mixed success of those labor lawyers and activists, see Weathers and North (2009).
7. Kumazawa Makoto (2010), a leading labor relations scholar in Japan, presents the most comprehensive study of karoshi and karojisatsu syndromes. His work carefully examines more than 50 concrete cases and reveals the spread of karoshi among all kinds of workers.
8. There are two large sets of the government labor statistics in Japan. One set of data shows workers’ actual overtime; the other data include only reported overtime obtained from employers and thus, exclude service overtime. Neither set of data shows the amount of service overtime, although it can be estimated from the differences between the two sets of data. A few studies compare the working hours, including service overtime, of Japanese full-time workers with those of other countries, showing that Japanese full-time employees work much longer than employees in the U.S. and the European Union (Ogura, 2007:7-13).
9. The following description of the postwar Japanese history of labor relations is a condensed version of chapter 3 in my Ph.D. dissertation (Shibata, 2007).
10. In the early postwar period, the U.S. Occupational Authority and the international labor activists were against the age-based wage; however, the local unions defended the “livelihood wage” system (Hamaguchi, 2009: 120). When the Labor Law was drafted, the “equal pay for equal work” principle was originally included. But the Japanese labor representatives indicated a contradiction between the “livelihood wage” system and the “equal pay for equal work” principle. As a result, the latter principle was replaced by a more ambiguous clause of prohibiting discrimination against female workers (ibid: 108).
11. This wage structure was called “Densan-type wage structure” and adopted by many corporations. There is no consensus among the labor relations scholars about how to characterize the wage structure in relation to the “ability pay” portion. Gordon (1985: 355) emphasizes the aspect of egalitarianism in this wage structure by referring to it as “the logic of labor more than capital.” Endo
(1999) and Nomura (1994) stress the “ability” portion of the wage structure as the starting point of workers’ acceptance of wage differences based on the ambiguous merit evaluation. Given the strength of the unions at that time, the wage structure certainly expresses the logic of Japanese workers. In my view, we have to expose ambivalences within this “logic” itself.


1 So far as the state needed positive willful cooperation from workers during the modern “total war” situation, the state had to make some sort of concession to the working class. This concession generally entailed an elevation of the status of industrial workers as “the same national members” and raising their working condition through wage controls (Saguchi, 1991). There are, however, substantial differences between Japan and countries like Great Britain and the U.S. in their wartime mobilization of workers. In the U.S., the government intervened into labor relations to mobilize workers through the National War Labor Board (NWLB). While the main role of the NWLB was to avoid strikes, it facilitated collective bargaining between organized labor and managers, and considerably expanded workers’ rights. In Japan, industrial democracy was repressed until the end of the Second World War. Therefore, in the U.S., the “working class” functioned at an intermediate level of institution and identity, and the principle of “equal national membership” largely meant equality between the two collective categories of “managers” and “workers.” In Japan, individual workers had to rely directly on the “egalitarian” drive of nationalist ideology and the states’ policy without a reliable intermediate institution and identity (ibid.).

1 Gordon (1998: 196-7) indicates that the ultra-cooperative stance of mainstream unions and corporate hegemony since the 1960s has been stronger in Japan than anywhere else in the world.

1 Gordon (1998) shows that the tactics of informal group had enormous influences on Japanese labor relations, and he characterizes them as “Leninism-through-the-looking-glass”: “Informal groups acted as a vanguard intent on leading the masses in the politically correct opposite direction” (135). See also Saito (1990: 62, 294) for a discussion of this issue.

1 There are some wage gaps between white- and blue-collar employees among the male regular employees. However, the male regular employees are stratified not only by the type of job but also by company size and educational background. The economic conditions of male employees divided by the type of job (white- or blue-collar), educational background, and company size can be estimated by each group’s average monthly income. Given the nature of
seniority-based wage system that makes wage disparity among young employees small and that among middle aged employees large, however, the average income of age 50-to-54 group would be a better indicator for the actual economic condition of each employee group. Using the data of this age group, the male high-school-graduate blue-collar workers employed in large corporations earn 70.6% of the monthly salary of their college-graduate white-collar counterparts and 86.3% of the male high-school-graduate white-collar workers in large corporations. But these male high-school-graduate blue-collar workers employed in large corporations earn more than male high-school graduate white-collar workers in medium size corporations and male college graduate white-collar workers in small corporations in 2001. The data source is the Table E-17 in Statistics and Information Department (2003: 154-157). Here, at least the distinction between white- and blue-collar jobs among regular employees is not the major reason for wage disparities.

17 Therefore, “comparable worth” (“pay equity”) policies alone would not eliminate gender discrimination in Japan since female employees tend to be placed in dead-end low paid jobs even if “comparable worth” policies are implemented. What is necessary to improve the situation is to make the evaluation that determines placement of employees into jobs and positions within the internal labor market gender-neutral, or to establish fair and gender-neutral work rules for job placements (Kumazawa, 2000; Ogoshi, 2006).

18 The welfare system based on the assumption of gender division of labor at home was a deliberate strategy by the government. The Liberal Democratic Party’s 1979 policy paper, *Nihon-gata Fukushi Shakai* (Japanese-style Welfare Society) clearly adopts this strategy. The document set up a hypothetical Japanese citizen as a “typical” welfare recipient and examined how his welfare ought to be changed and should be met throughout his life. Not surprisingly, this “typical” individual is a male salaryman and according to the document, he could not take any family-related responsibility after the age of thirty since he would be a position with heavy responsibilities in his company. The document states that his family is the prime welfare provider. In other words, his wife is not regarded as a welfare recipient but only as a welfare provider (Nomura, 1998; Osawa, 1993). The document makes no secret of supporting the complete gender division of labor at home. This welfare policy took effect since the 1980s. Influenced by this idea, the employment safety-net system for non-regular employees remains underdeveloped.

19 The data source is Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare of Japan (2009), “Heisei 20nendo Chingin Kōzō Kihon Tōkei Chōsa.” For income levels of regular and fulltime non-regular employees, the Ministry’s research results only show average regular monthly salaries, excluding bonus and other allowances given only to regular employees and some full-time non-regular employees. In order to obtain more accurate wage gap data, their hourly wages shown in
Table 1 are calculated by adding “yearly bonus and other special allowances” (converted to hourly wage) to their monthly regular salary data (converted to hourly wages). I have learned this correction method from Morioka (2009a: 155). It should be also indicated that many statistical dataset for international comparisons of hourly wage, including the OECD studies, do not consider this problem of the Japanese data.

A combination of the low wage, long out-of-work period due to job insecurity and the ineffective safety-net system results in very low income for the non-regular employees. The average annual income of young non-regular workers (15 to 34 years old) is about 1.4 million yen (i.e., US$16,700 or HK$129,600). This income level makes individual economic independence very difficult (Tachibanaki, 2006: 77-78). The overall result of the growth of non-regular workers is reflected in a number of indicators. The relative poverty rate of Japan in 2007 is 15.7%, the fourth from the worst among the 30 OECD member states, and this rate is estimated to be worsened (Mainichi Newspaper, 2009). Gini coefficient (a statistical measure that indicates the degree of inequality in terms of household income) marked the highest level in terms of income before redistribution in 2008 (the Ministry of Health, 2010a).

The data source is Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications of Japan, “Rōdōryoku Chōsa.” Retrieved on November 1, 2010 from http://www.stat.go.jp/data/roudou/longtime/03roudou.htm#hyo_9

Shortly after the worldwide financial crisis in 2008, a large number of non-regular workers were dismissed. As a result, the number of non-regular workers declined by about 390,000 while the number of regular workers declined only by 190,000. Thus, many non-regular workers are certainly used as a buffer in times of economic crisis (Asahi Newspaper, 2010). But the non-regular positions lost in the financial crisis only amount to 2.2% of the total non-regular workforce. This means that the non-regular employees have grown far beyond the level of buffer.

According to the Japan Institute for Labor Policy and Training (2006), among those interviewed enterprises where the number of non-regular employees is increasing, 78.3% of them have indicated that hiring non-regular workers saved labor costs.

This system was conceptualized by the Nikkeiren, a powerful association of managers in Japan, as a part of Nōryoku shugi (the ability-based principle) at the end of the 1960s (Nikkeiren, 1969).

Endo (1999), based on a comparative study of the U.S. and Japan, suggests that Japanese corporations tend to use more ambiguous and subjective evaluative criteria than American corporations; more rank and file workers are evaluated in Japan than in the U.S.; institutional and legal framework that supports employees to express dissatisfaction with evaluation result is much weaker in Japan than in the U.S.
The following analyses of governmental technologies are drawn on the findings and insights in chapter 4 of my Ph.D. dissertation (Shibata 2007).

Some of the most famous works in this genre are Nakane (1967), Doi (1971), Kimura (1972), Vogel (1979), Murakami, Kumon and Sato (1979). For a comprehensive survey of works in this genre, see Aoki (1990). Since the 1980s, numerous critiques on this discourse appeared both in Japan and elsewhere. For critical examinations of this discourse, see Harootunian (1988, 1998), Sakai (1988, 1996), Befu (1993), Sugimoto and Mouer (1995). Aoki (1990), having examined numerous nihonjinron works, has found that “collectivism” is indeed one of the most frequently mentioned “cultural traits of Japanese.” Studies of “Japanese management system” (a genre called nihonteki-keieiron) reveal the same tendencies (Iida, 1998).

“Identity” is often understood as a non-instrumental and cultural mode of self-understanding as opposed to “interest.” As Brubaker and Cooper (2000) indicate, however, this conceptual opposition is untenable (6-7). Claims for a particular identity and membership are very often linked to social actors’ strategic interests. Similarly, exercise of power sometimes takes a form of imposing a particular identity on someone else (Foucault 1975, 1982).

The translation of the term kyōsei sareta jihatsusei into “coerced volunteerism” is found in Weathers and North (2009: 624); the use of “forced spontaneity” is mine.

Foucault modified his earlier studies of “disciplinary power” (Foucault, 1995) and “biopower” (Foucault, 1990) into the concept of “governmentality” in his series of lecture given at the Collège de France (Foucault 2003, 2007, 2008). See also Foucault (1979, 1982) and Burchell, Gordon and Miller (1991).

One of the most famous of company mottos is “Seven Spirits of Matsushita Electric that Should Be Respected.” In each workplace at the Matsushita Electric (Panasonic at present), all employees chant the “Seven Spirits” and then sing a company song in unison every morning (Saito, 1990; Sataka, 1996). I have no knowledge, however, if this practice is still continued today.

Aoki (1990) estimates more than two thousand books and articles in this genre to have been published from 1946 to 1988. Befu (1993) indicates that a large number of works in this genre have been reprinted as many as one hundred times.

Spreading the nationalist discourse in corporations and characterizing a corporation as Gemeinschaft and “a community of destiny” have been a quite explicit labor management strategies since the 1960s (Kitagawa, 1968: 73, 124-128, 184-186, and 214-220). The difference is that while the explicitly nationalist ideas such as “respecting the Emperor” were invoked by business leaders in the 1960s (ibid.), the nationalist discourse became “softer” under the guise of social scientific studies on “culture” during the 1970s and 1980s.

Similarly, Befu (1993) states that nihonjinron, a descriptive discourse,
actually works as prescriptive (normative) model. It is a “modern moral
textbook” (116-117).

35 One of the clearest examples of this claim in karoshi lawsuits is the case of
Mr. Uchino of Toyota who died from overwork. See Kumazawa (2010: 323-333)
and Weathers and North (2009) for detailed discussions of this case. The
strategic blurring between working hours and off-work hours is often part of
the JIT production system in Japan as highlighted in Uchino’s case (Kumazawa,
2010).

36 Concerning the peer competition in the internal labor market, Burawoy
(1979) adds an important modification to Doeringer and Piore’s theory of
internal labor market: “Competition is by no means eliminated by the internal
labor market, as Doeringer and Piore imply, but rather takes on a new form,
regulated by different sets of constraints and rules” (96). Burawoy, however,
wrote the Japanese corporation as an exception to this trend (ibid: 232, n.6). This
is probably because he observed the tendencies of Japanese corporations only
up to the 1970s. His view on the competition within the internal labor market is
especially applicable to the Japanese corporation since the 1970s.

37 Bourdieu always talks about “field” only in relation to “habitus” and
“capital,” and it is hard to find a precise and concise definition of “field” in his
writings. For relatively clear discussions of “field,” see Bourdieu (1990: 66-68)
(1993) define “field” as a semi-autonomous space “characterized by its own
determinate agents (for example, students, novelists, scientists), its own
accumulation of history, its own logic of action, and its own forms of capital”
(5).

38 This state is what Goffman calls “role distance” (Goffman, [1961] 1990).
Berger (1963) summarizes it as “the playing of a role tongue-in-cheek, without
really meaning it and with an ulterior purpose” (135). He further indicates that:
“Goffman’s concept could be applied more widely to all cases where a role is
played deliberately without inner identification, in other words, where the actor
has established an inner distance between his consciousness and his
role-playing” (ibid.).

39 Sugimoto (1997) states: “Thus an employee who expresses dedication to his
company boss in accordance with the corporate tatemae of loyalty and harmony
may do so because of his honne ambition for promotion and other personal
gains” (26). Tatemae can be understood as what Wright Mills ([1940] 1990) called
the “vocabulary of motive,” a socially legitimated set of “motives” strategically
used by situated actors to appeal to others. The specificity in Japanese
corporation is that the socially legitimated vocabulary of motive that situated
actors can use is limited to the “collectivist” one. This situation has, however,
been changing since the mid-1990s.

40 The positive social image of salaryman stratum and the negative image of
blue-collar workers were mutually constitutive in prewar Japan. The sharp contrast between the two strata resulted from the state’s cultural Westernization policy and from the spread of the discourse of “civilization and enlightenment” from the Meiji (1868-1912) to the Taisho (1912-1926) eras as part of Japan’s modernization project. The image of modernized family lifestyle catered for salaryman families was disseminated also by the promoters of modern consumption culture such as department stores. For an in-detailed discussion, see Koyama (1999), chapter 2 of Shibata (2007), Takeuchi (1996, 1997) and Terade (1994).


43 For analyses of how the “middle status” consumption norm is driving the majority of workers to overwork, see chapter 9 of Kumazawa (1996) and chapter 5 of Shibata (2007). For an understanding of how male regular employees’ masculine sense of “family responsibility” is limited to fulfilling the role of the breadwinner of the family, see Amano (2001).

44 The overall view on these two motivational sources that lead employees to adapt to the competitive game in Japan is drawn from Kumazawa (2010). The term “strategic subordination” is taken from Deetz (1998), who analyzed a corporation in the U.S. where employees believed themselves to be constantly evaluated:

Through self-surveillance and control of their bodies, feelings, dress, and behavior, they use themselves for their own strategized employment and career movement. ... Strategized subordination happens as members actively subordinate themselves to obtain money, security, meaning, or identity. (164).

45 This form of power had been an integral part of the state’s modernization strategy since the beginning of the Meiji government in 1868. It is what Foucault (1990, 2003) calls “biopower,” which tries both to increase the physical and mental capacity of the population and to subjugate them at the same time, seeing the population as the vital resource to utilize for economic and military development. For details, see Fujino (2000) and chapter 2 of Shibata (2007).

46 At the same time, the discourse of cultural nationalism changed to that of political nationalism. Changes in the hegemonic discourse of management had to do with the way in which employees and the population were governed in
modern Japanese history. For details, see Shibata (2007).

The existence of this form of power should be taken into account in the debate between liberalists such as John Rawls (1991) and “communitarians” such as Michel Sandel (1982, 1996). In my view, the communitarian theory does have a potential to go beyond the liberal theory because of its Tocquevillian emphasis on the importance of collective self-government (i.e., “collectivism from below”) for democracy. At the same time, communitarians tend to downplay the danger of the technology of power that utilizes communitarian vocabulary (i.e., “collectivism from above”), which hinder the democratic process of collective self-government. Liberal thinkers may be aware of the danger of this form of power; yet they tend to minimize the importance of “collectivism from below” and discard it together with “collectivism from above.” In other words, neither theoretical position distinguishes the two types of collectivism.

Many social scientists who apply Foucauldian or similar perspectives to the analysis of the current labor management in the U.S. and Great Britain often directly or indirectly suggest the influences of Japan’s labor management technologies through the import of the JIT production system and human resource management. For details, see Barker (1993), Casey (1995), Delbridge, Turnbull and Wilkinson (1992), Fucini and Fucini (1990), Knights (2002), Knights and Willmott (2002), McKinlay and Taylor (1998), and Sewell (1998, 1999).


Many social scientists who apply Foucauldian or similar perspectives to the analysis of the current labor management in the U.S. and Great Britain often directly or indirectly suggest the influences of Japan’s labor management technologies through the import of the JIT production system and human resource management. For details, see Barker (1993), Casey (1995), Delbridge, Turnbull and Wilkinson (1992), Fucini and Fucini (1990), Knights (2002), Knights and Willmott (2002), McKinlay and Taylor (1998), and Sewell (1998, 1999).

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