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A UNIFYING THEORY FOR THE JUST-COMPENSATION CASES: TAKINGS, REGULATION AND PUBLIC USE

John A. Humbach*

The fifth amendment to the Constitution provides, in simple formulation:

nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.¹

Reconciling this plain language with the government's² general power to regulate has been a vexing complication of just-compensation law. The activities which may be restricted under the so-called police power³ include the use and enjoyment of property, personal and real.⁴ The complication arises because restrictions on the uses of

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² This Article refers to the "government" typically without specifying which level of government (federal, state or subdivisions of the latter) is meant. This usage avoids cluttering the exposition with the obvious but, for present purposes, irrelevant distinctions resulting from federalism. Where the distinction is relevant, it will be specified; otherwise, the references to government apply mutatis mutandis to the level(s) of government obviously appropriate from the context.


Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order—these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police power. . . . Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it. Id. at 32 (1954); see also infra note 124.

Federal regulations generally are traced to constitutionally "enumerated" powers (e.g., to regulate interstate commerce); however, as the distinction between "enumerated" and "police" powers has little bearing on the present discussion (see United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 808 (1950)), it will be ignored. Cf. infra note 24 relative to the federal power to regulate navigation.


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land\textsuperscript{5} can hurt the owner's economic position as much as an outright
taking in fee.\textsuperscript{6} Yet, by and large, such police power regulations do
not constitute compensable "taking" under the just-compensation
clause, nor, in general, are such regulations constitutionally infirm
merely for their impact on the value of affected lands.\textsuperscript{7}

It has frequently been observed that, from a fairness standpoint, the
present state of the law is somewhat illogical.\textsuperscript{8} The Supreme Court
concedes that it has "no set formula," much less a readily applicable
test, for determining when a land-use regulation becomes a taking of
private property.\textsuperscript{9} Despite its obvious practical importance, "[t]he
principle upon which the cases can be rationalized is yet to be discov-
ered. . ."\textsuperscript{10} Rather, the law of police-power takings is a widely
acknowledged hodgepodge, its doctrines a farrago of fumblings which
have suffered too long from a surfeit of deficient theories.\textsuperscript{11}

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5. The discussion that follows applies with much the same force to personal property as to
real property. The primary focus of inquiry, however, will be land and police-power regulations
restricting the uses of land. Accordingly, the kind of property contemplated will be real prop-
erty.

6. E.g., Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 517-19, 370
deprived land of all economic use); see also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 384 (1926) (75% loss); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915) (over 90% loss); 1
(1979) (personal property).

7. See supra note 6. See generally Annot., 52 L. Ed. 2d 863 (1978). The presumption of
constitutionality (e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594, 596 (1962)) makes a
successful attack on use regulations a generally unlikely prospect.

8. E.g., Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme
Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 63 ("a crazy-quilt pattern"); Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964) ("a welter of confusing and apparently incompatible
results"); Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condem-
nation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1971) ("the decisional law is largely characterized by
confusing and incompatible results, often explained in conclusionary [sic] terminology, circular
reasoning, and empty rhetoric").


10. Sax, supra note 8, at 37. In a 1981 article it was reported that "legal scholars are still in
search of a formula or set of rules which will lend precision to [the decision] process." Wright,
Sax himself proposed a theory, based upon a putative distinction between acts of government
as an "enterprise" (compensable) and actions it takes as an "arbiter" of private conflicts (non-
compensable). Sax, supra note 8, at 61-67. The distinction made by his theory, however, was not
always easy to discern. The theory does not account for all the important lines of cases, id. at 70,
and Sax in any event later felt compelled to "disown" it. See Sax, Takings, Private Property and
Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 150 n.5 (1971).

11. Attempts have been made to reconcile apparent inconsistencies by classifying cases
according to such factors as the regulation's purpose or its burdensome consequences,
the relationship between the public interest asserted and the private detriment
suffered, and the evil to be cured by the regulation. . . . But these efforts have not
provided a means by which judicial action can be predicted. Clearly, if the utility of
legal rules in a jurisprudential system can be judged by their predictability, the rules
employed to determine where regulation of land use ends and taking of property
begins are useless.
The past inability to find a unifying theory for the police-power takings cases seems to be a result of a persistent failure to refine properly the concepts involved. It is argued herein that the operative distinction made by the cases can be adequately described in terms of two suitably defined conceptions which may be inferred from the holdings themselves. By use of these two differentiated conceptions, which together cover a major portion of what are generally understood as property interests, it is possible not merely to reconcile the police-power takings cases with one another, but also to develop a theory unifying those cases with the general law of eminent domain.

The discussion begins with some remarks concerning the concept of property as a general matter. It will then consider briefly an approach to the problem which, though promising and advanced, nevertheless falls short of achieving an internally consistent, unifying theory. Following this introduction, an attempt will be made to specify the two distinctive conceptual components of property interests on whose difference the cases seem to turn, and then to demonstrate the suitability of this conceptual distinction as the foundation for a coherent theory of the law.

I. SOME WORDS ABOUT "PROPERTY"

Although the meaning accorded to the word property is critically related to the scope and import of the just-compensation clause, no definitive conception of the property idea seems possible. The boundaries of the concept in ordinary usage are too vague and unspecifiable to be analytically useful in fixing the limits of the just-compensation requirement. Precise conceptual boundaries can be defined, but they would be inherently artificial, often unconvincing, and infected by any weaknesses in the philosophico moral axioms on which they are based.12 Neither an ideal nor an ordinary usage definition of property will be attempted here.13 Nevertheless, in order to clarify the use of the term in this Article, a few remarks about the meaning or conception of property are in order.


13. The necessity to define property will be avoided by looking instead at two usual (and perhaps necessary) conceptual components of property which happen to receive opposite treatments in the outcomes, if not the rationales, of just-compensation cases. See infra text accompanying notes 47-76.
First, in standard usage, the word property refers not merely to the things which are subjects of ownership but to the legally recognized and protected ownership interest as well.\(^\text{14}\) In this Article the word "property" will refer to this latter conceptual construct—the ownership rather than the things owned.\(^\text{15}\)

Second, property interests include not merely present possessory estates, but also (without attempting to be exhaustive) future interests, incorporeal interests, powers of disposition, and liens. Certain incorporeal interests—negative easements and like servitudes—will draw our particular attention because of their similarity to land-use regulations.\(^\text{16}\) There has been some question whether certain kinds of servitudes, such as real covenants and equitable servitudes, are truly interests in land or even property.\(^\text{17}\) This issue seems, however, to be largely one of how inclusively one defines property. On the theory that like interests should be classified alike, such servitudes will be regarded as real property, i.e., as a variety of easements, without addressing the semantic question of whether that term ought to be applied to them. It is their legal characteristics for our purposes, not their taxonomy, which are important.\(^\text{18}\)

The question incidentally arises as to the extent to which just-compensation cases can shed light on the "true" nature of property or the proper meaning of that term. One writer has suggested, for example,
that the eminent domain cases provide "a fascinating laboratory in which to explore the concept of 'property.'" This appears unlikely. The Constitution contains many words, e.g., commerce, speech, due process, equal protection, yet one would hardly look to constitutional cases to see what those words mean—except in their constitutional context.

At the other extreme, statements are occasionally found to the effect that private rights or technical title under state law, i.e., property as between the owner and non-governmental others, is not necessarily property within the meaning of the just-compensation clause. Archetypical, perhaps, is Justice Jackson's dictum, in relation to certain riparian rights: "[O]nly those economic advantages are 'rights' which have the law back of them . . . We cannot start the process of [just-compensation] decision by calling such a [riparian] claim as we have here a 'property right'; whether it is a property right is really the question to be answered." If taken broadly to imply that the federal definition of property for purposes of just compensation may deviate freely from various state law conceptions of the term, such statements are unacceptable. If the just-compensation clause means anything, it means that the federal and state governments are on much the same footing as private persons with respect to the acquisition or destruction of rights that states enforce in respect to things. It is hard to imagine that the framers of the just-compensation clause thought otherwise. To be sure, the constitutional meaning of the word property would not have to be defined in terms of the substantive law, generally state law, that gives force to the legal interests usually comprehended by property. But if the correspondence is not close, the just-compensation clause be-
II. "Takings" as Compulsory Transfers:
Professor Stoebuck's Theory

Despite the Supreme Court's admission of defeat, the search to find a unifying theory for the extant cases continues. In a recent created under state law held compensable); General Box Co. v. United States, 351 U.S. 159, 165-67 (1956) (area invaded was subject to the state's "ancient" servitude under state law; held, no compensation); Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Comm., 274 U.S. 651, 657 (1927) ("no protection to supposed rights of property which the state courts determine to be non-existent").

In the recent case of Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980), the Supreme Court applied a federal definition of property instead of the state's where the federal definition was more inclusive (and, hence, more protective) than the state's definition, saying: "a state by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensation." See infra text accompanying notes 211-15. The Supreme Court found its authority for its more inclusive definition of private property in general principles. Of course, the thrust of the text is that the federal definition of property cannot be significantly narrower than the applicable state's definition. It must, however, in some instances be broader if the just-compensation clause is to apply to the states, which it does. See supra note 1.

For an interesting discussion of the limits of government authority to redefine property, see concurring opinion of Justice Marshall in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93-94 (1980). See also infra text accompanying notes 185-221.

24. Statements such as Jackson's quoted in the text accompanying note 21 supra can, of course, simply be written off as more wrong thinking in a hodgepodge field of law. However, such statements are actually not so extreme when read in the context where they are made, i.e., in reference to the subordination of all private riparian rights in navigable waters to the federally entrusted paramount public right of navigation over such waters. E.g., United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1956); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 65-66 (1913). But cf. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (compensation required if navigation easement is extended to previously "fast" lands).

If all that Jackson meant was that property rights as between private persons are not controlling when such private rights conflict with the paramount public easement for navigation, such statements make perfect, if tautological, sense. Private riparian rights in navigable streams and waters are, by definition, a subordinate residuum subverting the public navigation easement. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502-03 (1945). Any losses due to changes in such a navigable stream can be said to result "not from a taking of the riparian owner's property . . . but from the lawful exercise of a power to which that property has always been subject." United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 312 U.S. 592, 597 (1941). Accord United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967).

Of course, this argument can be carried too far. Without the just-compensation clause, on the one hand, all private property might be simply regarded as a subordinate residuum subverting the public's public-use easement (an idea inherent in the very words "eminent domain"). See P. Nichols, supra note 1, §§ 1.12-13. On the other hand, if the just-compensation clause or due process clause prevents such a subordinated status for property generally, why should the treatment of riparian rights in navigable streams be an exception? Perhaps the answer lies in (1) the long history of public navigation rights as a qualification on private rights, going back to the Roman law of jus publicum, later held by the King on behalf of his subjects (see for further discussion, Humbach & Gale, Tidal Title and the Boundaries of the Bay, 4 Fordham Urb. L.J. 91, 94-100 (1975)), and (2) the specific treatment given "navigation" in the commerce clause. U.S. Const. arts. I & VIII. In any case, the public navigation easement is special, and statements made in reference to it are not necessarily applicable in other contexts.

By contrast, the public avigation easement seems to be receiving narrower treatment. Not only are subjacent landowners' rights defined according to state law, see United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), but compensation is allowed for regular overflights within the avigation zone. Id.; see also Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) and discussion at note 93 infra.

25. See supra text accompanying note 9.
Professor Stoebuck pointed critically to "the general lack of connection between police-power takings and the larger subject of eminent domain" and offered an innovative suggestion for approchement:

Special study should be made of some fact patterns that are closest to those in which land use regulations may cause takings. . . [viz.] that large group of takings known as "non-trespassory takings," such non-physical invasions of private property as deprivations of street access and condemnations by nuisance.

Compared with actual physical appropriation, takings of this latter "non-trespassory" sort are factually closer to cases of land-use restrictions imposed under the police power. Therefore, Stoebuck reasoned, they should offer greater insight as to the essential differences between non-compensable regulations and compensable regulatory takings.

Professor Stoebuck cited three types of situations in which non-trespassory acts of government are held to require just compensation, either because the acts impair an affirmative easement or because they constitute "inverse condemnation" of a negative easement. From such cases, he concludes that the constitutional concept of taking refers in its essence to circumstances of "transfer," a kind of compulsory transfer to the government of the same sorts of property interests (estates, easements, real covenants) which are commonly transferred voluntarily. He argues that this transfer-oriented test of taking is supported by "all cases of trespassory [i.e. physical] or non-trespassory takings with the exception of police power takings. . . ."
Unfortunately, Stoebuck's transfer-oriented test of taking does not work well when applied to the police-power regulations cases, the object of his exercise. Specifically, although the adoption of land-use regulations seemingly effects a compulsory transfer to the government of what amounts to a negative easement or servitude over the regulated lands, much like those which are commonly transferred voluntarily, the land-use regulations which occasion such transfers are almost never regarded as takings.

In order to avoid this incongruity between his transfer-oriented theory and the law, Stoebuck argues that negative easements can be regarded as transferred "to the government" only if the land-use regulations in question specially benefit governmentally-owned land. Thus, in the usual regulation case, the transfers are not really to the government but rather to other private owners whom the regulations benefit. Without such a transfer to the government, Stoebuck seems to conclude, the government's regulation is not compensable eminent domain.

The weak point in Stoebuck's argument, however, is its assumption that, absent a government-owned dominant tenement, regulatory transfers must not be to the government but instead to other private owners. In terms of enforceable legal interests, the facts do not support his theory. It is not other owners who acquire the discretion and power to enforce the regulations by legal action, or to release the restrictions back to the owners of the servient land. It is the government alone which assumes that position and which, therefore, is the transferee of the "negative easements." Lacking a dominant tenement of its own, what the government gets is essentially a negative easement in gross.

Differentiating factor since these other two elements are concomitants of virtually any governmental act likely to come into controversy under the just-compensation clause.

34. See supra note 16.
35. See Stoebuck, supra note 19, at 1091-92.
36. Id. at 1092-93.
37. Id. at 1092.
38. See id. at 1088-89, 1092. Thus, Stoebuck proffers the following test for a police-power taking: "A police power regulation on land use is an eminent domain taking only when its effect is specially directed toward benefitting a governmental entity in the use of land in which that entity holds incidents of ownership." Id. at 1093 (emphasis added).
39. Stoebuck in effect switched gears when he looked to who received the benefits of regulations in order to determine who received the legal interest under them. A theory based on transfer of legal interests should consider just that, modifications of legal relationships and positions, not the incidental or intended economic effects which the transfers may have. It does not detract from the government's legal position obtained by means of regulations that it may gain no economic advantage from them. Indeed, it often does not gain economically. But cf. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 (1981) ("Because police power regulations must be substantially related to [a public purpose] . . . , it is axiomatic that the public receives a benefit while the offending regulation is in effect.") (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40. Like servitudes in gross generally, private negative easements in gross are not favored in the law, but they are nevertheless recognized proprietary interests. E.g., Merrionette Manor
In sum, Stoebuck's distinction between valid regulations and regulatory takings, on further analysis, hinges not on whether there is a transfer to the government. It turns rather on whether the property interest transferred to the government is a negative easement in gross as distinguished from an appurtenant negative easement, an affirmative easement, a fee simple, or some other recognized type of property. His transfer-oriented test of taking, however, does not account for this distinction, and thus it cannot, alone, supply a basis for differentiating non-compensable regulations from police-power takings.

Moreover, there is another, though perhaps lesser, problem with Professor Stoebuck's dominant-tenement criterion for treating certain land-use regulations as takings and not others. In principle, there is no apparent reason why the government always should be disqualified from enjoying the benefits of legitimate police-power zoning, even where the government happens, in a given locale, to be the primary or even sole beneficiary of the zoning regulations.41

In summary, the lesson which Professor Stoebuck draws from the other eminent domain cases, involving trespassory and non-trespassory takings, appears to be a sound one: the common strain of those cases is that takings are typically characterized by compulsory transfers to the government of commonly recognized varieties of property interests. To differentiate police-power takings from non-compensable regulations, however, a distinction must be made which, unhappily, the transfer theory of taking does not address.

III. ECONOMIC INTERESTS/LEGAL INTERESTS

Land has value because the use of land has value. Any event which impairs the usefulness or potential of a piece of land will, almost certainly, impair its value as well. This relationship between useful-

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41. One practical concern may be the ineluctable conflict of interest faced by a governmental body which is considering, e.g., restrictive zoning to enhance the value of its own real estate. The height limitations on buildings in Washington, D.C., which allegedly preserve the grandeur of government edifices, may be the nation's most prominent example. D.C. CODE § 5-405. Interestingly, Congress withheld the authority to increase permissible building heights as one of a few exceptions when it conferred home rule status on the District of Columbia. D.C. CODE § 1-147. See Larrabee v. Bell, 10 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1926).
ness and value makes it appear that there is a fundamental inconsistency in the law of just compensation. The law purports to relieve completely against the value losses resulting from certain governmental acts, such as physical intrusions and interferences, and not at all with respect to others, most particularly, regulations on use. Yet all of this is supposed to be consistent with "fairness and justice."44

From an economic perspective, it seems inexplicable that the Constitution should require the compensation of losses resulting from impairments of physical possession, but not of comparable losses of value resulting from restrictions on use. On the one hand, it is the owner's economic interest in land—his interest in its value—which is the primary interest compensated by payments of just compensation.45 On the other hand, if outcomes are any guide to purpose, it is clearly not the economic interest which the law is directed to protect.46 In any event, it does not appear possible to explain variations among case outcomes in terms of variant detrimental effects which different governmental acts have on owners' economic interests. The effect of governmental acts on the owner's economic interest in his land is simply too general a factor to differentiate cases of regulation from cases of taking; it is present—to the owner's detriment—in both.

By contrast, even a superficial comparison of the typical non-police-power takings cases (trespassory and non-trespassory) with land-use regulation cases reveals a striking difference between them in the kinds of legal property interests which are allegedly invaded. In takings cases the property interests at stake always include legally actionable rights which the owner has in relation to others' behavior, chiefly

42. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893) ("the compensation must be a full and perfect equivalent for the property taken"); see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979); United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506 (1979); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943); Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16-18 (1933). The physical intrusions and interferences referred to are no longer limited to ouster or the appropriation of an affirmative easement. See supra note 15 and infra text accompanying notes 111-13.


45. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374-75 (1943). It is the owner's loss, not the taker's gain, that is the measure of the value of the property taken. Id. at 375. Market value is the normal measure. Id. at 374. See generally Annot., 60 L. Ed. 2d 1107 (1980) and 19 L. Ed. 2d 1361 (1968).

46. "[T]he decisions . . . uniformly reject the proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish a 'taking' . . . ." Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978). See also cases cited supra note 6; Sax, supra note 8, at 51-53 ("if we look to what the Court has done, . . . the Court has not treated protection of values as its primary goal").
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rights to others’ forbearance from such acts as trespasses, ousters, and
nuisances. In cases of non-compensable regulation, the interest at
stake is solely the owner’s freedom to use and enjoy the land which he
owns.

Both of these legal property interests, namely, the right to others’
forbearance and the freedom to use and enjoy, are valuable; both are
part of the owner’s economic interest in his land. Nevertheless, the
two represent different ideas which are conceptually distinguishable
in several fundamental ways. The remainder of this Article will be
concerned in considerable part with further exploring the conceptu-
ally distinctive characteristics of the two interests and elaborating
their differences. The difference which is key to this inquiry, how-
ever, is a difference not in their characteristics but rather in their
significances: a taking of property under the just-compensation clause
is almost always found when government acts impair or destroy le-
gally actionable rights; conversely, such a taking is almost never
found where the government’s acts merely affect the freedom to use
and enjoy. That is, the distinction between rights as against others

47. E.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (“the ‘right to exclude’ . . . [is one] that the Government cannot take without compensation. This is not a case in which the Government is exercising its regulatory power . . . [to] cause an insubstantial devaluation”). The demonstration and elaboration of the proposition in the text are the crux of this Article—and their statement here, unsupported for the moment, is only for purposes of introduction. See also infra text accompanying note 48.

48. E.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962) (“the fact that [an ordinance] deprives the property of its most beneficial use does not render it unconstitutional”); see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), quoted infra text accompanying note 123.

49. The analysis which follows is by no means the first to distinguish between legally enforceable rights and freedoms, nor are the commentators and judicial opinions in the just-compensation area the first to overlook it. Hobbes criticized Lord Coke for missing its significance (T. Hobbes, Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England 73 (J. Cropsey ed. 1971)), and Bentham and Salmond, among others, made the distinction. See R. Dias, Jurisprudence 34-35 (4th ed. 1976). However, Hohfeld deserves credit for the first systematic specification of a comprehensive set of jural concepts, of which right and freedom are two. W. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions 35-50 (Cook ed. 1919) (also found at 23 Yale L.J. 16 (1913)). Hohfeld used the word “privilege” to designate the concept which this author calls a freedom. However, the word “privilege” is too misleading, both as a matter of ordinary and legal usage as well as etymology, to be a suitable name for what is, essentially, a vestige of a pre-legal-intervention state of affairs.

One important embellishment on Hohfeld’s scheme is to include the government as one of the actors on the jural scene. Although the government’s rights and duties are not the same as those of its subjects, there nevertheless is a possibility and routine practice of measuring the conformity of governmental acts to legal norms to which the government ostensibly submits. See infra notes 54, 101, and 103. It is in this light that the government will be treated not merely as an arbiter but also as a jural actor, though one with special prerogatives. Further elaboration on this analytical account of the government’s role as actor appears infra note 54.

50. The exceptions fall into two categories. First are the remaining vestiges of the now largely abandoned physical intrusion criterion of taking. See supra note 15 and infra notes 109, 111, 112, and 114. Second are the redistributive takings of rights for other than public use. See infra text accompanying notes 184-221.

51. See infra text accompanying notes 125-56 where the exceptional cases are reconciled with the theory being presented.
and freedoms to use appears to fix the line between takings and regulation.

Certainly, the rights/freedoms dichotomy has not usually been the ostensible basis for any court’s decision. Accordingly, the approach of this Article is rather like that of a chemist, observing phenomena which appear to have their own (perhaps unknowable) “natural” ontological logic, and afterwards positing a coherent explanatory structure for purposes of our own understanding. Unlike the chemist’s result, however, the result here is probably less arbitrary than, say, a molecular theory superimposed on nature; for the ontology of a body of law is comprised not of material phenomena, but rather of judicial decisions which have been made in furtherance of policy goals. Though courts may not always consciously articulate the policy distinctions underlying their decisions, it is likely that the analytical distinctions which can explain their decisions will closely parallel the unarticulated operative distinctions.

IV. Property Rights and Freedoms

The distinction between “rights” and “freedoms” is a distinction between two stipulatively defined concepts, each of which covers a significant, but quite different portion of what is generally understood as property interests. The words selected to designate those concepts are words taken from ordinary usage. It is solely to the concepts defined below, however, and not to any other meanings in ordinary usage, that the words “right” and “freedom” will refer in this Article.

The property interest referred to as a right is defined as the legal advantage of having the physical or moral power of the government invocable by legal action in order to induce the compliance of others or to redress others’ non-compliance with some particular set of behavioral requirements. In more mundane tones, the holder of a right is one who has a cause of action against those others who are

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52. The reference to moral power, in addition to physical power, accounts for legal actions which seek declaratory judgments or nominal damages. More broadly, the realistic threat of an adverse result in a legal action and the common desire to conform and behave in accordance with law are also part of the moral power of the government and, hence, of the legal advantage constituting a right. The potential cause of action, however, is the cornerstone of the conception of “right” as defined herein.

53. The behavioral requirements are subject, of course, to contingencies and these contingencies comprise, in general, all of the operative facts of the cause of action other than the defendant’s behavior itself.

Incidentally, behavior requires a somewhat stretched definition where the rights in question relate to certain kinds of causes of action, e.g., breaches of contractual representations and warranties, breaches of promises as to the behavior of others, and claims of strict liability in tort or claims similarly founded on circumstances outside the control of defendants. As these possibilities appear to have little to do with the rights usually associated with property, they were disregarded in selecting the word “behavior” to describe defendants’ connection with causes of action.
subject to specified behavioral requirements but who do not, or who sometimes threaten not to comply with them. The behavior-contingent cause of action is the cornerstone of a right as herein defined. The others who are subject to the behavioral requirements, and to enforcement by legal action, may be said to have a duty to comply with the particular behavioral requirements. Thus, for purposes of this discussion, the concept of duty is defined in terms of the concept of right.

Upon reflection, it appears that absent special contractual arrangements, the only rights normally comprehended by property interests in land are rights to others' (including, in general, the government's) forbearance from certain kinds of acts. Most prominent is the possessory owner's right to others' forbearance from acts in derogation of his assertion of exclusive control over who has access to his land and the conditions of such access. This particular right to forbearance shall,
for convenience but not limitation of meaning, be designated as the “right of exclusivity.” It refers generally to the legal advantage of being able to invoke the government's power to retain or regain actual physical possession, e.g., by actions in ejectment, or to redress or enjoin unlicensed intrusions, e.g., by actions in trespass.

Other property rights may arise in special situations, but they too are rights to others' forbearance. For example, the owner of an easement has a right to the servient owner's and others' forbearance from unreasonable interferences with the use of the servitude. The owner of land benefited by a restrictive covenant has the right to forbearance from stipulated behavior on the part of the owners of the land burdened by the covenant. The law of private nuisance confers a general right to others' forbearance from acts on their land which unreasonably and substantially interfere with the use and enjoyment of one's own land. Thus, to generalize, apart from special contractual arrangements, occasional equitable servitudes, or real covenants which impose affirmative burdens, the rights associated with property in land are largely concerned with others’ negative behavior. The event which they contemplate is that uninvited others stay away.

are never as absolute as the brief description in the text may imply. For example, the right to be free from invasions of others may be qualified by privileges, public and private. E.g., Proctor v. Adams, 113 Mass. 376 (1873) (“it is a very ancient rule of common law, that an entry upon land to save goods . . . is not a trespass”); Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908); see also Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1879) (privilege to destroy buildings to prevent spread of fire); Harrison v. Wisdom, 7 Tenn. (7 Heisk.) 99 (1872) (“The right to destroy property in cases of extreme emergency . . . [is a] right existing at common law, founded on necessity. . . .”). A privilege receiving more recent recognition is the state-conferred privilege to freely express oneself and to petition in certain semi-public areas of private property. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).

Of course, as an original question, and apart from the text of the Constitution, there is no reason why one of the qualifications of the right cannot be that it is inapplicable against the government. See Case of the King's Prerogative in Saltpeter, 77 Eng. Rep. 1294 (1607), and supra note 24, concerning such subordinate status in relation to the federal navigation easement. It is, however, the broad import of the just-compensation clause to limit this privileged status of the government. Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 552-53 (1914). Under the just-compensation clause, the government is not on quite the same footing as private persons because it can force a sale, but it nevertheless must, like private persons, respect private property by at least paying compensation. Still, asserting that it is the broad import of the just-compensation clause to impose limitations on the government does not answer or beg the question. The details of those limitations remain an issue, and are, indeed, precisely the issue.


57. These interests may or may not be proprietary, a point not worth arguing about. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.

58. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 826-831 (1939); 6A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 17, §§ 28.25-28.28.
The interest referred to as a freedom to use and enjoy is mostly concerned, by contrast, with the owner’s own affirmative behavior. A freedom may be defined as the legal advantage which one has when, in reference to particular behavior, others cannot by legal action invoke the physical or moral power of the government in order to redress or induce the behavior on one’s own part. Thus, a person has a freedom to engage in an activity if, or to the extent, the government has not made such activity civilly actionable at the instance of itself or others, or criminally actionable at the instance of the government itself. Phrased differently, a freedom in relation to an activity or its omission is the absence of a duty to observe another’s rights. Freedom means not being subject to causes of action.

A freedom is conceptually quite different from a right. The freedom to act in a particular way does not mean that the government’s power may be invoked to induce others’ compliance or to redress their non-compliance with any particular behavioral requirements. No causes of action are available to realize the freedom to use and enjoy, and the government will not intervene to redress its disappointment. A freedom is exercised by engaging in an act or an activity or omitting to act if the freedom is negative; a right is typically exercised by instituting a lawsuit.

The most prominent of the freedoms associated with property interests are the freedoms to use and enjoy, in either general or particular ways. These freedoms of use and enjoyment can be seen as a part of the larger freedom to engage in any non-proscribed acts, activities, or omissions. The comparatively wide residual freedom of activities on one’s own land, however, a locale as to which others generally have few rights, has the appearance of being rooted in the property interest itself. This appearance, though, is relative. The general duty to avoid activities on others’ land, and a limitation on the permis-
sible activities on public or state-owned land, simply leaves one's own land as the only locale where natural liberty remains relatively unimpaired.

The freedom to use and enjoy land is sometimes referred to as the right of use and enjoyment. Within the definition of right as used in this Article, however, there could be no such thing as a right of use and enjoyment. The only direct legal advantage which the law can confer in relation to one's own activities, such as use and enjoyment, is a freedom from successful legal actions by others, i.e., an immunity from judgments. Enforcing the right to others' forbearance from interfering with one's own activities does, of course, indirectly protect the freedom to engage in such activities. Yet such enforcement directly protects only the right to forbearance and not, strictly speaking, the freedom, as those two are conceptually distinguished. By its nature, freedom cannot itself be violated or redressed. Rather, a freedom is a behavioral possibility with which the government will not interfere at all, neither to support nor to obstruct, except to enforce any associated rights.

To summarize and further illuminate the distinction between the concepts which this Article designates as property rights and freedoms as they relate to land, the two may be compared point by point as follows:

1. Rights are concerned solely with others' activities, primarily their forbearance from interferences (broadly speaking) with the land, but conceivably also forbearance from other interferences (e.g., with the use of an easement) or from other acts (e.g., nuisances, violations of negative easements). Such rights to forbearance may, as a practical matter, be the predicate of use and enjoyment, but they are not a legal guaranty thereof.

Freedoms, by contrast, are concerned with the activities of the person having the freedom, not others' activities, and freedoms contemplate no necessary participation, cooperation or involvement of others for their exercise and, more importantly, guaranty none.

64. In public areas owned by the government (e.g., streets), the limited permission or license idea might be better framed in terms of special regulations applicable to areas which are not owned privately or by the government in a proprietor-like capacity (e.g., the state capitol). The consequences of the distinction appear to be negligible.

65. See infra text accompanying notes 71-75 for further elaboration.

66. This statement is limited to the context of the rights/freedoms dichotomy presented by this Article. Statements about rights to use and enjoy in the course of general usage are a semantically different matter. See infra text accompanying note 81. Of course, general usage may obscure important conceptual distinctions—precisely the reason for the careful differentiation of certain definitions in this Article.

67. There may be a legal right to enjoy a particular freedom, i.e., it may be a specific tort for others to prevent exercise of the freedom. For example, the general freedom of movement is supported by the tort of false imprisonment. More commonly, though, it is the general personal and property torts which support the wide residuum of freedoms to engage generally in non-proscribed activities. The frequent presence of ad hoc or general rights which support the exercise of freedoms does not make the two the same thing.

68. See supra note 67.
2. Rights impose, through correlative duties, mandatory behavioral requirements on others, which requirements are enforceable by legal actions for damages, sometimes for specific relief (injunction), and sometimes by the government's power to punish. 69

Freedoms, by contrast, carry no warrant for government intervention in the event of disappointment in their exercise except indirectly where the violation of some right is causally responsible for the disappointment. The concept of "freedom," however, does imply immunity from judgment or lawful action—legal action or self-help—founded upon the disappointments to others which exercise of the freedom may entail.

3. Rights are created by the government in the sense that the legal apparatus of the government is what specifies the behavioral requirements to be imposed, identifies the claims to be enforced, and provides the mechanism for legal enforcement. 70

Freedoms, by contrast, seemingly pre-exist intervention by the government, and are not dependent upon the government for their exercise except insofar as a right to others' forbearance may be a practical predicate for their exercise.

4. Rights apply, respectively, only to specific areas of land and are advantageous to the holder only in relation to the specific areas to which they apply.

Freedoms, by contrast, apply more to the person than to specific areas of land; i.e., they benefit the holder wherever he may be, subject to location-contingent regulations applicable to particular places. Restrictions on the freedom to use and enjoy land are frequently location-contingent. 71 Land-use regulations, however, are by no means always location-contingent, 72 and restrictions of freedom that have little to do with land-use regulations frequently are location-contingent. 73 Since land is immovable, location-

69. Insofar as a criminal action to punish is treated as an enforcement of private property rights, the government's standing might be viewed properly as vicarious or derivative. The government has, of course, its own interest in faithful observance of its criminal laws.

70. As Jeremy Bentham wrote, with apodictic aplomb: "Property and law are born together, and die together. Before laws were made, there was no property; take away laws and property ceases." J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION, PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE, pt. 1, 112 (E. Dumont ed. 1864).

This dictum, which rather presupposes the non-legality of such supergovernmental institutions as international law and extra-governmental institutions as customary law, may or may not be regarded as true, depending largely on the definitions which one chooses to supply to the various words comprising it. Certainly, the sudden disappearance of organized government would probably not occasion the immediate or even eventual demise of the institution of property or the behavioral patterns associated with that institution. Nevertheless, legal property (which, by an almost undeniable process of mutual influence, is closely congruent with any possible institution of extra-legal property) could not exist without the familiar supportive legal apparatus. In any event, what the just-compensation clause may mean in a legal system which offers no other legal protection for property expectations is a question that is highly academic.

71. E.g., environmental and historic preservation regulations, and zoning.

72. For example, prohibitions on growing marijuana or producing alcoholic beverages (Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)); mining gold (United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958)); building unsafe houses and suffering unreasonable hazards to invitees, are all regulations upon freedom and, by extension, are non-location-contingent restrictions on land use.

73. E.g., prohibition of abortions except in hospitals and authorized clinics; prohibition of nudity in areas open to public view; prohibitions on driving over 30 m.p.h. except outside of
contingent restrictions on activities may appear to be deductions from the ownership interest in land rather than deductions from the hypothetical pre-government natural liberty of those who are on it.\textsuperscript{74} By corollary, it may be said that the freedom to use and enjoy is derived from ownership. Nevertheless, it is at least as accurate to say such freedoms exist, and perhaps persist, because they are not impaired as a result of others' ownership.\textsuperscript{75}

Of course, both rights and freedoms have economic value, and the holder is properly concerned with preserving both: the pinch can be as hard whether the government impairs a freedom or takes a right. Nevertheless, for better or worse, the just-compensation clause has not been interpreted as a policy to protect economic values,\textsuperscript{76} but as a protection for only those values consisting of rights.

The legal significance of the rights/freedoms dichotomy becomes quite visible when one compares borderline cases such as the factually similar cases of \textit{United States v. Pewee Coal Co.}\textsuperscript{77} and \textit{United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co.}\textsuperscript{78} Both of these cases involved government intervention, as a wartime measure, into mining operations of private companies. In \textit{Pewee}, to avert a nationwide strike, the United States took possession of most of the nation's coal mines, requiring mine officials to act as "agents" of the government, and otherwise exerted dominion and control. A compensable taking was held to result. In contrast, in \textit{Central Eureka}, no compensable taking was found when the government merely prohibited the operation of gold mines in order to conserve equipment and manpower for the mining of more essential ores. In terms of the right/freedom analysis, the distinction is obvious: in \textit{Pewee}, there was an elimination of rights by ouster from possession,\textsuperscript{79} while in \textit{Central Eureka} only freedoms to use were affected. These two cases demonstrate how the substantive difference between rights and freedoms can be legally significant in distinguishing compensable takings from other, non-compensable cities and villages, and—quite importantly—prohibitions of any unlicensed activity on land belonging to others (as a result of their rights of exclusivity).

\textsuperscript{74} On reflection, it is rather curious that land-use regulations have become so widely regarded as property rules, having to do with the dimensions of ownership rather than personal freedom. Regulations on the use of particular types of chattels are not similarly viewed. For example, the rules against assault with deadly weapons, though applicable to only certain kinds of chattels, such as guns and knives, are generally not regarded as having to do with the property or dimensions of ownership in such chattels.

\textsuperscript{75} This includes the government's ownership of government-owned land. \textit{See supra} note 64.

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{See supra} text accompanying notes 42-46. Whether the policy is for better or worse, or, as Sax says, preposterous, \textit{supra} note 8, at 48, see \textit{infra} text accompanying notes 177-84.

\textsuperscript{77} 341 U.S. 114 (1951).
\textsuperscript{78} 357 U.S. 155 (1958).

\textsuperscript{79} Possession is the traditional factual predicate of actions in trespass or nuisance. \textit{See infra} note 96.
governmental actions that similarly affect economic values. The distinction is not a mere formality barren of substance.\footnote{This was alleged by Sax, supra note 8, at 47-48. Sax's assertion that Central Eureka represents an application of the now obsolete "physical intrusion" requirement for a taking, see supra note 15, is similarly beside the mark. The case is perfectly consistent with cases holding that, absent physical invasion, a compensable taking of rights can occur. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.}

It is perhaps important to make clear what the foregoing distinction between freedoms and rights does not mean to say. First, it does not mean to say that, as a matter of general usage, there is an error or impropriety in utilizing the word right to refer to the concept designated earlier as a freedom. It is common to refer to a right to use and enjoy land, or to recognize that such right of use and enjoyment is part of the bundle of rights that comprise ownership or property.\footnote{E.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945); see supra note 15; B. Ackerman, supra note 12, at 27; Stoebuck, supra note 19, at 1091.} Such usage is simply too widespread and familiar to be wrong or improper, or to be extirpated even if it were. In any case, to further emphasize, the distinction that is important to this discussion is not between meanings of words. The essential distinction is between the stipulatively defined concepts that have been designated rights and freedoms. It is this author's thesis that, distinguishing between these two defined subtypes of property interests carefully, there is not, and cannot be, a right to use and enjoy land, only a freedom to do so.

Second, and more significantly, it has not been suggested, nor will it be, that the constitutional meaning of property in the just-compensation clause can properly refer only to rights and not freedoms, as those terms are used in this Article or otherwise. The bundle of legal interests comprising ownership or property obviously can be seen to include freedoms as well as rights, not to mention a number of other interests which, according to the usage of Hohfeld,\footnote{See supra note 49.} may be denominated as powers, immunities, disabilities, liabilities, and no-rights. There is no reason a priori why the just-compensation definition of property should include one, or some, but not all of these interests. However, the holdings of Supreme Court cases point unambiguously to the conclusion that the just-compensation clause meaning of property \textit{does not} include freedoms, at least not the freedoms of use and enjoyment. Unlike rights, these freedoms apparently may be taken or destroyed without payment of compensation. Indeed, it turns out that a very good definition of police-power regulation is simply a governmental act which effects such a taking or destruction of freedoms alone.
V. APPLYING THE RIGHT/FREEDOM ANALYSIS

The value of a legal test depends upon several factors including ease of application, conformity to the existing body of both germane and analogous cases, and suggestiveness of plausible policy underpinnings for the distinctions which it makes. A test of constitutional taking based upon the rights/freedoms dichotomy is at least as easy to apply as the "fairness and justice" factors which are its "no set formula" precursors. To show its conformity with the existing body of law, its predictions will be compared with the results of a number of representative holdings, primarily recent Supreme Court decisions. Following this comparison, attention will be given to possible policy underpinnings of just-compensation law which are suggested by a test employing the rights/freedoms dichotomy.

A. Physical Intrusion Cases

Appropriating possession of privately held land, or making physical use of it as though under an affirmative easement, both constitute compensable takings of private property. In these situations, there is a limitation or elimination—in effect, a transfer to the government—of both the owner's rights of exclusivity and his freedom to use and enjoy. Taking possessory title eliminates both, and taking an affirmative easement limits both by subjecting the rights to an exception, for the government, and the freedoms to a qualification—forbearance from unreasonably interfering with the government's freedom to use. The distinction between rights and freedoms does not play a visible role in these cases of physical appropriation or use since, under their facts, the property interests which are taken include both rights and freedoms. The rights/freedoms dichotomy is not, however, inconsistent with such cases.

It is important to note that, in order for a physical intrusion to constitute a compensable taking, the physical intrusion must take a right away—that is, the effect of the intrusion must be to deprive the

83. See supra text accompanying notes 9 and 44. It has often been repeated that these determinations can only be decided case-by-case. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). This, of course, is no test at all.

84. The comparison is between the predictions and holdings, or hypothetical holdings mentioned in dicta. The right/freedom dichotomy does not play a prominent role in the stated rationales in such cases, though this is hardly to be expected in light of the wandering past of just-compensation theory.


86. E.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); see additional cases infra note 100.

87. See supra note 56.
owner of factual predicates, e.g., possession, for one or more causes of action which he might otherwise have had, either immediately or subsequently. When the government merely violates a right, or indirectly defeats its enforcement, but does not take the right away, no taking occurs, even though the effect on use and enjoyment may be disastrous.

Under the right/freedom analysis the explanation for these no-takings cases is that acts in derogation of rights are not necessary deprivations of rights. That is, even though an act of the government might, if committed by others, be actionable as a tort, it will not necessarily constitute a taking. To be a taking, there must be an act which is tortious and which has the further legal effect of depriving an owner of the prior-existing factual predicates for one or more potential causes of action. Only then would the owner be deprived of rights.


89. E.g., Mullen Benevolent Co. v. United States, 290 U.S. 89 (1933); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923) (requisition of steel which was contractually committed to plaintiff, frustrating plaintiff's contract rights); see infra note 90.

90. E.g., trespass or nuisance. Note, however, that government acts in this category are not necessarily tortious in character. For example, in Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923), when the government requisitioned steel contractually committed to plaintiff, the effect was to totally frustrate its contract rights. However, acts of a private person that result in comparable frustration of a contract might not be an actionable tort. See Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927); W. Prosser, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 129, at 938-42 (4th ed. 1971).

91. The reason why there must be a tortious act by the government or one acting under government auspices is examined infra note 93.

92. For example, ouster from possession deprives the owner of the prior-existing factual predicates of standing to maintain a trespass or nuisance action. See discussion infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.

93. Remember that the cause of action is the cornerstone of the right concept, as herein defined. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.

Apparently, the mere elimination of bases for inchoate causes of action is not enough to invoke the just-compensation requirement. See United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256, 267-68 (1939). There must also be conduct which occasions such actions, e.g., an entry into possession or a use of somebody's land by government or under its auspices. In the first place, the mere elimination of bases for legal action without conduct occasioning such action, e.g., the mere declaration by Congress of avigation easements, would not likely result in any loss to the owners and, hence, the just amount of compensation would be zero. Cf. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 94 n.39 (1978) (no compensation for new legal limitation of liability for nuclear accidents).

There is more to the matter, however. Consider, for example, a congressional declaration that there is an easement for avigation within bounds prescribed by Federal Aviation Administration regulations, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301(29), 1304 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The declaration in itself would not seem to be a basis for compensating anyone. As to high-level aviation, nothing would be taken ("Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum" was obiter dictum), and low-level aviation (takeoffs and landings) would only be a contingent possibility. Nevertheless, the use of near-earth airspace over specific lands, by the government or under its auspices, may trigger compensation if subjacent owners are injured. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962). But cf. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), where extension of navigation easement to
Tortious acts of the government short of a taking of rights may, of course, be actionable if, as to them, sovereign immunity has been waived.\textsuperscript{94} Actionable or not, however, the test of taking would be whether the government acts to detrimentally alter the factual predicates of the affected owner's rights.

A typical right-depriving governmental act would be the ouster of an owner from possession.\textsuperscript{95} Such an ouster would constitute a taking of rights and not a mere violation of rights because the effect of an

\begin{enumerate}
\item Previous fast lands was held to require compensation; however, surface intrusions are probably more likely to result ipso facto in injury whereas avigational intrusions are not.
\item Congress's declaration of the avigation easement resembles a state law that permits counties to build roads and allows automobile speeds of up to 55 m.p.h. "unless otherwise posted." Such a law would not make it any less tortious to drive through my neighbor's yard at 55 m.p.h. without his permission. If the county, however, establishes a street through my neighbor's yard, as was done in \textit{Griggs v. Allegheny County} with a landing approach, compensation could not be denied on the grounds that all drivers were obeying the traffic safety laws. Again, though, a law authorizing the county to put in the street would not trigger a taking until the street was established, and the congressionally declared avigation easement triggers no compensation until it is used to the point of injury cognizable under the just-compensation clause, viz., with such regularity an easement by prescription could, in time, arise. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748-49 (1947). Note that under \textit{Griggs}, the taker of an easement who is liable to pay compensation is the one whose actions prompted the overflights, not the authorizing government nor the private users acting under the taker's auspices. \textit{Cf.} Yearsley v. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940).
\item One may query whether avigation easements will eventually achieve the status of navigation easements, viz., become such longstanding potential qualifications on the right of exclusivity and other forbearances that new burdens incidental to their exercise will be treated as non-compensable. \textit{See supra} note 24. There is a good policy reason for resisting such a denouement. The navigation easement deprives an owner of only a peculiar advantage which he might otherwise enjoy as occupant of specially situated (riparian) lands, a peculiar advantage which he perhaps had no reason ever to expect to enjoy anyway. Ignorantia legis non excusat. However, the avigation easement deprives an owner of an ordinary advantage which he has every reason to expect to enjoy since there is no way of knowing in advance that an airport will become his neighbor.
\item \textit{See cases cited supra} note 85.
\end{enumerate}
ouster is to deprive the owner of possession, a prior-existing predicate for causes of action.96 Another right-depriving governmental act would be a set of repeated trespasses by means of which the government acquires an easement by inverse condemnation.97 Such repeated trespasses, unlike isolated trespasses, would deprive the owner of the history of exclusivity which is the factual predicate for legal actions to redress future incursions, analogously to situations where private easements are acquired by prescription. A taking also may occur when legal actions previously available against others than the government are drawn beneath the umbrella of sovereign immunity, as when the government acquires property which was subject to a private lien.98

The government’s power to invoke sovereign immunity complicates this analysis when applied to takings of affirmative easements by inverse condemnation.99 The operative fact of such takings is a course of repeated trespasses by the government100 resulting in an easement which can, in turn, legitimate subsequent incursions. Because of the government's power to invoke sovereign immunity, however, the owner may never have had any possible causes of action to prevent governmental trespasses in the first place.101 If not, then from the above definition of right it would follow that the owner may not lose any rights at all when the government acquires an affirmative easement by inverse condemnation.102


97. See infra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.

98. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (materialman’s lien). The lien became unenforceable by reason of sovereign immunity once the subject property was acquired by the government.

99. See supra note 30.

100. See United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 749, 751 (1947) (intermittent flooding; analogized to easement by prescription); Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933) (intermittent flooding); Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922) (repeated shooting over private land).

101. There is some support for this view. According to Justice Holmes: “A sovereign is exempt from suit . . . on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.” Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).

However, Holmes’s conclusion is compelled by neither logic nor practicality. Logically, a sovereign which specifies behavioral requirements and sanctions for non-observance can do so equally with regard to itself and to its legal subjects. As noted earlier, supra note 54, as a purely practical matter the sovereign’s self-imposed requirements and consequences are no more and no less at the sovereign’s whim than those imposed by the sovereign on others. At best, Holmes’s statement reflects the arbitrary definitional limitations on the concept of “law properly so called” which are implicit in Austinian positivism, viz., that law is a command of the sovereign backed up by a sanction. J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 11-16, 253-56 (1954). See R. DIAS, supra note 49, at 457-80.

102. It is not necessarily the case that, where the government takes an affirmative easement, the right of exclusivity is lost only as against the government. Sec. e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United
The analytical exit from this circle is to expand slightly upon the definition of "right" in order to specify the relation between rights and sovereign immunity: As against the government, rights are stipulated to include the entitlements to legal recourse which a person would have but for sovereign immunity alone. Phrased differently, sovereign immunity is viewed to mean not that private owners have no rights against the government, but only that, without the government's consent, the courts cannot enforce those rights. This definition of rights in relation to sovereign immunity is consistent with the decided cases.

Sovereign immunity has been allowed to shelter the government from liability for isolated trespasses. When the government commits repeated trespasses, however, amounting to the enjoyment of an easement-type of interest, the cases have required compensation for such inverse condemnations of affirmative easements. The government's course of action in such cases has not been regarded merely as trespasses, actionable or not, depending on the waiver of sovereign immunity as to torts. Rather, such repeated trespasses are treated by

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103. There is also support for this view. First, the very jargon of sovereign immunity ("consent to be sued," "waiver," and the term "immunity" itself) implies that the doctrine stands between the right-holder and his remedy, but not as the annihilator of the right itself. See United States v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 274, 281-82 (1941) (liens on property acquired by United States are not enforceable but nevertheless valid); accord Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960). Similar support is found in the cases which hold that consent-to-suit legislation such as the Tucker Act, see supra note 94, creates only jurisdiction and not any substantive rights, implying that the rights pre-exist the waiver of sovereign immunity. E.g., United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980).

Second, the ancient substantive counterpart of sovereign immunity—that "the King can do no wrong"—does not, by definition, have any apparent application to a government of limited constitutional powers. For example, if the government were to take "private property . . . for public use, without just compensation," the act would have to be considered a legal wrong if the constitutional just-compensation clause has any meaning at all. The wrong may not be compensable because of sovereign immunity, see supra note 94, but the absence of a remedy does not ipso facto make the act rightful. See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Power of the Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1370-71 (1953).

To be sure, constitutions can be amended and thus, perhaps, in an ultimate sense no government is constitutionally limited and, hence, can do substantive wrong. Nevertheless, until such legitimizing amendments are adopted, American governments are legally constrained by the amendment procedures and the ambient constitutional text, as interpreted. The protections therein promised—whatever Austin or Holmes may say—are properly denominated constitutional law. See supra note 101 for references to Austin and Holmes; see also supra note 54. Nevertheless, the distinction made here is fairly metaphysical, and the point is best resolved by inference from the decided cases which follow infra.

104. See supra note 88.

105. See cases cited supra notes 86 and 100.

as the operative facts of right deprivations and therefore, compensable takings, irrespective of whether sovereign immunity has been waived as to the tort of trespass itself. Accordingly, to account for the cases, the definition of rights for purposes of the right/freedom analysis should include entitlements to legal recourse which an owner would have but for sovereign immunity alone. Consonant with this definition sovereign immunity merely affects the availability of a remedy for tortious governmental acts in violation of an owner's rights, not the existence of the rights themselves.

B. Servitude Deprivation Cases

Where the government deprives an owner of an existing affirmative easement over another's land or of access onto a road or street, the owner loses a freedom to use and enjoy the servient land, road, or street and, derivatively, the freedom to use his own land may be curtailed. Such easement and access deprivations are compensated.

Under the right/freedom analysis, the basis for such compensation is navigation easement. Black's position was that the overflights were at best torts and at that time immune from action because of sovereign immunity. The majority, however, did not accept this just trespassing defense where the overflights were frequent, regular, and at low altitudes.

107. The appropriateness of this view is further suggested by the apparent just-compensation clause policy to put the government on approximately the same footing as private persons with respect to the acquisition or destruction of property rights, whatever may be its sovereign immunity with respect to ordinary civil actions. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24.

108. From this it should follow that the withdrawal by the government of a waiver of sovereign immunity would not constitute a compensable taking. Cf. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 281-82 (1980); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (dissenting opinion) (no compensation for losses which are a consequential incidence of sovereign immunity). A case such as Armstrong v. United States, see supra note 98 and accompanying text, is, however, distinguishable since there the government was not withdrawing a waiver of sovereign immunity but rather bringing within the immunity's reach a potential cause of action not previously subject to it. The taking may thus be viewed as the act of subjecting an existing right to a new limitation (consent of sovereign sued). Accord Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (extension of navigational servitude to previously fast lands). By contrast, rights against government are always subject to the consent limitation; thus, a withdrawal of its waiver of sovereign immunity does not result in any new limitation on such rights and, hence, no taking. Cf. supra note 24 (regarding private losses from exercise of the navigation easement).


Where access is lost as a result of a change of street grade, an anomaly rooted in history prevents uniform application of the right/freedom analysis. Lines of authority dating back to the case of Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418 (1823) deny compensation in such change-of-grade situations and, as such, represent continued influence within a narrow sphere of the now generally repudiated physical intrusion criterion of taking. See Stoebuck, supra note 15, at 314-19, 757-60. Under the change-of-grade cases, neither takings of rights nor takings of freedoms are compensable, but on the obsolete ground that the change-of-grade involves no physical intrusion. Such results are inconsistent with the prediction of the right/freedom analysis, viz., that the taking of rights, which they involve, will be compensable.
not the owner's loss of his freedom to use but his loss of the right to the government's forbearance from interfering with his affirmative easement (right of use) over the neighboring land, road, or street. This result may be described as a compulsory transfer or release of such right to the government, typically as servient owner, into whose title the right, and easement, merge. As was the case with takings of possessory title or new affirmative easements, though, the right/freedom dichotomy plays no visible role here since both rights and freedoms are taken.

A similar situation is presented by the cases where the government takes an existing negative easement which someone owns with respect to neighboring land or takes a natural servitude in the nature of a negative easement over neighboring land. In both situations a taking is now generally held to occur. Likewise, when the government acquires a servitude to burden private land with a nuisance, many cases now require a payment of compensation. This might be expected since the duty of a landowner to refrain from nuisances is a kind of natural servitude, in the nature of a negative easement. In these situations, the government's act has caused a private owner to lose the right to have the neighboring owner, the government, forbear, either as restricted by the negative easement or as required by the law of natural servitudes or nuisance. The loss of such rights may also be accompanied by an impairment of use and enjoyment, but it is the loss of the rights, not the impaired use, which would be controlling under the right/freedom analysis.

110. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
111. E.g., Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 625 (1963) (natural riparian servitude entitling owner to non-interference with continued flow; analogized to taking of affirmative easement); United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950) (natural drainage servitude); Adaman Mut. Water Co. v. United States, 278 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1960) (affirmative servitude to pay assessments); Town of Stamford v. Vuono, 108 Conn. 359, 143 A. 245 (1928) (simile); Allen v. City of Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 133 N.W. 317 (1911) (restrictive covenant). See generally 2 P. Nichols, supra note 1, § 5.73; Stoebuck, supra note 15, at 301-10. The only constitutional ground offered by cases contra seems to be that restrictive covenants are not property—a throwback to the obsolete physical-intrusion criterion of taking. See Stoebuck, supra note 15 at 301-10, and supra note 109.
113. I.e., to refrain from acts which substantially and unreasonably interfere with others' use and enjoyment of their land. See supra note 10.
114. See cases cited in supra note 112. As was the case with respect to takings of negative easements and change-of-grade, there is authority to the contrary. Again, these lines of cases trace back to precedents from the time when the physical test of taking held sway and the only rights which were thought to be compensable were the rights of exclusivity. See Ferguson v. City of Keene, 108 N.H. 409, 238 A.2d 1 (1968). As atavistic holdovers from a time when the evident policy of the law was different, these results have an acceptable explanation which does not
C. Regulation Cases—Acquisition of Negative Easements

Finally, this leaves the cases where the government acquires a negative easement that impresses a new servitude on a private owner's land. Such acquisitions may be accomplished compulsorily by condemnation, but because negative easements do not involve a physical intrusion by the holder onto the servient land, they cannot be acquired by inverse condemnation as that term is generally understood. That is to say, we cannot speak of a requirement that the government pay for carrying on an intrusive activity which would be actionable but which is not, as against the government, enjoinderable.

Nevertheless, when the government adopts land-use regulations, it acquires, in practical effect, compulsory negative easements in gross over the regulated land. Such regulations create new rights in the government to enforce acts or forbearances on the part of landowners, and, correspondingly, may affect the burdened landowner adversely. Thus, the suspicion is raised that such police-power regulations may be, in effect, compensable takings. Under the right/freedom analysis, however, such land-use regulations would not per se be considered compensable takings because, though they reduce the owner's freedoms to use and enjoy by imposing duties on the owner, they do not affect or reduce his rights as such. This prediction of the right/freedom analysis, with reconcilable exceptions, is in fact the law.

As early as 1887, in *Mugler v. Kansas*, the Supreme Court declared that police-power limitations on land use were simply outside the purview of the just-compensation clause.

A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals or safety of the community, cannot, in any sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit.

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detract from the framework of theory for modern cases set forth in this Article. See generally *supra* notes 15 and 109.

115. See 3 P. Nichols, *supra* note 1, § 9.221[1].
116. See *supra* note 30.
117. It is subject to the consent requirements of sovereign immunity. See *supra* note 94.
118. See *supra* text accompanying notes 90-107. Federal takings by eminent domain cannot be enjoined so long as adequate provision for compensation is made, and the power to sue the compensation in federal courts amounts to such a provision. Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104 (1932); Crozier v. Friederick Krupp A.S., 224 U.S. 290, 306 (1912).
119. See *supra* text accompanying notes 34-40.
120. See *infra* text accompanying notes 125-56.
121. 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (upheld prohibition on manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages, adversely affecting plaintiff's brewery).
122. Concerning the police power, see *supra* note 3 and *infra* text accompanying notes 125-38. For the qualification of this flat declaration for situations where the regulation goes too far, see Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), considered at text accompanying *infra* notes 139-44.
The Court’s language does imply that some external test of injuriousness might be imposed through judicial review. Later holdings, however, make it clear that the police power is not limited to eradicating conditions which are injurious by any narrow definition. Nevertheless, there are limits on the police power imposition of use, i.e., freedom, restrictions without compensation of affected owners. The explanatory power of the right/freedom analysis depends on its ability to accommodate those limits.

D. Limits on Police-Power Regulations

There are historically two distinct kinds of limitations on the regulations which may be imposed under the police power, each having its own distinct policy justifications and separate lines of supporting authorities. In Agins v. City of Tiburon, the United States Supreme Court recently made a combined and somewhat confused reference to the two kinds of limits:

The application of a general zoning law to a particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, or [if it] denies an owner economically viable use of his land.

The first type of limit referred to, the one also mentioned in Mugler, corresponds essentially to the limits on the scope, albeit extensive, of the police power itself, and is rooted in the due process clauses of the Constitution. The fourteenth amendment requirement of “equal protection of the laws” may also provide a possible limit on the police power in certain cases. See County Bd. of Arlington County v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5 (1977) (upholding ordinance which, on its face, rationally promotes legitimate social and environmental objectives). Since a developed case law on the matter as it relates to land use is lacking, and as the analytical “fit” of equal protection is seemingly identical to that of due process, equal protection will not be separately treated in the discussion that follows.

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124. See infra notes 125-38 and accompanying text; see also supra note 8. For example, in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935), the Court stated that “the police power embraces regulations designed to promote the public convenience or the general welfare, and not merely those in the interest of public health, safety and morals.” Id. at 429. In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962), the Court described the criterion as simply “reasonableness.”


126. Id. at 260 (citations omitted); accord Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978) (citations omitted): “[A] use restriction on real property may constitute a ‘taking’ if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose, or perhaps if it has an unduly harsh impact upon the owner’s use of the property.”

127. U.S. Const. amend. V: “Nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. . . .” Accord U.S. Const. amend. XIV; see supra note 3. “Legislatures may not, under the guise of the police power, impose restrictions that are unnecessary and unreasonable upon the use of private property or the pursuit of useful activities.” Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121 (1928). See cases cited infra notes 128-31 and 135.

Whether the scope of the police power defines, in part, what is substantive due process, or rather substantive due process delimits the scope of the police power, is a chicken-and-egg question which need not be addressed. See Donaldson, supra note 11, at 194-97.

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compensation clause, treats freedom regulations as takings if they go “too far.”

The first kind of limit on land-use regulations is concerned with whether, on broad balance, public objectives exist which justify the burden that a given regulation may impose on private interests, i.e., whether the restrictions have a “reasonable relationship” to some public purpose. Thus, as stated in the landmark zoning case, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., a restriction would be unconstitutional if it is “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”

Although the reasonable relationship principle has a rather long history, it is well accepted that substantive due process standards do not place particularly stringent limitations on the government’s power to act upon or regulate economic interests. This has not been a consequence of an announced abandonment of principle; rather, it is the result of the increased judicial deference to legislative determinations in economic due process cases since the late 1930’s. Nevertheless, perhaps influenced by the property protective policy of the just-compensation clause, police-power restrictions on freedom to use property sometime seem to receive somewhat stricter due process scrutiny than do economic interests generally. This is true especially in

128. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977) (regulations must rationally further some legitimate state purpose); see infra note 134; cf. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 89 (1980) (quoting test of Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934): “[T]he law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious and . . . the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.”) As recited somewhat more elaborately in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962), “To justify the State in . . . interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public . . . require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.” (quoting Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)). Discriminatory regulations in violation of the equal protection clause may also fall into this general rubric. See County Bd. of Arlington County v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5 (1977).
130. 272 U.S. at 395. The reasonable relationship principle was applied two years after Euclid to strike down, and not compensate, zoning regulations in Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928) and Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). The principle was more recently invoked in the Court’s plurality opinion and Justice Steven’s concurring opinion in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
131. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894), as quoted by Goldblatt in supra note 130. The doctrine’s more recent history is somewhat checkered. See generally McCloskey, Economic Due Process: An Exhumation And Reburial, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 34.
133. In Euclid itself, the Court said “[i]f the validity of the legislative classification . . . be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.” 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). This judicial deference has grown to the point that “when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.” Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). By 1963, “[t]he doctrine . . . that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely—[had] long since been discarded.” Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963). See generally L. Tribe, supra note 94, § 8-7, at 450-55; McCloskey, supra note 131, at 36-40.
state courts, though such stricter scrutiny possibly occurs also at the federal level as reflected by the relatively frequent mention of due process standards in cases of alleged police-power takings.

At first glance, it certainly seems legitimate that the effects on property values of regulations that restrict freedoms might be taken into the calculus of the balancing implicit in substantive due process adjudication. For present purposes, however, the most important feature of reasonable relationship limits on the police power is that they supply a theoretical basis for invalidating land-use regulations which is separate and distinct, in both its textual roots and its policy rationale, from the requirement of just compensation. Since due process requirements protect liberty as well as property, the reasonable relationship test may thus explain why regulations are sometimes struck down, especially in state courts, even though only freedoms, not rights, are impaired.

The other important limitation on the government’s power to regulate without compensation is the principle that regulations are to be treated as takings when they go “too far.” The landmark case recognizing this second type of limitation is Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. Mahon involved statewide regulation which prohibited the mining of underground coal seams where such mining would deprive the surface owner of necessary subjacent support. The regulation in effect prohibited the plaintiff coal company from making any use whatsoever of the subsurface space and occupying substance

134. For a compendious review of the state court cases, especially California, see Van Alstyne, supra note 8. Although Van Alstyne purports in his title to focus on inverse condemnation criteria, he might have better entitled his inquiry a “search for substantive due process criteria,” since it is mostly the validity, not the compensability, of regulations which his cases concern.

135. See Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 211-15, where the Court examined the police power justification for a statute and held that it was without “reasonable basis” and an “arbitrary use of governmental power”—“the very kind of thing that the taking clause of the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent.” 449 U.S. at 164.

Other fairly recent Supreme Court examples include Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 428 U.S. 104, 127, 133 n.29 (1978), quoted supra note 126; Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962), where the Court undertook to apply the reasonable relationship standard to a land-use regulation on excavations stating expressly that it was “still valid today.” See supra note 128.

In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), an ordinance limiting occupancy to “families,” narrowly defined, was struck down on due process grounds. Due to the family life implications of the regulation, the case was not limited to purely economic due process factors. The case, however, only emphasizes the close relationship between property freedoms and personal freedoms.


137. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.

138. See infra notes 145-56 and accompanying text.

139. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
which it owned. In holding that such regulations of activities went “too far” and constituted a taking of property, Justice Holmes, for the Court, wrote:

To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it. . . . While property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking . . . this is a question of degree. . . .

Although the Court’s decision in *Mahon* was that the Pennsylvania regulation effected a taking under the fifth and fourteenth amendments, no payment of just compensation was exacted. Rather the Court declared the regulation invalid through the implicit application of another substantive due process principle: to take property for public use without compensation is not due process of law.

In terms of the right/freedom analysis, the rationale of *Mahon* and similar cases is this: when a regulation of freedom leaves a landowner with no practical use of his land, the result is to render his right of exclusivity, though technically unimpaired, actually nugatory. To uphold such a regulation without compensation on the grounds that the owner’s rights are not impaired is to ride an empty hoax. The rights in such circumstances would have no more significance to the owner than title to a square on the surface of the sun. By contrast, if the regulation leaves the landowner with the possibility of substantial use of his land, his rights of exclusivity are not a mere hollow shell, but a matter of substance, albeit of reduced value as a result of the regulation. In sum, activity restrictions which technically take only freedoms and not rights can so drastically undermine the purpose for which rights are sought and conferred as to be the functional equivalent of a taking of the rights themselves. How much is too much is, of course, not susceptible of exact formulation.

It would not be appropriate, however, for the concept of functional equivalency, as an escape valve exception to a general principle, to be limited by fixed parameters.


143. Cases have evinced some variability in the judicial conception of how far is “too far.” The Supreme Court has upheld regulations which reduced property values by 75% to 90%. See *supra* note 6.

144. Although the right/freedom analysis does not provide a more precise formulation of the too far principle, it at least explains how the extent of police-power restrictions on use becomes
It has been argued that the holdings of cases such as *Mahon*, who find a taking where the value or usability of land is reduced “too much,” are actually based on the substantive due process requirement of a reasonable relationship to public objectives and do not really present just-compensation issues at all. There is some plausibility in the argument since regulations which are, for example, unduly oppressive on individuals, are theoretically subject to that substantive due process criticism. Recognition of an active substantive due process basis for striking down such regulations is not, however, without objection. To invoke substantive due process in these cases would create an enclave in the unmistakably contrary current policy of relaxed judicial scrutiny where government regulations affect only economic interests. Although, as previously suggested, such an enclave may be appropriate in view of the policy of the just-compensation clause, it is by no means necessary to explain cases like *Mahon*. Conversely, though, statements such as that of the Court in *Agins v. City of Tiburon*, that regulations which overreach the police power result in a taking, seem to miss the mark. What the stated operative facts of such overreachings really involve is not a taking of property relevant. Formerly, the entitlements to use and enjoyment have been lumped together with other property interests, so that the question posed has been: How much property interest can be taken before there is a taking of “property”? With the question thus put, the logical but authoritatively incorrect answer would be none. Hence, the traditional analysis has failed to explain the too far rationale.

By clarifying the dichotomy between property interest deprivations made in the police-power and just-compensation cases, the right/freedom analysis reveals the authoritatively operative frame of reference for adjudging what goes too far. A taking of freedom goes too far when it leaves no substantial purpose to be served by one or more rights.

The methodological advance of providing such a frame of reference should contribute to the comprehensibility, and hence, uniformity and predictability of results.

145. See *supra* note 140.

148. See *supra* quotations in note 133.
149. See *supra* text accompanying notes 133-34.
150. See *supra* text accompanying note 126; see also passage from *Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City*, quoted *supra* note 126.
151. The stated operative facts of these overreachings include no reasonable necessity, or lack of substantial public purpose, or undue oppression of private persons. Professor Van Alstyne’s article, *supra* note 8, provides an excellent breakdown of the application of these factors at the state court level.

The idea of unduly harsh or unduly oppressive in *Lawton v. Steele*, and *Penn Central*, is not synonymous with too far. The idea of unduly implies a lack of a reasonable relationship between the governmental act and a public purpose. The idea of too far could have that reference but, as noted earlier, can also refer to freedoms-takings which are the functional equivalent of rights-takings. See *supra* text accompanying notes 142-44.
without just compensation but, rather, a deprivation of property without the reasonable relationship to public objectives required by substantive due process of law.

The substantive due process requirements of a reasonable relationship and of just compensation, though related in terms of constitutional philosophy, are nevertheless distinguishable. The just-compensation clause addresses the question of whether a particular valid government act has resulted in a taking which requires compensation; the more general substantive due process question is whether the act is a valid exercise of government power at all, irrespective of whether any property is taken or only freedom (liberty) is affected. Confusion of the two serves no purpose and suggests that the government may exceed its constitutional powers as long as it pays a price to those who would complain.

152. They may also involve such a taking. See infra text accompanying notes 157-69.
153. See Stoebuck, supra note 19, at 1081-82, for a further discussion of this point. This author disagrees with Stoebuck's conclusion that Mahon is really a substantive due process rather than a takings case. Id. at 1097-98; see supra note 146 and infra text accompanying notes 157-69.
154. See supra text accompanying note 141.
155. Some governmental acts may exceed the scope of government authority even though any takings of property are compensated or no taking is involved at all, e.g., condemning my vintage Rolls-Royce to give it to my covetous neighbor, the city councilman; promoting a particular religious denomination. But cf. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980), discussed at text accompanying notes 211-15 infra, where property was taken for public use yet "no police power justification [was] offered for the deprivation." Other governmental acts, although otherwise legitimate exercises of the police power, nonetheless require that just compensation be paid to owners of affected private property, e.g., acquiring land to build an elementary school. Compensation upon the legitimate exercise of the government's taking power should be distinguished from damages for a wrongful governmental act. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 n.23 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting): [W]here a police power regulation is not enacted in furtherance of the public health, safety, morals or the general welfare so that there may be no "public use" . . . the government entity may not be forced to pay just compensation under the Fifth Amendment, [but] the landowner may nevertheless have a damage cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a Fourteenth Amendment violation. See supra text at notes 98-108 for a discussion of sovereign immunity.
156. That the government can exceed its powers for a price appears to be the clear import, though almost certainly not the intent, of the Supreme Court's alternatively phrased language quoted at supra note 126 and accompanying text. But see Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937): "[O]ne person's property may not be taken for the benefit of another private person without a justifying public purpose, even though compensation be paid."

There is yet another reason to avoid confusing the two limitations. Because the substantive due process standard of reasonable relationship is based upon different policy considerations than is the Mahon "too far" test, it may countenance freedoms-takings which are sometimes more and sometimes less extensive than permitted by Mahon. Indeed, substantive due process may allow for outright confiscations, not to mention imprisonment and the death penalty, at least in cases to which Mahon does not apply. Examples of valid confiscation include forfeiture for crime and the circumstances discussed infra text accompanying notes 185-221.

Obviously, Mahon applies to the kinds of governmental acts at issue under its facts, i.e., regulations limiting activities in general and limiting land-use activities in particular. Therefore, its test would seem to work as a kind of outer limit on the validity of uncompensated regulatory takings, a limit which would sometimes be more restrictive on the government than the reasonable relationship principles. There are some state court decisions which appear to belie this
E. Some Implications for Remedies

The question of remedies for invalid regulations is one of considerable current interest.\textsuperscript{157} Moreover, it is a question which can be addressed from a clear perspective only if we do not confuse the distinction between the requirements of just compensation for takings and of the reasonable relationship test for regulatory validity.

In \textit{Agins v. City of Tiburon},\textsuperscript{158} the California Supreme Court held that only mandamus or declaratory relief, but not monetary compensation, would be available to landowners adversely affected by exercises of police powers beyond constitutional limits:\textsuperscript{159} “[A] landowner . . . may not . . . elect to sue in inverse condemnation and thereby transmute an excessive use of the police power into a lawful taking for which compensation in eminent domain must be paid.”\textsuperscript{160}

The United States Supreme Court did not reach the remedies issue in its review of \textit{Agins} nor in the more recent case of \textit{San Diego Gas \& Electric Co. v. San Diego.}\textsuperscript{161} In \textit{San Diego}, however, four dissenting justices with the apparent concurrence of a fifth, were of the view that the California court’s opinion in \textit{Agins} “fails to recognize the essential similarity of regulatory ‘takings’ and other ‘takings,’” and that unconstitutional regulatory takings, even if temporary, should be compensated.\textsuperscript{162}

Under the right/freedom analysis, these views can be reconciled, and both would seem to be correct, strictly speaking, as long as the “reasonable relationship” and “too far” tests are not confused. The four \textit{San Diego} justices who dissented are correct that compensation should be paid when, absent such compensation, a regulation would be unconstitutional as a taking because it goes too far—an equivalent to a taking of rights.\textsuperscript{163} The California Supreme Court, however, is seemingly also correct that an excessive exercise of the police power,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{157} The Supreme Court nearly faced this issue twice during the past year. In neither case, however, was the question of remedies considered to be ripe for constitutional adjudication. \textit{See Agins v. City of Tiburon}, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25 (1979), \textit{aff’d}, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); \textit{San Diego Gas \& Elec. Co. v. San Diego}, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
    \item \textsuperscript{158} Id.
    \item \textsuperscript{159} Id. at 273, 598 P.2d at 28.
    \item \textsuperscript{160} Id.
    \item \textsuperscript{161} 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
    \item \textsuperscript{162} Id. at 651; \textit{see also} \textit{Keystone Assoc. v. Moerdler}, 19 N.Y.2d 78, 224 N.E.2d 700, 278 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1966).
    \item \textsuperscript{163} \textit{See supra} text accompanying notes 139-44.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
an act beyond its scope, without a justifying reasonable relationship, is not ipso facto such a taking.\textsuperscript{164} The right/freedom analysis takes no position on whether such an excessive exercise regulation should require compensation at all,\textsuperscript{165} only that the just-compensation clause would not be the basis for such a remedy if the regulation does not go too far and only freedoms are affected.

The availability of a monetary remedy in cases like \textit{Agins} and \textit{San Diego} should thus ultimately depend on (1) whether the regulation of freedom went “too far” under the \textit{Mahon} test, or (2) if the regulation did not go too far but is nevertheless unconstitutional, whether such unconstitutional regulations are compensable apart from the just-compensation clause. Assuming that unconstitutional freedom impairments are not compensable, it becomes especially important to clarify whether a particular loss-inflicting governmental act is merely ultra vires,\textsuperscript{166} is ultra vires and a taking or its equivalent,\textsuperscript{167} or is merely a taking or equivalent.\textsuperscript{168} The three appropriate remedies would be, respectively, (a) declaratory/mandamus relief only, (b) declaratory/mandamus relief plus compensation for the interim taking, and (c) compensation for taking only. In any event, to emphasize, consistency of treatment would require compensation whenever, by governmental act, rights are taken for public use or freedoms are impaired to such a degree as to evacuate the substance of a right. This compensation is constitutionally required independently of whether lesser freedom impairments, not within \textit{Mahon}, may be compensable on some other basis. Confusing the “too far” test of taking and the “reasonable relationship” test of validity\textsuperscript{169} would be a most unsound basis for denying such compensation.

\textsuperscript{164} 24 Cal. 3d at 272, 598 P.2d at 28; \textit{see supra} text accompanying notes 128-38 and 154-56. Unfortunately, though the California Supreme Court’s view is, strictly speaking, correct as far as it goes, that court is rather clearly confusing the “too far” test with the “reasonable relationship” test and thus would deny compensation where, under the former, it is constitutionally required. \textit{See Agins} v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d at 274, 598 P.2d at 29; \textit{supra} notes 146 and 156 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{165} The four dissenters in \textit{San Diego} suggested that such compensation may be required under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). 450 U.S. at 656 n.23; \textit{see supra} quotation in note 155.

\textsuperscript{166} \textit{E.g.}, the invalid zoning regulations in Moore \textit{v. City of East Cleveland}, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); \textit{Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge}, 278 U.S. 116 (1928); \textit{Nectow v. Cambridge}, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).

\textsuperscript{167} \textit{For example}, where the government requisitions my vintage Rolls-Royce to give it to the covetous city councilman. \textit{See Keystone Assoc. v. Moerdler}, 19 N.Y.2d 78, 224 N.E.2d 700, 28 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1966) (temporary use prohibition without public purpose).

\textsuperscript{168} \textit{E.g.}, in \textit{Kaiser Aetna v. United States}, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), where the extension to previous fast lands of the navigation servitude would be valid if compensation were paid. \textit{Accord Delaware, Lackawanna & W.R.R. v. Morristown}, 276 U.S. 182, 193 (1928).

\textsuperscript{169} This may be occurring in California. \textit{See supra} note 164.
F. Affirmative Duty Impositions

In the past, two types of cases have proved to be particularly intractable to commentators on police-power takings: railroad grade-crossing cases and utility relocation cases. Both concern regulations requiring private interests to bear the costs of accommodating their installations, tracks or utility conduits, to public thoroughfares or improvements, viz., by modifying or eliminating grade crossings or by relocating conduits.

Under the right/freedom analysis, no takings should be found in these cases as they do not involve any reductions of rights but merely impositions of affirmative duties. Such requirements still might be invalidated on a substantive due process or, perhaps, equal protection basis, and prior to the 1937-1940 shift in judicial review philosophy this had occurred. In general, though, such requirements have typically been treated as an affirmative version of freedom restrictions. Instead of imposing a duty to forbear from particular behavior, as does a typical land-use freedom restriction, they impose affirmative duties—to act. Whether affirmative or negative, however, duty impositions do not in and of themselves involve any taking of rights and thus, under the right/freedom analysis, one would expect that both affirmative and negative duties may be imposed without compensating the persons affected. Land-use regulations may, of course, involve affirmative duties as well as negative duties, though our focus has been on the latter.

170. E.g., Dunham, supra note 8, at 73-75; Sax, supra note 8, at 70; Stoebuck, supra note 15, at 298-301; Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 48-56.
173. They also would presumably be subject to limitations under the principle of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. See supra text accompanying notes 139-44.
175. Affirmative duty impositions are restrictions on the freedom to omit certain behavior.
176. E.g., in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the historic preservation legislation there approved by the Court required the owner to preserve his building as a landmark at his own expense; see also Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78 (1911), where the court assumed that the government could constitutionally require an owner to erect fences or otherwise prevent his cattle from straying, but could not prohibit grazing altogether (in anticipation of Mahon?).
To recapitulate the application of the right/freedom analysis to the cases, we have seen the following: First, the right/freedom analysis correctly predicts that the standard non-police-power cases of eminent domain, trespassory and non-trespassory, do require compensation; however, since both rights and freedoms are generally lost in such cases, the basic right/freedom distinction often does not play a visible role in them. Second, the right/freedom analysis correctly predicts that, in general, government regulations affecting land use will not constitute compensable takings because such regulations take only freedoms and not rights. The right/freedom analysis readily accommodates, however, two kinds of limits on the police power to regulate land use, even though both involve takings only of freedoms and not rights. The two kinds of limits are that: (a) such regulations may go "too far" and, if they do, they will be treated as the equivalent of a taking of rights, and (b) the validity of such government regulations still depends in theory on consistency with substantive due process limitations on the ways government may regulate. Why these general rules should be as they are, and some of the analytical implications of the rationale, will be next considered.

G. A Possible Policy Explanation

The right/freedom dichotomy is purely descriptive of the outcomes of decided cases and therefore contains no axiological rationale in itself. Nevertheless, by clarifying a distinction which the cases in fact make, the right/freedom analysis facilitates informed speculation as to policy rationales. Why should takings of land-related rights be compensable while takings of land-related freedoms should not?

One answer may be borne of practical necessity. Police-power restrictions on land use are by definition takings only of freedoms.178

177. The only important exceptions are some state court and lower federal court holdings which deny compensation for certain non-trespassory takings, and these may be viewed as vestiges of a now obsolete understanding of property. See supra notes 15, 109, 111, 112, and 114.

178. Restrictions on new activity cannot directly affect property rights in land because none of these rights are predicated on any required activity by the holder.

Two technical objections can be made to the statements of the preceding paragraph, but do not, on analysis, present genuine qualifications.

First, it might be objected that possession is a kind of activity and is the predicate of the right of exclusivity, enforceable by actions of trespass or ejectment. A governmental prohibition of possession, however, is not a mere use restriction but is identical to a taking of the right of exclusivity itself—taking the freedom to possess and taking the right to exclude are the same thing—and is treated as such. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); cases cited supra note 85.

The second possible objection concerns the activity of bringing lawsuits. Regulations that limit or proscribe this activity—by limiting or eliminating causes of action or access to the courts—are in real effect right-depriving, and not merely freedom-affecting; such regulations should probably amount to compensable takings. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960), discussed supra note 108. To speak precisely, however, the cause of action aspect of a "right"
Freedom reductions, directed at land use or otherwise, will almost always affect the usability of owned objects. Yet, the government could not undertake to compensate all such freedom takings and use-impairments without practically paralyzing itself in its regulatory function.\textsuperscript{179} Of course, a given freedom reduction may affect the use of some objects of property more than others—imprisonment, by analogy, may affect the use of one's automobile more than the use of one's wristwatch.\textsuperscript{180} Considerations of substantive due process\textsuperscript{181} may limit the extent to which such use-impairment burdens, or any other burdens, may be visited upon private persons by government.\textsuperscript{182} It nevertheless remains that governmental acts which merely limit freedoms of activities, even though property values are affected, could never be regular bases for compensation without an intolerable burden upon the law-making process itself.

In contrast, when the government selectively and adventitiously withdraws the landowner's rights of exclusivity, or other rights to the forbearance of others, which rights the government routinely confers to persons generally, there is not merely a practical possibility of treating such withdrawals as regular bases for compensation, there are positive and longstanding policy reasons for doing so.\textsuperscript{183} Thus, the policy duality which results is that takings of land-related rights are compensated because it is desirable to do so and can be done, but

presupposes not merely the freedom to sue, but the standing to bring \textit{successful} lawsuits under certain contingencies. It is the law's provision for success which is the key to the concept of right, and this provision for success is not, as viewed from the right-holder's perspective, a rule which concerns his freedom of activities. Nonetheless, a provision for success, under the contingencies defined by the right, would be almost nugatory, except to justify self-help, if there were no freedom to bring suit in the first place. See \textit{Armstrong v. United States}, 364 U.S. 40 (1960); \textit{cf. supra} text accompanying notes 100-08 for a discussion of the analytical significance of sovereign immunity on the concept of rights as used herein.

\textsuperscript{179} "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law." \textit{Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon}, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). "To require compensation in all such circumstances would effectively compel the government to regulate \textit{by purchase}." \textit{Andrus v. Allard}, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) (emphasis supplied).

\textsuperscript{180} Freedom restrictions are not transmuted into property takings merely because they happen to affect the usefulness of certain property. \textit{See supra} discussion at text accompanying notes 71-75.


\textsuperscript{182} \textit{See supra} text accompanying notes 127-38.

\textsuperscript{183} The fifth amendment:

prevents the public from loading upon one individual more than his just share of the burdens of government, and says that when he surrenders to the public something more and different from that which is exacted from other members of the public, a full and just equivalent shall be returned to him.


Similarly, the object of the just-compensation clause is "to redistribute certain economic losses . . . so that they will fall upon the public rather than wholly upon those who happen to lie in the path of the project." \textit{United States v. Willow River Power Co.}, 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945); \textit{accord Armstrong v. United States}, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
takings of land-related freedoms are not compensated because, whether or not it is desirable to do so, they cannot be.\footnote{184}

VI. TAKING RIGHTS WITHOUT COMPENSATION:
THE "PUBLIC USE" PROVISO

There are occasions where governmental acts actually do take rights in property but nevertheless are not deemed compensable takings. Before concluding, it is necessary to give an analytical account of such non-compensable takings. An example of a non-compensable taking is legislation removing ancient encumbrances or limitations on land titles,\footnote{185} destroying the rights of those who formerly held those interests. Similar effects can result from statutory or judicial modifications of the estate system\footnote{186} and legislation which is deregulatory in effect.\footnote{187} This consideration is best introduced by examining the relationship between freedom restrictions and rights.

The imposition of restrictions on activities typically occurs in connection with the conferring of rights,\footnote{188} e.g., when securities legislation expands upon the common law definition of fraud,\footnote{189} or when a regime of private property is instituted in the first place by creating actions such as trespass and ejectment.\footnote{189} However, with rare and

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\footnote{184. The policy reasons set forth in the preceding text are offered only as suggestions. In fact, the rationale offered by the text tends to unravel a bit at the edges: For example, there may sometimes be sound policy reasons to expropriate rights en masse, where compensation would be all but impossible, e.g., by enactment of a marketable title statute extinguishing old but possibly not forgotten rights of title. See infra text accompanying notes 185-222. Indeed, such government takings are generally non-compensable though the right/freedom analysis can accommodate such results. Id. In contrast, in some instances, takings of freedoms may be administratively quite easy to compensate, e.g., where a few landmark buildings are designated for historic preservation, such as in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).}

\footnote{185. E.g., marketable title statutes. See infra note 198.}

\footnote{186. E.g., eliminating the destructability of contingent remainders or expanding the cy pres limitations on the rule against perpetuities. See, e.g., N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 6-5.10, 6-5.11 (McKinney 1981) (preserving contingent remainders); see also Estate of Ye Hop, 52 Hawaii 40, 469 P.2d 183 (1970) (cy pres); Berry v. Union Nat'l Bank, 262 S.E.2d 766 (W. Va. 1980).}

\footnote{187. Deregulation will be used to refer to any withdrawal of state-enforced restrictions on freedom, though often these withdrawals may sometimes look more like regulation than deregulation. See infra note 199.}

\footnote{188. If the government's enforcement prerogatives are counted as legal actions, so that behavioral violations actionable by the government are treated as the subject of government's rights, then enforceable activity restrictions may always be said to confer rights. From the way in which right has been defined, this inclusion appears legitimate, though the emphasis in the textual discussion is that new regulations on freedom are often imposed in connection with the creation of new private and not governmental rights.}


\footnote{190. The extension of the writ of ejectio firmae (ejectment) to leasehold tenants during the late 15th century allowed them to recover possession when wrongfully ousted, and may be seen as the point at which the modern concept of leases as property was crystallized. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 213-17 (5th ed. 1942).}
arguable exceptions, new activity restrictions can never reduce the rights of private citizens, as that concept is defined herein.

Interestingly, although new regulations of activities per se do not generally occasion losses of rights, deregulation has precisely that effect by reducing previously existing potential causes of action. Any governmental acts which modify or dismantle portions of the system of torts and contract actions, may be seen as deregulatory. Historical examples of deregulation include the abolition of actions for seduction and criminal conversation, of seisin jure uxori under the married women's acts, or of certain real property interests under marketable title statutes. A drastic example would be the abolition of all property.

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191. E.g., prohibitions on the activity of possession or on the institution of lawsuits. See supra note 178.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54 where the cause of action is described as the cornerstone of a right.
193. Enactment of guest statutes, Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929), or workmen's compensation, New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). See also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978), which denied compensation for a new law which limits liability for nuclear accidents, though the rationale was that the affected landowners would still have an action against the federal government, under the Tucker Act, in the event of a nuclear disaster. Id. at 94 n.39.
196. Seisin jure uxoris is the husband's common law right to possess freehold lands belonging to his wife.
197. See, e.g., N.Y. Gen. Oblig. L. § 3-301 (McKinney 1978). In Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 447 U.S. 903 (1981), the Supreme Court held that such a taking of rights was not only permitted but mandated by the fourteenth amendment. Specifically, the Court invalidated the former Louisiana Civil Code provision that the husband, as "head and master," had the power, acting alone, to dispose of community property. This equal protection holding was reached without discussing whether the attendant reallocation of rights disrupting the "bedrock of Louisiana's community property system," effected any takings, compensable or not. 447 U.S. at 432. Since the ruling was not retroactive, the failure to discuss the taking issue cannot be dismissed on glib grounds such as that the Court only "declared" what had, under the equal protection clause, been the law since 1868. Either way, the new holding would involve a taking of property without compensation, though the losers may not be husbands, but wives whose husbands' transactions were not retroactively affected.

As precedent for Kirchberg v. Feenstra, one may cite Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), which similarly involved an apparent collision of constitutional principles.
It appears to be a fair assumption that, within the police power to regulate, there is included a power to deregulate on which the only general limitations are those of substantive due process and equal protection. Indeed, it has been held that the government must be able to take rights without compensation by modifying its regulatory pattern. We thus reach the somewhat ironic conclusion that police-power deregulation, not regulation, is the governmental act which has the potential for uncompensated takings of rights in private property. The question is how to distinguish non-compensable instances of deregulatory right-taking from compensable takings of rights within the right/freedom analysis.

The answer to this question is suggested by a distinction made in the text of the Constitution itself. To recite, in pertinent part:

nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

The first part of this text implies that, subject to due process limitations, the government is free to take property, liberty, or even life innkeepers lost some of their right of exclusivity, enforceable by trespass actions, and others gained freedoms when the government deregulated access to places of public accommodation. The rights-deprivation involved was not a compensable taking. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). Note that, under the Act, the deregulation was accompanied by a new regulation limiting the innkeepers’ freedom to exclude as well. This new freedom restriction would also, of course, not be in se compensable.

A similar limited abolition of property rights in favor of personal freedoms was upheld in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). There, owners of a private shopping center were deprived by the state of their right of exclusivity as against those who wished to exercise freedoms of speech and petition on the owners’ land. The case is discussed further infra note 220. See also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, 53 N.Y.2d 124, 423 N.E.2d 320, 440 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1981) (upheld statute which authorizes compulsory easements for CATV conduits over landlords’ property).

200. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 282 (1980) ("the State’s interest in fashioning its own rules of tort law is paramount to any discernible federal interest, except perhaps an interest in protecting the individual citizens from state action that is wholly arbitrary or irrational"); see also cases cited in preceding footnote; PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 92-95 (1980) (Marshall, J. concurring); Annot., 65 L. Ed. 2d 1219, 1230-31 (1981).

Miscellaneous constitutional limitations such as the commerce and establishment clauses, are disregarded as having no special significance to the discussion.

201. E.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 282 (1980); Demorest v. City Bank Farmer’s Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 48 (1944) ("The whole cluster of vexatious problems arising from uses and trusts, mortmain, the rule against perpetuities, and testamentary directions for accumulations or for suspensions of the power of alienation, is one whose history admonishes against unnecessary rigidity."); see also cases cited in preceding footnote; PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93 (1980) (Marshall, J. concurring) ("[i]f common law rights were . . . immune from revision . . . [it] would freeze the common law as it has been constructed by the courts, perhaps at its 19th-century state of development"); Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932); Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).

202. Remember that the elimination of causes of action and, hence, rights is exactly what the government does when it engages in the typical trespassory and non-trespassory exercises of eminent domain. See supra text accompanying notes 85-114.

203. U.S. Const. amend. V.
itself. When property is taken for public use, however, the remainder of the text imposes the familiar just-compensation requirement. In contradistinction, no requirement of compensation appears for deprivations of life or liberty,\textsuperscript{204} nor for deprivations of property for other than public use.\textsuperscript{205} Hence, it may be argued, in terms of the right/freedom dichotomy, that deregulatory takings of rights\textsuperscript{206} are not compensable because such takings are not for public use. It is the public use proviso which excludes deregulatory takings from the just-compensation clause.

In theory, substantive due process standards require that all government regulations have a public purpose, however loosely those standards are applied.\textsuperscript{207} The presence of a validating public purpose for a rights deprivation does not, however, necessarily mean that the rights are taken for public use. Hence, the question arises: Can rights-taking legislation have a validating public purpose and still not require compensation for the rights taken, on the grounds that the taking is not for public use? Or, reducing the problem to its essence, there is a question of whether the expression “public use” in the just-compensation clause and the public purpose requirement of substantive due process refer to two different ideas.\textsuperscript{208}

\textsuperscript{204} The fact that there is no just-compensation requirement for takings of liberty buttresses the argument that courts properly compensate only takings of rights, as defined herein, and not regulatory deprivations of freedoms. The use of the words liberty and property in the same phrase of the Constitution is evidence that the framers thought the two words referred to different ideas and intended them to be treated differently. In the alternative it could be argued, however, that property-related freedoms, such as use and enjoyment, are encompassed in the concept called property, and that the word liberty refers to freedoms which are and those which are not related to property. At any rate, the question is entirely one of interpretation. Though the gloss of the just-compensation clause cases in fact seems to support the first interpretation above (liberty and property are different), it must be admitted that the constitutional text only permits and does not compel this result.

\textsuperscript{205} The application of the federal just-compensation requirement to the states is by the fourteenth amendment due process clause, see supra note 1, and that clause does not make the textual distinction under discussion, nor for that matter does it make any reference at all to takings for public use. The public use proviso was, however, expressly referred to in the case which extended the federal just-compensation requirement to the states. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897) (the state “legislature may prescribe a form of procedure to be observed in the taking of private property for public use, but it is not due process of law if provision be not made for compensation”). It seems fair to say that the fourteenth amendment requirement of just-compensation applies the terms of the fifth amendment clause to the states.

\textsuperscript{206} Except, perhaps, “deregulation” eliminating rights against the government, i.e., removal by the government of freedom restrictions which the government previously committed itself to observe. Compare supra note 54 with infra text accompanying notes 223-34;

\textsuperscript{207} See supra text accompanying notes 128-38.

\textsuperscript{208} In the discussion that follows the expression public use has been reserved for references to the just-compensation clause proviso and the expression public purpose for references to the substantive due process standard. This does not imply that there is any particular authority for such a usage differentiation or that there is any particular legal significance to the somewhat different meanings which the two expressions may have in ordinary understanding.

The argument posited in the text is that there are two different conceptions to refer to, and that the difference between the two has legal significance. This argument must stand or fall on its supporting analysis, not nomenclature.
The notion that public use refers to the same thing as the substantive due process public purpose requirement finds arguable support in *Berman v. Parker.* The Court held in *Berman* that the government could constitutionally condemn private property for retransfer to private developers. The rationale was that such condemnations were for public use because they occurred in the pursuit of a legislatively determined public purpose. Thus, the meaning of public use was in effect identified with the scope of the police power.

At the same time, however, there have been indications that the question of whether a taking is for public use, requiring compensation, is quite separate from the question of whether there are possible validating public purposes for the government’s program. The distinction appears clearly in *Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith.* In *Webb’s,* the Court held that a state statute authorizing state courts to retain interest earned on money deposited with them was a taking of property without compensation in violation of the just-compensation clause. The Court stated that retention of the interest under the statute “has not merely ‘adjusted the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good’ . . . . Rather,

210. Id. at 32-33. In the opinion, Justice Douglas provided a fairly detailed exegesis on the extent of the police power, with the apparent aim of supporting the conclusion that the takings involved were for public use. Thus, the inference arises that public use means “use for a public purpose, whether the actual user happens to be governmental or private.” Id. at 33-34. However, Douglas’ reasoning does not compel the conclusion that taking for a public purpose necessarily means taking for a public use. My conclusion is that it does not.
211. For example, in *Hughes v. Washington,* 389 U.S. 290 (1967), the Supreme Court overturned a state court decision which had established the seaward boundaries of littoral lands further inland than where they had previously been understood to be. Since, under local law, lands seaward of the boundaries belonged to the state, the redefinition of the boundary location arguably effected a wholesale uncompensated expropriation, in favor of the state, of private shoreline property. Though the holding was on non-constitutional grounds, Justice Stewart remarked in a concurring opinion: “[A] State cannot be permitted to defeat the constitutional prohibition against taking property without due process of law by the simple device of asserting retroactively that the property it has taken never existed at all.” Id. at 296-97. The defeat presumably referred to by Stewart was that the state would, by its own redefinition, acquire land for itself without any payment. Stewart’s remarks were approved by the Court in *Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona,* 414 U.S. 313, 325 (1973), *rehearing denied,* 434 U.S. 1090 (1978), overruled on other grounds, *Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.,* 429 U.S. 363 (1977).

Earlier, in *United States v. Caltex,* 344 U.S. 149 (1952), the Court held that the destruction of terminal facilities by the United States Army to prevent their falling into enemy hands was not compensable because, inter alia, such destruction was not an appropriation for subsequent use. The implication was thus that there may be a public purpose for a taking without a public use—though the further implication that public use refers to only subsequent public use is questionable. Overall, the more satisfying rationale of the case is something on the order of a proximate cause-cum-emergency doctrine: “[I]n wartime many losses must be attributed solely to the fortunes of war, and not to the sovereign.” Id. at 155.
213. As earlier observed, the Court did not merely hold that property was taken, but it decided, contrary to the state’s definition, what the term private property meant for purposes of the case. See supra note 23.
the exaction is a forced contribution to general governmental revenues. . . ."214 The taking in Webb's clearly was for public use, indeed, the public use objective of the taking was the rationale of the case:

The county's appropriation of the beneficial use of the fund is analogous to the appropriation of the use of private property in United States v. Causby . . . [where the government acquired an affirmative easement by overflights]. . . . "Causby emphasized that Government had not 'merely destroyed property [but was] using a part of it. . . .'" [However, such "arbitrary use of governmental power" to effect acquisitions is the] very kind of thing that the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent.215

Hence, it appears clear that a taking may be for public use without there being a justifying public purpose for the taking albeit there is a public purpose for the use. The two concepts are different.

In light of the numerous circumstances where states have constitutionally modified private rights among private persons,216 a line must exist between such non-compensable takings and the compensable takings under the fifth amendment. The criterion of public use in the just-compensation clause would provide such a line. The distinction would be essentially between acquisitions of rights by the government in its corporate capacity217 and modifications of the rights enjoyed by private persons inter se, subjecting the latter only to the very broad limitations of substantive due process and equal protection.218 Nevertheless, the line is one which is difficult to state. A fair approximation might be as follows: when the government in its corporate capacity acquires or exercises dispositive control over property, for retransfer in some public program or otherwise,219 compensation is required for any rights taken. Conversely, when the government redistributes rights among private persons albeit for a public purpose, such government acts like many others, such as taking freedoms, levying taxes, or exacting fines and forfeitures, would be outside the ambit of the

214. 449 U.S. at 163.
215. 449 U.S. at 163-64 (emphasis supplied and citations omitted). The import of the takings cases generally is that the mere presence of a public purpose does not justify an uncompensated taking for public use. E.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954) ("The rights of these property owners are satisfied when they receive that just compensation which the Fifth Amendment exacts as the price of the taking.")
216. See supra notes 193-201.
217. Sax uses the term "enterprise capacity" in describing acts of the government which ought to be compensable. See Sax, supra note 10, at 151. The concept of corporate capacity here is broader, referring generally to the legal personality of the government and, in particular, to its capacity as an entity to institute legal actions and, hence, to have rights. See supra text accompanying notes 52-59. The government typically would hold negative easements created by regulation in its corporate capacity, but not in Sax's "enterprise capacity."
218. See supra note 200.
219. It is clear that the public use proviso of the just-compensation clause does not require that the government retain the property which it acquires, nor that it use the property itself or directly. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
just-compensation clause.\footnote{220} In the case of such intra-private sector redistributions, the just-compensation clause does not apply since the clause expressly limits its reach to takings of property for public use.\footnote{221}

VII. COMPENSABLE FREEDOM IMPAIRMENT: 
APPURtenANT NEGATIVE EASEMENTS BY REGULATION

Finally, the clarification provided by the rights/freedoms dichotomy may help to resolve the apparent inconsistency which troubled Professor Stoebuck's transfer-oriented test of takings.\footnote{222} His test, consistently applied, would find a taking in transfers to the government of negative easements appurtenant to benefited government land, but would find no taking in transfers to the government of negative easements in gross.\footnote{223} In both instances, negative easements may be created by regulation; both amount to transfers to the government, as

\footnote{220. In this regard, it may be observed that the "too far" principle of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, \textit{see supra} text accompanying notes 139-45, has no apparent application to deregulatory takings of rights. Indeed, to serve the public purpose of such legislation it is often deemed necessary to eliminate property rights entirely, e.g., in the case of marketable title statutes. \textit{See supra} note 198. \textit{But cf.} PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). In \textit{PruneYard}, the Supreme Court used a \textit{Mahon}-type rationale in upholding a state requirement that shopping center owners permit free expression and petitioning on their premises. The Court supported its holding with the observation that the owners had "failed to demonstrate that the 'right to exclude others' is so essential to the use or economic value of their property that the state-authorized limitations of it amounted to a 'taking.'" \textit{Id.} at 84.

It seems clearly established, however, that in a proper case the government could withdraw a property right, constitutionally and without compensation, even though such withdrawal of the right had the effect of totally destroying "the use or economic value of the property." \textit{See cases cited supra} notes 186, 193-94, 197-201. Thus the \textit{Mahon} test cannot consistently account for the general run of right-depriving cases like \textit{PruneYard}. It is only by coincidence that the facts in \textit{PruneYard} happened to satisfy the \textit{Mahon} "too far" test. Therefore, it is submitted, \textit{PruneYard} can be better understood as a case where no compensation was required because the state did not, in its corporate capacity, acquire any rights for public use.

\footnote{221. Cf. United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149 (1952) discussed \textit{supra} note 211.

It might be observed that it is not politically necessary for the just-compensation clause to apply to deregulatory takings of rights because, absent a governmental "appropriation of the beneficial use," there is less incentive for or likelihood of "the arbitrary use of governmental power" which "the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent." Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. at 164 \textit{quoted supra} text accompanying notes 214-15. By contrast, the obvious potential public and political benefits of land-use restrictions offer a much greater incentive to impose restrictions which affect a few drastically, and most people favorably or not at all. Hence, a policy reason appears for the rule of \textit{Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon} in relation to use regulation situations that is less applicable where that rule does not apply. By the same token, in cases where the government takes for public use as in the Webb's case, \textit{supra} text accompanying notes 212-16, it is arguable that the public purpose could never justify such a taking without compensation, no matter how little the interference with rights or freedoms. \textit{See supra} note 215 and \textit{infra} text accompanying notes 223-34. For cases where the government merely redistributes rights for other than public use but with a drastic effect on a few (e.g., requisitions my vintage Rolls-Royce to give it to the councilman's daughter), the limitations of reasonable relationship and equal protection and on the taxing power, such as they are, would seem to provide any necessary protection. \textit{See supra} note 155.

\footnote{222. \textit{See supra} text accompanying notes 25-41.

\footnote{223. \textit{Id.}}

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Stoebuck seems to use that word; and both are for public use. The transfer-oriented test does not, however, satisfactorily differentiate between them.\textsuperscript{224} Specifically, Stoebuck's theory does not explain why a transfer which is "specially directed toward benefiting a governmental entity" in land use, should be compensable while negative easement takings for other public purposes concededly should not.

The rights/freedoms analysis suggests an answer. When a government regulation restricts a private owner in the use of his land for the special benefit of nearby government land, the result, even though it takes only freedoms, is too similar to a compulsory version of a private transfer of rights.\textsuperscript{225} If the government uses or abuses its regulatory power to acquire rights as a landowner for public use at the direct, selective, and adventitious expense of a private owner who "happens to lie in the path of the project,"\textsuperscript{226} this would be exactly the kind of occurrence for which the policy of the just-compensation clause would require compensation.\textsuperscript{227} In contrast, when the government enacts a regulation which imposes land-use restrictions in gross, the resulting freedom impairments do not comparably enhance, at private property's expense, the government's position of ownership as a taker for public use. True, the validity of such regulations is theoretically subject to a substantive due process requirement of public purpose;\textsuperscript{228} but, where no government land benefits, such freedom restrictions lack the intimate connection with the acquisition or exercise of rights to property, in a corporate capacity, that seems to be contemplated by the just-compensation requirement.\textsuperscript{229}

In this connection, the right/freedom analysis also avoids another analytical oddity of the transfer-oriented test of takings. When applied evenly to negative easements appurtenant and negative easements in gross, the transfer test makes regulatory transfers of easements in gross to the government the exceptional case. By corollary, the whole police power to regulate land use becomes an exception to the just-compensation clause. In contrast, the right/freedom analysis regards the police power as occupying an essentially different domain

\textsuperscript{224} Id.; see also Stoebuck, supra note 19, at 1091-93.
\textsuperscript{225} See quoted language from Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith at supra text accompanying notes 214-15.
\textsuperscript{227} See supra note 226; cf. Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1959) (ordinance limiting use of a lot to off-street parking purposes only, held invalid; ordinance benefited the government's neighboring streets by reducing congestion on the street); see also Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963) (building height restrictions in the vicinity of an airport are really takings of aviation easements) and other cases cited at Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 25-26 n.120.
\textsuperscript{228} See supra text accompanying notes 127-30, 207.
\textsuperscript{229} See supra text accompanying notes 219-21.
from the just-compensation clause.\textsuperscript{230} The police power is concerned with restrictions on freedoms whereas the just-compensation clause focuses upon the taking of rights. Thus, under the right/freedom analysis, it is the compensation requirement for takings of appurtenant negative easements which is an exception to the general rule, viz., that only takings of rights are compensable. The too-much-like-a-taking policy explanation offered above for the exception is not wholly satisfying, though neither perhaps, at the fringes, is the policy rationale suggested earlier\textsuperscript{231} for the rights/freedom dichotomy which the holdings in fact create. At any rate, it may be argued that the exceptional compensability of appurtenant negative easements should not exist at all. The government, as a landowner, ought to be as eligible as anyone else to enjoy the benefits of zoning and environmental regulations.\textsuperscript{232} Only the fear of abuse of power would seem to suggest a presumption against such eligibility.\textsuperscript{233}

VIII. Summary and Conclusion

The law of eminent domain does not provide even remotely consistent protection for private economic interests, but neither is it an erratic accretion of irreconcilables. Rather, it appears that the law's underpinning is a set of principles which are both coherent and relatively defensible from a policy standpoint. While judicial opinions have not comprehensively articulated these principles, and especially their interplay, aspects of their application are repeatedly mentioned\textsuperscript{234} and their force is almost uniformly felt in the courts' holdings.\textsuperscript{235}

The central principle which appears to control the cases of alleged police-power takings is that, in general, compensation is not constitutionally required for regulations of land use that merely impair freedoms to use and enjoy. Instead the just-compensation clause appears to be primarily concerned with governmental acts which take or impair owners' legally enforceable rights of property. The concepts referred to by the words right and freedom in this context have been stipulatively defined to reflect and illuminate a distinction which is in fact made by the cases. As so defined, right and freedom together

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{230} Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) ("[T]he present case must be governed by principles that do not involve the power of eminent domain. . . .")
  \item \textsuperscript{231} See supra text accompanying notes 178-84.
  \item \textsuperscript{232} See supra text accompanying note 41.
  \item \textsuperscript{233} See supra notes 41 and 227.
  \item \textsuperscript{234} See, e.g., quotations supra note 123, and supra notes 126, 140, 214-15 and accompanying text.
  \item \textsuperscript{235} This uniformity is particularly evident in holdings of the United States Supreme Court, though some deviation is found in some state court cases, especially those influenced by the now obsolete physical intrusion criterion of taking. See supra notes 15, 109, 112 and 114.
\end{itemize}
seem to cover a major portion of what is generally understood as property interests. Distinguishing between them provides a basis for explaining (but not necessarily justifying) almost all of the cases of alleged police-power takings and for unifying such cases with the law of eminent domain.

There are three secondary principles which also affect the outcomes of alleged police-power takings cases. First, an impairment of freedoms may so far restrict the use and enjoyment of a parcel of land as to render the owner's legally enforceable rights nugatory. Such undermining of the purpose for which the rights are sought and conferred would amount to the functional equivalent of a taking and is treated as such. Second, an impairment of freedom may be constitutionally invalid apart from any just-compensation clause considerations, most prominently by failing to meet the substantive due process requirement of a reasonable relationship to some justifying public purpose. Freedom regulations of this sort are struck down but not compensated as takings. Third, a governmental redistribution of rights among private persons, through modifying the available set of potential causes of action, would fall outside the just-compensation clause because such takings are not for public use, albeit they are for some justifying public purpose. Such takings are neither invalid nor compensable.

To be sure, the basis suggested in this Article for understanding the law of eminent domain is highly conceptual or formalistic. The analysis presented would at least, however, supply an observed and settled distinction as the basis for future determinations of "justice and fairness." 236 This may not be the ultimate way to wage the "battle of conflicting interests,"237 but for courts of law it is at least a legal way to do so. This, in itself, makes it preferable to reliance on an array of fuzzy philosophisms that offer neither clear cut specific guidance nor any assured criterion of what, as a general matter, is just.

236. See supra note 44.
237. Sax, supra note 8, at 41.