Evolution of Community Policing in New York City

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Evolution of Community Policing in New York City
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Presentation Date: May 3, 2018
Graduation Date: May 22, 2018
Abstract

This study examines the various community policing initiatives, or lack of community policing initiatives, within the New York City Police Department (NYPD) from 1984 to present. Community policing is a policing model that is currently in the forefront of the criminal justice field due to strained relationships between many communities and the police. The community policing initiatives examined in this study are organized as follows: the Community Patrol Officer Program (C-POP) under Police Commissioner Ward (1984-1989); the Safe Streets, Safe City Program under Police Commissioner Brown (1989-1992), which established community policing as the dominant operational philosophy in the NYPD; Broken Windows data-driven policing under Police Commissioner Bratton (1994-1996), which ended community policing as the dominant operational philosophy; the Lack of Emphasis on Community Policing under Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly (2002-2014); the Re-emergence of Community Policing under Police Commissioner Bratton’s second term (2014-2016); and currently the Neighborhood Coordination Officer Program (NCO) under Police Commissioner O'Neill (2016-present). These initiatives were analyzed as an evolutionary process in order to determine how community policing models have changed in the NYPD as well as attempt to identify the factors driving the change in policing styles. This study includes research of prior community policing initiatives as well as first hand observations of current community policing initiatives within the NYPD. It was ultimately determined that numerous factors influenced the various community policing initiatives. Surprisingly, even though addressing the needs of the community is often cited as the sole or even primary goal of community policing programs, it was determined that this was not necessarily the case across NYPD policing initiatives examined in this study. This research only examines the evolution of community policing initiatives in the NYPD, and perhaps can act as a springboard for future studies on the effectiveness of NYPD community policing practices in terms of community satisfaction.
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Introduction

Community policing is an integral philosophy and practice in the grand scheme of procedural justice. The community policing model is designed to tackle problems specific to each community, to gain public trust and respect, reduce crime, and to maintain a criminal justice system that works for the people. In light of recent controversial policing practices in New York City, many communities have polarized views of their police and many police-community relationships remain severely damaged. Despite the fact that crime in New York City is currently at the lowest rate in decades, proactive police enforcement practices have created a large divide between the police and many communities. This study will examine the evolution of community policing models within the NYPD from 1984 until present. This thesis seeks to address three main questions: How have community policing initiatives within the NYPD changed from 1984 to present?; What factors influenced the NYPD to engage in each of the policing initiatives included in this study; and Was addressing the needs of the community the main goal?

Literature Review: Community Policing in the New York City Police Department (NYPD) 1984-2018

The concept of community policing stemmed from criminal justice scholar Herman Goldstein's model of Problem Oriented Policing (POP) in 1979. Goldstein advocated for a new type of policing that was unlike the traditional reactive and incident driven model of policing. Goldstein asserted that this should be replaced with POP, which would be, “a more proactive approach to identifying and targeting problems that contribute to crime, disorder, and other community issues.” (National Institute of Justice, n.d., para. 2) In 1986, Herman Goldstein wrote an article about a Community-Oriented Policing model for the University of Wisconsin Law School. This model of policing incorporated, “the involvement of the community in getting the
job done; the permanent assignment of police officers to a neighborhood in order to cultivate better relationships; the setting of police priorities based on the specific needs and desires of the community; and the meeting of these needs by the allocation of police resources and personnel otherwise assigned to responding to calls for police assistance.” (Goldstein, 1986, p. 6)

Essentially, community policing is a style of policing that is focused on community involvement and innovative solutions in order to reduce crime and build trust with the public.

Community policing models used by the NYPD have evolved greatly over time. My study focuses on NYPD community policing models beginning with the Community Patrol Officer Program (C-POP) under Police Commissioner Benjamin Ward (1984) and continuing until the present day Neighborhood Coordination Officer program (NCO) under Police Commissioner James O’Neill. Since the beginning of C-POP in 1984, theories regarding crime and policing strategies have changed drastically which ultimately culminated in the emergence of the NYPD’s newest and current community policing model, Neighborhood Coordination Officers (NCOs) which began in 2015.

**Community Patrol Officer Program (C-POP) under Police Commissioner Ward (1984-1989)**

It is helpful to examine past models of community policing in New York City, in order to gain a better understanding of the process and how the practice of community policing has been adjusted over time. Crime in New York City in the 1980s was concerning for residents as well as the NYPD. The NYPD reported that 1980 was the worst year for crime in New York City since the NYPD had began recording crime statistics. Between 1980 and 1981 there was a 14.3% rise in five out of the seven crimes measured in statistics; specifically, there was an increase in
murders, robberies, burglaries, grand larceny, and thefts of automobiles, and only a decline in
rape and assault (Buder, 1981). Police believed that the, “actual number of crimes is much
higher, possibly twice as high, because many victims do not report crimes.” (Buder, 1981, para.
4). Policing in New York City prior to and during the early 1980s was reactive, and mostly
involved responding to 911 calls of service. As a result, the NYPD was struggling to combat low
level crimes and maintain quality of life standards (The Vera Institute of Justice, 1988). New
York needed an innovative approach to crime reduction.

The first program examined was the Community Patrol Officer Program, which was
developed under Police Commissioner Benjamin Ward and Mayor Edward Koch. In 1984, the
NYPD created a community policing pilot program in the 72 Precinct in Southern Brooklyn (The
Vera Institute of Justice, 1988). The pilot program was expanded to six additional NYPD
precincts in 1985, and then to all seventy-five NYPD precincts by 1988. At the height of the C-
POP program there were 800 Community Patrol Officers (CPOs), 75 sergeants, and 75
administrative aides working towards a policing initiative to put the philosophical ideas of
community policing into practice in New York City (The Vera Institute of Justice, 1988). The
main goals of the C-POP pilot program were: “to prevent and control conduct threatening to life
and property, particularly that which affects neighborhoods as a whole”, “to create and maintain
a feeling of security in the community by reducing disorder and the fear of crime in
neighborhoods”, and “to identify and address the community problems that are potentially
serious law enforcement or governmental problems” (The Vera Institute of Justice, 1988, p. 3).

The concept of community policing was vastly different from traditional reactive policing
practices, which involved 911 calls, dispatching, and an immediate police response to 911 calls
(NYPD, 1988). The role of CPOs differed from that of traditional police officers, in that their
main function was to employ problem-solving initiatives to address crime and disorder (NYPD, 1988). CPOs were assigned to patrol a regular beat within their precinct and were expected to: involve the community in identifying public safety concerns, increase community involvement in police initiatives and programs, regularly exchange information with community members, and develop and utilize non-traditional strategies to combat the issues identified by the community. CPOs were instructed to work on solving problems over time, as opposed to a traditional response of ameliorating the symptoms of problems as quickly as possible so that responding officers may then respond to the next call for service. A CPO was expected to follow up on community concerns and problems and maintain relationships with stakeholders of the community (The Vera Institute of Justice, 1988).

C-POP was regarded as a success by the Vera Institute of Justice, which took into consideration various accounts from CPOs regarding effective change. C-POP was essentially the first successful model of its kind in NYC; it acted as a pioneer in the field of community policing within the NYPD. C-POP enabled the progression and improvement of subsequent community policing models as well as allowed for differing attitudes regarding policing. The Vera Institute of Justice cited several success stories of the C-POP program. Since a large portion of crime in New York City at the time dealt with drugs, many of the success stories involve the community’s concern with drug dealers and users. One of the first notable examples involved a CPO who became aware of, through his own observations and conversations with the community, a park within the confines of the 75th precinct that was consumed with drug dealers and users. Members of the community expressed concerns to the CPO that they were unable to use the park. The CPO initially utilized traditional policing methods, such as making arrests in the park; however, he realized that this did not get to the root of the problem and that the drug
dealers would return to the park whenever he was not around. The CPO instead devised a plan to involve the community for a more effective solution. The CPO held meetings with tenants of nearby buildings and asked for volunteers to take note of where the drug dealers were hiding their “stash” of drugs and to then notify the police anonymously. The CPO, armed with this intelligence, began confiscating stashes thus making the park become a less desirable place to deal drugs, and eventually restoring the park to the members of the community for recreational purposes (The Vera Institute of Justice, 1988). This example highlights both the ingenuity employed by the CPO as well as the CPO’s desire to work with and for the community. Another notable example involved an apartment building that had been identified by the New York City Department of Housing and Preservation Development (HPD) as one of the ten worst drug locations in New York City. This building, as a result of the rampant drug problem, also endured robberies, burglaries, criminal mischief, and shootings for over a ten-year period. The C-POP unit of the 90th precinct was tasked with ameliorating the situation. The CPOs coordinated with HPD and held meetings with the tenants. Many tenants came to voice their concerns, and they were advised not to give specific details in case drug dealers were also present; they were instead advised to call a hotline and leave information anonymously. Next the C-POP unit worked to enforce a Criminal Trespass Program in which they conducted vertical patrols of the building (an interior inspection of the building from the roof to the basement) and were authorized by the building’s owner to arrest individuals who were unlawfully in the building. With these vertical patrols, CPOs were able to crackdown on drug dealing as well as trespassing. CPOs would question any trespassers who claimed to be visitors by coordinating with tenants of the building to identify who was a trespasser and verify who was a visitor or friend. During these operations the C-POP unit would pass along intelligence gathered to the Narcotics and Anti-Crime Units of
the NYPD. CPOs continued to patrol the building until the presence of drugs was eliminated and then HPD began renovating the building to make it a better place to live (The Vera Institute of Justice, 1988). All of these success stories exemplify the goals of C-POP: “to prevent and control conduct threatening to life and property, particularly that which affects neighborhoods as a whole”, “to create and maintain a feeling of security in the community by reducing disorder and the fear of crime in neighborhoods”, and “to identify and address the community problems that are potentially serious law enforcement or governmental problems” (Vera Institute of Justice, 1988, p. 3).

Despite the successes of C-POP there were also many criticisms and shortcomings of the program. First, the CPOs were all volunteers who set their own hours (The Vera Institute of Justice, 1988). The CPOs oftentimes received very little oversight, direction, and training for their new roles. Mostly, the CPOs were young officers who were not prepared for their new role. The disparity between roles of CPOs and traditional officers caused resentment. Since each type of officer had different responsibilities, the traditional police officers would often feel as though they were working harder responding to calls non-stop, whereas the CPO was given extended time to work on problems (Bratton, 2015). Another issue with CPOs was that they, “have often been too few in number to establish any kind of critical mass or around-the-clock presence, or to make inroads with more than a small portion of a typical precinct’s many parts,” (Bratton, 2015, p. 2). This inability to connect with all parts of the neighborhood hindered the ability of CPOs to achieve the goals of C-POP.

In 1989, David Dinkins was elected Mayor of New York City, and he appointed Dr. Lee Patrick Brown, Ph.D. as the Police Commissioner. Mayor Dinkins believed that community policing was effective in terms of improving community-police relations and reducing crime, and therefore chose a Police Commissioner to implement those ideals. Commissioner Brown, the former Police Chief of Houston, Texas, was a known proponent for and expert on community policing. Mayor Dinkins and Commissioner Brown were adamant about expanding the CPOP community policing initiative in New York City. Mayor Dinkins lobbied the state to pass the Safe Streets, Safe City legislation, in which new taxes were proposed and the tax revenue was utilized to hire 5,000 new police officers and implement community crime prevention programs. Commissioner Brown declared that community policing will be the dominant operational philosophy of the entire department (White, 2011). In a 2014 article, Brown said,

We utilized the principles of community policing as our style for the delivery of police services to the people of New York City. After one year, crime went down in every index category over the previous year - the first time this had occurred in nearly 40 years.

(Brown, 2014, para. 7)

Police Commissioner Brown and Mayor Dinkins demonstrated that community policing and crime reduction could be achieved in tandem. During Mayor Dinkins four years as mayor, major crime as defined by the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR), fell about 12% (https://www.ucrdatatool.gov/), which was a result of the increased number of officers on the street as well as an increased departmental focus on community policing (Williams, 2015). Commissioner Brown employed policing strategies that,
instituted a form of community policing that linked neighborhood outreach by patrol officers, schools for at-risk youth, (and Beacons) and schools-as-community-centers in the evenings and on weekends, with other innovative youth programs designed to give young people something to do and safe places to be. (Adams & Brewer, 2015, p. 22)

These programs, along with the additional police officers, are credited with the community policing initiative’s success.

While the NYPD was engaging in community policing in the 1980s and early 1990s to combat high crime rates mostly stemming from drugs, William Bratton and the New York City Transit Police were beginning to engage in a more aggressive style of policing to combat the crime ridden subways; order maintenance policing (White, 2011). The concept of this new form of policing was rooted in publications from scholars in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1978 Professors James Q. Wilson and Barbara Boland wrote *The Effect of Police on Crime*, in which they urged police to abandon “random police patrol” in favor of a more aggressive policing style involving more interactions with the public. Their publication was based on an analysis of robbery rates in thirty-five different cities. They believed that police had the ability to reduce crime if they policed proactively. Wilson and Boland (1978) believed that this new type of policing would be successful for two reasons. First, they asserted that aggressive policing would lower crime rates as a result of higher weapons detection and seizure. Second, they asserted that stop and frisks could deter criminality by demonstrating to criminals that apprehension is probable. Wilson continued his call for proactive community-based policing in an article he co-authored with George Kelling in *The Atlantic* entitled “Broken Windows” (Kelling & Wilson, 1982). These theories eventually set the stage for more proactive policing practices being employed with the goal of crime reduction. A new style of policing was then introduced into the
NYPD by Police Commissioner Bratton, who subscribed to the philosophy of Broken Windows Policing.


William Bratton was appointed Police Commissioner of the NYPD in 1994 by the newly elected mayor, Rudolph Giuliani. Giuliani and Bratton discontinued prior community policing initiatives, and redeployed those officers in order to drive down crime in New York City. Giuliani, during his campaign for mayor went so far as to call community policing “social work” (White, 2011, p. 15). Commissioner Bratton focused on quality of life offenses by employing a proactive form of policing. The proactive policing employed by Bratton and Giuliani was influenced by Kelling and Wilson’s Broken Windows theory. Kelling and Wilson explained the theory of Broken Windows policing as the need to crackdown on lower level crimes and disorder, which over time result in more serious crimes and deterioration of neighborhoods. In a separate article by George Kelling in 2009, “How New York Became Safe: The Full Story”, he explained the terrible conditions in New York City as a result of crime in the 1980s-90s, particularly on the subway and in public parks and landmarks. First, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the New York City Transit Police Department was asked to focus on minor crimes. Bratton was hired as the Transit Police Department’s Chief of Police to address the issue. Bratton specifically focused on fare beating and disorderly behavior. Broken Windows policing was subsequently applied to the NYPD under Bratton and Giuliani’s terms. At the same time, the NYPD developed a crime analysis program called Compstat, which identified and tracked where UCR Part I offenses were occurring and held precinct commanders accountable for the reduction of crime in their commands (Kelling, 2009). As a result of Broken Windows policing,
misdemeanor arrests increased 70 percent in New York City during the 1990s. During the same period, robberies dropped by 3.2 percent, and motor vehicle theft dropped by 2.1 percent. This decrease was not a result of offenders being incarcerated and thus unable to reoffend, because most misdemeanor offenders don’t receive lengthy prison sentences; therefore, suggesting that this decline in crime was a result of Broken Windows policing (Francis, 2002). According to the NYPD, the incredible increase in misdemeanor, or minor, arrests was accompanied by a decrease in serious crimes and felony arrests. This supports the idea of Broken Windows that misdemeanor arrests help proactively prevent and or decrease felony crime.

Despite Broken Windows’ largely successful results in New York City in terms of major crime reduction, there were opponents to the practice. Many felt that such a crackdown on crime was not appropriate and it became the precursor to later issues with police-community relations, including stop and frisk. To address the controversies and public disapproval of Broken Windows, William Bratton and George L. Kelling wrote an article, “Why We Need Broken Windows Policing”, enumerating and providing “evidence” against each of these arguments. First, Bratton and Kelling acknowledged the common argument that Broken Windows is synonymous with Stop, Question and Frisk. They explained that the two practices are entirely separate and different; Stop, Question and Frisk (Terry stops) being a tool used by police to inquire about suspected criminality and frisks for a weapon if there is reasonable suspicion that a person is armed and dangerous. Broken Windows is not a tactical response based on reasonable suspicion of possible criminality. Rather, it is a more broadly based policy mandating that police will address disorderly illegal behavior, such as public drinking and drug use, fights, public urination, and other acts
considered to be minor offenses, with responses ranging from warning and referral to summons and arrest. (Bratton & Kelling, 2015, para. 9)

The next argument that Bratton and Kelling addressed was the misconception of targeting minorities through Broken Windows. They cite evidence of many minority communities actively seeking the aid of police, through 311 calls for example, to clean up their communities and crack down on crimes that pose a threat to quality of life and safety. They argued that Broken Windows was implemented in all neighborhoods and it could not be a discriminatory practice if many communities, including minority communities, were specifically asking for this type of policing in their neighborhoods (Bratton & Kelling, 2015).

Next, we see an increase in proactive policing strategies, the continued use of Broken Windows, a significant increase in the use of Stop, Question, and Frisk (Terry stops), as well as an increasing disconnect between the police and communities based on public distrust for the police and discriminatory police practices.

**Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly and Mayor Bloomberg’s Lack of Emphasis on Community Policing (2002-2014)**

In the wake of 9/11, terror and countering terrorists’ activities were the focus of Mayor Bloomberg’s administration. Raymond Kelly was appointed Police Commissioner under Mayor Bloomberg from 2002 until 2014. Police Commissioner Kelly was well known and either commended or criticized for his efforts to significantly reduce crime in New York City during his years as Police Commissioner. Specifically, under the direction of Commissioner Kelly, the NYPD deployed Operation Impact (OI) in 2003. OI was a form of hot spot policing, which is a policing style in which police focus their efforts on geographical zones with high crime. OI
involved labeling areas as impact zones based on crime statistics and electronic mapping. These impact zones would be patrolled by numerous rookie police officers who were instructed to focus on gang violence and narcotics (Garcia, 2013). In 2006, NYC hired 1,200 police officers in order to, “strengthen the City's efforts to drive down crime across the City and in the Impact Zones, take illegal guns off our streets”, according to a 2006 NYPD news release (NYPD, 2006, para. 1). The majority of these impact zones, however, were neighborhoods consisting almost entirely of minority populations, primarily Blacks and Latinos. This is when the issue with Stop and Frisk began within the NYPD. The stop and frisk encounters in these impact zones consisted of gathering pedigree information of the individuals who were stopped for the subsequent entry into gang databases, as well as the use of camera surveillance, command posts, and watchtowers (Garcia, 2013).

Although Commissioner Kelly’s hot spot policing methods were effective in reducing crime in New York City, they proved to be detrimental to minority populations, ultimately causing a significant strain on police-community relations. Crime was significantly reduced during Kelly’s term. Before Commissioner Kelly’s term from 1990-2002 the total number of violent crimes (murder and non-negligent manslaughter, rape, robbery, aggravated assault) in New York City in those 12 years was 1,478,891 and property crimes (burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle-theft) were 4,296,820; whereas the total of violent crimes during the entirety of Kelly’s term (2002-2014) were 686,563, a 54% decrease from the previous 12 years, and the total number of property crimes were 1,992,718, a 54% decrease from the previous 12 years (FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics, https://www.ucrdatatool.gov/). Even though crime was already rapidly decreasing in New York City from 1991-2002 (beginning under Commissioner Brown), crime decreased even more under Commissioner Kelly’s lengthy term. In addition,
“tens of thousands of weapons” were removed from the streets during Commissioner Kelly’s term (Devereaux, 2013, para. 3). However, a new problem arose. The issue with hot spot policing, despite its clear benefits on the reduction of crime, was considered by many a discriminatory police practice against minority populations. Police officers were:

Trained as they are in high crime areas, and taught that they are there to bring down crime, officers feel pressured to produce numbers and statistics, and therefore engage in stop-and-frisk practices at a disproportionate rate in these impact zones. During the stops, officers collect the names and addresses of those stopped and add this information to an NYPD database. The overwhelming majority of those stopped are innocent of any wrongdoing, yet their information is still added to this database. In 2009, the New York Civil Liberties Union accused the NYPD of, in effect, building a massive database of black and brown New Yorkers, since the overwhelming majority of those stopped are innocent. This practice of adding names to the database even when the individuals stopped are innocent has supposedly been discontinued after a lawsuit against the NYPD. (Garcia, 2013, p. 38)

Thus, began the admonishment against the practice of stop and frisk within the NYPD.

Between 2003 and 2011 the number of Stop and Frisk encounters rose from 160,851 to 685,724; clearly Stop and Frisk was being employed as an aggressive policing program in New York City (Meares, 2015). In the case of Floyd v. City of New York, four minority plaintiffs filed a class action suit against the NYPD and New York City claiming that the NYPD unlawfully and unconstitutionally used Stop and Frisk against them. The plaintiffs argued that the NYPD violated the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment because of the vast amount of minorities that were stopped and frisked, ninety
percent of the individuals stopped being Latino or African American (Long, 2015). Also in their arguments, plaintiffs used analysis of police UF-250 forms, which are forms the NYPD required officers to prepare to state the exact suspicion raised and the circumstances regarding each stop. The Center for Constitutional Rights was able to demonstrate that a crucial percentage of the stops did not meet the standards for seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, even though the majority of the stops were ruled to be constitutional (Meares, 2015). It was not enough that most stops were executed constitutionally. The stops that were proven to be unconstitutional is what mattered in this case, and they were sufficient to have the NYPD’s practice of Stop and Frisk ruled unconstitutional. This finding, both of unconstitutionality regarding the Fourth Amendment, along with the overwhelming discriminatory practice against minorities, were enough to have the court call for reform. It was ultimately ruled that, “...the NYPD’s stop and frisk policy indirectly targeted blacks and Hispanics through its focus on local crime suspect data.” (Suero, 2015, para. 9) Judge Scheindlin specifically stated,

In conclusion, I find that the City is liable for violating plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The City acted with deliberate indifference toward the NYPD’s practice of making unconstitutional stops and conducting unconstitutional frisks. Even if the City had not been deliberately indifferent, the NYPD’s unconstitutional practices were sufficiently widespread as to have the force of law. In addition, the City adopted a policy of indirect racial profiling by targeting racially defined groups for stops based on local crime suspect data. This has resulted in the disproportionate and discriminatory stopping of blacks and Hispanics in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Both
statistical and anecdotal evidence showed that minorities are indeed treated differently than whites. (Floyd v. City of New York, 2013)

As a result of Floyd, Judge Scheindlin ordered significant changes in police training and supervision, a joint remedial process for the purpose of future reforms, as well as the appointment of an independent unbiased monitor to ensure the success and implementation of these reforms (Long, 2015). The long held practices of hot spot policing and excessive use of stop and frisk, strained police community relations in New York City.

**Police Commissioner Bratton under Mayor de Blasio (2014-2016)**

Despite Commissioner Bratton’s prior emphasis on Broken Windows during his first term as NYPD Police Commissioner, Bratton placed more of a focus on community policing efforts during his second term as Police Commissioner under Mayor Bill de Blasio beginning in 2014. Bratton recognized that even though crime in New York City was relatively low, police-community relations were poor (Crawford & Adler, 2016). This, coupled with the fact that Mayor de Blasio ran on a campaign promising the betterment of police-community relations as well as a reduction in the amount of stop and frisk encounters and the federal Court Order, is ultimately what facilitated change in the NYPD in regards to placing more of an emphasis on community policing. Bratton had a notion to,

- dramatically improve neighborhood interactions with police through a host of techniques,
- all part of a shift in emphasis away from an exclusive focus on crime reduction and towards a balanced strategy of crime prevention and community outreach—an effort, in Commr. Bratton’s words, to move from a “warrior” to a “guardian” policing mindset. (Crawford & Adler, 2016, p. 1)
This was a key shift in policing philosophy and allowed for the further progression of community policing initiatives in the NYPD, which had been put on pause for decades.

As a part of Bratton’s changes in policing practices, he employed technology and social media as a platform to reach out to the community. This was a pioneering practice for the NYPD. When Bratton returned to the NYPD in 2014, technology was severely lacking agency wide. The extent of the problem was so widespread and fundamental that,

[p]recincts were served by 20th century low-capacity Internet connections provided by Verizon, which was less of a problem than it might have been because so few precinct officers had access to the Internet. Few officers had a desktop computer, and fewer still had computers with Internet connectivity. Most officers had no phone number or voicemail. Only 10,000 members of the NYPD had email addresses—and most of the holders of addresses were civilian. (Crawford & Adler, 2016, p. 22)

However, in Bratton’s two years of his second term as Police Commissioner, the NYPD installed new data centers, spent $140 million to provide all officers with smartphones, and tablets for patrol cars, and provided each officer with an email address (Crawford & Adler, 2016). This vast change brought the NYPD up to date in regards to modern technology and set the stage for the increased use of social media for community outreach.

The basic idea behind increasing police presence on social media is if you want to foster communication with community members, you have to consider the most popular forms of communication of the era; the Internet and social media. People are more likely to participate in the larger conversation if they are able to do so via means they are comfortable and familiar with, provided the means doesn't interfere with busy schedules. The accessibility of social media on smartphones was therefore a good solution. The NYPD’s deployment of social media resources
and outlets under Bratton was not largely popular at first, partly because it was vastly different from Commissioner Kelly’s era of policing, and anything that had been done before. One of the initial programs used under Bratton was IdeaScale, a social media platform in which community members could nominate quality of life problems for the police to address. This program was used to identify which issues the community cared about the most. Despite its vast potential, IdeaScale was quickly overlooked for the social media platforms Twitter and Facebook, in which the NYPD could better interact with members of the community. For the first time, a precinct commander was able to tweet information without receiving approval from anyone and a police officer in the precinct was tasked with running the precinct’s Twitter and Facebook, which included responding to community members. Precinct commanders and other staff also attended training sessions about how to use Twitter. Twitter served many purposes for the NYPD including sharing emergency information, however, its purposes specific to community policing were to connect with the public and to humanize police officers to better foster connections (Crawford & Adler, 2016).

Bratton wanted to focus on addressing quality of life issues such as noise, trash, and disorderly behavior. He believed that this would help to improve police-community relations as well as make New York City a safer and better place to live. In order to make this a reality, the NYPD began to recruit individuals who showed an interest as well as a capability in connecting with the community (Crawford & Adler, 2016). In addition, in 2016 the NYPD Police Academy class was 39% Hispanic, 21.9% Asian and Pacific Islander, and 16.4% Black (O’Connor, 2016), and in 2017 the NYPD Academy Class was 27% female, the highest to date, (DeStefano, 2017), both in efforts to better reflect the city it serves and connect with community members. As well as a change in recruitment, the NYPD also employed a change in training techniques, in which
they included training in “constructive community engagement by a way of simulations and other advanced educational techniques” (Crawford & Adler, 2016, p. 3). From 2015 to 2016 the NYPD re-trained over 20,000 police officers as well as amended the training that new recruits received to better encompass community policing ideals and strategies. This occurred at the same time that 1,300 new police officers were hired to support the NYPD’s newest community policing initiative, the pilot Neighborhood Coordination Officer (NCO) program (Crawford & Adler, 2016). This program began under Commissioner Bratton, however, it was developed and later implemented by Bratton’s successor, James O’Neill, in 2016. Commissioner Bratton released a Plan of Action just before he left the NYPD in 2015, titled “The NYPD Plan Of Action And The Neighborhood Policing Plan: A Realistic Framework for Connecting Police and Communities”. Within this plan of action, Bratton stated,

Chief of Department James O’Neill has developed a Neighborhood Policing Plan that I believe to be the first truly realistic and comprehensive approach to achieving the community policing goal in a large organization....The proposed plan is structured to solve the central problem in implementing the community policing ideal: It keeps our cops engaged with police work while allowing them to embed in our communities as part of a team that works together to improve safety and quality of life for everyone. (Bratton, 2015, p. 3)

The plan of action also enumerated the logistics of the implementation of the pilot NCO program; divide each precinct into four to five fully staffed sectors and make sector boundaries as close as possible to actual neighborhood borders; the permanent assignment of a two-officer patrol car to each sector; task NCOs with following up on past crimes, meeting with community members, working to solve problems in their sector for 33 percent of their shift; specialized
training for NCOs; and the utilization of new technology with NCOs (Bratton, 2015). Bratton’s new initiative on community policing and technology all transitioned very nicely into O’Neill’s ideas and new NCO program under his direction as the newly appointed Police Commissioner in 2016.

In addition, in January of 2016 shortly before Bratton left, several bills collectively named the Criminal Justice Reform Act, were introduced in the New York City Council proposing new consequences for quality of life offenses. These bills were passed in May of 2016. Under this legislation, individuals who commit quality life of crimes can be issued civil summonses and face fines or community service instead of being issued criminal summonses and face possible jail time (New York City Council, 2016). This legislation demonstrates a political wave of moving away from Broken Windows and making way for further community policing efforts. Other legislation that sought to hold the NYPD accountable for poor practices and to ensure transparency occurred in 2013 when the City Council created and tasked the Office of Inspector General of the NYPD (independent entity) to, “investigate, review, study, audit and make recommendations relating to the operations, policies, programs and practices of NYPD, with the goal of enhancing the effectiveness of NYPD, increasing public safety, protecting civil liberties and civil rights, and increasing the public’s confidence in the police force.” (Department of Investigation, n.d., para. 1)

**Neighborhood Coordination Officer Program (NCO) and Police Commissioner O’Neill**

**(2016-present)**

The NCO program was piloted under Commissioner Bratton in 2015 and further developed under Police Commissioner James O’Neill after Mayor de Blasio appointed him
Police Commissioner in September of 2016. Mayor de Blasio promised police reforms during his first term. In his second term he stated his desire to have, “officers engaging in deeper outreach with residents and, at the same time, looking inward to the internal biases they maintain” (Goodman & Baker, 2017, para. 9).

Bratton initially piloted the program in 4 precincts (NYPD News, 2016). The pilot was expanded under Commissioner O’Neill and is currently in 55 of the NYPD’s 77 precincts (Rayman, 2018). The NCO program is projected to be in all precincts by 2019 (“Neighborhood Policing”, NYPD, n.d.) The NCO program calls for the division of each precinct into four or five sectors that correspond to neighborhood lines. For each sector, there are two NCOs who are assigned the same shift daily in order to allow the community to become better familiarized with their NCOs. The NCOs also maintain sector integrity, which means that they do not leave the boundaries of their sector unless they have to respond to an emergency. NCOs are expected to spend about 33% of their eight hour shifts off-radio in order to develop relationships with the community, and identify problems and work towards solutions in the neighborhood (NYPD News, 2016). NCOs are also expected to, “immerse themselves in the community by attending meetings with community leaders and clergy, visiting schools, following up on previous incidents, and using creative techniques and adaptive skills to fight crime unique to their particular sectors.” (NYPD News, 2016, para. 7). NCOs receive special training in order to accomplish these goals including, a Detective’s Bureau course on investigations; a Special Operations Lieutenant’s course designed to teach about accident prone locations, CCTV footage, crime prevention, domestic violence, housing developments, nuisance abatement, street narcotics, etc; as well as mediation training designed to help with engaging the community, public speaking, and crime analysis. NCOs are given smartphones, in which they can access
NYPD databases as well as give their number and email address to the community in order to facilitate a simpler method of communication. The ultimate goal is to, “foster a sense of ownership among sector officers for the people, the problems, and even the perpetrators in a particular sector; a sense of geographic responsibility and accountability.” (NYPD News, 2016, para. 5)

An integral part of the NCO program’s operability is Build the Block meetings, which are run by the NCOs of each sector of each precinct to open a conversation with the community and to foster trust and positive relationships. There is a dedicated Build the Block website (buildtheblock.nyc) that prompts people to enter their email addresses to stay connected and also to enter their zip code to determine the date, time and location of the next meeting for their neighborhood sector. For each meeting, the names of NCOs are listed. As of January 2018, 10,466 New Yorkers have attended a total of 636 Build the Block meetings (Rayman, 2018). The New York City Police Foundation recently launched a $6 million ad campaign to promote the NCO program and to encourage attendance at neighborhood Build the Block meetings. The campaign consists of videos of New Yorkers offering their opinions on how police-community relations can be improved, as well as police officers offering insight to the importance of NCO and fostering conversations at Build the Block meetings. The advertisements air on television and radio, and are featured on social media sites (Rayman, 2018). The goal is to have “an ally on every block” so that community members feel comfortable coming to the police and ultimately the police can partner with the community to identify and solve problems (Parascandola, 2017).

Accountability and transparency are other goals of Commissioner O’Neill’s under his community policing initiative. O’Neill specifically demonstrated accountability and his commitment to community policing early in his tenure as Police Commissioner. A man was
wrongfully stopped by police outside of a housing development and subsequently filed a complaint with the NYPD claiming that he was stopped because of his race and that he was simply walking by when a fight broke out. Commissioner O’Neill personally called the man a few days later and told him they needed to have a conversation and learn from what happened (NPR, 2016). O’Neill has pushed for transparency in the department in order to gain the public trust; specifically, Commissioner O’Neill called for a change in the interpretation of section 50-a of the state civil rights law that protects officer’s personnel records from public disclosure (Parascandola, 2017). The change in interpretation would allow for public disclosure of personnel records. In 2017, the New York City Council passed the Right to Know Act designed to hold the NYPD accountable and ensure transparency. In this act, police officers are required to inform a person stopped of their right to decline to submit to a consent search and to record verbal or written consent before conducting a search, as well as provide individuals with their name, rank, command, business card, and reason for the stop even when the individual is not arrested or issued a summons (Right to Know Act, 2017).

There have been several success stories in the news of the NCO program. One notable success story occurred in a Queens neighborhood when two NCOs responded to a call of an armed robbery. The victim explained that the man she met from an online dating site was the robber and she showed the NCOs the picture of the man. One of the NCOs was able to quickly identify the man as someone he had seen in a local barber shop where he and members of the community had recently worked together to clean up graffiti; the perpetrator was subsequently arrested (NYPD News, 2016). Another notable success story occurred when a NCO in Harlem fostered a relationship with a property manager who gave him access to the building’s security cameras. The NCO was able to access the footage on his department smartphone when there was
a shooting in the building and the NCO was quickly able to identify the shooter from the footage as someone that he had recently arrested for drug possession (Kapp, 2017). Another example of a success in the NCO program occurred when a member of the community who had been arrested before and generally did not trust the police came to an NCO, with whom he recently had a positive interaction, and told him what he knew about two recent murders of teenagers in the neighborhood, which helped the NYPD identify a suspect when they had previously been stalled in their investigation. The informant even said to the NCO, “I usually don’t talk to the cops, but I’m talk to you ‘cause I’m cool with you, and when kids are in danger, I’m not gonna tolerate that” (Kapp, 2017, para. 40).

Some limitations of the NCO program include approval and acceptance of the initiative by the community, and ways in which to measure the program’s success. Certain communities that faced adverse actions by the NYPD may not be as willing to ascribe to this new initiative to build relationships and trust between the police and community due to past experiences with the police. In some neighborhoods, “residents, while fully acknowledging police are less confrontational, are still stinging from hundreds of thousands of stops — most resulting in no arrests or summonses — that were made in their neighborhood when Michael Bloomberg was mayor and Raymond Kelly was police commissioner.” (Parascandola, 2017, para. 50) In addition, some members of the community feel as though more police presence in an area will cause more issues. CBS News reported that many feel as though, “…policing is inherently an adversarial role and putting more police officers into an area can actually increase tension with community members, especially minorities.” and that “…police strategies alone are not enough: community-oriented programs, such as youth and economic development initiatives, must be coupled with an effort like neighborhood policing to truly have an impact.” (Nandi, 2018) Others
don't see the feasibility of the program and think that some of the goals of the program, such as having NCOs and community members know each other by name, are not realistic (NPR, 2016). Furthermore, it is difficult to track the successes of the NCO program statistically in terms of reducing crime and achieving the goal of improving police-community relations. There is no way to directly prove that decreases in crime correspond to the implementation of the NCO program. However, the NYPD has stated that they are going to judge the success of the program anecdotally and place less of an emphasis on numbers than they have in the past in determining the success of NCO (Southall, 2016, Kapp, 2017).

**Methodology**

In order to provide context and a deeper understanding of the factors driving past community policing initiatives, or the lack of community policing efforts in the NYPD, I researched literature on prior programs in the NYPD beginning with C-POP and continuing to the current NCO program for the first part of my study. Community policing initiatives in the NYPD, with the exception of CPOP, have not been scientifically evaluated and therefore some of the information regarding the programs is anecdotal or obtained from news articles. Since the NCO program is new and has not yet been implemented in all NYPD precincts, most of the success stories and some research were obtained from news articles, as there haven't been any scholarly assessments of the program. I also obtained information about the NCO program through my observations of community-police interactions and anecdotal success stories at Build the Block community meetings which are discussed in greater detail in the second part of my study.

In order to gain insight into the new NYPD NCO program, I planned to attend five Build the Block Meetings during the data gathering period of my study; three in Queens and two in
Brooklyn (only four of the five meetings were held) for the second part of my study. Build the Block meetings are public meetings that are held by NCOs, typically at public locations or community centers, and are designed to facilitate a conversation between the police and the community. NCOs work with the community at these meetings to develop solutions. At each of the four meetings, I took notes to document content and interactions between community members and the NCO police officers. I did not pose questions or interact with the NCOs or community stakeholders present at these meetings. The names of the NCOs, the specific neighborhoods, and precincts in which these meetings were held were not relevant to this study and I therefore refer to them as “NCO A from Build the Block Meeting 1”, etc. The meetings were open to the public, held in a public forum, and the NCOs conducting and participating in the meetings were acting within their official capacity as police officials. It is part of the NCO’s job to answer questions and engage with community members. IRB approval to attend these public meetings and record my observations was not required because there was no interaction between myself and the NCOs or community stakeholders. The Build the Block Meetings that I attended took place in neighborhoods of varying crime rates, population densities, demographics, and at least one took place within a New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) development. This part of the study is specifically focused on the NYPD's current community policing practices through the NCO program as applied in neighborhoods in Queens and Brooklyn.

In order to determine the demographics for the neighborhoods of each meeting, I utilized information from the 2010 U.S. Census. I looked up the zip code of each of the neighborhoods for the precincts and then determined the percentage of each race/ethnicity/gender by dividing the number of each race/ethnicity/gender by the number of the total population of the zip code. These demographics can be found in Figure 1 of the Appendix. I also obtained demographics
regarding unemployment and poverty percentages for each neighborhood from the New York City Department of City Planning’s website. These demographics can be found in Figure 2 of the Appendix. The purpose of these demographics is to determine if Build-the-Block meetings were conducted consistently across varying demographics and to understand how community concerns varied by neighborhood; and also to demonstrate the varying races, population densities, unemployment, and poverty rates among the neighborhoods of each meeting.

**Results and Discussion**

**Results**

Each of the Build the Block meetings that I attended were led by the two NCOs from the sector. The NCO’s Sergeant took notes on a large chart about complaints and concerns from community members. At some meetings, NCOs from the other sectors of the precinct were present, and at some meetings an officer from the NYPD Community Affairs Bureau was present. At each meeting, a map of the precinct and sector was displayed in the front of the room. The NCOs encouraged people to speak with them privately after the meeting if they preferred. Lastly, light refreshments (coffee, water, cookies, and doughnuts) were provided.

“Meeting 1” (Queens)

At Build the Block Meeting #1, NCOs A & B greeted each person and thanked them for coming; these officers recognized many community stakeholders and referred to them by name. There were approximately 45 people in attendance at this meeting. NCOs A & B began the meeting with an update on issues that were brought up at their prior meeting, including double parking by a school, package theft during the holidays, check washing, an issue with a homeless couple in the park, and drag racing. NCOs A & B noted that they were addressing these issues by; coordinating with and sending an intel report to the NYC Department of Transportation (DOT) to paint stripes on the street to address parking issues; educating community members
how to prevent package theft during the holidays and suggesting preventative measures such as having the package delivered to a P.O. box or setting up a mailbox camera; writing summonses to the drag racers for idling and equipment violations; and collaborating with the NYPD’s Homeless Outreach Unit to offer services to the homeless couple (which resulted in the female becoming employed and able to rent an apartment). The representative from the Community Affairs Bureau referred to a mailbox fishing and check washing epidemic and explained how to prevent it. He explained that if you are going to mail a check, you should take preventative measures to use a special pen that cannot be washed off of a check, mail your envelope in the post office, and if you use a regular mailbox use it before the pickup time.

A local councilman also attended this meeting. He spoke about a recent security issue at one of the local elementary schools. The topic of school safety in light of the recent school shootings across the country arose. The NCOs said they have increased police presence at the school in the morning and at dismissal times, and they continue to visit schools and coordinate with the principals of the schools in the area. The NCOs said that they have a good relationship with one particular school principal, who texts/calls them when she has any concerns. The councilman urged people to write petitions about school safety and school shootings. The NCOs also mentioned that there is an increase in burglaries in the area and they reminded everyone to lock their homes and cars. They added that they have recently made five arrests for burglaries and that they are coordinating with detectives who specialize in apprehending burglars. A member of the community brought up an issue relating to traffic and the NCOs told her to contact DOT and that they will also personally contact someone they have a professional relationship with at DOT. Another community member had noise complaints. The NCOs asked for the address and the time it occurs, and said they will follow up with her.
One member of the community said that her son recognizes NCOs A & B and that she would love for them to host events so that more children can grow up with a positive image of the police. The NCOs said they host events such as career day where they can interact with the youth. NCO B then spoke more about the NCO program and expressed how happy he is that this program exists because it brings a human element back to policing. He also mentioned that the NCO program is still new and they are working out ‘kinks’, but interacting with people at these meetings helps. NCO A said that he became a police officer because he loves people. He added that prior to his assignment as an NCO, community members would only know him or interact with him when he wrote tickets or made arrests, but now community members know him and interact with him for ‘good reasons’. Both NCOs stressed how important trust is, so that they can help the community and the community can feel comfortable to come to them with important information that help solve crimes and other issues. They added that they could help the community even when they are off duty; they take phone calls and texts from community members at all times.

“Meeting 2” (Queens)

At Build the Block Meeting #2 there were approximately fourteen people in attendance, and NCO C mentioned how they sometimes struggle with attendance. Before the meeting began, NCOs C & D spoke with a few people with whom they were familiar and referred to by name. When the meeting began, the NCOs introduced themselves and explained that the purpose of these meetings was to identify concerns/issues from residents, businesses, teachers, etc. NCO C said that they handle long term complaints, they are not tied down by 911 calls, and they have more time to get to know people. Both NCOs gave out their cards and encourage people to contact them whenever necessary. One of the complaints brought up in this meeting was electric
bikes used for deliveries on the street and sidewalk. The NCOs said that electric bikes are illegal and there was an initiative against stores selling them and that they hand out flyers at businesses to inform them that electric bikes are illegal. They said that the NYPD Traffic Division also does operations to confiscate these bikes. There was another complaint concerning shelter residents aggressively begging outside a store; the complainant gave the address and the name of one individual and the NCOs said they would work with the other sector to address it. There was another complaint about an ‘adult business’ near a school where many children walk by. The NCOs say that the community board is trying to shut it down due to prostitution violations and that they will check with the Vice Squad (a police unit that focuses on public-order crimes such as prostitution) and get back to her. Another complaint involved minors smoking marijuana during school hours in a park located within NYCHA. NCO D said that they will coordinate with the Youth Unit/Truancy Unit in the precinct as well as to increase police presence and coordinate with NYCHA. The NCOs acknowledge that is a temporary solution. There were also traffic complaints, one involving enforcement of parking regulations and abandoned cars, and another involving drag racing. The NCOs said they will talk to DOT and that people should email or text them about these issues, because the NCOs can solve these issues more effectively than a call to 311. They also said that they have towed two cars recently and they have designated days when they mark abandoned cars to be towed. As for the drag racing, the NCOs said that they have coordinated with DOT, who wants to install a speed bump on the street. Another complaint came from three employees of a local public elementary school; they asked for another school crossing guard, and they were concerned about shootings in the neighborhood after one of the students was recently grazed by a bullet. The NCOs said they would request the school crossing guard and get back to them. In regards to the shooting, they are aware of the issue and they made an
arrest for the recent shooting. They said they would double patrols and visit schools more often; they said they are already mandated to visit schools once week after the school shooting in Parkland, Florida. The NCOs finished the meeting by saying they want people to have the continuity of seeing the same police officers so people don't have to keep re-explaining a problem in the area.

“Meeting 3” (Brooklyn)

At the Build the Block Meeting #3 there were approximately 12 people in attendance and NCOs E & D recognized some people. NCO E began the meeting by explaining that in this neighborhood there are sometimes conflicts between residents as a result of gentrification. NCO E adds that it takes a while to have both sides understand each other, however, as NCOs they act as mediators so the issues do not escalate. NCO F said that they have had success working with the community members and that one woman recently emailed them to thank them for improving a situation. The NCOs stressed that they want the area to improve and mention that there's a form people can fill out to make complaints and they can remain anonymous. Two individuals brought up a complaint regarding a gang loitering on corners all day, living in both a van and RV, using drugs and alcohol, intimidating people, playing loud music, fighting, threatening community members, going to the bathroom in the street, and slashing their tires. The complainants were concerned about their safety and their children’s safety. Both NCOs said they are aware of this issue and they are interacting with this gang of men, however, the cars they are operating out of are legal and they have to witness them doing something illegal in order to issue a summons or effect an arrest. NCO E said their plan is to take away the cars when they reach enough unpaid parking tickets to be designated scofflaw and NCO E texted another officer during the meeting to walk by the area and check it out. The NCOs said that if they see them urinating in the street they
can get arrest for lewdness, but they emphasized that these people have rights as well and they can’t violate their rights if they are doing nothing illegal. They encouraged attendees to file police reports if they are harassed by these men. Someone gave the NCOs a name of an individual who knows a lot about this area and what is going on; they said they would contact this individual. The community members were very distraught by this issue and the NCOs were understanding, and said that they will make this ‘their mission’, but also stressed that results won't be seen immediately. There was another complaint about teenagers fighting in the park at dismissal time. The NCOs are aware of the problem and they said that at first they give warnings, but now they are going to increase patrol in the park at dismissal time to deter fighting. They have also spoken to principals in the schools about the issue. There was another complaint about double parking near a school, and the NCOs said they are working on getting access to a parking lot so that parents can use the lot instead of double parking. There was another complaint about issues with homeless individuals. The NCOs said that is being dealt with and they are working with the NYPD’s Homeless Outreach Unit for one particular woman, who is currently on a waitlist for a homeless shelter, and the NCOs are trying to speed up the process.

“Meeting 4” (Queens)

At the Build the Block Meeting #4, there were about ten people in attendance. NCO G & H were familiar with some people and refer to them by name. The NCOs explained parameters of the sectors and how each sector has two NCOs and two traditional police officers that only stay in that sector. They explain the NCO program and the goals of building relationships, being community oriented, and exchanging names and phones numbers with community members to more effectively handle problems. The NCOs mentioned that this is a very busy command and sector and that it used to be an Impact precinct, in which 60-80 police officers right out of the
Police Academy would engage in Impact policing (enforcement oriented policing that made extensive use of stop, question, and frisk and issuance of summonses or arrests for violations and minor criminal offenses). Someone asked the NCOs if it was true that someone could be stopped by police for smoking a cigarette on the street, and the NCOs inform him that this is just proposed legislation. There is a complaint about a local mall and block that the complainant says is not really patrolled by officers and there are a lot of unsavory people there that make her feel unsafe. The NCOs are aware of the area and said that they have done observation and enforcement on that block and they found that some business owners allow illegal activity to happen there and that they protect drug dealers. They have been working with the landlords to find out which tenants are causing the problems and they have made multiple arrests on the block. The NCOs also said they are in the process of getting NYPD cameras installed on the block, which would be helpful because they can watch video footage on their department smartphones in real time. They also add that they are all wearing body cameras, which are another useful tool. There was another complaint about someone getting ticketed for trash on their property that was not theirs. The NCOs said that the NYC Department of Sanitation issues those tickets and it is because the trash is on his property and he is responsible. There was another complaint about rat infestations due to the apartment building owner dumping garbage in the lot even though they were previously fined for doing so. The NCOs took down the address and said they will look into this and that they’ve had some success with Sanitation in the past to get areas cleaned up. The NCOs said they would contact Sanitation as well as the NYC Department of Buildings (DOB) and Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH). There was another complaint about drug dealers selling marijuana in the subway and operating out of a local Dunkin Donuts. The NCOs said they are aware and they have made six arrests, and
there are plainclothes narcotics officers and Transit police officers working on the issue. They said that they have also used another approach. Since the NCOs know the names of most of the individuals involved, they can monitor them in the system to see if they are wanted for more serious offenses. NCO G cited the example of one of the dealers who was wanted for larceny and credit card scams, and they were able to arrest him and get him off the street. The complainant mentioned that she feared that they had guns. The NCOs said there was a shooting there, but they were able to immediately find and arrest the shooter through the help of a confidential informant with whom they had built a relationship. They said that they also work with the detective squad and they have also confiscated a shotgun from one of the dealers. The NCOs said there is a blind spot in the cameras in that area, however, they are working on fixing that issue. There was another complaint about people hanging out on the roof the complainant's building (he lives on the top floor) and people smoking in stairwells. He gives the address and the typical times it happens (nights). The NCOs ask if there is an alarm on the roof door, and the complainant says there is but people still go on the roof. The NCOs told him to text them when it happens and that they will visit the building more often. The complainant thanks them and says he appreciates it.

One of the community members said that she felt the area was getting better. The NCOs mentioned that they want to increase attendance at the Build the Block meetings and that they hand out flyers about the meetings to all buildings in area, and building managers tell people to attend. The NCOs also said that they are always encouraging building owners to put up security cameras because they are a deterrent and great investigative tool and that Community Affairs assists building owners with camera placement. Someone asked the NCOs if there will be more Build the Block meetings and they say there will be and that if people leave their email address,
they will send monthly emails with crime information in area as well as dates and times of meetings. The NCOs also mention the Build the Block website.

“Meeting 5” (Brooklyn)

Meeting #5 was listed on the Build the Block website, however, when I arrived at the location, the doors were locked and the lights were off. I contacted the precinct via phone to inquire if the meeting had been canceled. I was informed that they were not aware of a meeting on that date and time.

I noticed several major similarities and dominant themes from my observations at Meetings 1-4. First, at all four meetings the NCOs knew the names of many of the attendees, who seemed to also know the NCOs fairly well. Next, the NCOs were already aware of about half of the issues and problems raised by the members of the community. Oftentimes, the NCOs had already been brainstorming and working towards solutions and were able to provide the community members with updates regarding those issues. Also, many of the concerns and issues raised in each meeting were quality of life issues, public drug use/dealing, aggressive panhandling and loitering, and parking/traffic concerns. There were some outliers including issues about shootings/gun violence and school safety, however, the majority of the issues from these four Build the Block Meetings were quality of life offenses. In addition, with the exception of Meeting #1, attendance was light at the meetings. Some NCOs even mentioned how they have struggled with attendance at their Build the Block Meetings.

Discussion

As evidenced by the first part of research conducted in this study, community policing in the NYPD has changed greatly over the course of nearly four decades. However, there is little in the literature to suggest that the evolution of community policing practices or the absence of a
community policing model in the NYPD resulted primarily in response to community needs. There were a multitude of factors involved in the transitions from one particular community policing model to another, and for a number of years, the abandonment of community policing.

Crime reduction was not a consistent factor in the NYPD’s decision to implement or modify community policing initiatives because crime in New York City began to drop in the early 1990s when community policing was the dominant operational philosophy of the NYPD. The rate of decrease hastened in the mid-1990s through 2014 when the practice of community policing by the NYPD was abandoned in favor of intelligence-led, hotspot, precision, and other data-driven policing models. Crime in New York City is currently at the lowest in recorded history, and the NYPD has resumed community policing (Crawford & Adler, 2016).

Mayoral politics appear to be a dominant factor in the changes among the different policing initiatives identified in this study. In New York City, the mayor appoints the police commissioner, and therefore can affect the type of policing philosophies and practices embraced during a mayoral term. In the late 1980s, Mayor Dinkins embraced the idea of community policing. He chose a Police Commissioner (Brown) who was not only a community policing proponent, but also an expert. This choice of Brown as Police Commissioner, along with Mayor Dinkins’ lobbying for state funding to hire more police officers drove the community policing initiative of Safe Streets, Safe City. This community policing initiative was primarily a reflection of Mayor Dinkins’ ideals as well as his political expertise in obtaining funding from the state in a time of financial constraint. Next, Mayor Giuliani (who succeeded Mayor Dinkins) publicly made a mockery of community policing by referring to it as “social work”. He chose a Police Commissioner (Bratton) who implemented policing practices and philosophies (i.e. Broken Windows) contrary to community policing. Giuliani's eight-year mayoralty followed by the 12
years that Bloomberg was mayor and Raymond Kelly was Police Commissioner, suggests that the needs of the community did not dictate the NYPD’s community policing initiatives; because the NYPD’s policing practices during the aforementioned period were contradictory to community policing. This time period of 20 years suggests that Mayor Giuliani and Mayor Bloomberg’s political and social views regarding the utility of community policing as well as their mandate to drive down crime, were the driving factors behind the policing practices during their terms. While Broken Windows and Impact Policing did reduce crime in NYC, they did little to address trust between the police and the public. Impact policing and the overuse of Stop and Frisk were clearly not policing practices employed to fit the needs of communities or build community trust and cooperation. These policing approaches only alienated the community from their police. Political agendas again came into play when Mayor de Blasio ran for mayor on a progressive platform and promised better police-community relations to a city with many communities that had become detached from and distrustful of the NYPD. Mayor de Blasio's progressive agenda and his views on police-community relations greatly influenced Commissioner Bratton’s approach when Mayor de Blasio appointed Bratton to a second term as police commissioner. Commissioner Bratton altered his previous Broken Windows model in favor of a precision policing and community policing model. Commissioner Bratton, who had previously employed a much more aggressive policing style in the NYPD, presumably changed his ideology to align with that of Mayor de Blasio, who wanted to regain the trust of New Yorkers, specifically minority populations.

There were also social changes and crime control philosophies that contributed to the NYPD’s use of or abandonment of community policing, such as Herman Goldstein’s model of community policing and Kelling and Wilson’s philosophy of Broken Windows. Scholars in the
criminal justice field had very real impacts on the day to day policing models employed by the NYPD. These policing philosophies, developed by revered criminal justice professionals and theorists, influenced the NYPD’s methods of policing on numerous occasions.

Legal issues, such as unconstitutional police practices, also shaped the policing practices of the NYPD. In Floyd v. New York, a federal district court ordered the NYPD to cease their unconstitutional practice of Stop and Frisk (which placed such a wedge between the police and the community). Perhaps, had that court case been decided differently, community policing initiatives might not have returned to the NYPD under Commissioner Bratton’s second term and Commissioner O’Neill. The New York City Council’s creation of and delegation of powers to an Inspector General for the NYPD also impacted policing practices by holding the NYPD accountable for any future discretions that adversely impacted the community to yet another outside entity. Prior to the creation of the NYPD IG, the NYPD was already accountable to the five district attorneys, two US attorneys, and Civilian Complaint Review Board.

Another factor, which both hindered and helped the NYPD’s community policing initiatives, was technology. First, under Police Commissioner Bratton’s first term and continuing through Police Commissioner Kelly, technology allowed for the creation of Compstat, which placed the responsibility on precinct commanders to drive down crime, and eventually implementation and perpetuation of several data-driven policing models, and abandonment of community policing. However, under Police Commissioner Bratton’s second term, technology also allowed for the NYPD to better engage with the community, both through social media and through providing each police officer with phones and emails through which the community can contact them.
In regards to the new NCO program, it is difficult to ascertain whether the NYPD returned to community policing practices to address the needs of the community and bridge the divide created by proactive police-citizen contacts. Many people are still opposed to the program, attendance is low at Build the Block Meetings, perceptions of trust and safety may still be poor, and I experienced firsthand the poor planning and lack of consideration for community attendees with respect to Meeting #5. Many of the people at the Build the Block meetings had unrealistic expectations for the NCOs in terms of solving their problems. A lot of them had to be reminded that the police have to act within the parameters of the law and sometimes issues cannot be remedied easily or quickly. It appears from my limited observations of the Build the Block meetings, that the NCO program is prioritizing community needs. At the Build the Block meetings that I attended, the NCOs knew several community members and often referred to them by name, which suggests that the NCOs take their responsibility to engage with and get to know members of the public seriously, and they have a desire to put community needs first. The NCOs at the meetings I attended were aware of many of the issues the community raised and they were already developing solutions. This coupled with the NCO program’s sector integrity model of having the same two police officers and the same two NCOs remain in the same geographic location for the same tours with the same residents, suggests that they are truly interested in learning their neighborhood and have a vested interest in their communities. With respect to the meetings that I attended, it appears that addressing the needs of the community is a dominant force behind the NCO program. This is very promising if replicated in all precincts once the NCO program is fully rolled out. The NYPD also hired more minority and female police officers just before the NCO program began in an attempt for the department to better reflect the communities it serves. The NCO model seems to be primarily geared towards addressing the
needs of the community, but of course this is yet to be determined. The new NCO program has not yet been fully implemented and has yet to be evaluated. It is recommended that before it is implemented in all precincts, a community satisfaction survey should be conducted pre and post NCO implementation in those precincts that have yet to implement the NCO model.

Ultimately the results of the instant study are inconclusive. I cannot pinpoint one specific dominant factor as to why community policing initiatives changed overtime in the NYPD, nor can I conclude that addressing the needs of the community was always the primary goal of the NYPD’s policing practices. I can only conclude that the evolution of community policing practices within the NYPD was influenced by many factors. Overall, community needs do not appear to be the impetus for the transitions between community policing or lack of community models. It is too soon to determine if the NYPD is employing their current NCO program in response to the needs to the community, however, my observations of the program tentatively suggests that the NYPD’s motivation for the NCO program, in part, is to rebuild trust and relations and respond to the needs of the community. Future studies regarding the effectiveness of community policing and community satisfaction would add crucial information to the conversation about and the understanding of community policing within the NYPD.

**Conclusion**

My research did not support the notion that addressing the needs of communities was historically the main goal of community policing initiatives within the NYPD from 1984 to present. The evolution of community policing initiatives and lack thereof was used in the NYPD to reduce crime and to further political agendas. Other factors, including technology, Federal court orders, and new criminal justice theories and philosophies have influenced the evolution of community policing models in the NYPD. Community policing initiatives in the NYPD existed
in waves; there was a greater emphasis on community policing beginning in the early 1980s and ending in the early 1990s; community policing efforts were paused as other data-driven, intelligence-led, hotspot policing, and precision policing practices were explored for a significant time period stretching from the early 1990s until 2014; and finally from 2014 until present, the Neighborhood Coordination Officer community policing initiative within the NYPD emerged. Community policing in the NYPD in the last forty years has been an evolutionary process that was influenced by a multitude of factors including, but as demonstrated by this study, certainly not limited to, the goal of responding to community needs and fostering positive relations between the police and the community.
## Appendix

Figure 1- Demographics of Neighborhoods of the Build the Block Meetings Studied

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographics of Neighborhood</th>
<th>Meeting 1</th>
<th>Meeting 2</th>
<th>Meeting 3</th>
<th>Meeting 4</th>
<th>Meeting 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Male (of total population)</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Female (of total population)</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% White (of total population)</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Black (of total population)</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% American Indian &amp; Alaska Native (of total population)</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.02%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Asian (of total population)</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Native Hawaiian &amp; Pacific Islander (of total population)</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.24%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Hispanic or Latino of any race (of total population)</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All of the percentages are approximations, rounded to the nearest tenth of a percent.
*Meeting 5 was not held.
Figure 2 - Unemployment and Poverty of each Neighborhood
(Figures from Department of City Planning- https://communityprofiles.planning.nyc.gov/)

Meeting 1

Unemployment

7.3% of the civilian labor force is unemployed

NYCgov Poverty Measure

24.4% of residents have incomes below the NYCgov poverty threshold. Compare to federal poverty rate.

Meeting 2

Unemployment

8.5% of the civilian labor force is unemployed

NYCgov Poverty Measure

19.5% of residents have incomes below the NYCgov poverty threshold. Compare to federal poverty rate.

Meeting 3

Unemployment

6.6% of the civilian labor force is unemployed

NYCgov Poverty Measure

17.7% of residents have incomes below the NYCgov poverty threshold. Compare to federal poverty rate.
Meeting 4

Unemployment:

13.3% of the civilian labor force is unemployed.

Queens: 8.8%  NYC: 9.5%

Queens: 13.3% (± 0.7%)

NYCgov Poverty Measure:

21.0% of residents have incomes below the NYCgov poverty threshold. Compare to federal poverty rate.

Queens: 18.4%  NYC: 20.5%

Queens: 21.0% (± 1.3%)

Meeting 5

Unemployment:

14.2% of the civilian labor force is unemployed.

Brooklyn: 10.0%  NYC: 9.5%

Brooklyn: 14.2% (± 1.1%)

NYCgov Poverty Measure:

25.2% of residents have incomes below the NYCgov poverty threshold. Compare to federal poverty rate.

Brooklyn: 21.2%  NYC: 20.5%

Brooklyn: 25.2% (± 1.7%)
References


