Enter at Your Own Risk: Criminalizing Asylum-Seekers

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ENTER AT YOUR OWN RISK:
CRIMINALIZING ASYLUM-SEEKERS

Thomas M. McDonnell† and Vanessa H. Merton‡

ABSTRACT

In nearly three years in office, President Donald J. Trump's war against immigrants and the foreign-born seems only to have intensified. Through a series of Executive Branch actions and policies rather than legislation, the Trump Administration has targeted immigrants and visitors from Muslim-majority countries, imposed quotas on and drastically reduced the independence of Immigration Court Judges, cut the number of refugees admitted by more than 80%, cancelled DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals), and stationed Immigration Customs and Enforcement (“ICE”) agents at state courtrooms to arrest unauthorized immigrants, intimidating them from participating as witnesses and litigants. Although initially saying that only unauthorized immigrants convicted of serious crimes would be prioritized for deportation, the Trump Administration has implicitly given ICE officers carte blanche to arrest unauthorized immigrants anytime, anywhere, creating a climate of fear in immigrant communities.

Particularly disturbing is the targeting of asylum-seekers, employing the criminal justice system and the illegal entry statute in the “zero tolerance policy.” Under this policy, children, including toddlers, are seized and languish for months and years separate from

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‡ Professor of Law, Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University, B.A. Radcliffe College, J.D., New York University School of Law. My contribution to this article is dedicated to my son Darrow Slade Godeski Merton and to my daughter Rebecca Suzanne Godeski Merton, both of whom in their own ways fight for peace, freedom, justice, and the rule of law—and to the worldwide victims of oppression and persecution they both work so hard to help.
their families, many of whom are seeking asylum. Directly contrary to federal statute and international law, another policy makes anyone who enters the country without inspection ineligible for asylum. Kirstjen Nielsen, Trump’s second Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), ordered asylum applicants to await the lengthy processing of their claims in cartel-ruled border areas of Mexico, with no realistic safe shelter and deprived of all meaningful opportunity to exercise their statutorily-guaranteed right to access to counsel—a necessity, given today’s convoluted asylum law.

Trump’s first Attorney General, Jefferson Sessions, largely disqualified as grounds for asylum even the most brutal and terroristic persecution of women and violence perpetrated by inescapable quasi-state gang actors. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) officers mislead asylum-seekers at the southern border, telling them they don’t have the right to apply for asylum or saying yes, they may apply, but admitting only a minute fraction of those who present themselves for processing at ports of entry. President Trump’s Administration refuses to grant parole or reasonable bond even to those asylum-seekers who establish a credible fear of persecution, frequently resulting in long-term detention, and forcing on detained asylum-seekers the Hobson’s choice of lengthy incarceration in terrible conditions in the United States or the risks of persecution and death in their countries of origin.

International law prohibits using the criminal justice system or prolonged administrative detention to deter and discourage bona fide asylum-seekers from asserting and proving their claims. We suggest two remedies: Federal courts should enforce article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention (1) by prohibiting criminal charges of unlawful entry against bona fide asylum-seekers until they complete the asylum application process and are denied asylum; and (2) by requiring parole or reasonable bond for asylum-seekers who pass fair credible fear interviews. The article argues that bona fide asylum-seekers should be kept in detention only for a short period, if at all, to determine whether they have a credible fear of persecution.

Article 31 of the Refugee Convention, made binding on the United States through our accession to the 1967 Refugee Protocol, generally prohibits “impos[ing] penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees... where their life or freedom was threatened.” “Penalties” clearly must include not only criminal prosecution and prison, but also prolonged immigration detention and the seizure of children from parents without good cause, for “deterrence” purposes. We argue also that customary international law and human rights treaties support the recommended remedies and
stand squarely against the Trump Administration’s policies. Federal courts may utilize customary international law directly or through the Charming Betsy canon.

Not only do the Trump Administration’s harsh immigration policies and practices violate international law and American values, but also foretell a government tending toward exclusion, racism, nationalism, parochialism, authoritarianism, and disregard of the rule of law. The parallels between the Trump Administration and Hungary’s autocratic, essentially one-party, state, are chilling. See Patrick Kingsley, He Used to Call Victor Orban an Ally. Now He Calls Him a Symbol of Fascism, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/world/europe/viktor-orban-hungary-ivanyi.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review).

Federal courts, however, have both the authority and the responsibility to enforce the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Refugee Protocol as well as international human rights norms to protect asylum-seekers from criminal prosecution and from prolonged detention. The Framers of the United States Constitution and its key amendments envisioned that federal courts would apply treaties as the rule of decision to protect foreigners and would serve as a check upon an Executive that tramples on individual rights, particularly the rights of a vulnerable minority. Given the outlandish behavior of this Administration, federal courts must live up to that vision.
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INTRODUCTION

Led by authoritarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Hungary has virtually closed its border to asylum-seekers from Syria, Sudan, and other countries. The few who are admitted to Hungarian “transit zones” generally are denied asylum and are given only three days to appeal, which they must do themselves in written Hungarian without a lawyer.¹ In June 2018, the Hungarian Parliament enacted a statute making it a criminal offense punishable by up to one year in prison for any person to “enable illegal immigration . . .” defined as . . . helping asylum-seekers who are ‘not eligible for protection . . .’ including [prohibiting any person from] ‘border monitoring,’ producing and disseminating information [about the asylum process], or ‘network building.’²

In November 2018, U.N. inspectors went to Hungary to ensure that its immigration centers met international standards. The Hungarian government refused them access. Mr. Orbán also refused to comply with the European Union’s order to admit 2,000 refugees as part of Hungary’s obligation as an EU member.³ An imposing Hungarian-built barbed wire fence, reinforced with drones and heat sensors, traverses the entire border between Hungary and Serbia. The state-controlled Hungarian media refers to immigrants, including


asylum-seekers, as undesirables and criminals. The Parliament, dominated by Orbán’s Fidesz party, enacted a statute to detain asylum-seekers, including children, during the entire course of the asylum procedure.

Aside from its anti-immigration policies, the Fidesz party pushed through a new constitution, gerrymandered election districts, virtually eliminated the independent judiciary, took over the state media, and enabled large portions of the private media to be “bought up by pro-Orbán oligarchs.” These disturbing policies have effectively made Hungary a one-party state and an example of new authoritarianism in Europe.

Hungary is not the only government to use criminal law and prolonged detention against the foreign-born. United States President

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5. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2.


Donald J. Trump has likewise demonized immigrants. Although all reliable studies demonstrate that immigrants commit fewer crimes per capita than native-born American citizens and many studies indicate


A necessarily incomplete list of this Administration’s attacks on immigrants, compiled by co-author Vanessa Merton, is appended as “The Trump Administration’s Policies and Practices Toward Asylum Applicants and Refugees” and will be posted at a URL available by email to vmerton@law.pace.edu. It is difficult to keep it up to date, because almost every week new policies are promulgated (often in violation of Administrative Procedure Act requirements) that are designed to make it more difficult and expensive to apply for any type of lawful entry or status, to get accurate and timely decisions on those applications, and to appeal or challenge incorrect decisions. See *infra passim*. The American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA), a membership organization joined by most expert immigration lawyers who represent immigrants, has found an artful metaphor for the massive policy changes under this Administration: the “Invisible Wall.” See AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, *DECONSTRUCTING THE INVISIBLE WALL: HOW POLICY CHANGES BY THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ARE SLOWING AND RESTRICTING LEGAL ADMINISTRATION* (Mar. 19, 2018); see also *Featured Issue: Changes in USCIS Policy Under the Trump Administration*, AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N (Sept. 2020, 2019), https://www.aila.org/advo-media/issues/allfeatured-issue-changes-in-uscis-policy-under [https://perma.cc/62HY-ZM3L] (collection of news articles about changes in U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services policy).
that immigrants significantly help the economy, the Trump campaign portrayed immigrants as largely criminal, labelling Mexican

10. See the recent review of decades of academic expert studies issued by the highly conservative Cato Institute, which found “All immigrants have a lower criminal incarceration rate and there are lower crime rates in the neighborhoods where they live, according to the near-unanimous findings of the peer-reviewed evidence. . . . Illegal immigrant incarceration rates are about half those of native-born Americans in 2017. In the same year, legal immigrant incarceration rates are then again half those of illegal immigrants. . . . crime along the Mexican border is much lower than in the rest of the country, homicide rates in Mexican states bordering the United States are not correlated with homicide rates here, El Paso’s border fence did not lower crime, Texas criminal conviction rates remain low (but not as low) when recidivism is factored in, and that police clearance rates are not lower in states with many illegal immigrants—which means that they don’t escape conviction by leaving the country after committing crimes. . . . [H]igher illegal immigrant populations [are correlated with] large and significantly associated reductions in drug arrests, drug overdose deaths, and DUI arrests with no significant relationship between increased illegal immigration and DUI deaths.” Alex Nowrasteh, Illegal Immigrants and Crime—Assessing the Evidence, CATO INST.: CATO AT LIBERTY (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.cato.org/blog/illegal-immigrants-crime-assessing-evidence [https://perma.cc/76JV-GHLW]; The Effects of Immigration on the United States’ Economy, PENN WHARTON BUDGET MODEL (June 27, 2016), https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2016/1/27/the-effects-of-immigration-on-the-united-states-economy [https://perma.cc/7XMM-DT5W] (finding immigration does not slow wage growth for native-born workers); Gretchen Frazee, 4 Myths About How Immigrants Affect the Economy, PBS NEWS HOUR (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/making-sense/4-myths-about-how-immigrants-affect-the-u-s-economy [https://perma.cc/AH9G-2P3Q] (refuting misconceptions about economic impacts of immigration); Ryan Nunn, Jimmy O’Donnell & Jay Shambaugh, Economic Facts: A Dozen Facts About Immigration, THE HAMILTON PROJECT (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/a_dozen_facts_about_immigration [https://perma.cc/6369-MX4T] (noting output in U.S. economy is higher and grows faster with more immigrants; small impact of immigration on low-skilled native-born wages; and immigration to the United States does not increase crime rate); Alexia Fernández Campbell, These Immigrants Contribute $4.6 Billion in Taxes. Trump’s Trying to Strip Their Legal Statuses, VOX (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/4/17/18411975/tps-immigrants-pay-billions-in-taxes [https://perma.cc/SXE7-24H3] (demonstrating that President Trump is trying to terminate Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for thousands of immigrants who pay taxes, mortgages, rents, and contribute to the economy); Nina Roberts, Undocumented Immigrants Quietly Pay Billions into Social Security and Receive No Benefits, AMERICAN PUBLIC MEDIA: MARKETPLACE (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.marketplace.org/2019/01/28/undocumented-immigrants-quietly-pay-billions-social-security-and-receive-no/ [https://perma.cc/YLS9-YKZ7] (noting that in one year, undocumented immigrants contributed $13 billion to Social Security and $3 billion to Medicare).
immigrants as “rapists.””11 As President, Mr. Trump has continued to highlight immigrant crime all out of proportion to reality.12

Mr. Trump appointed as his first Attorney General the most conservative and anti-immigrant sitting Senator, Jefferson Sessions.13 Mr. Sessions, and his anti-immigration counterparts the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, pressured if not ordered the Departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security—and their subsidiary agencies, including Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), and the Executive Office of Immigration Review, which includes the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and Immigration Court Judges (“IJs”)—to harshly enforce immigration laws.14 At times, these laws

are used to retaliate against activists, journalists, and even IJs who express the slightest resistance to, or merely report on, his policies.


This type of wholesale hijacking of legal authority to marginalize opposition was not seen in the United States even during the Holocaust era of abandonment of refugees.\textsuperscript{15}

The Trump Administration’s harsh immigration policies and practices violate international human rights, refugee law more specifically, and basic norms of morality.
This Article analyzes only one aspect of the Trump Administration’s breaches of international law: its policies and practices that penalize asylum-seekers in contravention of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Refugee Protocol.  

16. Cf. Robert Ticehurst, The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict, 317 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 125, 128–29 (1997) (noting that while international humanitarian law is developing, populations “remain under the protection . . . of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience”).


In July 2019, the Trump Administration issued perhaps its most restrictive order against asylum-seekers yet, precluding them from even applying for asylum if they have travelled through another country before reaching the southern land border with the United States—i.e., if they are not able to arrive by boat or airplane—and did not apply for asylum in the countries of transit. See Michael D. Shear & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Most Migrants at Border with Mexico Would Be Denied Asylum Protections Under New Trump Rule, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/15/us/politics/trump-asylum-rule.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review).

This purported rule directly contradicts not only the international law incorporated into domestic law, but a Congressional statute: Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 208(a)(1) (emphasis added) (“Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters), irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply for asylum in accordance with this section.”) as well as the Congressionally crafted scheme defining “firm resettlement” as a bar to asylum claims, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(2)(A) and 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (noncitizen ineligible for asylum in the United States only if “firmly resettled in another country prior to arriving in the United States.”). Related provisions of the INA were at issue in another Interim Final Rule issued in November 2018, which sought to prevent asylum-seekers who enter the United States other than through a Port of Entry from qualifying for asylum. See infra note 60 and accompanying text. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in December 2018 issued a preliminary injunction against that regulation, see East Bay Covenant Sanctuary, et. al. v. Trump, 3:18-cv-6810-JST (N.D Cal. November 19, 2018) (Motion for Temporary Restraining Order), application for stay pending appeal denied sur nom. Trump v. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 139 S.Ct. 782 (Mem) (2018).

On July 16, 2019, the ACLU, Southern Poverty Law Center, and the Center for Constitutional Rights filed a legal challenge to this latest Rule, seeking a preliminary and permanent injunction against its implementation, in the Northern
Part I of this article extensively details the Trump Administration’s policies toward immigrants generally and more specifically toward asylum-seekers, and briefly contrasts those policies and practices with those of his predecessors. Part II analyzes the relevant articles of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Refugee Protocol, including their historical context and various interpretations. Part II analyzes analogous customary international law governing refugees and discusses the practice of states. Part III argues that Articles 31(1) and 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention are self-executing and, consequently, should be the rule of decision when processing asylum-seekers. Since Article 31(1) expressly forbids imposing “penalties” on refugees for their unlawful presence, the United States Justice Department may not criminally prosecute individuals with a *prima facie* case for asylum until the asylum case is concluded.18 The article concludes with the argument that Article 31(1)

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18. 1951 Refugee Convention, *supra* note 17, art. 31(1). The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees’ authoritative refugee handbook identifies the “core principles” of the 1951 Convention as “non-discrimination, non-refoulement,
and customary international human rights law permit at most brief detention of *bona fide* asylum seekers and unquestionably prohibit the seizure of infants and children from their parents or lawful guardians.

I. THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S POLICIES AND PRACTICES TOWARD ASYLUM-SEEKERS

According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”), there are over sixty-seven million refugees, stateless persons, returnees, and internally displaced persons around the world. Over 70.8 million people have been forced from their homes—the highest number of displaced people ever recorded, substantially exceeding the number after World War II. The most obvious causes of this huge number include war and internal conflict; climate change; gross human rights violations; organized crime proto- and quasi-states; and severe economic exploitation—principally in the Global South. This unprecedented wave of refugees has coincided with pan political and economic shifts following the 9/11 attacks; the United States’ involvement in wars and failed states in Iraq, nonpenalization for illegal entry or stay, and the acquisition and enjoyment of rights over time." U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS AND GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 8 (re-issued Feb. 2019) (emphasis added), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/legal/3d58e13b4/handbook-procedures-criteria-determining-refugee-status-under-1951-convention.html [https://perma.cc/B2UX-JCB4].


Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and other Islamic countries; the 2008 worldwide economic crisis; increasing globalization; and the digitizing and growing automation of the economies of developed countries. Prompting steep increases in perceived economic and military insecurity, these events, together with the increasing realization by white Americans that they will be in the minority in the next decade or so,²¹ seem to have contributed to the ever more vehement opposition by many Americans to immigration and immigrants from certain countries.²²

Elected in part by promoting and riding this burgeoning anti-immigrant and white nationalist sentiment,²³ President Trump


promptly adopted harsh policies and practices against both unauthorized and legal immigration. In 2018, President Trump’s Justice Department imposed quotas on immigration judges, requiring them to complete 700 cases a year and ensure that fewer than 15% of their decisions are remanded on appeal; cut the number of refugees admitted by almost 80%; cancelled DACA (Deferred Action for actions), culminating in Mr. Trump’s embrace of the traditional chant of racial hatred and “ugly, lawless, racist sentiment”: “Send her back!” by an adoring crowd that had been whipped into a frenzy with his denunciations of four Congresswomen of color, see David Leonhardt, So This Is Where We Are, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/18/opinion/trump-ilhan-omar-rally.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review).


Implementation of this Draconian measure was temporarily limited by a complex set of legal actions in multiple jurisdictions, ultimately consolidated before the Supreme Court. Dept. of Homeland Security v. Regents of Univ. of CA., consolidating Trump, President of U.S v. NAACP and Mcaleenan, Sec. of Homeland Security v. Vidal, https://www.supremecourt.gov/garantednotedlist/19grantednotedlist. For a description of the Supreme Court argument on November 12, 2019 (and of Mr. Trump’s Tweet that morning, claiming with either profound ignorance or cynical mendacity that “Many of the people in DACA . . . are far from ‘angels’. Some are very tough, hardened criminals,” although DACA status is precluded by or revocable for any significant criminal record or perceived threat to national security or public safety. See DHS Memorandum, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-in-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [perma.cc/4F9W-D44G]; see also Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Appears Ready to Let Trump End DACA Program, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/12/us/supreme-court-dreamers.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review).


In June 2019, in a case brought by state prosecutors alleging that ICE activity was causing major disruption of the state criminal justice system, a federal judge

26. Childhood Arrivals),26 authorized ICE agents to arrest immigrants who are using the court system affirmatively or defensively,27 militarized
the southern—and only the southern—border with thousands of deployed troops and combat equipment, in keeping with his troubling reference to immigrants as an invasion; employed administrative removals to summarily deport immigrants; and ordered cancellation of Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) for residents of six countries.

enjoined ICE from making arrests for civil immigration violations in Massachusetts courts, on courthouse steps, and in courthouse parking lots. These state prosecutors have been viciously attacked, by name, by Mr. Trump, who called them “people that [sic] probably don’t mind crime.” See Alanna Durkin Richer, Judge Halts Immigration Arrests at Massachusetts Courts, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 20, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/4826abde814749bd9be54119037263e5 [https://perma.cc/C2QS-3HZ2] See also Akhiah Johnson, ICE Arrests at Courthouses Disrupt Justice, Lawsuit Claims, BOSTON GLOBE (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/03/15/ice-arrests-courthouses-are-disrupting-justice-two-lawsuits-claim/N7KhXIHiEuw3Qdz1XDht4I/story.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (“According to the suit, ICE has been arresting immigrants—both those in the country legally and illegally—at state courthouses in Massachusetts with increasing frequency since President Trump took office.”). See also Jeff Gammage, ICE to Cease Arrests In Philly Courthouses, Agree to New Rules of Conduct, Says Sheriff’s Department, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/ice-immigration-immigrants-courts-arrests-sheriffs-department-20190405.html?__vfz=medium%3Dsharebar.

The right of concerned citizens to document the behavior of ICE officers engaging in this abusive practice has also been sharply challenged. See Media Lab, “Eyes on Courts,” https://lab.witness.org/eyes-on-courts-documenting-ice-arrests/ [https://perma.cc/97DC-8HKV].


30. See Daniella Silva, Trump Calls for Deporting Migrants ‘Immediately’ Without a Trial, NBC NEWS (June 24, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/trump-calls-deporting-migrants-immediately-without-trial-886141 [https://perma.cc/XQS2-35Y3] (reporting that Mr. Trump tweeted, “when somebody comes in, we must immediately, with no Judges or Court Cases, bring them back from where they came”).

Although the Trump Administration initially said that only unauthorized immigrants convicted of serious crimes would be


For the current status of litigation temporarily protecting TPS beneficiaries, see Ramos v. Nielsen, No. 18-cv-01554 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/ramos-v-nielsen-order-granting-preliminary-injunction-case-18-cv-01554-emc.pdf [https://perma.cc/6EXJ-HUZS] (preliminary injunction halting enforcement based on sufficient evidence that discriminatory purpose motivated decisions to terminate the TPS designations of Sudan, Haiti, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, indicating that (1) DHS Acting Secretary was influenced by President Trump and/or White House officials such as Stephen Miller in TPS decision-making; and (2) President Trump's expressed animus against non-white, non-European immigrants); Saget v. Trump, No. 18-cv-1599 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2019), http://nipnlg.org/PDFs/practitioners/our_lit/impact_litigation/2019_12_Apr_tps-haiti-prelim-injunt.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQH5-FM45] (holding that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on merits of claim that DHS Secretary did not conduct good-faith, evidence-based factual review when determining whether to extend Haitian TPS, but was instead improperly influenced by White House officials' political motivations, in violation of Administrative Procedures Act); Bhattacharai v. Nielsen, No. 19-cv-731 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.aclsocal.org/sites/default/files/aclu_socal_bhattacharai_20190312_stipulation_stay.pdf [https://perma.cc/FS6X-CURX] (stipulating stay maintaining TPS for Nepal and Honduras pending resolution of Ramos v. Nielsen); see generally Temporary Protected Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status [https://perma.cc/5PXP-89A2] (providing information on current TPS administrative stances and ongoing litigation).

prioritized for deportation,\textsuperscript{32} it has implicitly given ICE officers \textit{carte blanche} to arrest unauthorized immigrants anytime, anywhere, creating a climate of fear in immigrant communities, and, somewhat ironically, substantially reducing the deportation of people actually convicted of significant crimes.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{32} In 1996, Congress enacted a statute changing the word for deportation to “removal.” See Deportation, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary/deportation. In this article, however, we use the word “deportation” instead of “removal” because the former term is more readily and easily understood.

\textsuperscript{33} Alan Gomez, ICE Arresting More Non-Criminal Undocumented Immigrants, USA TODAY (May 17, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2018/05/17/ice-arresting-more-non-criminal-undocumented-immigrants/620361002 [https://perma.cc/JV7G-7WEN] (noting that, during the Trump Administration, ICE agents have arrested on average 4,143 undocumented immigrants without a criminal record each month, whereas in the last two years of the Obama administration, agents averaged 1,703 a month); American Immigration Council, The End of Immigration Enforcement Priorities Under the Trump Administration (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/immigration-enforcement-priorities-under-trump-administration [https://perma.cc/7EWM-CRAB] (indicating that the Trump Administration has broadened enforcement priorities to afford ICE officers greater power to remove unauthorized immigrants than exercised in other administrations); see also ICE Focus Shifts Away from Detaining Serious Criminals, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (June 25, 2019), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/564/ [https://perma.cc/CN6R-3H5W] (stating that the number of ICE detainee was up 22\% from September 2016; the most striking change over the 27-month period was a dramatic drop in the number of detainees who had committed serious crimes); Profiling Who ICE Detains—Few Committed Any Crime, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Oct. 9, 2018), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/539/ [https://perma.cc/WS4Z-B8ES] (stating that 58\% of individuals in ICE custody had no criminal record; four out of five either have no record or committed only a minor offense such as traffic violation).

In June 2019, Mr. Trump announced—on Twitter—the impending arrest of “millions” of immigrants, not at or near the border but in several major metropolitan areas—apparently more retaliation for the “sanctuary” policies often denounced by President Trump, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions, and other Administration officials. See, e.g., Mike DeBonis, Rachael Bade & Felicia Sonmez, Democrats Take Aim at Miller as Questions Persist About ‘Sanctuary City’ Targeting, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2019) at https://www.washingtonpost.com/power_post/democrats-take-aim-at-miller-as-questions-persist-about-sanctuary-city-targeting/2019/04/14/61824ef4-5ed5-11e9-9ff2-abc984d99ec_story.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review); Nick Miroff & Maria Sacchetti, Trump Vows Mass Immigration Arrests, Removals of ‘Millions of Illegal Aliens’ Starting Next Week, WASH. POST (June 17, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/trump-vows-mass-immigration-arrests-removals-of-millions-of-
A. Treating All Irregular Immigrants as Criminals

Attorney General Sessions initiated the policy of criminally prosecuting all immigrants, including first-time entrants, who entered the United States without inspection. On April 6, 2017, Mr. Sessions formally declared his “zero tolerance” policy—every person who crossed the “Southwest” border (but not the Canadian border) without inspection would be “criminally prosecuted for illegal entry or illegal reentry.” Sessions directed all U.S. Attorneys to prioritize prosecuting noncitizens for smuggling and illegal aliens—starting next week. 


entry. His policy included asylum-seekers and families with children—no exceptions. A month later, he explained what “zero tolerance” meant:

I have put in place a “zero tolerance” policy for illegal entry on our Southwest border. If you cross this border

This provision is so broad that it could include persons who help to arrange a child’s travel to the United States, help pay for a guide for the child’s journey to the United States, or otherwise encourage the child to enter the United States. The memorandum directs that enforcement against parents, family members, or other individuals involved in the child’s unlawful entry into the United States could include (but is not limited to) placing such person in removal proceedings if they are removable, or referring them for criminal prosecution.

As of June 29, 2017, ICE confirmed that it has begun targeting individuals in the United States who may have paid a guide to smuggle children into the United States. Although ICE has failed to disclose details regarding the scope or length of this enforcement action, its apparent focus is on “sponsors” (individuals, often parents or other close family members, who agree to provide a safe appropriate home for children awaiting immigration processing). This means that individuals who sponsor a child to facilitate the child’s release from immigration detention are likely themselves at increased risk. Alison Kamhi & Rachel Prandini, Alien Smuggling: What It Is and How It Can Affect Immigrants (July 18, 2017), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/alien_smuggling_practice_advisor-y-20170728.pdf [https://perma.cc/YHZ5-GE8R].


unlawfully, then we will prosecute you. It’s that simple. If you smuggle illegal aliens across our border, then we will prosecute you. If you are smuggling a child, then we will prosecute you and that child will be separated from you as required by law. If you make false statements to an immigration officer or file a fraudulent asylum claim, that’s a felony. If you help others to do so, that’s a felony, too. You’re going to jail. So if you are going to come to this country, come here legally. Don’t come here illegally.38

B. Employing the Pretext of Criminality to Take More than 5000 Children from Their Parents

The Trump Administration seized on the so-called nuclear option of “zero tolerance”39 to deliberately separate noncitizens from their children on the theory that such violent disruption of people’s lives would deter other would-be immigrants from coming to the United States.40 Former DHS Secretary and then-Presidential Chief of


40. See Chappell & Taylor, supra note 14; see also L. v. United States Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 302 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1166–67 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (holding that the Trump Administration’s zero tolerance policy involving the separation of families as a means of deterrence is a violation of the constitutional protection of family integrity); Tal Kopan, Exclusive: Trump Admin Thought Family Separations Would Deter Immigrants. They Haven’t., CNN (June 18, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/18/politics/family-separation-deterrence-dhs/index.html [https://perma.cc/B7NT-JYGN] (writing that Mr. Trump’s zero-tolerance policy was intended to deter illegal entry into the United States by promising prosecution and potential family separation); Miriam Jordan, More Migrants Are
Staff John Kelly said, “a big name of the game is deterrence... Family separation would be a tough deterrent.” In prior administrations, first-time entrants were usually placed in administrative (civil immigration) detention. In civil detention, unlike federal penal custody, children can stay with their parents. It is critical to stress that, despite obfuscation to the contrary, the Trump Administration is not required by any law to separate young children from their families:

The president and top administration officials say U.S. laws or court rulings are forcing them to separate families that are caught trying to cross the southern border. These claims are false. Immigrant families are being separated primarily because the Trump Administration’s family separation policy.

Crossing the Border This Year. What’s Changed?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/05/us/crossing-the-border-statistics.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (stating that the zero-tolerance policy is not deterring families fleeing violence and corruption, although fewer single males seeking employment are being apprehended).

See Linda Qiu, Fact-Checking Trump’s Family Separation Claim About Obama’s Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/09/us/politics/fact-check-family-separation-obama.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (“Top [Trump Administration] officials countered that Mr. Trump’s predecessors had also separated families at the border. That is misleading. While previous administrations did break up families, it was rare... Neither former Presidents George W. Bush nor Barack Obama had a policy that had the effect of widespread family separation... Nothing like what the Trump administration is doing has occurred before.”); see also Salvador Rizzo, The Facts About Trump’s Policy of Separating Families at the Border, WASH. POST (June 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/06/19/the-facts-about-trumps-policy-of-separating-families-at-the-border/ (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (noting that in past administrations immigrants seeking asylum were "were released and went into the civil court system, but now the parents are being detained and sent to criminal courts..."").

administration in April began to prosecute as many border-crossing offenses as possible. This “zero-tolerance policy” applies to all adults, regardless of whether they cross alone or with their children. The Justice Department can’t prosecute children along with their parents, so the natural result of the zero-tolerance policy has been a sharp rise in family separations....The Trump administration implemented this policy by choice and could end it by choice. No law or court ruling mandates family separations.44

After nation-wide outcry, President Trump stated that he halted this program, but, as of late 2019, thousands of children are still separated from their parents or close relatives, whose whereabouts are essentially unknown.45 According to the Administration itself, in court filings, it may take at least a year and potentially two years before these children can be reunited with their families because the government made no effort to keep track of information about either

44. Salvador Rizzo, supra note 42 (emphasis added). “Administration officials have pointed to “the law” as the reason why undocumented children are being separated from their parents. But there’s no such law. . . . There is no law that requires migrant children who arrive at the border to be separated from their parents. The separation practice began in earnest when Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced in early May that the departments of Justice and Homeland Security would work together to criminally prosecute everyone who crosses the border illegally—the “zero tolerance” policy. “If you are smuggling a child, then we will prosecute you and that child will be separated from you as required by law,” Sessions said in Scottsdale, Ariz., on May 7. That tactic, in effect, directly leads to migrant children being separated from their parents; kids cannot be held in criminal jails alongside their mother or father.” Seung Min Kim, supra note 44.

45. In January 2019, the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services identified 2,737 immigrant children whom the government had separated from their parents, but noted that there may have been “thousands” more. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, OEI-BL-18-00511, SEPARATED CHILDREN PLACED IN OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT CARE (Jan. 2019), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-BL-18-00511.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DSV-6V23]. Recently, the true number of children separated from family at the border since July 2017 has been revealed to be almost double that number, at least 5400. See, e.g., ASSOCIATED PRESS, More than 5,400 Children Split at Border, According to New Count (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/more-5-400-children-split-border-according-new-count-n1071791 [https://perma.cc/98X9-WTUY].
the children or their relatives prior to April 2018.46 Advocates were reduced to recommending that the names, birthdates, and, when known, “Alien Numbers” of parents or siblings be written in indelible ink on the backs of children, with the thought that children would be less likely to wash ink off their backs.47 Before Mr. Trump ostensibly stopped the policy, hundreds of immigrant parents had been deported to their countries of origin without their children.48 The young sons and daughters of these immigrants were left in locked residential facilities or in foster care to fend for themselves.49 No proceeding determined

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47. Lorelei Williams, Esq., Chair, New York City AILA Chapter, Presentation (Apr. 9, 2019) (notes on file with author) (describing her multiple trips to asylum-seeker border camps and caravans and working with NGOs trying to provide food, water, clothing, and minimal shelter and protection to the refugees).


49. See Emily Atkin, The Uncertain Fate of Migrant Children Sent to Foster Care, NEW REPUBLIC (June 20, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/149161/uncertain-fate-migrant-children-sent-foster-care [https://perma.cc/57VW-QT6Z]. At the more than one hundred federally contracted “shelters,” children are not free to leave. The large, understaffed facilities have been denounced as hotbeds of illness and danger by Congressional leaders and criticized even by the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”). As of December 2018, the shelters were at 92% capacity with about 15,000 children detained, despite the fact that sponsors (usually family members residing in the United States) have applied for the release of thousands of the children pending resolution of their immigration proceedings. Release to sponsors is taking far longer than in prior administrations, in part because HHS now fingerprints sponsors to conduct a subsequent criminal background check. In contrast, staffers at the “shelter” facilities do not undergo the same kinds of background checks, and a horrifyingly high incidence of sexual assault on children has been documented by HHS and reported to Congress. See John Burnett, Almost 15,000 Migrant Children Now Held
that their parents were unfit or were otherwise abusive or neglectful. Even at the time that the program was formally and grudgingly disbanded—although it now appears DHS continues a de facto separation policy by claiming migrant parents present a risk to their children—ICE and CBP had little information they could use to


HHS has also deliberately discouraged eligible sponsors from coming forward to claim children by reporting sponsors’ background information to ICE; at least 170 potential sponsors who appeared to be undocumented have been targeted and arrested by ICE. See Brian Tashman, ACLU Report: Kirstjen Nielsen Continues to Insist that There Is No Family Separation Policy, https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/ice-and-border-patrol-abuses/kirstjen-nielsen-continues-insist-there-no [https://perma.cc/G5JA-SCMM].

Finally, in an apparent attempt to hide the truth, ICE has sought permission from the National Archives and Records Administration (“NARA”) to destroy the records of physical and sexual abuse of immigrants in its custody, which have been widely reported and the subject of federal civil rights action. See Records Schedules; Availability and Request for Comments, 82 Fed. Reg. 32,585, 32,586 (July 14, 2017); see also Victoria López, ICE Plans to Start Destroying Records of Immigrant Abuse, Including Sexual Assault and Deaths in Custody, ACLU (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/ice-and-border-patrol-abuses/ice-plans-start-destroying-records-immigrant [https://perma.cc/C7ZV-DFDH] (reporting that “NARA has provisionally approved ICE’s proposal to destroy ‘11 kinds of records, including those related to sexual assaults, solitary confinement and even deaths of people in its custody’”); CIVIC Files Civil Rights Complaint on Rising Sexual Abuse in U.S. Immigration Detention Facilities, CIVIC: BLOG (Apr. 11, 2017), http://www.endisolation.org/blog/archives/1221 [https://perma.cc/HA5M-G4JE] (detailing CIVIC’s civil complaint against DHS regarding reported abuse and harassment at immigration detention facilities).

comply with the court-ordered reunification of the thousands of children whom the agencies had separated from their parents.\textsuperscript{51}

C. Radical Attempts to Sharply Reduce Asylum-Seekers’ Rights to Assert Their Claims

1. Denying Bond (Bail) and Making “Detention” Intolerable

Almost as disquieting as the Trump Administration’s child separation policy are its actions targeting asylum-seekers and refugees.\textsuperscript{52} President Trump’s first executive order called on the U.S. “a federal judge ordered the government to reunify more than 2,800 children it had removed from their parents,” but “the judge allowed [DHS] to continue separating families if the parent posed a danger to the child or had a serious criminal record or gang affiliation. . . . More than 700 children were taken from their parents or, in a few cases, from other relatives between June 2018 and May 2019”).

\textsuperscript{51} Tal Kopan & Catherine E. Shoichet, Only 54 Children To Be Reunited by Court Deadline, but Judge Praises ‘Progress,’ CNN (July 9, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/09/politics/family-separations-reunification-hearing/index.html [https://perma.cc/3DPZ-4A4D]; see also Catherine E. Shoichet, Why It’s Taking So Long for the Government to Reunite the Families It Separated, CNN (July 10, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/09/politics/family-separation-reuniting-hurdles/index.html [https://perma.cc/NG7D-Y643] (reporting that the delay in reuniting separated families is due to: officials’ failure to have a plan for reunification in place when the practice began, the fact that some parents had already been released from ICE custody and others deported, DHS’ attempts to confirm parentage by using DNA testing, and the agency’s lengthy process for releasing children from custody, including background checks and “suitability” determinations); Michael D. Shear, Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Maggie Haberman, Trump Signals Even Fiercer Immigration Agenda, With a Possible Return of Family Separations, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/08/us/politics/trump-nielsen-family-separation.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (reporting on a proposed Trump Administration policy called “binary choice,” which would involve giving migrant parents “a choice of whether to voluntarily allow their children to be separated from them, or to waive their child’s humanitarian protections so the family can be detained together, indefinitely, in jail-like conditions”).

\textsuperscript{52} Under the binding Flores settlement, the DHS “shall release a minor from its custody without unnecessary delay.” Stipulated Settlement Agreement ¶14, Reno v. Flores, No. CV 85-4544 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 1997). Rather than challenging the settlement, the Trump Administration is seeking to undermine it—and bypass a federal court finding that the settlement prohibits detention of children for more than twenty days—by issuing an interim regulation that permits DHS to detain immigrant children with their parents indefinitely during their immigration proceedings. See Dean DeChiaro, Trump Administration Moves to Detain Immigrant Children Longer, ROLL CALL (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/trump-administration-detain-immigrant-children-longer
Department of Justice to make prosecutions of illegal entrants a “high priority,” even though such cases already accounted for more than half of federal prosecutions. 53 Besides prosecuting first-time border entrants—including asylum-seekers—for illegal entry, 54 the Trump Administration had denied virtually all asylum-seekers parole or reasonable bond (that is, bail or some other form of release from detention) in their noncriminal immigration cases, regardless of the strength of their claims. 55 The Trump Administration kept asylum-seekers locked up in immigration detention until the ACLU obtained a


55. The practice of denying parole for asylum-seekers who passed their credible fear interviews became most salient in 2017 when the Administration departed from the 2009 directive requiring ICE officials to make individualized determinations for parole. Damus v. Nielsen, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317, 339 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding that from February to September of 2017, three field offices denied 100% of parole applications and two other field offices denied 92 to 98% of parole applications, as compared to previous years where ICE granted more than 90% of parole applications) (emphasis added). For particularly vivid and egregious examples of the detention of more than 100 Cuban asylum-seekers (who used to be greeted with open arms when allegedly fleeing from Castro) languishing for years in detention despite having passed credible fear interviews, see Cuban Men Thrown into Louisiana Prisons Despite Legal Asylum Requests, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.splcenter.org/news/2019/04/10/cuban-men-thrown-louisiana-prisons-despite-legal-asylum-requests [perma.cc/6CFY-C7DQ].
district court order in July 2018 to stop the blanket denial of parole.\(^{56}\) Despite the court order, ICE has reportedly rejected 75 percent of requests for parole made by asylum-seekers deemed to have a credible fear of persecution (often referred to as “passing the credible fear interview”).\(^{57}\) In comparison, the Obama Administration granted over 90 percent of such requests.\(^{58}\)

A recent decision of Attorney General William Barr will presumably enable ICE to deny bond to almost all asylum-seekers. On April 16, 2019, Mr. Barr overruled a George W. Bush-era Board of Immigration Appeals decision and codified ICE’s bond denial practice with a directive to Immigration Judges that will further reduce meaningful access to asylum. Again exercising the unique power in our system of unilateral reversal of selected Board precedent, with no hint of deference to stare decisis, the Attorney General found that, except in extraordinarily limited cases, asylum-seekers who demonstrate a credible fear of persecution are no longer eligible for parole or reasonable bond.\(^{59}\) By requiring asylum-seekers to remain

\(^{56}\) Damus, 313 F.Supp.3d at 323 (noting that the rate of parole grants “plummeted from over 90% [under the Obama Administration] to nearly zero” and entering a preliminary injunction on July 2, 2018 against the Department of Homeland Security to cease its wholesale denials of parole to asylum-seekers who passed credible fear interviews).

\(^{57}\) See Julián Aguilar, ACLU Claims ICE Still Detaining Some Asylum-Seekers for No Reason Despite Court Order, TEXAS TRIBUNE (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/08/28/aclu-ice-still-detaining-some-asylum-seekers-no-reason/ [https://perma.cc/ZK8Z-KV4R] (noting that after a July 2018 federal court order, ICE began granting parole to only about 25 percent of those asylum-seekers demonstrating credible fear, as compared to 90 percent under the Obama Administration); see also Will Weissert & Emily Schmall, ‘Credible Fear’ for U.S. Asylum Harder to Prove Under Trump, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 16, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/a7c571cbe7f94880816f2b6e434ae80 [https://perma.cc/HFS2-N2S7] (noting that the Obama administration “allow[ed] many immigrants passing credible fear interviews to remain free while their asylum cases progressed”). President Trump and other members of his Administration have pejoratively characterized prior policies, which would allow most who pass a credible fear interview to qualify for bond, as “catch and release” (as if immigrants, including asylum-seekers, were some sort of gamefish or animal). See, e.g., Rafael Carranza, Trump Administration Announces the End of ‘Catch And Release’; USA TODAY (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/09/23/trump-administration-announces-end-catch-and-release-kevin-mcaleenan/2425679001/ [https://perma.cc/K3UR-MC3L].

\(^{58}\) Aguilar, supra note 57.

\(^{59}\) See Matter of M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509, 518–19 (A.G. 2019) (holding that noncitizens initially placed in expedited removal proceedings are statutorily subject to mandatory detention during full removal proceedings, even when found to have
incarcerated pending adjudication of their asylum claims, a process that now averages nearly two years, the Trump Administration has


60. From the time President Trump took office in January 2017 through May 2018, Immigration Courts experienced a 32% increase in backlog, causing waiting times before an Individual Merits Hearing (fact-finding and decision proceeding) to vary enormously, depending on location. See Immigration Court Backlog Jumps While Case Processing Slows, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (June 8, 2018), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/516/ [https://perma.cc/5LTE-M8QE]. Overall, the Immigration Court backlog (exacerbated by a five-week federal government shutdown precipitated by the President’s attempt to force Congress to fund his obsession with a border wall) has ballooned by a stunning 49% during the first two years of the Trump Administration, surpassing one million pending cases for the first time. See Immigration Court Backlog Surpasses One Million Cases, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Nov. 6, 2018), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/536/ [https://perma.cc/BDP8-YZLQ]; Immigration Court Workload in the Aftermath of the Shutdown, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Feb. 19, 2019), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/546/ [https://perma.cc/5W46-R876] (providing data on immigration backlog in February 2019). In some locations such as Houston, the wait averages 1,751 days; in other locations such as Dilley, Texas, 266 miles away, the wait may be only one to two months. Id.

The location of the detainee and thus the venue of the proceeding are initially entirely up to the DHS officer who issues the I-862 Notice to Appear advising the recipient of the location, date and time of the removal proceeding. Although generally cases are located near the place of arrest or apprehension, a DHS officer can make a case returnable in whatever Immigration Court she selects. Amer. Imm. Council, Practice Advisory, Notices To Appear: Legal Challenges And
forced many *bona fide* asylum-seekers to give up their asylum claims. In effect, the Administration compels them to make the Hobson’s

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Strategies (updated Feb. 27, 2019) at 8-9, https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/practice_advisory/notices_to_appear_practice_advisory.pdf [https://perma.cc/LC5L-AD29]. Detainees also can be transferred at will anywhere within the United States, which can result in a change of venue to a different Immigration Court. Since the issuing DHS officer largely determines where an asylum claim will be heard, the agency in turn controls the applicable legal standards that will be applied, because Immigration Courts follow precedent set by the Circuit Courts with jurisdiction over their geographic locations, and also the type of Immigration Court Judge likely to be assigned, which asylee advocates agree is perhaps the single most important factor (next to having counsel) in predicting the outcome of a claim. Roger Grantham, Jr., *Detainee Transfers and Immigration Judges: ICE Forum-Shopping Tactics in Removal Proceedings* (Feb. 18, 2019); see also TRAC, *Asylum Decisions by Custody, Representation, Nationality, Location, Month and Year, Outcome* (May 31, 2019), https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/asylum/, *Findings of Credible Fear Plummet Amid Widely Disparate Outcomes by Location and Judge* (July 30, 2018), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/523; *Asylum Outcome Continues to Depend on the Judge Assigned* (Nov. 20, 2017) (odds of asylum denial range from, e.g., 10.9 percent to 98.7 percent depending upon the judge assigned), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/490; see also SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, *The Attorney General’s Judges: How the U.S. Immigration Courts Became a Deportation Tool* (June 25, 2019) (impact on decision-making of highly politicized hiring and firing in Executive Office of Immigration Review, along with many other factors that contribute to random and arbitrary outcomes), https://www.splcenter.org/20190625/attorney-generals-judges-how-us-immigration-courts-became-deportation-tool [https://perma.cc/Z3VZ-8JTS]; Gabriel Thompson, *Your Judge Is Your Destiny: The Immigration Court Judge Who Has Rejected Every Asylum Seeker*, TOPIFIC (July 2019) (example of IJ who has denied every single asylum case of over 200 heard during past five years), https://www.topic.com/your-judge-is-your-destiny?fbclid=IwAR1KJ6Z9aJg15THh_BeQ14nlBogb0WVqMB3WgtKjJ0NhWZzcD1WbDxGQ [https://perma.cc/AT5L-4R87]

As of September 2019, the average wait time for an Immigration Court proceeding has reached 696 days. *Average Time Pending Cases Have Been Waiting in Immigration Courts as of September 2019*, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/apprep_backlog_avgdays.php [https://perma.cc/7FRH-4CJ3]; see also, Marissa Esthimer, *Crisis in the Courts: Is the Backlogged U.S. Immigration Court System At Its Breaking Point?*, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/backlogged-us-immigration-courts-breaking-point [https://perma.cc/M76L-RKWU] (noting that average wait times for current open cases in Immigration Court surpass 700 days; yet, since the decision can mean life or death for those fleeing violence and persecution, growing backlog and pressure to expedite decisions, combined with pre-existing disparities in asylum grant rates, may result in insufficient due process for those who need it most).
choice between lengthy immigration detention in the United States or “voluntary” deportation with the risk of persecution and death in their countries of origin. Despite continuing publicity and protest about the conditions in which asylum-seekers are held, the Administration has descended to new lows in its treatment of detained children, at a cost to the U.S. taxpayer of about $775 per child, per day. Terrified toddlers, who were promptly separated from their parents or guardians upon entering the United States, are confined with no understanding of why or for how long they will be detained without their parents, or whether or when they will ever see their parents again, and often with

61. In a classic example of this phenomenon, one co-author consulted with an asylum applicant with a textbook religious persecution claim who had been detained for seven months in an isolated facility in Georgia awaiting his individual hearing. He had never been accused of any crime and there was no reason to suspect, with his strong asylum claim, that he would not appear for his hearing. Because he was incarcerated, he was forced to appear pro se before one of the notorious Atlanta Immigration Judges who virtually never grant asylum (see GAO-17-72, Asylum Variation Exists in Outcomes of Applications Across Immigration Courts and Judges (Nov. 2016) (grant rate of 52 percent (defensive)-66 percent (affirmative) in New York Immigration Court and less than 5 percent (affirmative and defensive) in Atlanta Immigration Court, https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/680976.pdf). This judge refused to allow him representation by someone of his own choosing, even though the representative was qualified by statute and regulation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(a)(3) (2011). After a cursory hearing and the subsequent denial, this immigration judge misinformed the respondent about the length of time an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals would likely take. In despair at the thought of years more in detention, he was persuaded to give up, irrevocably waive his right to appeal, and accept immediate removal to the country where he had been repeatedly physically harmed and threatened with death for carrying out his evangelical duties to resist the actions of local maras.

The U.N. Committee Against Torture has specifically concluded that this practice violates the Convention, stating that “[s]tates parties should not adopt dissuasive measures or . . . policies, such as detention in poor conditions for indefinite periods, [or] refusing to process claims for asylum or prolonging them unduly, or cutting funds for assistance programmes for asylum seekers, . . . which would compel persons in need of protection under article 3 of the Convention . . . to return to their country of origin in spite of their personal risk of being subjected to torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment there.” U.N. Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 4 (2017) on the Implementation of Article 3 of the Convention in the Context of Article 22, 3, CAT/C/GC/4 (Sept. 4, 2018) (emphasis added).

no supervision but that of other children.63 Most recently, the Trump Administration announced that it would no longer provide any opportunity for sports, English classes, or the general know-your-rights legal orientation programs that have long been offered to detained, unaccompanied children.64

No one should even purport to decide whether the “temporary detention of asylum-seekers” constitutes a “penalty” within the meaning of international refugee and human rights law without first reading these truly shocking accounts by law professors and reputable journalists of the “detention centers”.65


2. Prohibiting Asylum-Seekers Who Entered Without Inspection from Applying for Asylum

The day after the 2018 midterm elections, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Acting Attorney General jointly issued an interim rule purporting to prohibit immigrants who entered without inspection from applying for asylum. Such a regulation is without precedent and underscores not only the Administration’s disregard of this phrase was used to describe the detention of civilians without trial based on group identity. . . A camp in a country in which the leader openly expresses animosity toward those interned, in which a government detains people and harms them by separating children from their parents or deliberately putting them in danger through neglect, is much closer to a concentration camp than a refugee camp. Nothing we are doing is likely to repeat Auschwitz, or to come anywhere close to it. But the history of concentration camps shows us that when it comes to this kind of detention, even when a government isn't plotting a genocide, shocking numbers of people can still end up hurt—or dead.


But see Aaron Bandler, Wiesenthal Center Calls AOC’s Concentration Camp Remarks ‘Insult to Victims of the Shoah’, JEWISH JOURNAL (June 18, 2019), https://jewishjournal.com/news/nation/300186/wiesenthal-center-calls-aoc-concentration-camp-remarks-insult-to-victims-of-the-shoah/. Rabbi Abraham Cooper, Associate Dean of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, stated, “It’s an insult to the victims of the Shoah to make blatant false comparisons. . . Stop casting Trump as a latter-day Nazi scheming to build concentration camps. AOC and all Congressmen from both parties have a moral obligation to fix the humanitarian disaster at the border.”

American law and traditions, but, as this article shows, our international obligations and the rights of refugees. The stated purpose of the proposed rule is to funnel asylum-seekers to the U.S. ports of entry. Yet reliable reports have indicated that under this Administration many CBP officers first began telling asylum-seekers at the border ports of entry that they no longer have a right to asylum, dissuading them from filing asylum claims. Later, the CBP, claiming a lack of capacity, appears to have changed its policy to interview many fewer applicants at the ports of entry. Meanwhile, the rest of the applicants must remain in Mexico, trapped in an extralegal process called “metering” that is often controlled by corrupt Mexican law enforcement who make the destitute migrants bid with whatever they have for higher “numbers” on an unofficial list that is, nonetheless, enforced by the CBP.


69. One non-governmental organization has sued the DHS Secretary, alleging that this “lack of capacity” is a deliberate governmental policy:

[B]eginning around 2016, high-level CBP officials, under the direction or with the knowledge or authorization of the named Defendants (the “Defendants”), adopted a formal policy to restrict access to the asylum process at POEs (“Ports of Entry”) by mandating that lower level officials directly or constructively turn back asylum-seekers at the border (the “Turnback Policy”) contrary to U.S. law. In accordance with the Turnback Policy, CBP officials have used and are continuing to use various methods to unlawfully deny asylum-seekers access to the asylum process based on purported—but ultimately untrue—assertions that there is a lack of “capacity” to process them. These methods include coordinating with Mexican immigration authorities and other third parties to implement a “metering,” or waitlist, system
wonder whether this is a deliberate policy to discourage asylum applicants from claiming asylum at the ports of entry.

3. Requiring Asylum-Seekers to “Remain in Mexico”

The Trump Administration’s euphemistically-named Migration Protection Protocols (“MPP”) force asylum-seekers to remain in Mexico while their asylum claims are pending in the United States. This policy geometrically magnifies the long-term practice of placing immigration detention centers in isolated areas of the United States, far from the media and, more importantly, far from attorneys who could represent those seeking refuge from systematic violence in their countries of origin. Rather than protecting asylum-seekers, this creates unreasonable and life-threatening delays in processing asylum-seekers; instructing asylum-seekers to wait on the bridge, in the preinspection area, or at a shelter until there is adequate space at the POE; or simply asserting to asylum-seekers that they cannot be processed because the POE is “full” or “at capacity.”


radical policy makes it all but impossible for asylum-seekers to obtain counsel while they wait for months, if not years, in the impoverished, cartel-ruled Mexican border cities. Not only does this policy deprive asylum-seekers of their right to obtain effective assistance of counsel, but the DHS memorandum establishing the “Remain in Mexico” policy also impermissibly imposed a much higher bar for asylum.  


Journalistic accounts and the State Department’s own Travel Advisory indicate that asylum-seekers face an even more frightening rate of violence, especially in Northern Mexican cities along the Texas border where kidnappings are rampant. See, e.g., Gus Bova, Nuevo Laredo Shelter Director Reportedly Kidnapped After Protecting Cuban Migrants, Texas OBSERVER (Aug. 11, 2019), https://www.texasobserver.org/nuevo-laredo-shelter-director-reportedly-kidnappedafter-protecting-cuban-migrants/ [https://perma.cc/X9DA-HSMU]; Mexico Travel Advisory, U.S. Dep’t of State (Apr. 9, 2019), https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/travel-advisories/travel-advisories/mexico-travel-advisory.html [https://perma.cc/CN5L-B4BS] (“violent crime, such as murder, armed robbery, carjacking, kidnapping, extortion, and sexual assault, is common”). On the “higher burden of proof” required to demonstrate the risk of danger in Mexico, see This American Life, supra. See also McAleenan v. Innovation Law Lab, Case No. 19-15716, Brief of Amicus Curiae Local 1924 in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Answering Brief and Affirmance of the District Court’s Decision (MPP violates non-refoulement obligation because
After being returned to Mexican border cities, which are completely unequipped to provide refugees any services or support, and among the most criminally violent and dangerous places on the globe, thousands of asylum-seekers have found it virtually impossible to participate in developing the necessary evidence for their asylum claims. They are mostly homeless and unemployed, and the Mexican government does not issue them work permits. They have no addresses or ways to communicate with Immigration Courts or with lawyers. The CBP or ICE often keeps their precious identification documents—e.g., birth, marriage, and death certificates—and other necessary original documents making it difficult for them to navigate any Mexican governmental systems. But they have no choice: if they are to pursue their asylum claims.

Mexico is not safe for most asylum-seekers from Central America, and not necessary to handle influx at border).


74. Tens of thousands of asylum-seekers live in street encampments, with no reliable sources of food, potable water, or sanitation, despite the best efforts of faith-based and civic organizations. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “WE CAN’T HELP YOU HERE”: U.S. RETURNS OF ASYLUM SEEKERS TO MEXICO 18–20 (2019). See Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Maya Averbuch, Waiting for Asylum in the United States, Migrants Live in Fear in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019) (outlining that twenty shelters and churches in Tijuana are housing around 3,000 migrants forced to remain in Mexico, with next to no room for future migrants; unable to find U.S.
their asylum cases, they must remain close to the border, able to attend their scheduled and rescheduled court appearances.

Observers of the massive “MPP dockets” describe the San Diego Immigration Court as a chaotic epicenter of “aimless docket reshuffling.”\textsuperscript{75} Below are a few examples from a collection of near-transcripts by attorneys and advocates at the Court that seem to strongly corroborate that image:

\begin{quote}
(Baby crying during Immigration Court hearing for a mother and child forced to “Remain in Mexico”)

\textbf{Immigration Judge:} Ma’am, didn’t I tell you that you didn’t need to bring your child to Court for this hearing?\textsuperscript{2}

\textbf{Mother with nursing baby:} It’s just that . . . I don’t have any family. I don’t know anyone in Mexico.

\textbf{Immigration Judge:} Okay, but you are going to need to be able to concentrate at your hearings so that you can provide the best testimony in your case.

\textbf{Mother with nursing baby:} But if I have to stay in Mexico and come the United States for [C]ourt . . . where am I supposed to leave my baby?

\textbf{Immigration Judge:} Okay. I just don’t want your baby to distract you.

\textbf{Immigration Judge to ICE Trial Attorney:} Since you didn’t provide me with the brief I requested at the last hearing, what would you like me to do?

\textbf{ICE Trial Attorney:} I’m sorry your [H]onor. I’m having trouble thinking over the crying baby.

\textbf{Immigration Judge:} Well what exactly would you like me to do about it?\textsuperscript{76}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{76} Brianna Rennix, This Week in Terrible Immigration News, CURRENT AFFAIRS (June 10, 2019), https://www.currentaffairs.org/2019/06/this-week-in-

lawyers and are repeatedly robbed and kidnapped; Remain in Mexico Updates, HOPE BORDER INSTITUTE (last updated June 13, 2019), https://www.hopeborder.org/remain-in-mexico-052219 [https://perma.cc/CN2M-GFPS].
Can one truthfully declare that this practice comports with human rights and the United States’ international obligations toward refugees and asylum seekers or that it does not amount to a “penalty” within the meaning of Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention?\(^{77}\)

terrible-immigration-news [https://perma.cc/TVXC-MD5M] (quoting Innovation Law Lab, FACEBOOK (June 6, 2019), https://www.facebook.com/innovationlawlab/posts/2408081462758045 [https://perma.cc/X8AK-QTXF]); see also Taylor Levy (@taylorklevy), TWITTER (June 18, 2019), https://twitter.com/taylorklevy/status/114112449972408321 [https://perma.cc/4NEC-3G2V] (“A Honduran woman sent back to Mexico under Migrant Protection Protocol was kidnapped and raped in Juarez. The #MigrantPersecutionProtocols are directly at fault for this woman’s kidnapping & rape by men wearing Mexican Federal Police Uniforms. She had been returned to Mexico after having court in El Paso . . . .”) (citing Bob Moore (@BobMooreNews), TWITTER (June 18, 2019); Taylor Levy (@taylorklevy), TWITTER (June 12, 2019, 3:24 AM), https://twitter.com/taylorklevy/status/1138708709025222656 [https://perma.cc/H8ML-WJN7] (“Today in #MigrantPersecutionProtocols court; a crying, shaking mom showed off her 7[year-old] daughter’s bloody scab from where she bumped her head while escaping armed attackers who broke into their migrant shelter in the middle of the night. [E]ven the judge looked shook.”); Bob Moore (@BobMooreNews), TWITTER (May 9, 2019), https://twitter.com/BobMooreNews/status/1126608592822579201 [https://perma.cc/T7B7-LFCR] (“Rene, a man from El Salvador, said on March 29 he was robbed and stabbed in Ciudad Juarez. He went to the police but was told that they couldn’t help him because he wasn’t Mexican. . . . Esdras, a man from Guatemala, was robbed twice at a church shelter. . . . Elvia, also from Guatemala, said she was robbed at a church shelter. Altogether, 9 of the 20 people in court told the judge they had a fear of returning to Mexico.”).

One asylum officer eloquently described the Remain in Mexico policy and practice as follows: “People don’t have a right to asylum, sight unseen, but under international human rights law and our own immigration laws, they have the right to seek it. They have the right to knock on the door and say, “Help, a wolf is chasing me, let me in!” When that happens, we’re supposed to give them food and drink, and to let them sit by the fire and tell their story — and if it’s true that they’re in danger, we are supposed to give them shelter. It’s wrong to block their way and force them to wait on the front step, while we decide if we’re ready to listen.” Charles Tjersland Jr., I became an asylum officer to help people. Now I put them back in harm’s way. WASH. POST (July 19, 2019), https://wapo.st/33Pmvxq (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review).

The former DHS Secretary’s rationale for how this policy manages not to violate the principle of non-refoulement, which she acknowledged might seem applicable, appears in a paragraph of her January 25, 2019 Policy Guidance Memorandum to the then-Directors of ICE, CBP, and USCIS. See Memorandum from Kirstjen Nielsen, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to L. Francis Cisnsa, Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., et al. (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0129_OPA_migrant-protection-protocols-policy-guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/GF76-GUYT]; see also Guidance for Implementing
4. Charging Desperate Asylum-Seekers Filing Fees While Denying Work Authorization

In a less cruel but counterproductive move, the Trump Administration is in the process of imposing new filing fees on asylum seekers. At the same time, the Administration has revoked eligibility for work permits from asylum seekers who either enter, or try to enter, the United States in a way other than through a port of entry, even as CBP continues to block attempts to enter at those ports. Very recently, this constriction has been augmented with a broader range of disqualifications for employment authorization aimed specifically at asylum seekers.

5. Politically Interfering in the State Department’s Human Rights Reports

The Trump Administration has deliberately falsified through omission information in what had been the gold standard for factual claims about persecution in other countries: the State Department’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. These Reports are the bedrock documentation that asylum seekers must both rely on and counter during the adjudication of their claims. They are utilized by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) asylum


78. See Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Caitlin Dickerson, Asylum Seekers Face New Restraints Under Latest Trump Orders, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/29/us/politics/trump-asylum.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (“The entire idea of asylum is that it’s something that you need because you are fleeing some sort of violence or persecution,” said Michelle Brané, director of migrant rights and justice at the Women’s Refugee Commission, adding “to then say that it’s only accessible to people who can pay a fee doesn’t make sense. . . . There’s a reason that we give people work permits while they are waiting for asylum, so that they can support themselves and don’t have to be depending on government assistance during that time.” Speaking of the Trump administration’s broader approach to asylum, Ms. Brané said, “All of it has been aimed at reducing the number of people who can access the system as opposed to reducing the need for asylum by addressing root causes.”).

79. See discussion and authorities infra note 107.
officers, ICE and CBP officers at the border, Immigration Court Judges, the BIA, and by State Department officers in embassies and consulates abroad to test and evaluate the credibility, persuasiveness, and reliability of asylum-seeker accounts of persecution, as well as to establish, or controvert, whether individual reports of abuse are isolated criminal acts or governmental policies—a crucial distinction that makes or breaks almost every asylum claim.  

For the vast majority of asylum-seekers who are unrepresented (and who often lack English proficiency and literacy, access to computerized resources or even books and newspapers, and increasingly are detained in remote facilities or now, cabined in Mexico), these official publications, routinely entered into evidence at asylum hearings, may be their sole means to corroborate the torture and persecution they have suffered or fear. In a campaign worthy of the Orwellian term “memory hole,” State Department compilers obviously are being ordered to eliminate information specifically about the oppression of female and LGBTQ residents including

80 See generally DREE K. COLLOPY, Chapter 6: Proving the Case: Burdens, Standards, and Evidence, in AILA'S ASYLUM PRIMER: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO U.S. ASYLUM LAW AND PROCEDURE 545–6 (8th ed. 2019); see also DEBORAH E. ANKER, Chapter 3: Evidence: Country Conditions and Human Rights Documentation, in THE LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES (2018 ed.) (country conditions are perhaps the single most important factor in determining asylum applications, essential to explaining why asylum-seekers cannot safely relocate within their country of origin and escape persecution that way, and essential to establishing the validity, social distinction, and particularity of particular social groups, a necessary element for all asylum claims that are not based on racial, religious, ethnic or nationality discrimination, or political opinion).

81 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (first published by Martin Secker & Warburg, London, 1949) (concept of and term “memory hole” a central feature of this dystopian and prophetic novel, in which the omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent and monopolistic Party systematically and constantly destroys and re-creates all documents, official and otherwise, to comport with the oft-changing current government propaganda—re-writing history and current events to match the official version, no matter how contrary to reality, and often entirely contradictory to the preceding version).

82 For example, in 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions unilaterally overruled a BIA decision and decreed that women fleeing intimate partner violence would no longer be recognized as a “Particular Social Group” and therefore a protected category. See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). But see Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 105 (D.D.C. 2018) (permanently enjoining Attorney General from effectuating his decision, albeit with respect solely to credible fear and reasonable fear interviews); see also Theresa A. Vogel, Critiquing Matter of A-B-: An Uncertain Future in Asylum Proceedings for Women Fleeing Intimate Partner Violence, 52 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 343, 373 (2019); Testimony of
governmental policies that deprive women of reproductive rights (not only the right to abortion, but also to contraception, to freedom from domestic violence, and access to health care). In 2019, as observed by many advocates and NGOs:

> The Trump Administration released its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices without information on the full range of abuses and violations of reproductive rights experienced by women, girls and others around the world. The reports focus solely on coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization. These violations represent only a narrow slice of the coercive and harmful policies and other systemic challenges that women and girls face when trying to exercise their reproductive rights, including a lack of access to contraceptives and other sexual and reproductive health services.


84. PAI Press Release, supra note 82.
In response, the “Reproductive Rights are Human Rights Act,” bicameral legislation that would require the United States to report on the full range of reproductive rights in the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, has been introduced and is cosponsored by 126 members of the House of Representatives and thirty Senators.85

6. Drastically Reducing the Number of Refugees and Their Capacity to Present and Prove Their Claims

President Trump’s original January 2017 executive order suspended the worldwide refugee program for 120 days and indefinitely halted the admission of Syrian refugees.86 The United States is now admitting refugees again but at numbers among the lowest in decades. President Trump cut the refugee allocation from 110,000 in Fiscal Year (“FY”) 2017 to 45,000 in FY 2018.87 Given all the additional restrictions imposed on migrants, the number of refugees actually admitted in 2018 was 22,491—less than half those allocated.88 Secretary of State Michael Pompeo subsequently announced a further reduction to 30,000 for FY 2019, then the lowest on record. Recently,


86. From February 2017 to September 2017, the Trump Administration admitted 21,268 refugees in total, including 1,673 from Syria. See DEPT OF STATE, REFUGEE PROCESSING CENTER, REFUGEE ADMISSIONS REPORT (July 31, 2018). In the 2018 fiscal year, 18,214 refugees in total were admitted, but only 62 were from Syria. Id. In contrast, during the 2016 fiscal year, the Obama administration admitted 84,994 refugees in total, including 12,587 Syrian refugees, with another 4,884 Syrians admitted through the end of his term on January 20, 2017. Id.


88. See DEPT OF STATE, supra note 4; see also DEPT OF STATE, REFUGEE PROCESSING CENTER, REFUGEE ADMISSIONS REPORT (June 30, 2018).
the Trump Administration announced that the allocation would be cut in the current fiscal year to 18,000. 89

In suspending the refugee program, President Trump principally argued that terrorists posing as refugees would come into the country. This was essentially the same argument that the United States raised against Jewish refugees in World War II. 90 This fear during World War II proved largely unfounded, 91 just as the President’s argument is now. As many have noted, none of the immigrants and visitors coming from the Muslim-majority countries designated in the Executive Orders 92 has been found to have committed any terrorist offenses in the United States. 93

89. Davis, supra note 87; Michael D. Shear & Zolan Kanno Youngs, Trump Slashes Refugee Cap to 18,000, Curtailing U.S. Role as Haven, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2OgF2w9 (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review).


91. Id. (finding that most of the concern about Jewish refugees entering as Nazi spies stemmed from a single story of an alleged Jewish refugee that after intense questioning admitted he was a Nazi spy).

92. Kyle Blaine & Julia Horowitz, How the Trump Administration Chose the 7 Countries in the Immigration Executive Order, CNN (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/29/politics/how-the-trump-administration-chose-the-7-countries/index.html (finding that the Obama Administration had imposed restrictions on Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Syria, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen in 2011 by eliminating the visa-waiver program that allowed dual citizens of these countries to travel back and forth without a United States visa whereas the Trump Administration’s order is broader by initially banning entry from Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen).

93. Alex Nowrasteh, TERRORISM AND IMMIGRATION: A RISK ANALYSIS, CATO INSTITUTE 1, 13 (Sept. 13, 2016), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa798_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/38EQ-C37S] (finding that of the refugees admitted into the United States between 1975 and the end of 2015, 0.00062% were terrorists and only three ever succeeded in an attack; no other murders were recorded after the Refugee Act of 1980 implemented rigorous screening measures); see also Uri Friedman, Where America’s Terrorists Actually Come from, ATLANTIC (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/01/trump-immigration-ban-terrorism/514361/ [https://perma.cc/R9BV-J469] (“Nationals of the seven countries singled out by President Trump have killed zero people in terrorist attacks on U.S. soil between 1975 and 2015.”); see also IntelBrief, supra.
Another approach to reducing the number of refugees who reach the United States to claim asylum is to deter and prevent U.S. citizens from assisting them, whether by intimidation, surveillance, and harassment or by criminal prosecution. Attacks against all kinds of efforts to aid migrants, primarily asylum-seekers, have stepped up in both the United States and Mexico. Many appear to involve collusion between corrupt Mexican officials and Border Patrol officers, a constant problem since the CBP’s creation in 2003. For example, Scott Warren, a volunteer for the humanitarian organization No More Deaths, was prosecuted (but not convicted by the jury) for “harboring” note 12 (finding in 2018 just one death in the United States as result of jihadi-linked terrorism, while native-born right-wing terrorists killed fifteen Americans).


in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324. CBP agents set up surveillance at a humanitarian station and arrested Mr. Warren, a thirty-six-year-old geography teacher, on three felony charges because he helped a pair of migrants from Central America who were hungry, dehydrated, and struggling to walk on blistered feet.\textsuperscript{96} At the same time, vigilante groups such as the United Constitutional Patriots, with no legal basis whatsoever, roam the border in full combat gear, intimidating, threatening, and even detaining large numbers of people whom they believe to be immigrants.\textsuperscript{97}


The United States is still largely a Christian country, and often proclaimed as such by members of the Trump Administration, including the Secretary of State. See Michelle Boorstein, \textit{State Department’s First-Ever Employee Christian Faith Group Underscores Mike Pompeo’s Influence}, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2019) https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2019/11/01/highlighting-value-christians-state-departments-first-ever-employees-faith-group-underscores-mike-pompeos-influence/ (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (Pompeo posts about being a “Christian Leader” on the State Department website, founded a Christian affinity group within the Department, etc.) But the prosecution of those who try to prevent unnecessary migrant deaths in this way seems to fly in the face of the Last Judgment, From the Gospel According to St. Matthew, Matthew 25:31-46:

\begin{quote}
'Come, you that are blessed by my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world; for I was hungry and you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me something to drink, I was a stranger and you welcomed me, I was naked and you gave me clothing, I was sick and you took care of me, I was in prison and you visited me.'

Then the righteous will answer him, 'Lord, when was it that we saw you hungry and gave you food, or thirsty and gave you something to drink? And \textit{when was it that we saw you a stranger and welcomed you}, or naked and gave you clothing? And when was it that we saw you sick or in prison and visited you?' And the king will answer them, 'Truly I tell you, \textit{just as you did it to one of the least of these who are members of my family, you did it to me}.'
\end{quote}

\textit{Id.} (emphasis added).

Perhaps the most preposterous, yet alarming, policy adopted by the Trump Administration is the initiative to substitute ICE and CBP officers for trained, experienced asylum officers to conduct reasonable and credible fear interviews. These interviews determine the crucial question of whether an asylum-seeker is eligible for bond, and if so, whether she or he will have to await a full Immigration Court hearing in Mexico. From our own experience as volunteer lawyers at the detention facilities in Dilley, Texas, and Folkston, Georgia, the authors are painfully aware of how difficult and delicate a challenge it


For more on the analogous broad policy initiative of the Trump Administration, first announced on January 25, 2017 in Section 9 of the Executive Order “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States,” to defund federal grants for so-called “sanctuary cities,” municipalities that have adopted perfectly lawful ordinances to minimize diversion of local law enforcement resources to federal immigration enforcement. This policy has been largely repudiated by the federal courts. See City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1234–35 (9th Cir. 2018) (based on the principle of Separation of Powers and the Spending Clause, which vests exclusive power in Congress to impose conditions on federal grants, the Executive Branch may not refuse to disperse the federal grants in question without congressional authorization); see also Priscilla Alvarez, Trump Cracks Down on Sanctuary Cities, ATLANTIC (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/trump-crack-down-sanctuary-city/514427/ (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review); Laure Meckler, Sanctuary Cities to Be Barred from Justice Department Funds, Sessions Says, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sanctuary-cities-to-be-barred-from-justice-department-funds-sessions-says-1490637493 (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review); see generally Christopher N. Lasch, Sanctuary Cities and Dog-Whistle Politics, 42 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 159, 162 (2016) (explaining how ‘dog-whistle’ politics has contributed to the coded racial narratives within debates about sanctuary cities); Elizabeth McCormick, Federal Anti-Sanctuary Law: A Failed Approach to Immigration Enforcement and a Poor Substitute for Real Reform, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 165 (2016) (arguing that anti-sanctuary approach to immigration enforcement is a failed strategy which diverts attention from seeking comprehensive immigration reform).

98. Molly O’Toole, Border Patrol Agents, Rather than Asylum Officers, Interviewing Families for ‘credible fear,’ WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2019), https://lat.ms/2qRjVbG (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review); Victoria Neilson & Anna Gallagher, Trump Administration Makes a Mockery of Asylum System, HILL (May 11, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/443200-trump-administration-makes-a-mockery-of-asylum-system [https://perma.cc/WYL2-D5CA] (reporting that the Trump Administration is seeking to remove asylum officers from their core duties because they have been correctly applying the law: allowing those who have a credible fear of persecution to pursue protection in the United States, in accord with our international treaty obligations).
is to build a modicum of trust that will enable these highly traumatized women, children, and men to reveal their most painful, frightening, and sometimes shameful secrets about the events and people who made them give up everything at home to make the long dangerous trek across the border. Asylum-seekers cannot be expected to achieve even that inadequate level of rapport and communication (setting aside language and cultural barriers for the moment) with uniformed officers under no obligation of confidentiality, and with only a cursory knowledge of the multilayered, nuanced, immensely complex body of relevant asylum, immigration, and international human rights law.  

99. We do not mean to suggest that every CBP official, including Border Patrol agents, attempts to deny immigrants and asylum-seekers their rights or treats them inhumanely. However, one cannot ignore the revelation that at least 9500—a very significant percentage—current and former CBP officers subscribe to and post on a secret, exclusive Facebook group page that is rife with revolting misogynistic, racist, and callous comments, expressing indiscriminate contempt and hatred for immigrants. This does nothing to enhance confidence in their ability to conduct effective threshold interviews of asylum-seekers. See A.C. Thompson, Inside the Secret Border Patrol Facebook Group Where Agents Joke About Migrant Deaths and Post Sexist Memes, PROPUBLICA (July 1, 2019), https://www.propublica.org/article/secret-border-patrol-facebook-group-agents-joke-about-migrant-deaths-post-sexist-memes [https://perma.cc/6WN4-2A67] (detailing derogatory comments about, among others, Latina lawmakers published in secret Facebook group by current and former CBP officers). What is worse, CBP leadership had known for at least three years about the site, which included graphic images of agents simulating sexual acts with a training mannequin, defecating, and smiling at a human skull, but did nothing. Ted Hesson & Cristiano Lima, Border Agency Knew About Secret Facebook Group for Years, POLITICO (July 3, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/03/border-agency-secret-facebook-group-1569572 [https://perma.cc/XR6K-TE3B].

As one commentator noted, assigning Border Patrol agents to this duty is like asking the security guard in a hospital to triage incoming patients in an emergency ward. It is, in fact, worse because many CBP agents view their jobs as arresting undocumented immigrants, including those with valid asylum claims, who have crossed without inspection; and because some of these “security guards” are already being sued for illegally repulsing and misinforming the exact people whose asylum claims they will now be screening.

100. Neilson & Gallagher, supra note 95.
101. For another example of the type of behavior that suggests it is very unlikely that an asylum-seeker could ever communicate openly with these officers, see, e.g., the conduct alleged in the civil legal action Mejia Rios v. GEO Group, 5:19-cv-00552 (W.D. Tex. May 24, 2019), Raices, Arent Fox LLP, and Aldea PJC Sue the GEO Group for Forcefully Re-separating Immigrant Families, RAICES (May 28, 2019), https://www.raicestexas.org/2019/05/28/raices-arent-fox-llp-and-aldea-pjc-sue-the-geo-group-for-forcefully-re-separating-immigrant-families/ [https://perma.cc/9SRE-85CG] (alleging that GEO sanctioned unlawful separation of thirteen children from their fathers):

The [court] issued a nationwide preliminary injunction prohibiting the US Department of Homeland Security from separating families and requiring reunification of families previously separated. . . Two months after the federal court injunction, and in direct violation of that order, [defendant] sanctioned the unlawful separation of these thirteen children from their fathers. With no prior notice, [defendant] permitted armed men to forcibly remove the fathers of these thirteen children from their rooms at the Karnes Detention Center by using bulletproof vests, shields, knee pads, boots, helmets, tear gas equipment and guns . . .; loaded the fathers without their children onto buses and transported them . . nearly two hours away . . Fathers screamed and cried loudly for their children. Others vomited blood and shook uncontrollably.

Because [defendant] told the fathers that they would never see their sons again and again all of the circumstances appeared to confirm it, one father attempted suicide. [Defendant] refused to inform the fathers where they were being taken, why they were again being separated from their children, where their children were located, whether their children were safe, and who would care for them. [Defendant] also told the fathers that they would be deported without their children, that their children would be adopted by families living in the United States, and that they would never again see their children. . . [Defendant] intentionally traumatized families who came to the United States seeking refuge . . When [defendant] received these
As Julie Veroff of the American Civil Liberties Union’s Immigrant Rights Project stated, “Credible fear interviews involve the discussion of sensitive, difficult issues. . . . Federal law thus requires that credible fear interviews be conducted in a ‘nonadversarial manner.’ . . . Credible fear interviews have always been conducted by professionals who specialize in asylum adjudication, not immigration enforcement. 102 The Administration’s radical proposal is antithetical to principles of elemental fairness and due process and violates our obligations under international human rights and refugee law.

To evaluate the extent to which the U.S. asylum process complies with the commitment not to “penalize” asylum-seekers, it is important to look to its overall functionality, reliability, and insulation from political pressure. The U.S. Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration Appeals have failed to fulfill the constitutional and statutory promise of fair and impartial case-by-case review, according to a report by the Innovation Law Lab, the largest network of pro bono-based immigrant defenders, and the Southeast Immigrant Freedom Initiative of the Southern Poverty Law Center. 103 Entitled The Attorney

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102 Nick Miroff, U.S. Asylum Screeners to Take More Confrontational Approach as Trump Aims to Turn More Migrants Away at the Border, WASH. POST (May 7, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/us-asylum-screeners-to-take-more-confrontational-approach-as-trump-aims-to-turn-more-migrants-away-at-the-border/2019/05/07/3b15e076-70de-11e9-9eb4-0828f5389013_story.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (in response to pressure and comments from President Trump such as “the asylum program is a scam,” John Lafferty, director of the USCIS asylum division, sent all asylum officers a memorandum requiring them to adopt a much more challenging and adversarial approach to asylum-seekers; this memorandum is “among the most significant steps the administration has taken to limit access to the country for foreigners seeking asylum”).

103 Southeast Immigrant Freedom Initiative, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER (June 21, 2018), https://www.splcenter.org/our-issues/immigrant-justice/southeast-immigrant-freedom-initiative-en [https://perma.cc/HSAT-F277] (noting that only one in six immigrants detained in the Southeast has access to an attorney in removal proceedings; for an immigrant in detention, legal representation means the difference between staying safe with his/her family and being forced to return to a place that is no longer home).
General’s Judges: How the U.S. Immigration Courts Became a Deportation Tool, the Report begins:

The nation’s immigration courts have been dysfunctional since their inception. Today, the system has effectively collapsed. The attorneys general appointed by President Trump have used their authority over the immigration courts to weaponize them against asylum seekers and immigrants of color in support of Trump’s anti-immigrant policies. This report examines the system’s collapse and explains why it cannot be salvaged in its current form.104

We recognize the many courageous and reputable Immigration Court Judges and the many fair and reasonable ICE trial counsel, but the policies that the Trump Administration has compelled them to implement undermine due process and fundamental fairness of these courts.


This is only one of several fierce critiques of the Trump Administration’s blatant politicization of what should be a system of apolitical adjudicators. See Aaron Reichlin-Melnick, Immigration Judges and Advocates Criticize Immigration Court System for ‘Propaganda’, American Immigration Council (May 16, 2019) (politicization of court system demonstrated by the Executive Office of Immigration Review’s sending to all Immigration Court Judges a fallacious, distorted document entitled “Myths vs. Facts About Immigration Proceedings,” plainly “aimed directly at opponents of the Trump administration’s crackdowns on asylum seekers”), http://immigrationimpact.com/2019/05/16/judges-criticize-immigration-court-system-propaganda/.

The “Myths vs. Facts” pastiche was denounced as raw propaganda by a group of 27 former Immigration Court Judges/BIA members known as the Round Table, which has taken issue with several of the changes in Immigration Court structure and practice instituted by the Trump Administration, but never before this strongly. Round Table Letter to James McHenry, Director of Executive Office of Immigration Review, dated May 19, 2019 (“issuance of such a document can only be viewed as political pandering, at the expense of public faith in the immigration courts” “nothing short of judicial independence, neutrality, and fairness is acceptable for courts that make life and death determinations”), https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_6gbFPjVDoxSmZaaWw0ODetMkRSaTIyZWlpa5URDjZDI4/view.

See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 2019 UPDATE REPORT: REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES (March 2019) (discussing major systemic issues facing the immigration courts such as political interference, lack of judicial independence, a chronic lack of resources, and “policies and practices that threaten due process,” as well as disparities in how and when Immigration Court judges grant asylum; lack of independence and
In a final example of political interference with the adjudication of asylum claims, in June 2019 the newly appointed Acting USCIS Director, Kenneth Cuccinelli (widely touted as likely to become Trump’s “immigration czar” and an official with extreme anti-immigrant views), \(^{105}\) emailed asylum officers, telling them to do a better job of rejecting asylum-seekers during their initial screenings at the border and noting USCIS needs to do its “part to help stem the crisis and better secure the homeland.”\(^{106}\)

The Acting Director (whose appointment without Senate confirmation attracted broad bipartisan opposition and was criticized by legal scholars as unconstitutional and illegal)\(^ {107}\) cited grossly false politicized hiring practices in the immigration court so problematic that the ABA calls for suspension of hiring of new immigration judges until the immigration courts become more independent, even in light of historic backlogs; best solution is to make immigration courts an “Article I” court, similar to federal tax or bankruptcy courts, which would insulate the judges from the Attorney General’s current authority to directly overrule them, to create new precedent, and to discipline judges for failing to meet case completion quotas, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/commission_on_immigration/2019_reforming_the_immigration_system_volume_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8HD-4J5Q].


statistics about the percentage of asylum-seekers who do not appear in Immigration Court, and admonished asylum officers that the gap between the number who pass a Credible Fear Interview and the number who eventually are denied asylum in Immigration Court was


On November 13, 2019, Mr. Cuccinelli was elevated by Mr. Trump’s newest Secretary of Homeland Security, Chad Wolf, to Acting Deputy Director of the Department, despite “profound doubts over Cuccinelli’s ability to win a confirmation vote in the Republican-led Senate.” Bill Chappell, Chad Wolf Becomes Acting Head Of Homeland Security, Names Ken Cuccinelli His Deputy, NPR (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/14/779264900/chad-wolf-becomes-homeland-securitys-acting-secretary-and-names-cuccinelli-as-no [https://perma.cc/AV64-VWSG].

This makes Mr. Cuccinelli’s active hostility toward asylum-seekers and the U.S. asylum system of even greater concern. He celebrated his new office with a guest op-ed entitled “We Need to Tighten up Loopholes in Our Asylum Laws” in which he announced further restrictions on the eligibility of asylum-seekers for employment authorization. See THE HILL (Nov. 15, 2019) https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/470596-ken-cuccinelli-we-need-to-tighten-up-loopholes-in-our-asylum-laws [https://perma.cc/GE7U-33DL]. See also Dep’t of Homeland Security, Notice of Proposed Rule-Making, Asylum Application, Interview, and Employment Authorization for Applicants, 84 FR 62374 (11/14/2019) (new restrictions would block, with limited exceptions, employment authorization for aliens who entered the United States illegally, who did not meet the one-year deadline for filing an asylum application, or who are convicted of certain offenses).

108. President Trump and his surrogates have been trumpeting (no other word will do, alas) the false statistic, with no source cited, that 90% of asylum-seekers don’t show up for Immigration Court. See, e.g., Jack Crowe, DHS Secretary: 90 Percent of Recent Asylum-Seekers Skipped Their Hearings, NAT’L REV. (June 11, 2019), https://www.nationalreview.com/news/dhs-secretary-90-percent-of-recent-asylum-seekers-skipped-their-hearings/ [https://perma.cc/NBE7-XZJS] (quoting the DHS Secretary’s assertion that 90% of recent asylum-seekers failed to appear in court). The converse reality was investigated and is reported by TRAC. See, e.g., Most Released Families Attend Immigration Court Hearings, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (June 18, 2019), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/562 [https://perma.cc/6732-PWQ6] (finding that, from September 2018 to May 2019, based on over 47,000 Immigration Court hearing records, almost 100% of represented families, and about 70%–80% of unrepresented families, attend Immigration Court hearings); Obed Manuel, Almost 100% of Asylum-Seeking Families with Legal Aid Are Showing up to Court, Analysis Finds, DALLAS NEWS (June 19, 2019), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/immigration/2019/06/19/almost-100-asylum-seeking-families-legal-aid-showing-court-analysis-finds [https://perma.cc/722G-4QAS].
wider than the “two legal standards would suggest.” Acting Director Cuccinelli’s email then stated:

“Therefore, USCIS must, in full compliance with the law, make sure we are properly screening individuals who claim fear . . . .” He added that officers have tools to combat “frivolous claims” and to “ensure that [they] are upholding our nation’s laws by only making positive credible fear determinations in cases that have a significant possibility of success.”

Despite the facially innocuous sounding of this language, former immigration officials said in the current political context the email was clearly a threat. “I read this only in one way—a threat. A threat that asylum officers will be blamed by their new boss for the repeated failures of the Trump administration,” Ur Jaddou, a former chief counsel at USCIS, told BuzzFeed News. “This is an unbelievable threat and not something a director would normally ever send.”

The severe policies of the new Administration are particularly troubling given the human rights catastrophe occurring not only in distant countries such as Syria and Myanmar, but also in Venezuela and the nearby countries in Central America. Extensively networked

109. Aleaziz, supra note 106.
110. Id. One official at the Department of Homeland Security—of which USCIS is a part—said the email was “insane.” Id. Sarah Pierce, a policy analyst at the Migration Policy Institute, stated that Cuccinelli was trying to ramp up the pressure on officers in whatever way he could, and that his understanding of asylum law is at best misguided: “The acting director is trying to place the burden of reducing the difference between the high level of credible-fear acceptances and the low level of ultimate asylum approvals on the shoulders of asylum officers” . . . However, the reason for this difference can be traced back to Congress—which purposefully made a low bar for the credible-fear process—and the failure to provide counsel for asylum-seekers, which all but guarantees the majority will fail in the court system.” Id.
111. Id. See also Nick Miroff, Chief of U.S. Asylum Office Reassigned as White House Pushes for Tighter Immigration Controls, WASH. POST. (Sept. 4, 2019), 2019 WLNR 26927891 (Trump administration replacing career official John Lafferty, Asylum Office Director, with an acting director presumably with far more restrictionist views).
quasi-governmental entities (“the Maras”) have taken on quasi-state authority in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, often referred to collectively as “the Northern Triangle.” Those countries have among the highest homicide rates in the world, and their governments are manifestly either unable or unwilling to protect a large proportion of their population from persecution.

year, Venezuelan asylum applications increased 168% compared to the previous year (10,221 versus 3,810). Id.

113. UNITED NATIONS, THE GLOBALIZATION OF A CRIME: A TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT 240 (2010) (stating that gangs in the Northern Triangle have corrupted and outgunned civilian police forces); see also Nelson Rauda Zablah, Sala de lo Constitucional declara ilegal negociación con pandillas y las nombra grupos terroristas, EL FARO (Aug. 25, 2015), https://elfaro.net/es/201508/noticias/17307/Sala-de-lo-Constitucional-declara-ilegal-negociacion-con-pandillas-y-las-nombra-grupos-terroristas.htm [https://perma.cc/ZNT4-84Q5] (El Sal.) (reporting decision of Constitutional Chamber of Supreme Court of El Salvador to declare that MS-13 and Barrio 18 are terrorist organizations wielding political power over people and territory; the decision is available at http://www.csj.gob.sv/Comunicaciones/2015/AGO_15/COMUNICADOS/Sentencia%202022-2007%20versi%C3%B3n%20final.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8VZ-MCU4]). “Mara” is typically translated as “gang” in English, but that is overly simplistic. Numerous experts in Immigration Court hearings and scholarly articles attest that “gang” is a complete misnomer for these entities. “Gang” in no way denotes or connotes these sophisticated, powerful organizations that have seized political power and rule their fiefdoms as warlords, constituting de facto governments not only in their local strongholds, but throughout such extensive regions that no one can hope to escape them anywhere in these countries. See, e.g., MAX G. MANWARING, STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, A CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGE TO STATE SOVEREIGNTY: GANGS AND OTHER ILLICIT TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, EL SALVADOR, MEXICO, JAMAICA, AND BRAZIL 7 (Dec. 2007), https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub887.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5ZW-VUKD]. Translating “mara” as “gang” may serve the interest of de jure governments that seek to mischaracterize, and thus, minimize, the threat posed by these formidable political opposition forces. For the acknowledgement of this reality by the United States Ambassador to Mexico, see “Parallel Narco-Governments Need to be Stopped, Warns US Ambassador,” MEXICO DAILY NEWS (Nov. 15, 2019), https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/narco-governments-power-will-increase-without-action/ [https://perma.cc/W2LZ-MGL6].

114. For extensive documentation of the rampant unpolicd (or perpetrated by law enforcement) violence in the Triangle against distinctive target groups such as women, young men who reject forced induction into Mara service, etc. there are a multitude of sources. For basic data, see UNHCR COUNTRY CONDITIONS REPORTS, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/country-reports.html [https://perma.cc/FSQ6-WYFP]; AMNESTY INTL., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2017/18: THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S HUMAN RIGHTS 156–58, 180–81, 185–87 (2018), https://www.amnesty.org/download/
II. THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES TO ASYLUM-SEEKERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

From the rise of Nazi Germany in 1933 to nearly the end of World War II, most Western nations, including the United States, refused to admit Jewish refugees and others who were attempting to escape the fatal grasp of the Third Reich. The world’s failure to...
provide a safe haven for those facing the Holocaust led to the adoption of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1951. The Convention prohibits returning refugees to a country where they might face persecution “for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.” The Convention also prohibits receiving countries from discriminating among refugees on the basis of their religion. Most saliently, the Convention generally prohibits penalizing a refugee for unlawful presence or illegal entry. The Convention recognizes the extraordinary circumstances refugees may encounter in fleeing a country where they run a high risk of persecution. The Convention plainly contemplates that refugees may have no realistic choice but to enter a country illegally without a visa or passport and requires, at least where certain conditions are met, that the countries that have joined the Convention (“States Parties”) forego imposing penalties on such refugees.

In 1967, the international community formed the Refugee Protocol, which expanded both the temporal and geographic scope of the 1951 Convention. In 1968, the United States Senate gave its

116. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 17, art. 1.
117. Id. art. 4.
118. Id. art. 31(1).
120. The 1951 Refugee Convention was limited to events occurring before January 1, 1951, essentially to refugees compelled to flee their countries because of World War II and its aftermath. See 1967 Refugee Protocol, supra note 17, art. 1. The Protocol eliminated that date restriction and clarified that the key provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention applied worldwide. Id.; see also Ira Frank, Effect...
advice and consent to the Protocol, which President Lyndon B. Johnson subsequently ratified. Although the United States did not originally join the 1951 Convention, the Protocol incorporates all the critical provisions of the Convention, namely, Articles 2 to 34.

A. The Plain Meaning of the 1951 Refugee Convention’s Articles Prohibiting Non-Refoulement and Penalization of Asylum-Seekers

Two provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention work in tandem with each other. First, the Convention prohibits refoulement—the receiving state’s returning the refugee to a country where he or she might be persecuted. Second, the States Parties to the Convention have an obligation generally not to penalize asylum-seekers for entering its country without authorization. The non-refoulement obligation is contained in Article 33(1):

No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.121

The wording of Article 33 expresses an intent to protect refugees virtually absolutely from expulsion to a country where their “life or freedom” would be threatened for any of the five given grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. The words, “No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’),” constitute mandatory language prohibiting the return of a refugee. The phrase “in any manner whatsoever” underlines the absolute nature of the prohibition. The only exception is found in subsection 2 of Article 33:

The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime,
constitutes a danger to the community of that country.\textsuperscript{122}

Note that the language requires a showing that the particular refugee is a danger to the national security or has been so convicted. A receiving state is prohibited from banning classes of refugees, whether on the basis of nationality or religion.\textsuperscript{123}

An exception to Article 32 explains the “national security” rationale, emphasizing that the state may exclude a refugee only for “compelling reasons of national security.” \textsuperscript{124} Dr. Paul Weis’s commentary on the drafting history notes that at the negotiation conference the official representatives wished to impose on receiving states a high bar for excluding refugees on grounds of national security.\textsuperscript{125}

To help effectuate this strict prohibition on returning refugees, the Convention imposes a corresponding obligation on receiving states to refrain from penalizing asylum-seekers. Penalizing asylum-seekers would deter them from seeking asylum in the first place, thereby undermining the non-refoulement obligation, a fundamental obligation in international refugee and human rights law.\textsuperscript{126} Penalizing asylum-seekers by taking their children from them likewise runs afoul of United States human rights obligations under the Convention against Torture ("UNCAT"), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), the Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination ("CERD"),\textsuperscript{127} the Universal Declaration of Human

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\item \textsuperscript{122} Id. art. 33(2) (emphais added).
\item \textsuperscript{123} Id. art. 3 (“The Contracting States shall apply the provisions of this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin.”) (emphasis added).
\item \textsuperscript{124} Id. art. 32.
\item \textsuperscript{125} The Refugee Convention, 1951, The Travaux preparatoires 278–304 (Paul Weis ed., Cambridge University Press 1995) (emphasis added).
\item \textsuperscript{126} Cf. James C. Hathaway & Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status 26 n.56 (2d ed. 2014) (noting that refugee rights including the “right to non-penalization for illegal entry or presence” would be undermined if “a state could avoid its responsibility to protect by the simple expedient of refusing ever to assess a claim.”).
\item \textsuperscript{127} The International Court of Justice has recently granted precautionary measures to Qatar and ordered the United Arab Emirates “pending the final decision in the case and in accordance with its obligations under CERD [Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination], [to] ensure that families that include a Qatari, separated by the [deportation] measures adopted by the UAE on 5 June 2017, are reunited . . . .” Application of International Convention on Elimination of
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Rights, the Declaration on the Rights of Man, and customary international law. The spokesperson for the U.N. High

all Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. UAE) Request for Provisional Measures, 2018 I.C.J. 172, ¶ 75 (July 23, 2017).

128. See also Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Res. 63/2018, Vilma Aracely Lopez Juc de Coc and Others Regarding the United States of America (Aug. 16, 2018). There, the Commission noted that “a rupture in the family unit can occur from the expulsion of one or both progenitors [parents] in such a way that separating families due to the violation of immigration laws results in a disproportionate restriction” on the right to family protection under Article 17 of the American Convention on Human Rights and under Article VI of the American Declaration on the Rights of Man. Id. ¶ 27 (citing Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, and the Committee on the Rights of the Child, Joint General Comment No. 4 (2017) on State Obligations Regarding the Human Rights of Children in the Context of International Migration, ¶ 29 (Nov. 16, 2017), CMW/C/GC/4-CRC/C/GC/23).

129. See, e.g., Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ¶ 45, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/37/50 (Nov. 23, 2018) (describing states’ international obligations to uphold the “absolute and non-derogable right of migrants not to be subjected to torture and ill-treatment”). States increasingly subject migrants to unnecessary, disproportionate and deliberately harsh reception conditions designed to coerce them to “voluntarily” return to their country of origin, regardless of their need of non-refoulement protection. This approach “may include measures such as the criminalization, isolation and detention of irregular migrants, the deprivation of medical care . . . and adequate living conditions, the deliberate separation of family members and . . . excessive prolongation of status determination . . . Deliberate practices such as these amount to “refoulement in disguise” and are “incompatible with the principle of good faith.” Id. ¶ 43. President Trump’s policy of taking children from their parents also violates the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) and the American Convention on Human Rights (“ACHR”). Because the United States Senate attached an understanding to both the UNCAT and the ICCPR making most, if not all of their provisions, non-self-executing, because the United States is not a party to the CRC or the ACHR, and because the UDHR is a UN General Assembly resolution, not a treaty, federal courts cannot rely on these instruments as the rule of decision. All these instruments are, however, strong evidence of customary international law, and federal courts can invoke them as such or do so under the Charming Betsy canon discussed infra at notes 229–245 and accompanying text. See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, Family Separation as a Violation of International Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 213, 229–58 (2002); see also Nick Cumming-Bruce, Taking Migrant Children from Parents Is Illegal, U.N. Tells U.S., N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/05/world/americas/us-un-migrant-children-families.html (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (quoting Ravina Shamdasani, spokeswoman for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: “The U.S. should immediately halt this practice of separating families and stop criminalizing what should at most be an administrative offense—that of irregular entry or stay in the U.S.”).
Commissioner for Human Rights ("UNHCR") noted, "The practice of separating families amounts to arbitrary and unlawful interference in family life, and is a serious violation of the rights of the child."  

Article 31 of the 1951 Convention prohibits States from criminalizing the presence of refugees and prohibits unnecessary restrictions on refugees’ free movement. The Refugee Convention of 1951 is official in both English and French. The English version of Article 31 provides:

The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.

The French version adds the word “pénales” to modify “sanctions”—or “penalties” in English in the first part of Article 31. Thus, in French, Article 31 reads, “Les Etats Contractants n’appliqueront pas de sanctions pénales, du fait de leur entrée ou de leur séjour irréguliers aux réfugiés.”

The Council of Europe’s French-
English Legal Dictionary defines “pénale” as “criminal, penal.”\textsuperscript{134} The dictionary defines “sanction” as relevant here as “penalty.”\textsuperscript{135} Google Translate gives the first line of Article 31 in French as meaning, “The Contracting States shall not apply penal sanctions . . .”\textsuperscript{136} Others have argued that reading the English and the French versions of Article 31 together along with ICCPR’s ban on “arbitrary detention” requires a broader meaning, namely, to include not only criminal penalties but
civil ones as well. 137 Nevertheless, under either interpretation, criminal prosecution is definitely barred.138

B. Drafting History (Travaux Préparatoires) of the Non-Refoulement and No Penalty Provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention

In drafting Articles 31 and 33, the framers of the Refugee Convention intended to ensure that states parties would not return refugees to a country where they might be persecuted. The framers also intended that asylum-seekers would generally not be penalized for entering a country illegally. The first draft of what is now Refugee Convention Article 31 captures the latter theme:

The penalties enacted against foreigners entering the territory of the Contracting Party without prior permission shall not be applied to refugees seeking to escape from persecution, provided that such refugees present themselves without delay to the authorities of

137. See GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 248 (2d ed. 1996). (“[A]ll detention must be in accordance with and authorized by law; . . . detention should be reviewed as to its legality and necessity, according to the standard of what is reasonable and necessary in a democratic society. Arbitrary embraces not only what is illegal, but also what is unjust.”) (emphasis added) (citing U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Study on the right of everyone to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile, UN Doc. E/CN.4/826/Rev.1. (1964)); see also U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9.1, opened for signature Dec. 9, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; adopted by the United States, Sept. 8, 1992, 6 I.L.M. 368) (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.”); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 9 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.”).

138. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the interpreter of co-official texts in two or more languages should do as follows when the meanings differ in the two (or more) texts: “[W]hen a comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference in meanings which the application of Articles 31 and 32 [governing treaty interpretation generally] does not remove, the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 33(4), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (emphasis added). Subsection 1 of Article 33 notes an exception to the above rule, namely, where a treaty provides that in case of “divergence, a particular text shall prevail.” Id. art. 33(1). No such provision is present in the 1951 Convention on Refugees. In addition, Article 33(3) provides that “[t]he terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text.” Id. art. 33(3).
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the reception country and show good cause for their entry.\textsuperscript{139}

The official commentary on this draft explained its purpose:

A refugee whose departure from his country of origin is usually a flight, is rarely in a position to comply with the requirements for legal entry (possession of national passport and visa) into the country of refuge. It would be in keeping with the notion of asylum to exempt from penalties a refugee, escaping from persecution, who after crossing the frontier clandestinely, presents himself as soon as possible to the authorities of the country of asylum and is recognized as a \textit{bona fide} refugee.\textsuperscript{140}

The original draft was modified only slightly. As noted above, the French representative proposed the term “sanctions pénales” for “penalties.” According to the French representative, the penalties in subsection 1 meant judicial, not administrative, penalties:

The French representative said that the penalties mentioned should be confined to judicial penalties only. But in so far as non-admission or expulsion had to be regarded as sanctions, they were in the vast majority of cases \textit{administrative measures}, especially where they were applied at very short notice.\textsuperscript{141}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{139} Weis, \textit{supra} note 125 at 278 (emphasis added). The first draft was proposed by the U.N. Secretariat. \textit{Id. See also} GOODWIN-GILL, \textit{supra} note 137, at 305 (“Such refugees are not to be subjected to ‘penalties’, which appear to comprehend prosecution, fine, and imprisonment, but not administrative detention.”) (citing travaux préparatoires).
\item \textsuperscript{140} Weis, \textit{supra} note 125 at 279 (emphasis added). At the negotiation conference, the Belgian representative and the French representative engaged in a colloquy on this issue. The Belgian representative stated:

With regard to the presence of a refugee in a given territory, a case might arise of a refugee who had been on foreign soil for a certain length of time being discovered by the authorities. The moment he was discovered he could present himself to the local authorities, explaining the reasons why he had taken refuge in that territory. In such cases, the text would not necessarily cover the case of prolonged illegal presence.

\textit{Id.} The French representative responded, “The first paragraph of the Article involved a voluntary act. A person who presented himself to the authorities after he had been discovered could no longer benefit by the provisions of Article 26 [Article 31 in the final act].” \textit{Id. at 295. But see} Kriel, \textit{supra} note 12 (noting that a wave of immigrants at their first opportunity have surrendered to the United States immigration or other U.S. officials).
\end{itemize}
There can be no doubt that the states parties at the conference did intend to impose a legal obligation on states to refrain from penalizing asylum applicants. Taking the opposite position, Pakistan proposed that states should have the right to determine whether to impose penalties:

The Contracting States may at their discretion exempt from penalties on account of his illegal entry or presence a refugee who enters or who is present in their territory without authorization, and who presents himself without delay to the authorities and shows good cause for his illegal entry or presence.142

In the first line of its proposal, Pakistan attempted to give states parties the unfettered discretion whether to penalize asylum-seekers. Pakistan’s proposed language, however, was rejected. Article 31 (and Article 33 and the Convention as a whole) was enacted to protect asylum-seekers from being returned to the country of persecution and from being mistreated by the receiving state.143

As noted above, many scholars have argued that Article 31(2) should be interpreted to bar extended incarceration of asylum-seekers in administrative detention.144 The French representative, whose

So, for example, an asylum-seeker would be protected under Article 31 where he or she has entered the receiving state without inspection but sees an immigration officer or other law enforcement official and voluntarily surrenders to that person. On the other hand, an asylum-seeker who enters without inspection and attempts to evade immigration or other law enforcement would presumably have a more difficult case under Article 31. Note, however, that the UNHCR calls for a more nuanced interpretation of this language of Article 31. See infra notes 157, 165, 175, and accompanying text.

142. Weis, supra note 125 at 295.
143. In this regard, note that Article 33(2) attempts to prevent receiving states from overly restricting the movement of refugees. As observed above, the Convention expressly prohibits discrimination in the asylum procedural and substantive processes on the basis of race, religion or country of origin. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 17, art. 3.
144. See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 137, at 248; see also UNHCR, SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS: ARTICLE 31 OF THE 1951 CONVENTION ¶ 11 (November 8–9, 2001), http://www.unhcr.org/419c783f4.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6T4-9PZ7] (finding that Article 31(2) intended that detention should not be extended for the purpose of punishment or deterrence). See also Anita Sinha, Defining Detention: The Intervention of the European Court of Human Rights in the Detention of Involuntary Migrants, 50.3 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REVIEW 176 (2019) (comprehensive analysis of the post-crisis migrant detention decisions of the European Court of Human Rights reveals that the Court has upheld the applicability of the prohibition of
language was adopted in the co-official French version of the Convention, asserted that the Convention only bars criminal penalties imposed by a court, not administrative ones imposed by immigration control bodies.

The English version of Article 31, however, makes no mention that only “penal” or “criminal” penalties are prohibited. While a reasonably brief period of administrative detention may be required to determine whether the asylum seeker can make out a prima facie case of asylum, lengthy or indefinite detention of asylum-seekers certainly constitutes a penalty.\(^{145}\) Such detention, or the threat of such lengthy detention, may not only effectively punish the asylum-seeker, but it may also coerce a great many asylum-seekers to relinquish their asylum claims and “accept” deportation.\(^{146}\) Such coercion undermines the receiving state’s obligation of non-refoulement and the general obligation of receiving states to protect refugees—the central purposes of the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol.

In case of conflict between two or more official languages (versions of a treaty), the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties instructs that “the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.”\(^{147}\) In addition, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that the interpreter should consider “the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”\(^{148}\)

The purpose of the Refugee Convention is to protect refugees from persecution and “to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of [their] fundamental rights and freedoms.”\(^{149}\) Since the plain deprivation of liberty in the European Convention of Human Rights to migrant detention).

145. Of course, the authorities can continue to detain individuals with serious criminal records or those who pose a definite national security risk. Even such individuals, however, should have a bond hearing at which the immigrant may contest the government’s arguments for keeping the individual detained. Sajous v. Decker, No. 18-cv-2447, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86921, at *1–47, *25–26 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2018) (holding that prolonged detention without a bond hearing would violate due process protections). But see infra note 158 on Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).

146. See supra note 61 (relating co-author’s experience with this phenomenon).


148. Id. art. 31(1) (emphasis added).

149. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 17, pmbl. ¶ 2.
meaning of “penalties” in English includes both criminal and civil sanctions, and because the central purpose of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol is to protect refugees, the two official versions are best reconciled by reading “penalties” not only to include criminal prosecution and punishment, but also lengthy civil incarceration. The ordinary meaning of “penalties” contemplates both civil and criminal ones. The U.N. agency responsible for monitoring compliance with the Convention and the Protocol, the UNHCR, has reached the same conclusion.

Weighing against that interpretation, the travaux préparatoires shows that “sanctions pénales” in the French version...
referred only to criminal penalties and none of the representatives at the conference argued against that view. If, however, the parties at the conference intended to endorse the French version, they could have simply inserted “criminal” before “penalties.” The proponents of the French interpretation do have a second argument: the parties must have considered temporary administrative detention necessary so that authorities could have a reasonable opportunity to determine whether a given immigrant is a *bona fide* or a *prima facie bona fide* refugee.

Both of these arguments are valid. Nevertheless, looking at the purpose of the Convention, from its constant theme of protecting refugees from discrimination, expulsion, and other violations of international human rights law, one has to conclude that administrative detention at some point undermines the fundamental purpose of the Convention.

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153. See id. ¶ 24 (“Minimal periods in detention may be permissible to carry out initial identity and security checks in cases where identity is undetermined or in dispute, or there are indications of security risks.”). In the United States, a *prima facie* showing of asylum status is made through the “credible fear” interviewing process. Jason Boyd, *The President’s Proposal to Eliminate Due Process at the Border*, THINK IMMIGRATION (July 16, 2018), http://thinkimmigration.org/blog/2018/07/16/the-presidents-proposal-to-eliminate-due-process-at-the-border/ [https://perma.cc/3KYT-JCBE] (writing that Congress created the credible fear interviewing process in 1996 as a low-threshold, preliminary screening process to ensure *bona fide* claims to asylum); 8 C.F.R. § 208.30 (2019); see also Alvaro Peralta, *Bordering Persecution: Why Asylum Seekers Should Not Be Subject to Expedited Removal*, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1303, 1313–14 (2015) (arguing that credible fear interviews have become “cursory in nature” thus preventing proper screening of asylum screeners while “imped[ing] asylees’ statutory, regulatory, and constitutional rights to a fair and meaningful hearing”); Dree K. Collopy, *Crisis at the Border, Part II: Demonstrating a Credible Fear of Persecution or Torture*, 16 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (2016) (explaining that credible fear interviews are not meant to be full asylum interviews but are intended to prevent asylum seekers from being returned to places where they may be subjected to persecution or torture); Denise Gilman, *Realizing Liberty: The Use of International Human Rights Law to Realign Immigration Detention in the United States*, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 243, 305–306 (2013) (“Detention under expedited removal for a brief . . . time is likely not itself incompatible with . . . standards relation to immigration detention. . . . [E]ven the UNHCR standards permit detention of asylum seekers for the brief period necessary to confirm identity and initially screen the claim, which is essentially what the credible fear interview does.”).

and crosses the line into a “penalty” within the meaning of Article 31(1).

The Trump Administration intended to deter and possibly to punish asylum-seekers by keeping them in prolonged immigration (administrative) detention (as well as by criminal prosecution and punishment). While the Administration may continue trying to deny its intentions, it cannot credibly deny that its interwoven criminal prosecution/prolonged detention imperative and concomitant family separation policy have the effect of coercing asylum-seekers to give up their asylum claims, however strong.\(^{155}\) The Administration’s “Remain in Mexico” policy, distortion of Human Rights Reports, and political interference with and retaliation against advocates and adjudicators render it nearly impossible for any asylum-seeker to meet the high burden of proof required by the Real ID Act of 2005.\(^{156}\) When one adds substandard conditions in the immigrant detention facilities, including inadequate food, housing, medical care, and the failure of ICE to stop private detention personnel from subjecting immigrants to the risk of sexual assault, one could conclude that immigration detention beyond a short period does indeed constitute a penalty within the meaning of Article 31.

Although brief detention of asylum-seekers is permissible, it should be avoided except in the case of a threat to “public order, public health or national security.”\(^{157}\) Even in one of those cases, detention should be relatively short and should only occur to ensure the asylum-seeker is not a threat. Generally, twenty days should be more than enough to conduct credible fear interviews or their equivalent. Six months unquestionably constitutes “prolonged” immigration detention.\(^{158}\) Six months is more than adequate for the government to

\(^{155}\) See supra note 61 (discussing co-author’s observation of this type of coercion).


\(^{157}\) Costello et al., supra note 150, ¶ 21.

\(^{158}\) See, e.g., Abdi v. Duke, 280 F. Supp. 3d 373, 411 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) (ordering ICE to provide members of putative class of immigrant detainees who had been detained for six months or more with individualized bond hearings); Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 616 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that an immigrant detained pursuant to INA § 236(c) [8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(c)], which requires mandatory detention of certain aliens awaiting removal proceedings, has a right to a bail hearing before an immigration judge within six months of his or her detention), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1260 (2018); Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 498–99 (1st Cir. 2016) (finding that the Due Process clause imposes an implicit reasonableness limitation on the statute that requires mandatory detention of certain criminally
provide an appropriate credible fear interview and allow an appeal to
an immigration court. Immigrants have the right to make an asylum
claim. Lengthy incarceration of asylum-seekers undermines that right.
Even under United States law, a first-time illegal entrant is at most
criminally responsible for committing a misdemeanor, a minor offense.
Incarcerating such an individual for a lengthy period—including in
immigration detention—violates the principle of proportionality.

It is difficult to imagine anything more inherently punitive
than forcible removal of children from their families that was concealed
until it was useful to be publicized as an explicit deterrent to asylum-
seekers. These actions are compounded by the Administration’s failure
to keep track of the whereabouts and condition of the children so that

(2018) (applying INA provisions primarily to detention of aliens seeking entry to
United States and defining narrow conditions under which the Attorney General
may release on bond aliens in removal proceedings (based on criminal offenses or
terrorist activities) preclude the provision from being plausibly interpreted as
placing an implied six-month limit on detention or as requiring periodic bond
Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 601 (2d Cir. 2015); Reid v. Donelan, 2018 WL 400993
(1st Cir. 2018) (opinion below withdrawn on reconsideration); Matter of M-S., 27 I.
731 (B.I.A. 2005), holding that noncitizens initially placed in expedited removal
proceedings who establish credible fear of persecution (i.e., significant possibility
that the noncitizen is eligible for asylum, withholding of removal or protection
under the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 208.30, § 1208.30) are statutorily
subject to mandatory detention throughout proceedings—without addressing
constitutional limits). Contra Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 860 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for upholding denial of bond hearings for noncitizens held
beyond six months and finding such denial unconstitutional for treating them worse
than individuals charged with major crimes). See also Shanahan v. Lora, 138 S. Ct.
1260, 1260 (2018) (vacating Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 601 (2d Cir. 2015);
Reid v. Donelan, 2018 WL 400993 (1st Cir. 2018) (opinion below withdrawn on
noncitizens initially placed in expedited removal proceedings who establish credible
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asylum, withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against
Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 208.30, § 1208.30) are statutorily subject to mandatory
detention throughout proceedings—without addressing constitutional limits).

159. See Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited
Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263, 263 (2005) (“In doctrinal contexts other than
criminal sentencing, proportionality is frequently used as a mechanism of judicial
review to prevent legislative encroachments on individual rights and other
exercises of excessive power.”).
reunification is not readily possible. Any parent who has lost her child for five minutes in a benign and secure department store or mall has experienced a depth of terror and wretched, self-blaming panic, an absolute inability to concentrate on or attend at all to anything else but the missing child that is hard to match. How then should we characterize that agony when it is coupled with the knowledge that as parents are helplessly incarcerated, their children are suffering from extreme distress, loneliness, depression, and fear of physical and sexual abuse? Their children may be kept in isolation or thrown together with strangers of all ages, with no guarantee of communication or contact with counsel and family, in substandard and unacceptable detention facilities.

Furthermore, the refusal to release detained children to potential sponsors—usually other relatives—leaves children questioning whether their loved ones are jailed, safe, or deported. Any other potential sponsors who step forward to provide the children with a home while they seek asylum might be prevented from doing so, or may be targeted and be deported themselves. The wholesale cover-up, denial, and attempt to ascribe blame for this shameful policy to the Obama Administration by Trump officials further highlights the hypocrisy of the Trump Administration’s defense of this harmful treatment, or, at the very least, its willful blindness.

As the UNHCR notes, “The term ‘penalties’ includes, but is not limited to, prosecution, fine, and imprisonment.” Article 1 of the Convention against Torture prohibits meting out not only severe physical pain, but also “severe . . . mental pain or suffering . . . intentionally inflicted . . . for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.” ICE and CBP officials separated


children from their parents because of their parents’ immigration status or nationality, which falls within “discrimination of any kind.” The severe mental pain or suffering must be committed by a “public official or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official”—unquestionably satisfied here. Government officials deliberately took children from their parents to deter asylum-seekers, anticipating the mental pain and suffering their premeditated policy would cause both the children and their parents. Inflicting pain to deter immigrants from coming to the United States was the goal, thus satisfying both the “intentionality” element of the UNCAT and also the “specific intent” element of the understanding that the U.S. Senate attached to the UNCAT. 163 Amnesty International, whose major mission is to prevent torture in all parts of the world, stated, “[T]his is a spectacularly cruel policy, where frightened children are being ripped from their parents’ arms . . . . This is nothing short of torture. The severe mental suffering that officials have intentionally inflicted on these families for coercive purposes means that these acts meet the definitions of torture under both US and international law.”164 Is it even possible to claim that such treatment does not constitute a “penalty?”

C. Presenting Oneself to Authorities Without Delay and Showing Good Cause for Entering Without Inspection

Article 31(1) prohibits imposing penalties on refugees, but only “provided that such refugees present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.”165 For example, Canadian courts have stressed the concern about protecting refugees and have refused to penalize immigrants in such situations:

It does not stand to the applicant’s credit that, after entering Canada as visitors, they illegally obtained Canadian social security cards, worked illegally for approximately a year before they were found out and

163. See supra notes 38–51 and accompanying text.
165. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 17, art. 31(1) (emphasis added); Weis, supra note 125, at 278. The first draft of the Convention was proposed by the U.N. Secretariat. Id.
arrested, and then claimed refugee status. Nevertheless, since the law allows them to apply as refugees even in such circumstances, we must conclude that it does not intend that their refugee claims should be determined on the basis of these extraneous considerations.\(^{166}\)

Similarly, a British court stated that it has long been settled that “those fleeing from persecution or threatened persecution . . . may have to resort to deceptions of various kinds (possession and use of false papers, forgery, misrepresentation, etc.) in order to make good their escape.”\(^{167}\) The obligation not to impose penalties on refugees who present themselves without delay and show good cause “is perhaps the most contentious element of Article 31”\(^{168}\) as the grant of protection is contingent on qualifying conditions: directness, promptness, and good cause.\(^{169}\) As to “directness,” refugees are afforded asylum protection after “coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened.”\(^{170}\) But, as Britain’s High Court of Justice concluded, a “short term stopover en route to such intended sanctuary cannot forfeit the protection of the Article.”\(^{171}\)

With respect to “promptness,” the 2001 Expert Round Table, organized by the UNHCR and the Migration Institute, and composed of governmental officials, scholars, and NGO representatives, explained that it is “a matter of fact and degree” that “depends on the circumstances of the case[.]”\(^{172}\) Moreover, the UNHCR has stressed

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166. HATHAWAY & FORSTER, supra note 126, at 29 n.77 (quoting Surujpal v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] 60 NR 73 (Can. FCA) at 73–74, per MacGuigan J. (in obiter)); see also GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 137, at 305 (“Such refugees are not to be subjected to ‘penalties’, which appear to comprehend prosecution, fine, and imprisonment, but not administrative detention.”) (citing travaux préparatoires).


168. Costello et al., supra note 150, at 17.

169. See SXH v. CPS, [2014] EWCA Civ 90 [¶ 16, n. 26] (appeal taken from Eng.) (quoting speech of Lord Bingham of Cornhill explaining the application of article 31 of the Refugee Convention as not “limited to offences attributable to a refugee’s entry into or presence in this country, but should provide immunity, if the other conditions are fulfilled, from the imposition of criminal penalties [for] offences attributable to the attempt of a refugee to leave the country in the continuing course of a flight from persecution even after a short stopover in transit”).

170. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 17, art. 31(1).


172. UNHCR, supra note 144.
that “no strict time limit” should be applied to the “without delay” language.\textsuperscript{173} Noting that an asylum seeker may have many reasons for not immediately going to the receiving state’s authorities, the UNHCR stated:

[Asylum-seekers] may fear authority figures because of the persecution they have suffered or because of a language barrier. They may have been advised not to come forward immediately or fear immediate removal to the country of feared persecution. They may wish to first consult with an attorney or organization familiar with the country’s asylum laws. Trauma victims may be particularly fearful of revealing themselves immediately. Some asylum-seekers may wish to reunite with family members in the country of asylum before approaching the authorities.\textsuperscript{174}

To the extent a refugee must show “good cause,” the 2001 Expert Round Table concluded that having a well-founded fear establishes this requirement:

Having a well-founded fear of persecution is recognized in itself as ‘good cause’ for illegal entry. To ‘come directly’ from such a country or countries in which s/he is at risk or in which generally no protection is available, is also accepted as ‘good cause’ for illegal entry. There may, in addition, be other factual circumstances which constitute ‘good cause.’\textsuperscript{175}

The United States has adopted a catch-22 immigration policy: a refugee is faced with the choice either to cross the border without inspection and be subject to an inevitable criminal prosecution or to attempt admission “the right way” through a port of entry and encounter CBP officers who “don’t tell the [refugee] they can’t apply for asylum, just that they cannot apply right now because the port of entry

\textsuperscript{173} Costello et al., supra note 150, at 19. See also Kriel, supra note 12 (noting that a wave of immigrants have, at their first opportunity, surrendered to United States immigration or other U.S. officials).

\textsuperscript{174} Advisory Opinion on Criminal Prosecution of Asylum-Seekers for Illegal Entry, supra note 161.

\textsuperscript{175} UNHCR, supra note 144, at 10(e); see also R v. Zanzoul [2006] CA297/06 (N.Z.) (holding that applicant “was not in the situation of many refugee claimants who . . . travelled on false documentation because their country of origin would not issue passports. On the facts, his possession . . . of a false Australian passport was completely irrelevant to any genuine belief he may have had a claim of refugee status.”).
is at capacity.”\textsuperscript{176} Eleanor Acer, Senior Director of Refugee Protection for Human Rights First, cautions that the United States “has increasingly illegally turned away refugees at official border points, driving them to make the dangerous crossing between points.”\textsuperscript{177} The Trump Administration’s policies of largely rejecting presumptive asylum-seekers at its ports of entry, separating families, and indefinitely detaining refugees, raise the question: might refugees have \textit{good cause} for not presenting themselves \textit{without delay} to obviously adverse authorities eager to impose harsh punishments?

III. THE SELF-EXECUTING NATURE OF KEY ARTICLES OF THE 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION AND 1967 PROTOCOL

The Framers of the United States Constitution intended treaties to be the supreme law of the land, to supersede inconsistent state statutes and state court rulings, and, when applicable, to be a state or federal court’s rule of decision. The Framers were particularly concerned that states would violate the rights of British nationals and other foreigners, and specifically would refuse to ensure that British nationals would be paid in pound sterling for debts that American nationals owed them. Article IV of the 1783 Treaty of Peace with Britain required such payment: “It is agreed that creditors on either side, shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.”\textsuperscript{178}

During the Revolutionary War, several of the newly declared independent states printed their own currency and permitted Americans to use such currency (generally with little actual value) to pay off their mortgages and other debts owed to British nationals. For example, the Virginia Legislature during the War of Independence passed a statute “contemplating to prevent the enemy [the British and


British creditors] [from] deriving strength by the receipt of [payments of debts]." The statute provided that if any debtor "paid his debt into the [Virginia] Loan Office, obtain[ed] a certificate and receipt as directed, he shall be discharged from so much of the debt." After the war ended in 1781 and the Treaty of Peace was signed in 1783, the State of Virginia did nothing to ensure that the British creditors' debts were paid in pound sterling as the Treaty of Peace required. Virginia's and other states' failure to abide by the Treaty threatened to unravel the hard-won victory by the fledgling United States over the then-superpower British.

To address these and related issues, the Constitutional Convention convened in Philadelphia in 1787, and ultimately crafted Article 6, section 2 of the Constitution—the Supremacy Clause:

This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

Correspondingly, the Constitutional Convention expressly granted federal courts jurisdiction over treaty claims. "The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority . . . ."

In 1796, the Supreme Court had its first opportunity to interpret a treaty of the United States, namely, the Treaty of Peace with Britain. In Ware v. Hylton, the Court held that Article IV of the

179. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) (Cushing, J.).
180. Id. at 281–82.
181. See David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1115–16 (2000) (discussing states' reticence to pay British creditors their owed debt, leading to severe tensions and the possibility of war); Colin G. Calloway,Suspicion and Self-Interest: The British-Indian Alliance and the Peace of Paris, 48 HISTORIAN 41, 54 (1985) (discussing how Britain justified its refusal to turn Northwest frontier posts over to the United States by pointing to its failure to pay British debts). The Framers were also concerned with foreign powers playing one American state off another leading to a resultant weak, balkanized foreign policy. Golove, supra, at 1128–30.
182. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. (emphasis added).
183. Id. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added).
Treaty provided a remedy to the British creditor for money owed but denied by the Virginia sequestration statute discussed above. 184 Supreme Court Justice Cushing noted that Article IV was definite and mandatory: “The provision, that ‘Creditors shall meet with no lawful impediment,’ etc (sic) is as absolute, unconditional, and peremptory, as words can well express, and made not to depend on the will and pleasure, or the optional conduct of any body of men whatever.” 185

Justice Cushing, however, went on to imply that Article V of the treaty might not have established a legally enforceable obligation. That article states in relevant part, “It is agreed that the Congress shall earnestly recommend it to the legislatures of the respective states, to provide for the restitution of all [confiscated] estates, rights, and properties . . . .” 186 The words “shall earnestly recommend” are plainly hortatory and strikingly contrast with “[c]reditors shall meet with no lawful impediment.” A party receiving a recommendation implicitly has the right to reject it. Article IV, on the other hand, is more than sufficiently definite to require the party or parties to whom it is directed to comply.

The Court’s first treaty case thus clarifies perhaps the most important strand of what became known as the self-executing treaty doctrine. That strand presumes that treaty provisions are self-executing and may therefore serve as the rule of decision, but makes an exception for a treaty provision that is insufficiently definite. By framing Article V in the Treaty of Peace as a recommendation, the parties did not create nor intend to create a legally binding obligation. Consequently, the Court implied that Article V was not enforceable.

Like Article IV of the Treaty of Peace, the relevant treaty articles of the 1951 Convention impose definite legal obligations. Article 31(1), for instance, uses mandatory language and is stated in the negative. “The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence . . . .” 187 Negatively stated treaty provisions are more readily found to be self-executing, probably because “negatively drafted provisions are often more precise than are

184. Ware, 3 U.S. at 284 (pointing out that the new nation, in exchange for its promises to pay debts in pound sterling, got much from the British with the 1783 Treaty of Peace).
185. Id. at 284.
187. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 17, art. 31(1) (emphasis added).
affirmative ones\textsuperscript{188} and [because] the negative nature of such a treaty term implicitly eliminates the need for implementing legislation.\textsuperscript{189}

Article 33 of the Refugee Convention likewise uses mandatory language, imposes a negative obligation, and is similarly precise and definite:

\textit{No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.}\textsuperscript{190}

The highlighted language is specific and expressly prohibits the expulsion or return of refugees. The Supreme Court itself has contrasted this language with other articles in the Refugee Convention that do not create a legally binding obligation. “In contrast [to Article 33], Article 34 provides that contracting states \textit{shall as far as possible} facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees.”\textsuperscript{191} The Court characterized this provision of Article 34 as “precatory.”\textsuperscript{192} It

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{189} \textit{See} McDonnell, \textit{supra} note 188, at 1428 n.128 (noting that the Supreme Court considered \textit{Hawes}, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697, a “very able” opinion. United States \textit{v. Rauscher}, 119 U.S. 407, 427–28 (1886)); \textsc{Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations} § 111 reporter’s note 5 (\textsc{Am. Law Inst.} 1987). The court in \textit{Hawes} also explained that negative treaty provisions are self-executing. \textit{Hawes}, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) at 702–03.
\item \textsuperscript{190} \textit{1951 Refugee Convention, supra} note 17, art. 33 (emphasis added).
\item \textsuperscript{191} McDonnell, \textit{supra} note 188, at 1423 (citing \textit{Refugee Convention, supra} note 17, art. 34).
\item \textsuperscript{192} \textit{I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca}, 480 U.S. 421, 441 (1987). The Court properly recognized this as creating something less than a legally binding obligation, a hortatory provision. The Court, however, went on to assert that Article 34 made granting asylum (rather than withholding deportation) a discretionary rather than a legally binding obligation—a characterization that does not fit with the plain meaning nor the purpose of Article 34. Article 34 calls for receiving states to “as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees.” \textit{1951 Refugee Convention, supra} note 17, art. 34. It exhorts states to “make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings,” but does not clearly require the states parties to do so. \textit{Id.} The article does not deal with asylum \textit{per se} except to call upon states
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
bears an uncanny resemblance to Article V of the Treaty of Peace with Britain. The language “shall as far as possible” suggests that if it is not possible, then it does not have to be done, just as Article V’s “shall earnestly recommend” language carries with it the right of states to reject the recommendation.

A. Clarifying the Roberts Court’s Confusion about the Self-Executing Treaty Doctrine

The Framers intended that treaties, like federal statutes, be the law of the land. But courts have often ignored or misunderstood this command of the Supremacy Clause. Such courts have typically relied on an 1829 case that was overruled just four years later. In *Foster & Elam v. Neilson*, the Court interpreted the treaty between Spain and the United States regarding the U.S. purchase of Florida.\(^\text{193}\) The treaty stated that previous Spanish land grants “shall be ratified and confirmed.”\(^\text{194}\) Apparently, the Court took this language to mean that such grants *will* be ratified and confirmed *in the future*, and

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194. The full text of the relevant article of the Treaty states as follows: All the grants of land made before the 24th of January, 1818, by His Catholic Majesty, or by his lawful authorities, in the said territories ceded by His Majesty to the United States, shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands, to the same extent that the same grants would be valid if the territories had remained under the dominion of His Catholic Majesty. But the owners in possession of such lands, who, by reason of the recent circumstances of the Spanish nation, and the revolutions in Europe, have been prevented from fulfilling all the conditions of their grants, shall complete them within the terms limited in the same, respectively, from the date of this treaty; in default of which the said grants shall be null and void. All grants made since the said 24th of January, 1818, when the first proposal, on the part of His Catholic Majesty, for the cession of the Floridas was made, are hereby declared and agreed to be null and void.

Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limit Between the United States and His Catholic Majesty, Spain-U.S., art. 8, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 U.S.T. 252.
believed that the treaty provided only an executory right. The Court held this treaty provision unenforceable.

Four years later, however, the Court in United States v. Percheman overruled Foster. In Percheman, the Court again analyzed whether the same treaty language was sufficiently definite to state a legal obligation, but, apparently for the first time, examined the Spanish version of the treaty. The Spanish version of the Treaty of Amity between the United States and Spain used the phrase “quedaran (sic) ratificados,” which is translated “[the grants] shall remain ratified [and confirmed] . . . .” A treaty can include definite future obligations, so the futurity or lack thereof should not have made a difference. Apparently, the Foster Court saw the treaty language as referring to a future event without indicating who would “ratify and confirm” or when such ratification or confirmation would happen, thus rendering that treaty term indefinite. Regardless, the Court relatively quickly overruled Foster, perhaps recognizing that besides the Spanish version of the relevant treaty term, the Court’s original decision contained strained analysis. After all, “shall” in this context generally denotes and connotes a present, mandatory norm; a legal obligation, not future tense.

Unfortunately, some federal courts, instead of seeing the Foster case for what it was—an overruled opinion of little or no precedential value—relied on Foster as if it were controlling precedent. This practice reached its zenith in Medellín v. Texas. In an admittedly hard case, the Medellín majority nevertheless distorted the doctrine of self-executing treaties, displaying an ignorance of both international and domestic law on the subject. In Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”)

195. Foster, 27 U.S. at 254.
196. Id.
197. Tratado de Amistad, Arreglo de Diferencias y Límites entre S. M. Católica y los Estados Unidos de América [Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limit Between the United States and His Catholic Majesty], art. 8, Feb. 22, 1819; Percheman, 32 U.S. at 52 (emphasis added).
198. See Foster, 27 U.S. at 254 (“By whom shall they [the land grants] be ratified and confirmed?”).
199. In this regard, the Percheman Court noted, “Although the words ‘shall be ratified and confirmed,’ are properly the words of contract, stipulating for some future legislative act; they are not necessarily so. They may import that they ‘shall be ratified and confirmed,’ by force of the instrument itself.” Percheman, 32 U.S. at 89 (emphasis added).
ruled that United States violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations ("VCCR"), noting that Texas officials failed to timely inform capital defendants, all of whom were Mexican nationals, of their right to consult with the Mexican consul. The ICJ rejected the argument that such VCCR claims were procedurally defaulted. The ICJ reasoned that internal rules of a state may not be raised to defeat VCCR treaty obligations. The ICJ ruled that the United States was obligated “to provide, by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals . . . .” Presumably, the ICJ expected that the United States Executive, or federal or Texas courts, would determine whether any of the defendants had been prejudiced by Texas’s failure to inform the defendants of their consular rights.

In rejecting the Mexican defendants’ arguments, the Medellín majority misunderstood how international law works in tandem with domestic law in determining how a country carries out its treaty obligations. International law does not care how a country carries out its treaty obligations as long as the country carries them out. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides, “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” Noticeably absent from this fundamental article in this foundational treaty is any indication of how a state must “perform” its treaty obligations. A given country may use its courts to carry out its treaty obligations (via a self-executing treaty), or use its executive to do so (by issuing executive orders), or its legislative branch (by enacting implementing legislation). No matter the method used, the doctrine of self-execution rests on a state’s domestic law. One can consider the mode of performance of a treaty (unless the states parties

204. Id. ¶ 153(9).
206. See McDonnell, supra note 188, at 1404–06, illustrating how either the Executive or the Judiciary can carry out a treaty obligation; see also ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 159–177 (Cambridge University Press 3d ed. 2013) (discussing how states can implement treaty obligations domestically).
otherwise specifically agree) a matter solely within a state’s sovereignty.

Certain states, such as Britain, can never enter into a self-executing treaty. Under British law, treaties to be effective domestically must be expressly implemented by Parliament.\(^{208}\) The Framers of the United States Constitution were well aware of British practice and adopted a different approach.\(^{209}\) The relevant domestic law of the United States is contained in Articles 3 and 6(2) of the Constitution. As previously noted, Article 6(2) makes treaties the supreme law of the land, invocable in state and federal courts as the rule of decision.

Perhaps the most grievous error of the _Medellín_ majority is to quote with approval a statement from the First Circuit which claims that to be self-executing, treaties have to “convey[] an intent that it be ‘self-executing’ and is ratified on these terms.”\(^{210}\) As explained above, the question of “self-execution” is a matter of domestic law, not international law. Rarely, then, could one expect states parties with different domestic law traditions to negotiate on the precise manner in which a treaty will be enforced.\(^{211}\) Therefore, the question is not whether the negotiating parties to a treaty “convey[ed] an intent that it be ‘self-executing’.”\(^{212}\) The question is whether the parties intended to create a legally binding obligation. If so, it is up to the domestic law of the states parties to the treaty to determine how each party is to enforce the treaty. Sometimes the treaty will have a clause requiring states that do not recognize the doctrine on self-executing treaties to

\(^{208}\) Carlos Manuel Vazquez, _The “Self-Executing” Character of the Refugee Protocol’s Nonrefoulement Obligation_, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 39, 45–46 (1993) (“For example, even if a treaty [entered into by Britain] purported itself to set a tariff at a given level, [British] domestic law-applying officials would collect the tariff as set by prior statutes until Parliament executed the treaty by amending the earlier statute.”).

\(^{209}\) See _Medellín v. Texas_, 552 U.S. 491, 543 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (referring to Justice Iredell in _Ware v. Hylton_, 3 U.S. 199, 276–77 (1796) discussing the proposition that the Constitution rejected the British approach, noting that “further legislative action in respect to the treaty’s debt-collection provision was no longer necessary in the United States”).

\(^{210}\) _Medellín_, 552 U.S. at 505 (quoting _Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States_, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Boudin, C. J.)).

\(^{211}\) Justice Breyer was correct in observing, “How could those drafters achieve agreement when one signatory nation follows one tradition and a second follows another?” _Medellín_, 522 U.S. at 548 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

\(^{212}\) _Medellín_, 552 U.S. at 505 (quoting _Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States_, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Boudin, C. J.)).
enact legislation to bring the treaty into effect by domestic statute. Generally, however, the states parties leave it up to each individual state to enforce the treaty under the mode that the state itself has chosen to adopt.

The *Medellín* majority’s error is egregious. First, the Court looks to find something in the treaty that treaty drafters, for good reason, generally are unlikely to include. It’s like telling children to hunt for Easter eggs hidden in the backyard when in reality all the Easter eggs can be found only inside the house. Second, the *Medellín* majority’s misinterpretation ignores the plain meaning and the purpose of the Supremacy Clause and the Framers’ intent in drafting this critical constitutional provision. The *Medellín* Court never ruled on whether Article 36 of the VCCR is self-executing. The language of that article is as definite as Article IV from the Treaty of Peace. Article 36 requires states to inform foreign detainees of their right to consular assistance. “The [detaining] authorities shall inform the person [the foreign detainee] concerned without delay of his rights [to request the assistance of a consul from his or her country]” and if the detainee “so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State” of its national’s detention.

Sometimes called the international Miranda warning, the right to consular notification is stated in mandatory language, “shall inform . . . without delay.” The language is as specific as a Miranda warning, and is well within the competence of federal and state courts to apply.

Instead of focusing on the VCCR, the Court directed its attention to Article 94 of the U.N. Charter and held that Article 94(1) is non-self-executing. Article 94 provides in full as follows:

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213. Because most countries lack constitutional provisions making treaties the supreme law of the land, some multilateral treaties have a domestic implementation clause, requiring states to enact legislation to make the treaty enforceable domestically. Yet depending on the subject matter, countries like the United States that have taken the self-executing approach may not need to enact legislation. See Iwasawa, *supra* note 188, at 660; McDonnell, *supra* note 188, at 1428–31.

214. For a brief discussion of the Framers’ intent in adopting the Supremacy Clause, see Vazquez, *supra* note 208, at 47–48; see also McDonnell, *supra* note 188, at 1406–16.

(1) Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.

(2) If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.216

The Court reasoned that the words “undertake to comply” were not sufficiently definite to constitute a self-executing treaty term.217 Granted, the language might have been stronger, for example, “shall comply.” But “[i]n international usage, ‘undertaking’ is well recognized to be a hard-immediate obligation.”218 As Justice Breyer observed in dissent, “undertake” means to put oneself under a legal obligation.219 Justice Breyer examined “undertake” and the terms used in the Spanish version of the U.N. Charter to conclude that they mean “become liable.”220 But query whether the Court would have reached the opposite result had Article 94 used the “shall comply” language.

A better argument for the Medellín majority’s position—one that the majority does make—is in reference to Article 94(2) of the U.N. Charter.221 That subsection concerns what happens when a state party

216. U.N. Charter, art. 94 (emphasis added).
217. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 508–09.
220. Id.
221. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 509–10 (arguing that the sole remedy for noncompliance under Article 94(2) was referral to the United Nations Security Council and that this nonjudicial remedy was evidence that ICJ judgements were not meant to be enforceable in domestic courts). The Court also noted that this was not an absolute remedy given that the Security Council would need to effectuate the judgement and given that the United States would retain its ability to veto the Security Council resolution. Id.
fails to comply with a decision of the International Court of Justice. Article 94(2) states that “if any party to a case fails to perform the obligations [under an ICJ judgment], the other party may have recourse to the Security Council.” One might argue that here the parties to the U.N. Charter specifically agreed that the only mode of enforcement of an ICJ decision is through the U.N. Security Council. Considering the high regard parties have had for state sovereignty and the placement of Article 94(2) in the same article dealing with legal obligation of states to comply with ICJ judgments, such an interpretation is plausible.

Although the state parties usually leave the manner of enforcement to the individual states, the parties can agree to make a treaty provision non-self-executing. A clear example of this is the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty ("MLAT") between the United States and Switzerland. The MLAT expressly states that no defendant shall be able to invoke the treaty to exclude evidence in United States courts. This is a narrow exception to the general rule that treaties are self-executing.

On the other hand, one could argue that Article 94(2) of the U.N. Charter is not absolute. The subsection says that an ICJ judgment holder “may have recourse to the Security Council . . .” The subsection does not say that going to the Security Council is the only way for the judgment holder to enforce the ICJ judgment. Unlike the MLAT, the treaty language in Article 94 does not clearly make that article non-self-executing.

Powerful states typically resist giving broad jurisdiction to international tribunals. Given the veto power over Security Council

222. U.N. Charter, art. 94, ¶ 2 (emphasis added).
223. One distinguished commentator analyzed Article 94(2) as essentially amounting to a directive to the United States to “make best efforts” to comply. “The Medellín opinion indicates that the Court concluded that ICJ judgments are not directly enforceable in the courts because Article 94, in effect, obligates the United States to do its best to comply with ICJ judgments . . . This reading is further supported by the Court’s interpretation of Article 94(2), in conjunction with the fact that the United States retained a veto in the Security Council, as establishing that the United States had retained ‘the option of noncompliance.’” Vazquez, supra note 218, at 661. Professor Vazquez argues that Medellín should be so interpreted by lower courts. Id.
224. McDonnell, supra note 188, at 1428 (quoting Cardenas v. Smith, 733 F.2d 909, 918 (D.C. Cir 1984) (“This Treaty shall not give rise to a right on the part of any person to take any action in the United States to suppress or exclude any evidence . . . ”).
resolutions held by the five permanent members, drafting Article 94(2) presumably helped persuade these states—China, France, the United Kingdom, the then-U.S.S.R., and the U.S (and perhaps others)—to accept the establishment of the International Court of Justice. Although imperfect, this argument forms a stronger basis for the Medellín Court’s decision than does misinterpreting the self-executing treaty doctrine.

Medellín exemplifies the truism that hard cases make bad law. It was a hard case because the petitioners were not asking the United States Supreme Court to affirm an international commercial arbitration or to recognize a foreign court’s judgment against a private party. Rather, they were asking the most powerful national court on the planet to accede to an order issued by the UN’s World Court against the United States itself, on an issue related to the controversial question of capital punishment.

B. Weak Precedent Asserting the Refugee Convention and Protocol are Non-Self-Executing

A few federal courts of appeal have found the 1968 Refugee Protocol non-self-executing. These courts, however, ruled so summarily. At best, one can describe their analysis as conclusory.226 The Second Circuit, in a one-page 1973 per curiam decision, Ming v. Marks, adopted the district court’s opinion, which relied heavily on some statements in the Senate while debating giving its advice and consent to the Protocol. The district court seemed to cite these statements for the proposition that our immigration laws and regulations already comported with the 1967 Protocol.227 However, the

226. See, e.g., Al-Fara v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 733, 743 (3d Cir. 2005); Cuban American Bar Ass’n, Inc. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1425 n.13 (11th Cir. 1995) (asserting that the protocol is not self-executing without any additional legal analysis).

227. Ming v. Marks, 367 F. Supp. 673, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d on opinion below, 505 F.2d 1170, 1172 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam). There, the district court quoted the following from the Senate’s hearing on the Protocol:

SENATOR [JOHN] SPARKMAN. Is there anything in here that conflicts with our existing immigration laws?

MR. DAWSON. I would answer that briefly and then ask Mrs. McDowell [of the Treaty Section, Office of the Legal Advisor, Department of State] to give a more authoritative answer. I would say that Article 32 which prohibits the expulsion of a refugee who is lawfully in this country to any country except on grounds of national security or public order would pose certain
per curiam decision itself, while ostensibly adopting the district court’s opinion, seems to have applied the 1951 Refugee Convention through the 1967 Protocol as the rule of decision.\textsuperscript{228}

The district court opinion upon which the Second Circuit opinion and other Circuit opinions are ultimately based is unsound.\textsuperscript{229} First, the 

\textit{Ming} district court did not undertake an examination to determine if the treaty language created a legal obligation at all, and thus relied on an unfounded assumption.\textsuperscript{230} Second, the Supreme Court in \textit{I.N.S. v. Stevic} adopted a far more nuanced analysis of the 1967 Protocol than did the district court in \textit{Ming}.\textsuperscript{231} The Court in \textit{Stevic} noted that there was a significant difference between the Protocol and United States domestic law at that time:

The most significant difference was that Article 33 gave the refugee an entitlement to avoid deportation to a country in which his life or freedom would be threatened, whereas domestic law merely provided the Attorney General with discretion to grant withholding of deportation on grounds of persecution. The Attorney General, however, could naturally accommodate the Protocol simply by exercising his discretion to grant such relief in each case in which the required showing was made, and hence no amendment of the existing statutory language was necessary.\textsuperscript{232} The Court essentially interpreted the 1967 Protocol and Article 33 of the Refugee Convention to mandate the Attorney General to exercise his or her discretion in favor of the asylum applicant “in each

\begin{itemize}
  \item questions in connection with section 241 of our Immigration and Nationality Act, which states the deportation provisions. But I do not believe it would be in conflict. We believe most of those grounds in 241 are grounds which can be properly construed as having the basis of national security or public order, and we also are assured that those relatively limited cases which perhaps could not be so construed could be dealt with by the Attorney General without the enactment of any further legislation . . . .
\end{itemize}

\textit{Id.} at 678 (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{228} Ming v. Marks, 505 F.2d 1170, 1172 (2d Cir. 1974). Unfortunately, the Second Circuit adopted a strained interpretation of Convention Articles 31 and 32.

\textsuperscript{229} In \textit{Bertrand v. Sava}, 684 F.2d 204, 218–19 (2d Cir. 1982), the Second Circuit again incorrectly relied on \textit{Ming} for the proposition that the Protocol and the Convention were non-self-executing on the ground that the Refugee Act of 1980 implemented the Protocol.

\textsuperscript{230} \textit{Ming}, 367 F. Supp. at 678.


\textsuperscript{232} \textit{I.N.S. v. Stevic}, 467 U.S. at 428 n.22 (emphasis added).
case in which the required showing [under the Protocol and Convention] was made." So what was once the generally unfettered discretion of the Attorney General was now, because of the Protocol, an almost compelled exercise of discretion to grant withholding of deportation if the immigrant showed that he or she suffered a threat of persecution within the meaning of Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention. By effectively limiting the Attorney General's exercise of discretion, Article 33 of the Refugee Convention (made binding in the United States by the 1967 Protocol) had become the rule of decision.

Ironically, the colloquy in the Senate quoted by the Ming district court likewise supports this proposition. Responding to Senator John Sparkman's question, Lawrence Dawson, a State Department official, testified, "We also are assured that those relatively limited cases which perhaps could not be so construed [where then-current immigration law failed to comport with the 1967 Protocol] could be dealt with by the Attorney General without the enactment of any further legislation . . . ." In that same colloquy, another State Department official noted two additional ways in which the then-current immigration law and regulations differed from the requirements of the Protocol:

There are two categories, only two, that we think are not covered, and these are the deportation of an alien for reasons of mental illness or deficiency, where he has become institutionalized for that reason, or deportation on grounds that he has become a public charge. These two areas would not be enforced against refugees if the protocol were in force.

Fundamentally, the testimony supports the Stevic Court's proposition that the Protocol limits Executive discretion over matters the Protocol prescribes. Specifically, the testimony indicates that the Attorney General has virtually no choice but to comply with the 1967 Protocol and the relevant provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention.

233. Id. at 428.
234. See id.
235. See Vazquez, supra note 208, at 51 ("[T]he acknowledgement that no amendment of the statute was required must have been a recognition that Article 33 had domestic legal force and superseded the inconsistent provisions of the immigration law.").
237. Id.
Moreover, had the Senate intended to make the 1967 Protocol non-self-executing, it could have attached a reservation, understanding or declaration so saying, during the advise-and-consent process of ratification of the Protocol. The Senate never attached such a reservation, understanding, or declaration.238 In his memorandum submitting the 1967 Protocol to the Senate, the President never suggested that the Protocol should be considered non-self-executing. To the contrary, the President’s memorandum stated, “The Protocol constitutes a comprehensive Bill of Rights for refugees fleeing their country because of persecution on account of their political views, race, religion, nationality, or social ties.”239

One might argue that the Refugee Act of 1980 suggests that Congress believed that the 1967 Protocol was non-self-executing and that implementing legislation was required. The Senate Committee Report on the bill that later became the Refugee Act notes, however, that the bill “improves and clarifies” asylum procedures, but continues the substantive standards of the 1967 Protocol and the relevant 1951 Refugee Convention articles:

[T]he bill establishes an asylum provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act for the first time by improving and clarifying the procedures for

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238. The Senate attached reservations to Articles 24 and 29 of the Convention, but made no reservation or understanding applicable here. See Declarations and Reservations to the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, UN TREATY SERVICE, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-5&chapter=5&clang=_en#EndDec [https://perma.cc/5KZS-E67R]. The Senate has attached “non-self-executing” clauses in “understandings or declarations” to the Convention against Torture, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. See United States Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations to Human Rights Treaties, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA LIBRARY, http://hrlibraryumn.edu/usdocs/usres.html [https://perma.cc/2L68-6R4F]. Some commentators question whether including a non-self-executing clause in a reservation, understanding, and declaration document should have any legal effect given the command of the Supremacy Clause that ‘all treaties’ are the supreme law of the land. See, e.g., Jordan Paust, Avoiding “Fraudulent” Executive Policy: Analysis of Non-Self-Execution of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 1257, 1264–68 (1993) (detailing the legal and policy rationale for finding these clauses to be without legal effect). Because there is no such clause in the Protocol, that issue is inapplicable here.

239. Special Message to the Senate Transmitting the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1 PUB. PAPERS 868 (Aug. 1, 1968); see also Vazquez, supra note 208, at 58 (quoting same language). The authors are indebted to Professor Vazquez for his deep and penetrating scholarship on these issues.
determining asylum claims filed by aliens who are physically present in the United States. *The substantive standard is not changed; asylum will continue to be granted only to those who qualify under the terms of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,* to which the United States acceded in November 1969. 240

Professor Carlos Manuel Vazquez further refutes that argument:

As the House Judiciary Committee Report states, and as the Supreme Court made clear in *Stevic,* this change [the Refugee Act of 1980] was made ‘for the sake of clarity.’ . . . The amendment to the statute, which removed the discretion that the statute appeared to give the Attorney General, could have “clarified” existing law only if Article 33 itself served to limit the discretion that the Attorney General enjoyed before accession to the Protocol. 241

Although *Stevic* concerns the non-refoulement obligation under Article 33 of the Convention, the same reasoning applies to Article 31 of the Convention. 242 Article 31 is equally definite, containing mandatory language and stated in the negative. 243 Because Article 31 as well as Article 33 is self-executing, and for all the reasons set forth above, federal courts should enjoin the Administration from prosecuting asylum-seekers who make out a *prima facie* asylum case and who satisfy Article 31 until their asylum claims are adjudicated. On the same basis, federal courts should enjoin the Administration from indefinitely detaining asylum-seekers who likewise make out a *prima facie* asylum case and who satisfy Article 31.

241. Vazquez, *supra* note 208, at 52. See also I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428 n.8 (1987) (emphasis added) (“While the Protocol constrained the Attorney General with respect to § 243(h) (withholding of deportation) between 1968 and 1980, the Protocol does not require the granting of asylum to anyone, and hence does not subject the Attorney General to a similar constraint with respect to his discretion under § 208(a).”).
242. Articles 3 and 4 of the Convention prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and national origin are likewise more than adequately definite.
243. For similar reasons, Article 3 of the Refugee Convention is likewise self-executing: “The Contracting States shall apply the provisions of this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin.” 1951 Refugee Convention, *supra* note 17, art. 3.
C. Interpreting Federal Statutes to Comply with International Refugee Law and International Human Rights Law

The Supreme Court has long held that international law is “part of our law.”244 Aside from directly enforcing the Refugee Convention, federal courts are generally obligated to interpret federal statutes to avoid violating international law. Chief Justice John Marshall declared in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy245 that a statute “ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”246 The American Law Institute’s Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States follows this canon: “Where fairly possible, courts in the United States construe federal statutes to avoid conflict with international law governing jurisdiction to prescribe.”247 Courts should find a later federal statute to supersede “an earlier rule of international law or a provision of an international agreement as law of the United States if the purpose of the act to supersede the earlier rule or provision is clear or if the act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly reconciled.”248

Here there is little, if any, evidence of a Congressional purpose for the illegal entry statute to supersede the Refugee Convention or the

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244. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) ("International law, in its widest and most comprehensive sense . . . is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice as often as such questions are presented in litigation . . . duly submitted to their determination."); see Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
245. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
246. Id.
247. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 406 (AM. LAW INST. 2018); see also Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 136 (2005) ("If . . . [the statute] were not to take conflicts with international law into account, it would lead to [an] anomalous result. . . . [that] Congress could not have intended. . . ."); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (applying this “maxim of statutory construction” to employment law on military bases); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Mineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21–22 (1963) (requiring clear congressional intent before sanctioning a potential conflict with international law); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 508–11 (1947) (distinguishing the ability for statutes to conflict with international law from the judicial assumption that they do not); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118–20 (1933) (appealing to this assumption when a statute’s legislative history makes no reference to a particular treaty).
Refugee Protocol. The undisputed purpose of the Refugee Act of 1980 was to bring U.S. law into harmony with international refugee law:

If one thing is clear from the legislative history of the new definition of ‘refugee,’ and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress’ primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees [and hence with the Refugee Convention of 1951]. . .

As discussed above, Article 31 of the Refugee Convention generally prohibits the criminal prosecution of refugees for illegal entry or presence. The current Justice Department has adopted a policy of criminally prosecuting for illegal entry virtually everyone suspected of crossing the border without inspection. The Justice Department and the Department of Homeland Security have done little to ensure that valid asylum-seekers are protected from such prosecutions. Consequently, the United States is violating this article of the Convention, and thereby transgressing an international law obligation.

The Refugee Convention does permit some initial administrative detention of bona fide asylum-seekers. However, the States Parties Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner of Refugees, charged with monitoring compliance with the Convention, notes detention’s limits:

Detention should normally be avoided. If necessary, detention may be resorted to only on grounds prescribed by law to verify identity; to determine the elements on which the claim to refugee status or asylum is based; to deal with cases where refugees or asylum-seekers have destroyed their travel and/or identity documents or have used fraudulent documents in order to mislead the authorities of the State in which they intend to claim asylum; or to protect national security or public order. . .

251. See supra notes 34–50 and accompanying text.
252. Id.
There is considerable authority for the proposition, however, that prolonged administrative detention of refugees and *bona fide* asylum-seekers violates international law.254

Nothing in the legislative history of the criminal statute penalizing illegal entry suggests that either the Congress or the President were made aware that prosecuting refugees for illegal entry or presence in the United States violated international law.255 Nothing in the Congressional Record, Committee Reports, or other evidence of legislative history shows that Congress intended to abrogate Article 31 of the Refugee Protocol. Absent clear congressional intention to abrogate an international law obligation, a court should “fairly reconcile” the treaty and the congressional statute to construe them as consistent with one another to the extent possible.256 Thus, federal courts should dismiss *without prejudice* any charges against asylum-seekers who have passed fair credible fear interviews—that is, asylum-seekers who have demonstrated a *prima facie* case of asylum eligibility, for example with a finding of credible fear. Should the asylum-seeker ultimately be unsuccessful in the pursuit of asylum, then the criminal charges can be reinstated against him or her.257


254. *See, e.g.*, Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, supra note 129, ¶¶ 25–28 (emphasizing the compounding effect of unnecessary, disproportionate, and prolonged detention). Aside from detention itself are the exacerbating factors of conditions in detention, deliberate family separation, and interference with the right to counsel.


257. That is not to say the criminal prosecution of first-time unauthorized entrants is either necessary or fair. The United States had more than a century of open borders. Criminal prosecution of immigrants entering illegally was only adopted in 1929. *See* Kelly Lytle Hernandez, *How Crossing the US-Mexico Border Became a Crime*, CONVERSATION (Apr. 30, 2017), http://theconversation.com/how-crossing-the-us-mexico-border-became-a-crime-74604 [https://perma.cc/4H6S-8ADK]. Hernandez further notes:
In any event, criminal prosecution of migrants for “improper entry,” whether they are eligible or ineligible for asylum, is generally neither necessary nor compatible with international human rights law. Immigration into the United States was essentially unrestricted until 1875. Prosecution of individuals for what is largely a status offense is disfavored and often unconstitutional. Before the current Administration, few first-time unauthorized entrants were ever prosecuted for such entry. Prosecuting individuals who are fleeing persecution not only violates international law, but also elemental justice.

CONCLUSION

In the past two decades, a series of cataclysmic events has created a “perfect storm” resulting in social and economic upheaval that has led millions of people to cross international borders. These events include the 9/11 attacks, the widespread incidence of insurgencies, terrorist occupation and devastation of societies, and the emergence of brutal, corrupt, autocratic dictatorships, often theocratic or grounded in ethnic division. Violent conflict and outright civil and transnational wars have broken out in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Yemen, the Philippines, Kashmir, Ukraine and the Crimea, Myanmar, Haiti, Sudan and South Sudan, Somalia and Somaliland, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Colombia, and now Venezuela and

It was not always a crime to enter the United States without authorization. In fact, for most of American history, immigrants could enter the United States without official permission and not fear criminal prosecution by the federal government. . . . With few exceptions, prosecutions for unlawful entry and reentry remained low until 2005. . . . By 2015, prosecutions for unlawful entry and reentry accounted for 49 percent of all federal prosecutions and the federal government had spent at least U.S. $7 billion to lock up unlawful border crossers.

Id.


259. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (prosecution of defendant for “being an addict” violates due process and the Eighth Amendment). Here, the noncitizen is essentially prosecuted for “being a foreigner” and entering the United States without being inspected.
perhaps Brazil. Financial insecurity has spread throughout the international community with the devastating worldwide economic recession/depression of 2008, the revolutionary technological advances in communication and resulting digitization and robotic automation of the workplace and world economies displacing hundreds of thousands, if not millions of workers; climate change pushing multitudes in the Global South from ruined farms and villages; and the rise of civil strife in many other parts of the world, but again especially in the Global South. In many receiving countries, this perfect storm has simultaneously fueled virulently intense hostility, often tinged with violence, toward immigrants, even between communities that have peacefully cohabited for generations.260

Instead of standing as a bulwark against these pressures, which ultimately amount to fearing and blaming the foreigner—the “other”—the United States has not merely given into them but has exacerbated and exploited them for political gain. Since the end of World War II, the United States has generally seen itself as the undisputed world leader in human rights, known, among other things, for one of the most generous refugee programs in the world. A “Nation of Immigrants,” as this country has boasted for at least a century (until last year when USCIS removed that sobriquet from its Mission Statement),261 the United States has taken full advantage of the


USCIS secures America’s promise as a nation of immigrants by providing accurate and useful information to our customers, granting immigration and citizenship benefits, promoting an
remarkable contributions of successive waves of newcomers who continually reinvigorate both our economy and our democracy. The current Administration has turned its back on these ideals, using its vast discretionary power over immigrants to harshly enforce and often violate our immigration laws, undermining American values and staining our country’s international reputation.

Federal courts, however, have both the authority and the responsibility to enforce the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Refugee Protocol as well as international human rights norms to protect asylum-seekers from criminal prosecution and from prolonged immigration detention. The Framers of the United States Constitution and its key amendments envisioned that federal courts would apply treaties as the rule of decision to protect foreigners and would serve as a check on an Executive that tramples on individual rights, particularly the rights of a vulnerable minority. To fulfill their constitutional obligations, federal courts must live up to that vision and stand up against a rogue Administration tilting towards authoritarianism and willfully disregarding the rule of law—both domestic and international.