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Property's Boundaries

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PROPERTY'S BOUNDARIES

James Toomey*

Property law has a boundary problem. Courts are routinely called upon to decide whether certain kinds of things can be owned—cells, genes, organs, gametes, embryos, corpses, personal data, and more. Under prevailing contemporary theories of property law, questions like these have no justiciable answers. Because property has no conceptual essence, they maintain, its boundaries are arbitrary—a flexible normative choice more properly legislative than judicial.

This Article instead offers a straightforward descriptive theory of property's boundaries. The common law of property is legitimated by its basis in the concept of ownership, a descriptive relationship of absolute control that exists outside of the law. Ownership's limits thus lie at the limits of absolute control—that which cannot in principle be the subject of human dominion cannot be owned. In short, this Article both offers a comprehensive explanation for why a conceptual theory of property's limits matters and how one can be possible, and defends a substantive theory of the concept of ownership as control.

Under this theory, cells, organs, gametes, embryos, and corpses can be owned. But information—like genes and personal data—that cannot be controlled cannot be owned. Viewed through this lens, intellectual property—a challenge for any theory of property that appears to entail ownership in information—can be understood either as a statutory analogy or a rough approximation of the real but temporary control of information exercised by those who create or discover it.

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 132
I. PROPERTY'S BOUNDARIES AND CONTEMPORARY THEORY ........ 138
II. EXTRA-LEGAL CONCEPTS .......................................................... 144
   A. Concepts and the Common Law.................................................. 145
   B. The Ontological Status of Concepts ........................................... 154
      1. Ownership as Metaphysically Real ........................................ 154

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INTRODUCTION

In October 2021, the estate of Henrietta Lacks sued Thermo Fisher Scientific. The underlying facts are by now well-known. On February 5, 1951, Ms. Lacks sought treatment for cervical cancer at Johns Hopkins Hospital. In the course of her treatment, physicians removed, without her consent, a portion of her tumor for research. The cells were found to have a stunning quality—they reproduced indefinitely outside the human body. For the first time, scientists could conduct research on mass-produced human cells. This cell-line, known as “HeLa” after its source, underwrote the biotechnology revolution and the immeasurable profits of companies—including Thermo Fisher—that have intellectual property in HeLa cells. But Ms. Lacks, who died shortly after the operation, never knew any of this, and her family has never legally owned any part of the

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3 Lacks Complaint, supra note 1, at 2.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 3.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 3–4.
HeLa cell line. This, the Lacks family’s complaint alleges, was “theft”—
“this genetic material was stolen from Ms. Lacks.”

The plaintiffs face an uphill battle convincing the court that Lacks’s
doctors stole her cells. In the famous case *Moore v. Regents of the
University of California*, the Supreme Court of California rejected a
similar claim for conversion by a plaintiff whose spleen was used for
research without his consent. The court observed the law “deal[s] with
human biological materials as objects sui generis,” not subject to the
“general law of personal property.”

But why? After all, many people (maybe most) feel that they own their
cells and genetic material, and that Henrietta Lacks owned hers. Others
disagree. Debates in the public sphere like this—about the boundaries
of property law, about whether a kind of thing can be owned—are hardly
limited to Henrietta Lacks and immortal cell lines. Indeed, we debate and

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8 Id. at 12. Although rhetorically describing the incident as “theft,” the complaint sounds in
unjust enrichment. Id. at 12–13. Unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy whereby a plaintiff
is entitled to the gains of a defendant “enriched by misconduct and who acts . . . with
knowledge of the underlying wrong.” Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment § 51(3) (Am. L. Inst. 2011). It seems that the plaintiffs have three distinct theories
of the underlying “wrong”—(1) “theft,” Lacks Complaint, supra note 1, at 12; (2) “assault,”
id. at 5; and (3) violation of privacy, id. at 4. This Article only touches on the legal plausibility
of the first—whether or not a claim for unjust enrichment on the basis of conversion is
plausible. Lacks’s claim based on assault or violation of privacy remains independently
plausible.


10 Id. (“[T]he laws governing such things as human tissues, transplantable organs, blood,
fetuses, pituitary glands, corneal tissue, and dead bodies deal with human biological materials
as objects sui generis, regulating their disposition to achieve policy goals rather than
abandoning them to the general law of personal property.” (footnotes omitted)).

11 See, e.g., Barbara J. Evans, Barbarians at the Gate: Consumer-Driven Health Data
(revealing that in a 2014 survey on personal health data, only thirteen percent of respondents
were agnostic to the question of ownership).

12 See, e.g., Henry H. Heng, HeLa Genome Versus Donor’s Genome, 501 Nature 167, 167
(2013) (“I contend that the continual divergence of chromosomal features (‘karyotype’) and
DNA sequence in dynamic cancer-cell populations undermines debate over ownership of the
HeLa cancer-cell line derived from Henrietta Lacks six decades ago.”).
litigate the ownership of organs, tissue samples, genetic information, gametes and embryos, corpses, digital data, and much more. These debates arise whenever value is discovered within—or technology makes it possible to capture value in—something new.

Courts presented with these kinds of questions need a theory of property’s boundaries. But they would search largely in vain for one in contemporary property theory. Indeed, conventional legal wisdom has it that there are no conceptual answers to what can be owned. Instead, the

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13 See, e.g., B. Björkman & S.O. Hansson, Bodily Rights and Property Rights, 32 J. Med. Ethics 209, 209 (2006) (“An underlying issue in these discussions is whether various types of biological material can be owned.”).

14 See, e.g., Shannon Cunningham, Kieran C. O’Doherty, Karine Sénécal, David Secko & Denise Avard, Public Concerns Regarding the Storage and Secondary Uses of Residual Newborn Bloodspots: An Analysis of Print Media, Legal Cases, and Public Engagement Activities, 6 J. Cmty. Genetics 117, 124 (2015) (“Across the public engagement activities we reviewed, numerous participants stated that parents have a right to retain ownership of their child’s blood samples and control over who has access to the specimens.”).

15 See, e.g., Jon F. Merz & Mildred K. Cho, What Are Gene Patents and Why Are People Worried About Them?, 8 Cmty. Genetics 203, 203 (2005) (noting that “[n]umerous ethical concerns have been raised about the effects of [gene] patents on clinical medical practice as well as on research and development,” although “[n]early 30,000 human genes have been patented in the US”).

16 See, e.g., Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 359, 414 (2000) (“Courts appear utterly confused as to how to classify these objects, characterizing sperm and embryos variously as property, quasi-property, or not the subject of property rights at all but governed instead by precepts of privacy.”); see also Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 850 (1993) (holding that a decedent “had an interest, in the nature of ownership,” permitting sperm to be bequeathed); David Horton, Indescendibility, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 543, 580–81 (2014) (discussing the extent to which Hecht supports the existence of property rights in sperm).


18 See, e.g., David A. Dana & Nadav Shoked, Property’s Edges, 60 B.C. L. Rev. 753, 761 (2019) (“[O]ver the past few months, popular and legislative disputes over privacy on the Internet and the allocation of rights to information between users, websites, and providers[] have likewise extensively employed—somewhat thoughtlessly—the boundary-focused terms supposedly derived from traditional property law.”).

19 See, e.g., Meredith M. Render, The Law of the Body, 62 Emory L.J. 549, 569 (2013) [hereinafter Render, The Law of the Body] (noting that “when conditions are ripe—when we discover something new (or something that is useful in a new way) that is also ‘ownable’—our concept of property bends to accommodate the new entity”); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 531, 563 (2005) (“As society changes, the value derived from different assets is transformed, and therefore the objects of property law will change over time.”).

20 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1089–93 (1972) (arguing that society chooses to protect entitlements with “property rules” or “liability rules” in order
law of property is widely understood to be an arbitrary "bundle of sticks"—a collection of rights and responsibilities designed to achieve exogenous social goals, not a coherent concept with determinable boundaries. From this perspective, the question of what can be owned is a normative one. It is necessarily coterminous with questions about what should be owned, who should own what, and how ownership ought to be regulated.

In our system of popular sovereignty and separation of powers, these questions are inappropriate for judicial resolution. If the conventional legal wisdom is correct, we would need to adopt by statute a code of property's boundaries.

This Article, in contrast, argues that the concept of ownership—which exists outside the law and from which the common law of property derives its legitimacy—offers a descriptive, properly judicial theory of the boundaries of property law. Ownership is a relationship characterized by absolute control, and it cannot exist where a person could not in principle exercise absolute control over something. This means that ownership can properly apply to anything over which control can in principle be exercised, but not to those things that it cannot be.

This distinction illuminates many public and legal controversies about ownership. On the one hand, because it can be subject to absolute control, human biological matter—from organs and corpses to cells and embryos—can be owned. We control, and therefore own, our bodies and their constituents. On the other hand, information that is in principle accessible to anyone and cannot be manipulated cannot be owned. This means that human genetic information and personal data are not ownable.

In cases such as Lacks's, the theory tells us that when Ms. Lacks walked to maximize welfare); Jessica L. Roberts, Progressive Genetic Ownership, 93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1105, 1159–60 (2018) (arguing that the state should recognize individual ownership of genetic information because doing so would maximize human flourishing under Roberts's pluralistic theory of human flourishing).

See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1015, 1015 (2008) (“As any first-year student knows, modern theorists have savaged the idea of ‘absolute dominion’ and tend, instead, to view property as a ‘bundle of rights,’ . . . .”).

Cf. J.E. Penner, The Idea of Property in Law 106 (paperback ed. 2000) (“For most philosophers, the actual objects of property are uninteresting, and the real meat of the question about property is how we can justify unequal holdings.”).

See infra Section II.A.

See infra Section III.A.

See infra Part IV.

See infra Section IV.A.

See infra Section IV.B.
into the clinic for treatment, she owned the cells of her tumor. But that is of course not really what her claim of theft is about. It’s the HeLa cell line—not Lacks’s cancer cells—from which the biotechnology companies have profited. HeLa is not metaphysically identical to Lacks’s cancer cells—what they share is genetic information. Because information, genetic or otherwise, cannot be owned, Lacks’s estate has never owned the HeLa line.

The theory of property’s boundaries offered in this Article is descriptive, not normative. It is a theory of the entailments of ownership as the concept actually exists outside the law, not a claim about whether the outcomes it suggests are good or bad, or whether we ought to have a common law of property organized around the concept of ownership in the first place. As such, the theory is entirely compatible with the possibility that people like Ms. Lacks have remedies in other areas of law—privacy, informed consent, or intentional torts, most prominently. Indeed, it is also entirely legitimate for legislatures to codify structures analogous to ownership by statute (as discussed below, this is one way to understand intellectual property). But this theory tells us the boundaries of the judge-made law of property—so long as judges ground their decisions on the concept of ownership, they might get it wrong, but they do not act illegitimately. And this matters because, for better or worse, courts are in fact regularly called upon to adjudicate whether something can be owned.

28 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Property: Principles and Policies 57 (3d ed. 2017) (“[A]mong the ways that ownership can get started is for someone to possess a thing for the first time with the requisite intent.”).
29 At least, it’s not what the rhetoric of the lawsuit is about. It is in fact possible to have a claim for unjust enrichment even if the only thing Lacks owned were her cells ab initio, as the derivation of the metaphysically distinct HeLa cell line may have been premised on the underlying wrong.
30 See generally Heng, supra note 12.
31 Indeed, in Moore, the court held that Moore had stated a claim for breach of informed consent after dismissing Moore’s claim for conversion. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 497 (Cal. 1990).
32 See infra Section IV.C.
33 See, e.g., Lacks Complaint, supra note 1, at 13; Moore, 793 P.2d at 488–89; Wash. Univ. v. Catalonia, 490 F.3d 667, 670 (8th Cir. 2007); Greenberg v. Mia. Child.’s Hosp. Rsch. Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1074 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (holding that individuals with Canavan disease did not have an ownership interest in the gene that causes Canavan disease isolated from their tissue samples); Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 517–18 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (resolving a dispute of ownership between ex-boyfriend and ex-girlfriend over embryos they had jointly created).
This Article builds on growing scholarly criticism of the "bundle of sticks" model of property. Indeed, although that model remains predominate, the view of property law as essentially arbitrary and normative has come under sustained attack over the past several decades. Moreover, some scholars have outlined conceptual theories of property's boundaries analogous to this Article's, although they offer different views of the concept's substance. Building within this intellectual movement, this Article offers a comprehensive explanation for why a conceptual theory of property's boundaries matters and how it is possible. Further, it defends a substantive theory of the concept of ownership as control—and ownership's boundaries at the boundaries of control—as opposed to the alternatives.

The argument proceeds in four Parts. In Part I, I canvass the development of contemporary property theory and illustrate the extent to which still-prevailing theories conflate theories about what can be owned with what should be, rendering questions about the boundaries of property fundamentally legislative.


36 See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Property as Control: The Case of Information, 18 Mich. Telecomms. & Tech. L. Rev. 367, 384 (2012) (noting that “the bundle-of-rights metaphor has been under particularly heavy weather recently”); see also Shane Nicholas Glackin, Back to Bundles: Deflating Property Rights, Again, 20 Legal Theory 1, 1 (2014) (“My aim in this paper may, at first glance, strike the reader as somewhat odd. It is a defense of a theory of property rights that after all has been prevalent among legal theorists for most of the last century and that is taught as a matter of routine in most undergraduate property-law courses in order ‘to disabuse entering law students of their primitive lay notions regarding ownership.’”).

37 See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 Neb. L. Rev. 730, 753 (1998) [hereinafter Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude] (arguing that the essence of property is exclusion); Arthur Ripstein, Possession and Use, in Philosophical Foundations of Property Law 156, 156 (James Penner & Henry E. Smith eds., 2013) (same for “exclusive use”); Penner, supra note 22, at 111 (arguing that “separability” delimits the boundaries of the concept of property); John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 185 (The Legal Classic Libr. 1994) (1690) (arguing that labor is the essence of property); Bart J. Wilson, The Property Species: Mine, Yours, and the Human Mind 19 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1093/osoj/9780190936785.003.0001 [https://perma.cc/PX8D-CW8B] (arguing that an irreducible concept of “mine” organizes property law).

38 See infra Part II.

39 See infra Part III.
In Part II, I lay the groundwork for a conceptual theory of property’s boundaries by explaining why such a theory matters and how it could be possible. In short, the extra-legal existence of concepts relied on by the common law legitimates common law law-making consistent with democratic theory, and the concept of ownership could exist metaphysically, psychologically, or socially.

In Part III, I outline a theory of property law as grounded in an extra-legal concept of ownership understood as absolute control. I argue that ownership—absolute control—is a determinate category. And I situate ownership as control in relation to other conceptual theories of property and show how it fares better at explaining the concept.

Finally, in Part IV, I apply this theory to some contemporary boundary challenges in property law, bioethics, and law and technology. I find that, under the theory, such things as organs, gametes, tissue samples, organisms, and corpses fall within property’s conceptual domain. In contrast, genetic information, gene sequences, information derived from tissue samples, and personal data cannot conceptually be subject to property law. Moreover, I apply the theory to the most challenging case recognized in positive law at the boundaries of ownership—intellectual property—and find that it fares plausibly, if roughly.

I. PROPERTY’S BOUNDARIES AND CONTEMPORARY THEORY

Any thorough property regime must answer at least four distinct questions: (1) what can be owned; (2) what should be owned; (3) who should own what; and (4) how ownership ought to be governed. The latter three questions are normative—policy questions that legislatures can and do decide on in the main.40 The first question is different. It at least purports to be descriptive, analytical, conceptual, and answerable a priori. It is a question upon which we regularly call courts, employing common law reasoning, to answer.41 Most contemporary theories of property, however, hold that the apparently descriptive nature of the question of

40 The prohibition on owning land in Antarctica, for example, established by international treaty, is an example of legislation on what should be owned. See Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution, and the Macroeconomic Analysis of Law, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2001) (observing that “no private entity 'owns' Antarctica,” while acknowledging that it is conceptually possible). The so-called “law of find” and property taxes are examples of the final two normative questions of property governance. See, e.g., 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property § 25 (2022) (describing the law of find).
41 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
what can be owned is a façade. Instead, they conflate the question of what can be owned with questions about what should be owned, by whom, and how.

This Part situates contemporary property theory and illustrates the extent to which it predominately does not take seriously the possibility that the boundaries of ownership might exist as something other than a policy judgment, by discussing the intellectual origins of current theories in the Legal Realist response to the natural law theories of the nineteenth century. As discussed in the next Part, if these theories are right, the question of property’s boundaries is fundamentally legislative.

The story of contemporary property theories begins, like many others, in the natural law theories of the nineteenth century. Under these theories, law and legal concepts were thought to be an essential moral feature of the universe, and basic legal categories such as “intent,” “malice,” or “meeting of the minds” were thought to both exist outside of our minds and be of inherent normative significance—typically understood to have been ordained by a benevolent God. In deciding cases and laying down legal rules, judges were thought to be discovering profound ethical truths, not making up positive law; if a judge could deduce from reason the boundaries of a basic legal concept, he would have come upon a deep moral truth about the universe. Nineteenth century natural law theory, then, makes two distinct claims: (1) basic legal concepts exist; and (2) those basic legal concepts are normatively significant.

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42 See, e.g., Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind: An Interpretation of American Thought and Character Since the 1880’s, at 367 (1950) (“According to the philosophy of natural law, laws are discovered, not made. They are deduced from the nature of things rather than patterned on the needs of man.”); see also Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870–1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 17 (paperback ed. 1994) (“Nineteenth-century legal thought was overwhelmingly dominated by categorical thinking—by clear, distinct, bright-line classifications of legal phenomena.”).

43 See Commager, supra note 42, at 367; see also Morton J. Horwitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental Conception of American Law, 1780–1820, in 5 Perspectives in American History 287, 297–98 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971) (summarizing Founding-era treatises arguing that law is discovered rather than made); see also William M. Wiecek, Liberty Under Law: The Supreme Court in American Life 187 (1988) (“Formalist judges . . . assumed that law was objective, unchanging, extrinsic to the social climate, and, above all, different from and superior to politics.”).

44 See, e.g., Ian McLeod, Legal Theory 18 (6th ed. 2012) (“In the context of legal theory . . . natural law theories may be labelled normative, because they deal with what law ought to be . . . ”); cf. also Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 2424, 2425 (1992) [hereinafter Moore, Moral Reality Revisited] (defining natural law theory as having two theses: “(1) there are objective moral truths; and (2) the truth of any legal
The Legal Realist movement of the early twentieth century positioned itself directly in opposition to the metaphysical and ethical confidence of natural law. Though a heterogeneous theoretical movement, the Legal Realists were united by a thoroughgoing skepticism of the reality and moral relevance of legal concepts—they were philosophical nominalists about the law.\(^4^5\) From this perspective, judges deciding cases have a panoply of rules from which to choose, their choice of which is subject to criticism on normative, but not conceptual, grounds.\(^4^6\)

As for property, the Realists drew from Jeremy Bentham’s view that “[p]roperty and law are born together, and die together”\(^4^7\) to argue that “property” did not refer to a relationship that existed outside of the law, but was an arbitrary “bundle of rights” the law recognized “owners” had against others and that was designed by judges to achieve other social ends.\(^4^8\) Having “de-naturalized” property, progressive Legal Realists were able to argue that the legal regime of property that the common law had designed was not appropriately maximizing welfare as it ought to be, and that legal reforms, primarily in the legislature, should therefore reorganize the bundle to better achieve those goals.\(^4^9\)

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\(^4^5\) See generally, e.g., Michael S. Moore, The Need for a Theory of Legal Theories: Assessing Pragmatic Instrumentalism, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 988 (1984) (summarizing prominent Legal Realists and outlining their view that determinate legal categories did not exist or were not of ethical significance). See also Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222 (1931) (discussing the project of Legal Realism); Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (6th ed. 1949); Horwitz, supra note 42, at 170 (“Perhaps the most significant difference between Realism and its pre-war reformist predecessors can be expressed in terms of skepticism about reason and morality.”). But see Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 731, 735–38 (2009) (describing controversies within Legal Realism and contemporaneous resistance to its theoretical unity).

\(^4^6\) See, e.g., Felix Cohen, The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 41 Yale L.J. 201, 216 (1931).


\(^4^8\) See, e.g., Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Professor of L., Yale Univ., A Vital School of Jurisprudence and Law: Have American Universities Awakened to the Enlarged Opportunities and Responsibilities of the Present Day?, Address Delivered Before the Association of American Law Schools at Its Annual Meeting in Chicago 36–37 (Dec. 28–30, 1914) (transcript available in the Harvard Law School Library); see also Dana & Shoked, supra note 18, at 763–64 (“The precise origins of the ‘bundle of rights’ metaphor are unclear, but it nicely conveys the core realist tenet: ‘property’ is a hollow, formalistic concept of no practical usefulness.”).

\(^4^9\) See Hohfeld, supra note 48, at 1 (situating the Legal Realist project in Woodrow Wilson’s call for a “radical reconstruction” of American society); see also Horwitz, supra note 42, at
Thus, Legal Realist theories of property make two essential and distinct claims—the flipside of the basic claims of natural law. The first is the descriptive claim that there is no extra-legal reality to legal concepts; property is an arbitrary bundle of rights in positive law. This move conflates the question of what can be owned with its analytically subsequent normative questions—if there is no concept of ownership outside the law, reasoning about property law is just normative reasoning. The second essential claim of Legal Realism is that the particular bundle of property rights designed by common law judges happened to be normatively suboptimal.

The heyday of classical Legal Realism has long since come and passed, but we still live in the theoretical world Realism built. As Professor Joseph Singer has observed, “All major current schools of [legal] thought are, in significant ways, products of legal realism.” It is by now a well-worn cliché to remark that “we are all legal realists now.” And although there are proliferating contemporary theories of property, they for the most part accept the first, descriptive thesis of Realism—that ownership is not an extra-legal concept with determinable boundaries and

152, 155–56 (discussing the role of Hohfeld’s normative commitments in his critique of the conceptual analysis of property law); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 Yale L.J. 357, 365 (2001) (“[T]he motivation behind the realists’ fascination with the bundle-of-rights conception was mainly political. They sought to undermine the notion that property is a natural right, and thereby smooth the way for activist state intervention in regulating and redistributing property.”).


52 Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 465, 467 (1988) (reviewing Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale: 1927–1960 (1986)); see also Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 267, 267 (1997) (observing “the enormous influence Legal Realism has exercised upon American law and legal education over the last sixty years, and considering, too, as the cliché has it, that ‘we are all realists now’”).

53 Singer, supra note 52, at 467.

entailments. Thus, these theories similarly conflate questions about what can be owned with what should be, who should own it, and how. The variation in contemporary theories is largely limited to disagreement on Realism’s second thesis—the extent to which the property law we have has maximized the good and how to measure it.

For instance, law and economics theories of property—the most influential set of theories in the legal academy since the decline of Realism—accept that property is a conceptually arbitrary bundle of rights granted by the state to maximize exogenous social goals. Where law and economics theories depart from classical Legal Realism is in the extent to which they argue that the common law of property has more or less already optimized welfare. Similarly, another prevailing contemporary theory of property law—the Progressive Property school championed by Gregory Alexander, Eduardo Peñalver, and others—agrees with Legal Realism and law and economics that the boundaries of property are arbitrary, but disagrees about the appropriate normative framework property law is designed to optimize, offering instead a “pluralistic,” more communitarian theory of the good.

Property theory is, however, in flux, and the metaphor of property as an arbitrary bundle of sticks has come under sustained criticism. But for

55 See, e.g., Render, The Law of the Body, supra note 19, at 558 (describing as “relatively uncontroversial” the notion that “‘ownership’ is not a single thing but is instead a collection of severable incidents (or powers) that can be divided between and among several ‘owners’”); Baron, supra note 36, at 384, 417 (describing the principle, derived from the bundle theory, that property is ultimately arbitrary “not particularly controversial” because “[n]o legal category can define itself”); Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, supra note 37, at 738 (“Today, the nominalist conception is more-or-less the orthodox understanding of property within the American legal community.”).

56 See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 44 (1960); Render, supra note 54, at 439 (acknowledging the argument from law and economics that “property (or ‘ownership’) is nothing more than a series of in personam legal obligations—in other words, a subset of contracts”).

57 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 745, 774 (2009) (critiquing traditional law and economics property theories for reliance on a narrow and inadequate utilitarianism); see also Roberts, supra note 20, at 1113 (“[N]eoclassical law and economics, like all utilitarian theories, evaluates particular outcomes in terms of a single metric: ‘welfare.’”); Brian Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy 95–96 (2007) (arguing that law and economics is a continuation of the basic project of Legal Realism).

58 See Alexander, supra note 57, at 750; Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 821, 822 (2009).

59 See, e.g., Dana & Shoked, supra note 18, at 760 (“The past few decades have witnessed an explosion of sophisticated work on property law theory.”); Smith, supra note 34, at 1695
the most part, these newer theories are limited to arguing that the arrangement of the sticks in the bundle is not arbitrary from a policy perspective, rather than that there is an extra-legal reality to the concept of ownership.\(^6\) (A cluster of bona fide-ly conceptual recent theories of property are discussed at greater length below.) For instance, Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith seek to return theorizing about property to our basic relationship with "things," characterizing property as the "law of things."\(^6\) But Merrill and Smith accept with Realism that property's boundaries are arbitrary in pursuit of exogenous normative goals—in their view, property law defines what "things" are in the first place, to which extending property protections is socially beneficial.\(^6\) Indeed, ultimately, they view the in rem nature of property law as a shortcut designed to maximize social utility while minimizing information costs, making the boundaries of property a policy question, as it is under Realist theories.\(^6\)

(criticizing the bundle theory for embracing "a basic ambiguity: it is both an analytical device and a family of theories of property that elevate that analytic device to a central place"); Baron, supra note 36, at 384 ("[T]he bundle-of-rights metaphor . . . has been under particularly heavy weather recently . . . .''); see also Glackin, supra note 36, at 2 ("Among contemporary theorists, the previous orthodoxy is under siege, with a substantial faction now holding that the so-called 'bundle theory' of property rights is no longer tenable and that a robust relation of ownership of things can and should be reestablished.").

60 See, e.g., Ripstein, supra note 37, at 163–69 (noting that, under Smith's theory, "if there were no information costs, the law of property would work pretty much the way that the realists say that it does"); see also Eric R. Claeys, Property 101: Is Property a Thing or a Bundle?, 32 Seattle U. L. Rev. 617, 623 (2009) [hereinafter Claeys, Property 101] (reviewing Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Property: Principles and Policies (2007)) ("Merrill and Smith aim not at the bundle metaphor pure and simple, but rather at the ad hoc bundle conception of property."). But see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1849, 1851 (2007) ("[I]f the core of property law must rest on a simple foundation of everyday morality, property is unlikely to be wholly the creature of law. If we are right about the necessary connection between property and morality, then Bentham is almost certainly wrong that property arises wholly from law.").

61 See infra Section III.B.


63 See Smith, supra note 34, at 1703, 1725 ("A fundamental question is how to classify 'things,' and, hence, which aspects of 'things' are the most basic units of property law. . . . Property law is a modular system. It helps define what a thing is in the first place and why we should care."); see also Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1719, 1791–93 (2004) (discussing how the culture and law and define the creation of a thing).

64 Smith, supra note 34, at 1693.
In short, contemporary property theory predominately accepts the Realist thesis that the question of what can be owned is coterminous with questions about what should be owned, by whom, and how. Judges looking for answers to questions before them about what can be owned are redirected to their own moral views. If correct, then, these theories pose a profound challenge to the legitimacy of the common law.

II. EXTRA-LEGAL CONCEPTS

Property law is the law of ownership. The boundaries of the concept of ownership thus delimit its domain—or at least the domain of adjudicative law. As I hope to show in the next Part, the essence of the concept of ownership is descriptive control, or absolute decision-making authority; and its limits lie at the limits of control. But before getting there, we must lay some essential groundwork establishing the significance of this claim and its plausibility.

To lay this groundwork, this Part does two things. First, I explain why legal concepts matter—why there are real stakes to whether a determinable concept of ownership exists, or the prevailing view is correct that it does not. In short, the extra-legal existence of basic legal concepts—including ownership—makes the project of judge-made private law compatible with democratic political theory. Next, I discuss how extra-legal concepts are possible. I suggest that there are three ways in which concepts can exist analytically prior to their incorporation into the law, each of which is equivalent from the perspective of legitimating the project of the common law—the concepts might be metaphysically real; they might be evolved heuristics of the human mind; or they might be extra-legal social constructions.

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65 See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 917, 917 (2010) ("Property is about the relationship of persons to things that can be owned and alienated . . ."); Dana & Shoked, supra note 18, at 757 ("That continuum [of property law] starts at a core of private ownership . . ."); Olivier Massin, The Metaphysics of Ownership: A Reinachian Account, 27 Axiomathes 577, 586 (2017) (arguing that property rights are "grounded in ownership"); see also Björkman & Hansson, supra note 13, at 209 ("For the purposes of the present article the words ‘property’ and ‘ownership’ will be treated as synonyms."); O. Lee Reed, What is “Property”? 41 Am. Bus. L.J. 459, 459 (2004) (describing a common view of “property” as coterminous with ownership).
A. Concepts and the Common Law

Why does anyone listen to judges? This can be owned, they say from time to time, and this other thing can’t be. At stake may be billions of dollars. Who is a judge to decide? We didn’t vote for them, at least not in the same way that we voted for our legislators. They didn’t hear everyone’s perspectives on what the answer should be; usually they’ve just heard from two people with a financial interest in the outcome. Perhaps “why does” anyone listen to judges is too sharp. After all, their decisions are backed by the state’s monopoly on violence. But why should anyone listen to judges in a democracy, where normative questions ought to be resolved by democratic processes, not aristocratic contemplation?

In the federal system, where there is no general common law, this question by now has a straightforward answer—courts are to serve as the “faithful agents” of the legislature. The theory is that unelected federal courts don’t make law; they interpret and apply it. Thus, the ultimate lawmaker is Congress, the democratically elected representatives of the people, who within constitutional parameters may legislate anything they would like to. The same basic idea maintains for federal constitutional

67 See id. at 516 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (noting that the plaintiff claimed that an immortal cell line derived from his cancer cells was worth $3 billion).
68 In political theory, this is referred to as the question of “normative legitimacy”—how a state or legal system is morally justified—as opposed to “descriptive legitimacy”—the extent to which people subjectively feel that they ought to follow a state’s pronouncements. See, e.g., Christopher S. Havasy, Relational Fairness in the Administrative State, 109 Va. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2023) (manuscript at 11–12), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4164125 [https://perma.cc/VN63-45UH] (distinguishing between normative and descriptive legitimacy).
69 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“There is no federal general common law.”).
70 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 5 (2001) (“In our constitutional system, it is widely assumed that federal judges must act as Congress’s faithful agents.”) (first citing Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 415 (1989); and then citing Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1295, 1313 (1990))); Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 109, 112 (2010) (“The view that federal courts function as the faithful agents of Congress is a conventional one.”).
71 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 70, at 5 (“[I]f Congress legislates within constitutional boundaries, the federal judge’s constitutional duty is to decode and follow its commands, particularly when they are clear.”).
72 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Faithful Agent, Integrative, and Welfarist Interpretation, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1565, 1575 (2010) (“[F]aithful agent interpretation is necessary in
interpretation—"we the people" agreed upon a written constitution (metaphorically, at least), and, in exercising judicial review, judges are supposed to police its boundaries.\textsuperscript{73}

This basic commitment to popular sovereignty is constitutionalized and enforced through the doctrines of separation of powers and legislative supremacy.\textsuperscript{74} Throughout American government, we distinguish "legislative" and "judicial" powers from one another, the former of which makes law and the latter interprets and applies it, and situate these powers in distinct institutions—legislatures and judiciaries respectively.\textsuperscript{75} And indeed, regardless of the normative commitments to democracy that underlie our particular understanding of separation of powers, it's plausible that as a conceptual, definitional matter, the "legislative power" refers to the power to make law, and the "judicial power" to applying it in particular cases.\textsuperscript{76}

But this theory of the relationships between popular sovereignty and separation of powers cannot neatly be applied to state courts when they exercise their general common law powers.\textsuperscript{77} Nor to federal courts

\textsuperscript{73} See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void. This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is consequently to be considered, by this court, as one of the fundamental principles of our society.").

\textsuperscript{74} See, e.g., Michael Sant'Ambrogio, Standing in the Shadow of Popular Sovereignty, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 1869, 1891 (2015) ("The primary institutional mechanism of American popular sovereignty was separation of powers."); see also Christiane C. Wendehorst, The State as a Foundation of Private Law Reasoning, 56 Am. J. Compar. L. 567, 577 (2008) ("Political consensus about law, which should, at least in Western countries, be rooted in democratic legitimation, is indispensable for a functioning set of rules of recognition.").

\textsuperscript{75} See, e.g., Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 904 (2018) ("To the legislative department has been committed the duty of making laws; to the executive the duty of executing them; and to the judiciary the duty of interpreting and applying them in cases properly brought before the courts." (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923))).

\textsuperscript{76} See, e.g., Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825) ("[T]he legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law."); see also, e.g., Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 905 ("[T]he legislative power is the power to make law . . ."); William Baude, Adjudication Outside Article III, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 1511, 1522 (2020) ("[T]he judicial power is the power to apply existing law to the parties before it.").

building the common law in the limited domains—such as maritime law—where they have that authority. In these domains—where most of the private law in the United States originates—judges are not interpreting any positive enactment agreed upon by a democratically elected body. Indeed, they are not interpreting any positive enactment—any textual source backed by a claim of popular sovereignty—at all. To our post-Realist eyes, it looks a hell-of-a-lot like judges adjudicating common law cases are, at bottom, making it up. And if they are, and the faithful agent theories of the judiciary are right that judicial decision making is compatible with democracy only insofar as judges enforce or interpret democratically agreed-upon laws, common law adjudication is an illegitimate enterprise. We would need to codify property, or decide to be comfortable with a crypto-aristocratic private law.
To be sure, state courts have several salient differences from federal courts that some have suggested mitigate this essential legitimacy problem in the common law. For one thing, most state judges are elected, at least to some extent. But this could not, on its own, legitimate judicial lawmaking. Indeed, separation of powers is as clear and as strict at the state level as it is at the federal level, if not more so—many states have explicit guarantees of the separation of powers in their constitutions, unlike the federal system. To the extent, then, that making law is “legislative” while resolving disputes about what it means is “judicial,” it is not clear why the method of appointment of judicial actors matters.

Moreover, state judges are almost nowhere elected like legislators are—in a plurality of states judges are appointed by the governor and reselected in unopposed retention elections. In some sense federal judges are democratically accountable too—they are appointed by elected branches and accountable to them by impeachment—but nobody seems to think this is sufficient to avoid the legitimacy problem of federal judicial lawmaking. And indeed, in ten states, judges are appointed by the executive just as they are in the federal system. At least for them and for the federal courts crafting maritime law, we need a theory for why anyone ought to pay attention.

therefore, codification was a necessary bulwark against what amounted to illegitimate judicial legislation.

See, e.g., Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts About State Constitutional Interpretation, 115 Pa. St. L. Rev. 837, 849 (2011) (“[I]t strikes me that the problem that has engendered the legitimacy debate—the fact that federal judges are not elected—simply does not apply to most state courts engaging in judicial review under their state constitutions.”).

See Pojanowski, supra note 77, at 524 (“[State courts] embrac[e] structural norms of separation of powers and legislative supremacy that are stricter than those contemplated by Madison.”); Nelson, supra note 81, at 25 (“American-style separation of powers is not confined to the federal government; state constitutions also separate judicial power from legislative power.”).


U.S. Const. art. II, §§ 2, 4.

See, e.g., John S. Kane, Refining Chevron—Restoring Judicial Review to Protect Religious Refugees, 60 Admin. L. Rev. 513, 562–63 (2008) (“When it comes to making the policy decision that lies at the end of any consideration of ‘technical’ data an agency marshals in its decisionmaking process, the court will face the ‘political accountability’ issue. Congress and the President are democratically elected. Federal judges are appointed, essentially for life.”).

Judicial Selection, supra note 87.
My theory is that some of what appears to be judicial lawmaking in traditional private law fields can be understood as the application of the entailments of extra-legal concepts that we have implicitly decided we want to govern the private law and delegated to judges to adjudicate. Thus understood, these domains of private law adjudication avoid both challenges based in democratic legitimacy and separation of powers. It is democratically legitimate because the relevant normative decision—whether to have a system of law that acknowledges private ownership, say—is made by the people, at least abstractly. And it is not a conceptual violation of the separation of powers because adjudication of the boundaries of these extra-legal concepts is meaningfully adjudicative as opposed to legislative.\footnote{See Nelson, supra note 81, at 13 (noting that to the extent that the common law adjudicates the boundaries of concepts external to the law “perhaps common-law decisionmaking is less analogous to legislation than to a species of interpretation”).}

In writing statutory law, legislatures can import extra-legal concepts—concepts that exist elsewhere in our social world and are analytically distinct from law—into the law. In these circumstances, courts are directed to interpret the boundaries of the concept outside of the law. And indeed, this is routine—it is what justifies the interpretive banality that terms not defined in the statute are given their ordinary meaning (read: when a concept is not created or refined by the law, look to its existence outside of it).\footnote{See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1140 (2018) (noting that where a term is not defined in a statute, it is given its ordinary meaning and looking to an English dictionary to find that meaning).} When a criminal statute prescribes sentences in “years,” courts look to the concept of a year in its extra-legal sense; when the tax code prescribes mathematical procedures for calculating liability, courts rely on the generally extant concepts of numbers, multiplication and division.

Much—far from all, but much—of the common law can be understood and justified in a similar way. The basic common law fields are built on extra-legal concepts—ownership, agreement, obligation—that we have implicitly agreed to build a private law upon.\footnote{See, e.g., Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 65, at 952 (discussing the concepts underlying private common law legal fields and noting “we . . . recognize[e] that the concepts of wrong, duty, obligation, and right employed within tort law have roughly the same kind of normative force as they do when used outside of law”); see also Tomasz Bekrycht, The Question of Legitimizing Law in Adolf Reinach’s Phenomenology, 90 Folia Iuridica 63, 64–65 (2020) (observing that “[t]he philosophical process of legitimizing law has two characteristic cores,”} In adjudicating the
entailments of these concepts, courts act legitimately, judicially, and in accord with the general notion of popular sovereignty. It is, of course, true that no legislature has passed a statute explicitly saying "we will have a private law of property based on the concept of private ownership," nor to my knowledge has there ever been a plebiscite on that question. But popular endorsement of the basic normative principle that we ought to have a law of private property can be seen in a number of ways. For instance, all states have imported the English common law, which is based on the concept of private ownership. Moreover, the Federal Constitution—ratified at least metaphorically by the people—explicitly incorporates a concept of property that it procedurally shields from government intervention.

Obviously, it isn't the case that every principle of property law can be extrapolated as entailed in the concept of ownership. Indeed, probably the overwhelming bulk of it cannot be. But some of it can be, and that portion is within the legitimate domain of the judicial power, properly resolved by judges applying the common law method. Consider the distinction between the legal principle that if you waive a claim you may no longer enforce it and the Rule Against Perpetuities. The former everyone understands whether or not they have gone to law school. It simply inheres in the concept of a claim as it exists in the world that if you waive...

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95 See Nelson, supra note 81, at 28–30; Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 66, at 917 ("Property is about the relationship of persons to things that can be owned and alienated."); Dana & Shoked, supra note 18, at 757 ("Th[e] continuum [of property law] starts at a core of private ownership . . . .").

96 See U.S. Const. amend. V ("No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.").

97 Cf. Adolf Reinach, The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law 131 (John F. Crosby ed. & trans., 2012) (distinguishing complex structures in positive law from the intuitive entailments of basic legal concepts, such as the idea of waiving a claim); Merrill & Smith, supra note 60, at 1852 ("Beyond the core of property, the simple robust morality . . . gives way to more pragmatic situational morality.").

98 Reinach, supra note 97, at 131 ("But whoever promises to make a loan, whoever waives a claim, whoever appoints a representative, cannot expect anything else except that he acquires an obligation, that his claim is extinguished, and that he becomes entitled and obliged through the acts of the representative.").
it, it no longer exists.\textsuperscript{99} In contrast, the Rule Against Perpetuities is an obviously arbitrary, crude policy judgment.\textsuperscript{100} It was crafted by late-Medieval English judges in a power struggle with the landed aristocracy on the policy grounds that a society with alienable land not tied up in fee-tail-male forever would be a better one.\textsuperscript{101} Whether or not that judgment was right, this is not the kind of thing we want contemporary judges in our system of separation of powers and popular sovereignty doing. And indeed, the debate about the future of the Rule Against Perpetuities has shifted—properly—largely into state legislatures.\textsuperscript{102}

Finally, my account of the legitimacy of the common law may bear passing resemblance to two more traditional theories—natural law and the theory of the common law as the judicial implementation of custom. It is, however, importantly distinct from both. As discussed above, natural law theories hold that the law both normatively and descriptively inheres in a discoverable way in the structure of the universe.\textsuperscript{103} Like natural law theories, my claim is that some concepts that the private law relies upon exist outside of the law. But unlike natural law theories, I do not infer anything normative about the extra-legal existence of concepts—it is still a normative \textit{choice} to have a private law of property based in private ownership (as opposed to, say, based in something else, or nothing at all), and this choice is only legitimate insofar as it is ultimately situated in the people.\textsuperscript{104} That is, judges can legitimately litigate the boundaries of the

\textsuperscript{99} See id. at 5 ("That a claim lapses through being waived, is grounded in the essence of a claim as such and holds therefore necessarily and universally.").


\textsuperscript{101} Id. at 898–99.

\textsuperscript{102} Id. at 910–14 ("The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP) . . . prescribes a fixed wait-and-see period of 90 years. Under USRAP, all interests are valid for 90 years after creation . . . . At the end of 90 years, any interest that has not vested is reformed by the court so as to best carry out the intention of the long-dead settlor . . . . A variant of USRAP is in force in roughly half the states.").

\textsuperscript{103} See, e.g., Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, supra note 44, at 2425 (defining natural law theory as accepting “two essential theses: (1) there are objective moral truths; and (2) the truth of any legal proposition necessarily depends, at least in part, on the truth of some corresponding moral proposition(s”) ); Commager, supra note 42, at 367 ("According to the philosophy of natural law, laws are discovered, not made. They are deduced from the nature of things rather than patterned on the needs of man."); see also Horwitz, supra note 42, at 17 ("Nineteenth-century legal thought was overwhelmingly dominated by categorical thinking—by clear, distinct, bright-line classifications of legal phenomena.").

\textsuperscript{104} Cf., e.g., McLeod, supra note 44, at 18 ("In the context of legal theory, . . . natural law theories may be labelled \textit{normative}, because they deal with what law \textit{ought} to be . . . ."); see also Maria Golebiewska, Normativity of Prescriptions in Adolf Reinach’s Aprioristic Theory
concept of ownership, but they can’t decide that *we ought* to have a law of property based in ownership in the first place.

Another primary historical justification of the legitimacy of the common law is that common law judges implement extra-legal customs.105 This account is similar to mine in that it grounds the democratic legitimacy of the common law in its correspondence with widely accessible realities outside the law, and in popular acquiescence to legal application of those practices.106 But the precise locus that serves this legitimating function is importantly different—*customs* versus *concepts*. Customs are behavioral practices, and claims about them are sociological.107 Concepts, in contrast, are *ideas*.108 Reasoning about them is abstract and unempirical.109

This distinction has two important implications for the plausibility of my theory as compared to the custom theory. The first is that to the extent that the democratic legitimacy of the common law is derived from sociological claims rather than conceptual ones, it would be institutionally odd to situate it in the courts rather than in legislatures.110 And indeed,
one of the primary criticisms of the theory of the common law as custom is that courts are bad at or disingenuous about finding customs and that much of what they claimed was custom was not.111 Surely if the normative goal were to legalize custom, legislatures would be better at it.112

Second, reasoning from concepts permits courts to answer legal questions where there is no obvious behavioral practice that answers the question, or where looking to behavior is an odd fit. For instance, if the question in a case is whether waiver of a claim discharges it, it is not clear how a court could go about deciding the case on the basis of custom.113 Hear from experts who can tell us that in most instances of waiver, the person waiving no longer thinks they have a claim? Conduct an opinion poll and conclude that most people seem to think that if you say “don’t worry about it,” the other person is off the hook? It’s not entirely clear that there is a custom here at all that we could reference in answering this question, or what that means.114

In short, the extra-legal existence of the concepts that ground our basic legal categories matters because the construction of a common law on those foundations is only legitimate in our democracy characterized by separation of powers insofar as it litigates the boundaries and entailments of extra-legal concepts. And this understanding shows us why we should care about what the boundaries of the concept of ownership are—because to the extent we would like to extend property-like protections to things

Pojanowski, supra note 77, at 512 (“State courts share many of the institutional infirmities that lead textualists to disfavor courts’ interpretive policy making. Like federal courts, state courts lack expert staff and fact-finding abilities. State courts must also take concrete cases as they come, rather than investigating and initiating general proceedings.”).

111 See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 81, at 10 (“Proponents of [the custom] view tended to be vague about whether real-world customs always preceded the rules of decision that judges and juries applied in court, or whether judicial decisions and custom sometimes had a more symbiotic relationship; perhaps some rules of decision that were recognized as part of the common law had originated in one or more court cases, but customs had grown up around those rules in such a way as to validate them and to dictate the use of the same rules in later cases.”); Scalia, supra note 77, at 4 (“[F]rom an early time—as early as the Year Books, which record English judicial decisions from the end of the thirteenth century to the beginning of the sixteenth—any equivalence between custom and common law had ceased to exist, except in the sense that the doctrine of stare decisis rendered prior judicial decisions ‘custom.’”).

112 See Gillman, supra note 110, at 220.

113 Cf., e.g., Reinach, supra note 97, at 80 (“The fact that we have such a clear and indubitable insight into the absolute impossibility of performing a qualified transfer of a claim without any cooperation from the one against whom the claim exists, shows that it is not ‘custom’ . . . , as psychological dilettantism says so glibly, which guides us in putting forth supposedly apriori laws.”).

114 See id.
beyond the conceptual boundaries of ownership (or not recognize legal ownership in things that conceptually can be owned), we must act through legislatures rather than the courts.

B. The Ontological Status of Concepts

Much of the post-Realist skepticism of descriptive boundaries of property is grounded in skepticism of the possibility of the existence of the concepts on which the law relies.\footnote{115} We think we know by now that “[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky.”\footnote{116} We wonder, then, how the concepts on which it relies could exist.

Concepts like ownership could conceivably exist in any of three relevant ways. First, it might be that, as natural law theories more or less have it, the concept of ownership metaphysically exists. But, to serve the legitimating function described in the preceding section, ownership need not exist in some immaterial way in the fabric of the universe. It could instead be that the concept of ownership is biologically embedded in our evolved minds—a category that, whether or not it would exist without us, is something human beings innately understand. Finally, it might be that “ownership” as a word in English is simply socially determinate—it denotes a determinable concept to speakers of English and exists within our social and linguistic community. This is indeed the only kind of existence a concept need have to legitimately underlie common law reasoning about its boundaries.

1. Ownership as Metaphysically Real

Metaphysical realism is the philosophical view that entities—whether we’re talking about atoms, persons, stars, justice, intent, real numbers, or anything else—exist independent of human minds.\footnote{117} In contrast,
antirealism holds that a proffered category either does not exist at all or
does not exist outside of our perception and cognition of it.\textsuperscript{118}

Metaphysical realism is not an all or nothing proposition, that either
everything exists or nothing does. You can, in other words, be a
metaphysical realist about certain things but not others.\textsuperscript{119} For instance, it
is not uncommon to be a metaphysical realist about, say, numbers—
believing that the concepts of numbers exist in the fabric of our
universe—but not about ethics.\textsuperscript{120} Indeed, the most common lay
metaphysics would probably accept that “matter” and “energy” are
metaphysically real and exist outside of our minds, but deny the
metaphysical existence of social conventions like “dating.” And between
those poles you might find a diversity of views on whether concepts like
“tables,” “green,” “the good,” or “human beings” really exist or are
merely the words we use to describe certain collections of atoms with “no
there there.”\textsuperscript{121} In contemporary philosophy, you’ll find a full spectrum
of arguments, from denying the existence of anything outside of our

\textsuperscript{118} See Moore, The Interpretive Turn, supra note 115, at 880 (“Corresponding to the two
essential tenets of realist ontology are two kinds of antirealists: (1) those who deny the
existence of some class of entities, such as real numbers, and (2) those who grant the existence
of such entities but deny their independence from our minds or our conventions. The first kind
of antirealist is a skeptic; the second is an idealist.”).

\textsuperscript{119} See, e.g., Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, supra note 44, at 2432 (“[T]he metaphysical
realist . . . about some class of entities need not be a realist about all other classes.”); William
P. Alston, Introduction to Realism and Antirealism 1, 2 (William P. Alston ed., 2002)
(“[T]here are also views of a realist or nonrealist sort about particular stretches of reality:
perceivable physical objects, abstract objects, universals, propositions, the objects of pure
mathematics, moral obligation, meanings, God, and so on.”).

\textsuperscript{120} See, e.g., Gilbert Harman, Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on
Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History, 79 J. Phil. 568, 569 (1982) (“I still feel the
attraction of metaphysical realism. . . . I don’t see that there is anything problematic about
moral relativism.”); see also Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, supra note 44, at 2432
(“[S]taunch realists about the physical world are commonly antirealists about morality.”).

\textsuperscript{121} The phrase “no there there,” which evidently originated with Gertrude Stein, is often
used to refer to claims with no ultimate substance or claim to reality. See Ben Zimmer, Why
Gertrude Stein’s ‘No There There’ Is Everywhere, Wall St. J. (Feb. 2, 2018, 11:35 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-gertrude-steins-no-there-there-is-everywhere-1517589198
[https://perma.cc/6H8P-3MAS] (describing the origins and use of the phrase “no there
there”).
minds to holding that a great deal of even apparent social conventions in fact exist. In the debate. Michael Moore, the most prominent defender of metaphysical realism in the legal academy, has argued that many fundamental concepts in law—including cause, intention, or culpability—are, like mathematical concepts, metaphysically real. In contrast, Legal Realism (confusingly) is perhaps best understood as a movement by its antirealist stance on legal categories—indeed, it targeted itself directly against nineteenth-century natural law theory, which is a species of metaphysical realism.

Importantly, however, the metaphysical existence of intangible concepts such as numbers is, in principle, entirely unrelated to the metaphysical existence of a divine creator. One can just as well be a metaphysical realist about numbers and an atheist as otherwise. Why there is something rather than nothing is of course one of the primary questions, but it is in principle no easier with respect to matter than intangible concepts (nor, I might add, are we any closer to resolving the former than the latter!).


See id. at 872 ("[T]hose badly misnamed 'Legal Realists' have changed significantly the way we now theorize about and practice law. Indeed, the Legal Realists have so thoroughly applied their brand of philosophical antirealism to legal entities and quantities that it is difficult for us post-Realist generations even to understand what a metaphysical realist about law could believe.").

See, e.g., John Bishop, On J.J.C. Smart and J.J. Haldane’s Atheism and Theism, 36 Sophia 38, 38, 42 (1997) (noting that metaphysical realists believe that “whether God exists or not is independent of any beliefs or attitudes anyone has on the question” and that God need not “have the same kind of existence as is attributed” to numbers); see also Baltzer-Jaray, supra note 94, at 101 (noting that Reinach’s phenomenological realism “describes a metaphysical footing for justice . . . with no need for God as the source”).

See, e.g., Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics 6–7 (Ralph Manheim trans., 1959) (describing the question of why there is something rather than nothing as “the most fundamental of all questions” of metaphysics); see also James Ladyman, The Foundations of Structuralism and the Metaphysics of Relations, in The Metaphysics of Relations 177, 179–80 (Anna Marmodoro & David Yates eds., 2015) (arguing that potential differences and phase differences are fundamental physical examples of intangible relations that metaphysically exist).
The most intractable difficulty of debates about metaphysical realism is a lack of agreed-upon methodology, and discussions in metaphysics have a way of going in circles. For example, in arguing for the metaphysical reality of certain ethical concepts, Moore relies on an “explanationist” methodology that holds that “to discover whether some particular entity or quality exists is to determine whether that thing has a necessary place in the best explanation of some features of the natural world that we take (for these purposes) to exist.” To which antirealists reply, not implausibly, something along the lines of “but surely that is not what you meant by the existence of moral principles!”

Most directly to our point here, the turn-of-the-twentieth-century legal philosopher Adolf Reinach offered an account of the metaphysical realism (which he referred to in terms of “apriori” realism) of the concept of ownership, one that has been recently resuscitated by the philosopher Olivier Massin and others. Reinach’s methodology was particularly idiosyncratic. Reinach was what is called a phenomenological realist...
and an early follower of Edmund Husserl, and through Husserl a follower of Kant’s understanding of intuition and pure reason. In contrast to how phenomenology came to be understood in Husserl’s later work (and the work of Heidegger and others following), “phenomenology for early members like Reinach was primarily about a universal philosophy of essences, not merely the essence of consciousness.” For Reinach and other phenomenological realists, states-of-affairs—such as the state of being red, or being in a relationship of ownership—have a distinct, essential kind of existence. In the words of the philosopher Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray:

These entities do not require consciousness to constitute them, implying that their being cannot be reduced solely to the operations of consciousness . . . . When I look at a red rose in my garden, I perceive the physical rose, and I apprehend . . . that the state of affairs . . . being-
red obtains. . . . [T]hey are ‘there’, and not because I think them into being.¹³⁸

So understood, insight or intuition is the fundamental method by which we understand the existence and boundaries of states of affairs;¹³⁹ “[a]ccording to the phenomenological analysis, we must reduce our knowledge to original phenomena and to the original moment at which we start perceiving law, for whose nature we intuitively search.”¹⁴⁰ This approach commits Reinach to doing metaphysics at the same time as epistemology,¹⁴¹ an approach he shares with many contemporary analytical realists.¹⁴²

¹³⁸ Id. Note the similarity of this move to Moore’s argument that moral or categorical properties can supervene on material states of affairs. See Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, supra note 44, at 2522 (“Not only are moral properties token-identical to natural properties (and, accordingly, not only is each sub-type of a moral property on each sort of situation type-identical to some natural properties), but the moral property as such must be type-identical to a finite disjunction of natural properties. Then it is not at all mysterious why there must be a variation in the physical world if there is a change in moral status, for moral properties just are one or other of a set of physical properties.”); see also Baltzer-Jaray, Bogged Down, supra note 135, at 165–66 (“For Reinach essences do not inhabit some separate realm as timeless, immutable, disembodied entities; rather, they subsist in the relations that obtains between the form and matter of objects.”).

¹³⁹ Baltzer-Jaray, Bogged Down, supra note 135, at 158 (“[P]henomenological realism is an investigation of necessary states of affairs, and we come to apprehend these by way of insight.” (citing Fritz Wenisch, Insight and Objective Necessity: A Demonstration of the Existence of Propositions Which Are Simultaneously Informative and Necessarily True, 4 Aletheia Int’l J. Phil. 107, 108 (1988))).

¹⁴⁰ Bekrycht, supra note 93, at 66.

¹⁴¹ Baltzer-Jaray, Bogged Down, supra note 135, at 158–59 (“Reinach does metaphysics and epistemology simultaneously, or more precisely, he specifies that we must regard all epistemological and logical terms as primarily ontological.”); Lorenzo Passerini Glazel, Grasping an Ought. Adolf Reinach’s Ontology and Epistemology of Legal and Moral Oughts, 90 Folia Iuridica 29, 30 (2020) (“The way in which an ought or a norm can be ‘perceived’ or ‘grasped’ is indeed strictly related to the specific ontological status of norms and oughts, that is to say to their specific mode of existence.”).

¹⁴² See, e.g., Ruth Garrett Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism 14 (1984) (“Epistemology, ontology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language cannot ultimately be separated from one another.”). Indeed, Moore’s explanationist account of the reality of moral concepts makes a similar move. See Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, supra note 44, at 2494 (“The view is nonetheless empiricist in a nontraditional sense, because it holds our ontological beliefs hostage to there being some connection, no matter how indirect, between what we think to exist and what we experience.”); see also Moore, The Interpretive Turn, supra note 115, at 875 (“I use the word ‘metaphysics’ in a broader sense, to include not just ontology but also (2) a theory of truth, (3) a theory of logic, (4) a theory about the meaning of sentences, and (5) a theory about the meaning of the words used in sentences.”).
Armed with this methodology, Reinach argued that ownership is a state of affairs that exists not only outside of the law but inheres in the nature of things:

The relation between person and thing which is called owning or property is an ultimate, irreducible relation which cannot be further resolved into elements. It can come into being even where there is no positive law. When Robinson Crusoe produces for himself all kinds of things on his island, these things belong to him.

Reinach reaches this conclusion based on the nature of ownership as a state of affairs and argues that we would all reach the same conclusion if we were to engage in similar reasoning. Indeed, because these conclusions inhere in the nature of things, Reinach presses that they would be accessible and applicable even to "angels, devils, and gods" as well.

Now, whether all this—and the more general account of ontology and epistemology on which it is based—is right is somewhat beside the point. The point here is that the question of whether the concept of ownership exists in the metaphysical sense is fairly a live one, and indeed follows directly under certain at-least-not-insane-and-thoroughly-secular theories of ontology generally.

Perhaps more importantly, Reinach’s general conclusion that the concept of property exists and has certain determinable entailments can be right even if its metaphysical foundation is unconvincing—indeed, Reinach can still be right about the implications of the existence of the concept of ownership even if he is wrong about its nature. If the concept of property exists either in human psychology or by way of social convention, it still may be right that "[i]t lies in the essence of owning that the owner has the absolute right to deal in any way he likes with the thing

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143 See Massin, supra note 65, at 577.
144 Reinach, supra note 97, at 55.
145 Id. at 5, 55.
146 Id. at 47.
147 See Massin, supra note 65, at 579 ("[T]he ordinary view of property has largely disappeared from the discussions of property in contemporary literature, with some rare exceptions.").
which belongs to him," and that conceptual reasoning is a valid way to reach that conclusion.

Indeed, perhaps Reinach’s strongest argument for the extra-legal existence of certain core legal concepts (like ownership), would seem to hold regardless of whether ownership is metaphysically real, a feature of human psychology, or a universally recognized social or linguistic construction:

[I]t would have been enough to consider the judgment of legally untrained laymen in order to have noticed the apriori sphere of right. How can one explain the fact that many who do not know the positive law or who hardly know it find so many enactments “self-evident”? . . . Whoever orally enters into a contract to rent a piece of land for three years may be surprised to find that according to our law this contract is considered “as made for an indefinite length of time.” But whoever promises to make a loan, whoever waives a claim, whoever appoints a representative, cannot expect anything else except that he acquires an obligation, that his claim is extinguished, and that he becomes entitled and obliged through the acts of the representative.

Reinach’s point is that there are some things that inhere in the nature of some legal concepts that can be determined by reflection on the nature of the concept alone. My point is that the common law is a democratically legitimate enterprise, consistent with the separation of powers, insofar as it is limited to adjudication of the boundaries of concepts we have adopted into law. The next two Sections discuss two alternative ways that, contra Reinach, the concept of ownership could exist outside of the law without committing oneself to his controversial metaphysics.

148 Id. at 591 (quoting Reinach, supra note 97, at 55).
149 Id. at 579; see also id. at 590 ("In their influential works Penner (1995) as well as Merrill and Smith (2001) rehabilitate absolute rights over things—albeit without citing Reinach, accusing Hohfeld of muddying the distinction between rights in rem (here, property rights) and rights in personam (here, relative rights). The convergence between Reinach and these authors does not end here. Although Penner as well as Merrill and Smith officially identify property as being a right, they are all led to surreptitiously reintroduce the distinction between property and property rights in order to characterize the opposition between rights over things and rights in personam.").
150 Reinach, supra note 97, at 131.
2. Ownership as a Human Cognitive Category

As many have argued, it may be that metaphysical categories—at least the kind of complex, emergent metaphysical categories with which the law purports to be concerned—do not exist. But it nevertheless could be that, as human beings developing laws, the concept of ownership may as well exist for us. For example, ownership could be a basic concept that inheres in human psychology.

Psychology and evolutionary biology have by now demonstrated that human minds share certain universal cognitive features. Our minds are not blank slates from birth onto which experience shapes personhood in infinitely plastic ways. Perhaps the paradigmatic example is our capacity for language. "All infants come into the world with linguistic skills." And those skills involve basic parameters of language
acquisition and function—people learn, in certain times and ways, words in nouns and verbs that they relate to one another with universal grammatical mechanisms. These basic characteristics of language are innate, not learned. They are a fundamental structural feature of the way in which we’ve evolved to think about and understand the world.

Indeed, our cognitive similarities are not limited to abstract capacities such as that for language—they include consistent, determinable categories through which we organize and perceive information. Colors are often thought to be an example of this. The spectrum of wavelengths of visible light from what we call “blue” to what we call “red” is continuous, not clustered. There are no ontologically obvious points to “carve nature at its joints” and cleave this smooth spectrum into categories that correspond to our colors—perhaps this suggests that colors are not metaphysically real. But although there is variation from culture to culture and language to language on the specifics of color categories, all cultures have differentiable concepts of color, and this variation is far


157 See Pinker, The Language Instinct, supra note 155, at 83–125 (describing the universal structure of grammar); id. at 262–96 (describing language acquisition in children); see also generally Noam Chomsky, Language and Mind (enlarged ed. 1972) (outlining a universal theory of grammar).

158 See Ray Jackendoff, Languages of the Mind 1–20 (1992) (describing the quasi-linguistic processes of thought); Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works 90 (1997) (describing the “mentalese” as the internal, innate language “of thought in which our conceptual knowledge is couched”).

159 See, e.g., Ara Norenzayan & Steven J. Heine, Psychological Universals: What Are They and How Can We Know?, 131 Psych. Bull. 763, 764 (2005) (“The most extensive recent effort to catalogue human universals was that by Donald Brown (1991), who constructed a list of hundreds of characteristics, incorporating both categories (e.g., marriage, rituals, language) and content (e.g., fear of snakes, coyness displays, having color terms for ‘black’ and ‘white’) that are common to people everywhere.” (citing Donald E. Brown, Human Universals (1991)).

160 See, e.g., D.H. Sliney, What is Light? The Visible Spectrum and Beyond, 30 Eye 222, 225–26 (2016).


162 See, e.g., C.L. Hardin, A Spectral Reflectance Doth Not a Color Make, 100 J. Phil. 191, 196–99 (2003) (arguing against the metaphysical reality of color on grounds that colors are fundamentally arbitrary). To be sure, there are plenty of people who are “color realists” and maintain that color categories (or at least some of them) are ontologically real to differing degrees. See id. at 191 (“It is a curious sociological fact that many philosophers, but very few visual scientists, are color realists.”); see also, e.g., Keith Allen, The Mind-Independence of Colour, 15 Eur. J. Phil. 137, 143–45 (2007) (discussing how it could be that colors exist in some mind-independent way).
less random than we would expect if languages were drawing arbitrary lines across the spectrum. Indeed, anthropologists and cognitive scientists have noted basic patterns in the existence of color words across languages—all languages have words for black and white; if a language has three color words they are for black, white, and red; the fourth is always yellow or green, and the fifth the other; the sixth color word is blue. Indeed, "the evidence suggests that the qualitative color boundaries along the visible spectrum are a result of inborn feature detectors, rather than of learning to sort and name colors in particular ways."

Research in psychology, anthropology, and evolutionary biology suggests that the concept of ownership might be such a universal cognitive category. Indeed, anthropologists have found that all cultures have a basic understanding of personal property and understandings of ownership. Further, developmental psychology has shown that "[a]wareness of ownership ... emerges during early childhood" and that children as young as two understand the basic relationship of

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163 See Pinker, The Language Instinct, supra note 155, at 62 ("[W]here languages do differ in their color words, they differ predictably, not according to the idiosyncratic taste of some word-coiner.").
164 See Brown, supra note 159, at 10–14.
165 See Richard S. Cook, Paul Kay & Terry Regier, The World Color Survey Database, in Handbook of Categorization in Cognitive Science 223, 234–37 (Henri Cohen & Claire Lefebvre eds., 2005); Brent Berlin & Paul Kay, Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution 1–3 (1969). This classic story of color category acquisition has been complicated substantially by subsequent research, but the essential observation that color terms develop in non-random and universal ways remains widely accepted. See, e.g., James S. Boster, Categories and Cognitive Anthropology, in Handbook of Categorization in Cognitive Science, supra, at 91, 105–09.
166 Stevan Harnad, To Cognize is to Categorize: Cognition is Categorization, in Handbook of Categorization in Cognitive Science, supra note 165, at 19, 34.
167 See generally Wilson, supra note 37 (consolidating linguistic, anthropological, and biological evidence of the universality of property). See also Lee Anne Fennell, Property Beyond Exclusion, 61 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 521, 536 ("Because territoriality is found in nonhuman animals as well as in human populations, it might seem to be innate.").
ownership as dominion over a thing. Recent research suggests that these understandings are not socially taught and arise in children "without being explicitly taught . . . or without facing limitations about when and how they are permitted to use others' property."171

Indeed, research in linguistics and psychology appears to vindicate Reinach's metaphysical claim that "[t]he relation between person and thing which is called owning or property is an ultimate, irreducible relation which cannot be further resolved into elements."172 As Bart Wilson recently pointed out, linguists have found that the concept "mine" (which he argues is the conceptual core of property rather than ownership, about which more is below)173 is a "semantic prime[], [an] atomic concept[] . . . found in every human language and thus presumed to be universally innate."174 Indeed, Wilson argues:

Mine means just what mine means, just like do means what do means, say means what say means, and good means what good means. Attempting to define these words in terms of simpler concepts fails because these words symbolize atomic conceptual units. And yet in

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170 See, e.g., Federico Rossano, Hannes Rakoczy & Michael Tomasello, Young Children's Understanding of Violations of Property Rights, 121 Cognition 219, 225 (2011) (showing that two-year-olds understand the rights of control over and exclusion of others from their property); Hildy S. Ross, Negotiating Principles of Entitlement in Sibling Property Disputes, 32 Dev. Psych. 90, 92, 95–99 (1996) (showing that children from two to four years old understand property rights such that they are able to make claims of ownership); Nancy Eisenberg-Berg, Robert Haake, Michael Hand & Edward Sadalla, Effects of Instructions Concerning Ownership of a Toy on Preschoolers' Sharing and Defensive Behaviors, 15 Dev. Psych. 460, 461 (1979) (using the sharing and defensive behaviors of children from ages two to five years old to show that they display an understanding of property rights); see also Madison L. Pesowski & Ori Friedman, Preschoolers and Toddlers Use Ownership to Predict Basic Emotions, 15 Emotion 104, 107 (2015) (showing that two-year-olds understand that others will be upset if their things are used without their permission).

171 Van de Vondervoort et al., supra note 169, at 2; see also Julia Van de Vondervoort & Ori Friedman, Parallels in Preschoolers' and Adults' Judgments About Ownership Rights and Bodily Rights, 39 Cognitive Sci. 184, 185, 193 (2015) (suggesting that conceptions of ownership arise from an inherent understanding of ownership in the body); Nicholas Humphrey, A History of the Mind 125–34 (1992) (discussing the inherent emergence of ownership as a cognitive category incident to our consciousness); see also Wilson, supra note 37, at 9 ("[N]o human parents in any community have to teach their child to resist attempts to take things securely within their grasp. Children are natural-born possessors.").

172 Reinach, supra note 97, at 55.

173 See infra Subsection III.B.4.

174 Wilson, supra note 37, at 50.
every language every human being knows what mine, do, say, and good mean.\textsuperscript{175}

It may be, in sum, that a basic understanding of ownership as a concept—one with at least partially determinate and determinable boundaries—is an evolved feature of the human mind. If this is right, ownership may not be metaphysically real and would not necessarily be a feature of all conceivable rational or sufficiently intelligent minds—it could be that space aliens evolved in very different circumstances, though intelligent persons, would not understand ownership as we do. But so long as ownership means something to humans, the concept in our law may still justify common law adjudication of its boundaries.

3. Ownership as an Extra-Legal Social Practice

Not every word in English corresponds to ontology or universal features of human minds. Some words—“nation,” “dating,” “adjusted gross domestic product”—facially derive their meaning from wholly socially contingent structures and organizations. But it does not follow from the possibility that “ownership” may not be a metaphysically real or innate concept that it does not exist outside of the law; that there is no descriptive answer to the question of what can be owned.

It might be that our language—like presumably all languages—effectively carves up our social world into concepts with determinate boundaries, as understood by a confederate speaker of the language, regardless of the ontological status of those concepts.\textsuperscript{176} Consider a social practice like dating. People in the world of love engage in all sorts of behavior and relationships: unrequited love, friends with benefits, one-night stands, marriage, co-habitation, committed non-marital relationships, cordial exes, polyamory. Only one class of these relationships we call “dating,” in the sense that “X and Y are dating”—a class of relationships characterized by non-committed social, romantic, and usually sexual meet-ups.\textsuperscript{177} The concept of dating is largely

\textsuperscript{175} Id. at 55.

\textsuperscript{176} See, e.g., Delia Belleri, You Can Say What You Think: Vindicating the Effability of Our Thoughts, 191 Synthese 4431, 4449 (2014) (“I propose the following: If I successfully express my thought that p by uttering S, this means that, if I share the right background with the hearer and all goes well, my hearer will come to understand p as well.”).

\textsuperscript{177} See, e.g., Erica Owens, The Sociology of Love, Courtship, and Dating, in 21st Century Sociology: A Reference Handbook 266, 269 (Clifton D. Bryant & Dennis L. Peck eds., 2007) (“[T]he goal and seriousness of the relationship is often the basis for marking whether the
contingent on our social practice. In many societies—indeed, in most—nothing remotely resembling modern dating takes place. But it does in ours, and we have a word for it. The concept of “dating” entails certain things. For example, if X and Y are “dating,” they cannot, conceptually, be “married.”

“Ownership” could be like dating in this regard—a word referring to a circumscribed social practice that, while contingent on the construction of the social practice, determinately refers to it in the understanding of American Anglophone listeners. Surely even if we are skeptical that ownership exists as a metaphysical matter, and are skeptical of the extent to which it is built into the human mind, we must concede that ownership exists as a social concept in the United States—people feel as though they own things, act as though they own things, act as though other people own things, and recognize other people’s ownership when they, in fact, own things. At the end of the day, maybe this is all Reinach’s “insight” and “intuitions” are really getting at—we,” as socially and historically contingent Anglo-American readers, call a relationship characterized by descriptive dominion “ownership” because that is what we recognize it as. Maybe things don’t have to be this way, and maybe we could change them over time. But to the extent that these are facts about the social and linguistic world we inhabit, we can say that, for our purposes, ownership
exists as a concept outside the law; that it is real in perhaps the only sense that matters for us.

III. THE CONCEPT OF OWNERSHIP AND ITS BOUNDARIES

Whether as a metaphysical category, evolved feature of human psychology, or social construct, ownership is a concept that exists outside of the law with certain determinable entailments that underlie the legitimacy of at least some of the common law of property. In this Part, I discuss one of the essential entailments of the concept of ownership, indeed perhaps the essential entailment—ownership is, at its core, a descriptive relationship of control. Therefore, as a conceptual matter, the limits of property law lie at the limits of control, and that which cannot in principle be controlled cannot be owned.

Further, I situate this theory in relation to four prevailing alternative theories of the conceptual essence of property law that could explain its boundaries—Merrill’s exclusion theory, Penner’s separability thesis, Locke’s labor theory, and Wilson’s theory of “mine”—and show that the theory of ownership as control is either analytically prior to, resolves ambiguities within, or makes better sense of our general understanding of the concept than these alternatives.

A. Ownership as Control

It is widely recognized that the lay understanding of the concept of ownership is rooted in a descriptive relationship of control—that is, actual, unreviewable decision-making sovereignty over a thing. Indeed, even

183 See, e.g., Dana & Shoked, supra note 18, at 783 (“From Blackstone’s oft-repeated catchphrase on the popular cachet of the right of property, to more recent scholarly explorations, commentators have long noted how deeply ingrained in laypeople’s minds the concept of private property is.”); Render, supra note 54, at 439 (“Property is basically about the ownership of things.”); Merrill & Smith, supra note 60, at 1850 (“Property can function as property only if the vast preponderance of persons recognize that property is a moral right, and this requirement has important consequences for the study of property.”).

184 See Render, The Law of the Body, supra note 19, at 576 (observing a “strong intuitive sense that we ‘own’ our bodies—that is, that we enjoy a unique dominion in our corporeal selves and that a set of a priori rights attend this dominion”); Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in 22 Nomos: Property 69, 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) (“To own property is to have exclusive control of something—to be able to use it as one wishes, to sell it, give it away, leave it idle, or destroy it.”); see also Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 277, 283 (1998) (describing an “intuitive image of” property as “absoluteness”); Claeys, Property 101, supra note 60, at 632 (“[In Blackstone’s definition,] the core of property is the owner’s ‘dominion’ or ‘indefinite right of
many contemporary scholars skeptical of the extra-legal existence of the concept of ownership recognize that factual control—absolute decision-making authority—lies at the heart of the concept in the lay imagination. And importantly, in seeking to understand the extra-legal concept of ownership from which some part of property law derives its legitimacy, it is the lay understanding (or at least the reflective lay understanding) of the concept we are seeking. After all, in the absence of a statutorily constructed legal concept, common law adjudication based on a concept is compatible with democracy only to the extent that the concept exists outside of the law and is endorsed by the people—which is only possible if they too have access to the concept.

This understanding of the essence of property law was of course what Blackstone meant (or has been taken to have meant) when he defined property as “that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.” And Reinach too, when he wrote that “[i]t lies in the essence of owning that the owner has the absolute right to deal in any way he likes with the thing which belongs to him.” Ownership, in this understanding, is a concept that, at its heart, refers to a descriptive state of facts about the world, not merely a legal status.

Indeed, the notion of ownership as a descriptive state of control—irrespective of anything about the law—is how the term is used in ordinary English (to which judges would look, of course, if legislatures

\[\text{user and disposition.} \] Dominion connotes a zone of policy control (if one is a social scientist), or a domain of practical discretion (if one stays closer to case law and everyday language)."

\[185\] See, e.g., Williams, supra note 184, at 291 (describing the “intuitive image of property as ‘naturally’ involving absolute dominion”); Grey, supra note 184, at 69; see also Rao, supra note 16, at 418 (“Privacy, like property, encompasses the right to exclude others from that protected space and the corollary right to exercise control within one’s own territory.

\[186\] See David B. Schorr, How Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 10 Theoretical Inquiries L. 103, 103 (2009) (arguing that Blackstone himself did not understand ownership as requiring absolute dominion); cf. Claeys, Property 101, supra note 60, at 633 (arguing that “Blackstone makes the operative noun ‘dominion.’”).

\[187\] 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *2; see also Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 Yale L.J. 601, 601 (1998) (“Since Blackstone’s time, his definition of property as exclusive dominion has been cited again and again.”).

\[188\] Reinach, supra note 97, at 55; see also Massin, supra note 65, at 591 (“[T]he owner of a thing has the absolute right to behave towards the owned thing in the manner he wants . . . .”)

\[189\] See, e.g., Ownership, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2003) (“the state, relation, or fact of being an owner”); see also Reinach, supra note 97, at 53 (noting that possession “is clearly no right but rather a factual relation, if one will, a fact”).
had passed a statute saying “we shall have private ownership” and didn’t otherwise specify an idiosyncratic legal construction of “ownership”).

Take, for instance, Merriam-Webster’s definition of “ownership”: “the state, relation, or fact of being an owner.” The verb “to own,” in turn, means “to have power or mastery over” or “to have or hold as property.” Moreover, our verb “to own” derives from the Middle English “ounen” or “ahnen” which meant “to possess, have; rule, be in command of, have authority over,” further derived from the Proto-Indo-European root “*aik-”—“to be master of, possess.”

Moreover, control, the relationship at the core of the concept of ownership, entails at least the majority of the familiar bundle of rights with which we have come to understand the legal relationship of property. If you descriptively control something, you may choose to simply possess it—i.e., hold it with you or (if it happens to be a plot of land) patrol its boundaries. But you can also use it. Maybe you gaze longingly at your widget or cultivate the field that you own. Alternatively, maybe you don’t want to use it yourself, but exercise your absolute control over what happens with the thing to rent it out to others for a certain amount of income paid to you. This will temporarily give up your possession, but as the controller, this can conceptually only take place on terms you agree to. Ditto for your choice to destroy or consume that which you control,

[190] See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1140 (2018) (establishing that the Court would look to the ordinary meaning of the term “salesman” because it was not defined in the pertinent statute).
[194] Id.
[195] See, e.g., Honoré, supra note 50, at 165 (listing possession, use, management, income, capital, security, transmissibility, and absence of term as incidents of ownership under a view of property law as a bundle of rights).
[196] Id. at 168.
[197] Id. at 169.
pledge it as security, transmit it after your death, and do any of these things for an indefinite duration. It is true, as mentioned above, that it is impossible to derive everything about property law from this understanding of ownership as control. There is certainly no amount of reflection on the nature of control as a relationship that could produce the Rule Against Perpetuities, or the distinction between tenancy-by-the-entireties and joint tenancy, what an easement requires, or how long the adverse possession clock is. And indeed, I think a great deal of confusion about the concept of ownership in the scholarly literature results from attempting to theorize about the concept of *everything related to property* in the law, rather than its *core*. It is compatible with my theory that large portions of property law concerning arbitrary normative decisions about how to own things and who should own what—that is, normative decisions *related to* ownership—were made by judges acting outside the modern dictates of democracy and separation of powers. But to the extent that many of these decisions were made by English judges prior to Founding and the advent of democracy, it is kind of a wash.

198 That this "stick in the bundle" is entailed by the concept of ownership itself is debatable and may well be wrong—after you are dead, it seems plausible that you cannot exercise control of anything and cannot make sure that it goes to your preferred heirs. Cf. Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Child v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 67 (Fla. 1990) ("[D]evising property came to be regarded as a right created by statute, not a 'property' right inherent in the common law of England."); United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625, 627 (1896) ("[T]he right to dispose of his property by will has always been considered purely a creature of statute and within legislative control."). If this is so, and bequest is not descriptively entailed by control, then permitting testamentary dispositions is a policy choice that ought to be made by legislatures, not courts, and the Supreme Court’s claim that “the right to pass on property” is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property” in *Hodel v. Irving*, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987), is simply wrong. That is hardly a radical position, having indeed been the position of the Supreme Court prior to *Hodel*, which has since been confined nearly to its facts, and of prior centuries of common law. See, e.g., Reid Kress Weisbord & David Horton, The Future of Testamentary Capacity, 79 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 609, 651 (2022) (summarizing the history of the relationship between bequest and property and noting that “[f]or centuries, there was consensus that ‘the right to make a will is in no sense a property right’ and thus is not ‘protected by any of the constitutional provisions whereby property is protected’” (quoting 1 William Herbert Page, A Treatise on the Law of Wills, § 25, at 49 (3d ed. 1941))).

199 Honoré, supra note 50, at 171.

200 Cf. Scalia, supra note 77, at 9 (observing that judicial lawmaking “would be an unqualified good, were it not for a trend in government that has developed in recent centuries, called democracy”).
In short, the incidents of property law are coherently derived from an essential conceptual core based in the nature of ownership. They all follow from a descriptive relationship of dominion over a thing. And that descriptive relationship of dominion is what we call ownership.

B. Control and Other Theories of Property

As discussed above, most contemporary theories of property reject the proposition that it has an extra-legal conceptual core. But there are several exceptions, and there are a handful of theories that agree that ownership is an extra-legal concept but disagree that a descriptive relationship of control is its essential characteristic. In particular, Thomas Merrill argues that “exclusion” is the essence of ownership; James Penner argues that “separability” determines what property can be; theorists who follow John Locke ground the essence of ownership in labor; and Bart Wilson argues that the concept of “mine,” rather than ownership, is the core of property law. This Section discusses the relationship between the theory of ownership as control to each of these alternatives in turn, and argues either that control is analytically prior to them or better captures what the concept of ownership is all about.

1. Merrill’s Theory of Property as Exclusion

Thomas Merrill argues that the “right to exclude” is the “sine qua non” of property—“[g]ive someone the right to exclude others from a valued...

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201 It is possible, in addition, to read a conceptual theory of property’s boundaries into the work of the Kantian theorists Arthur Ripstein, Larissa Katz, and Eric Claeys, who argue that property is grounded in people’s interest in the “exclusive use” of things. See generally, e.g., Ripstein, supra note 37; Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. Toronto L.J. 275, 275 (2008); Claeys, Property 101, supra note 60, at 618. Indeed, to the extent that we understand the boundaries of the concept of “use” to be similar to the concept of “control,” we might think that the boundaries of the Kantian theory of property are similar to those of the theory of ownership as control. See, e.g., id. at 631–32 (discussing the importance of the idea of “dominion” as decision-making authority to the “exclusive use” theory).

But the theory of property as grounded in “exclusive use” is presented as a normative theory of our interest in property, not a descriptive theory of its boundaries. See Ripstein, supra note 37, at 156; Katz, supra, at 278. That is, it justifies property law on the grounds that we have an interest in the exclusive use of things, but it doesn’t tell us that, say, this means that the laws of mathematics cannot be owned (and surely, on its face, we can imagine that some individuals could actually have an interest in the exclusive use of mathematics, if it were possible). See id. at 277. And indeed, some proponents of this theory do not see it providing a theory of property’s boundaries and have instead imported Penner’s separability thesis to resolve those questions. See Claeys, Property, Concepts, and Functions, supra note 35, at 48.
resource... and you give them property. Deny someone the exclusion right and they do not have property." 202 From this perspective, the possibility of exclusion presumably delimits the concept of ownership—"the line between 'property' and 'nonproperty'—or 'unowned things' (like the air in the upper atmosphere or the resources of the ocean beyond a certain distance from shore)—the right to exclude others is a necessary and sufficient condition of identifying the existence of property." 203

This theory is not wrong so much as incomplete—exclusion is conceptually entailed by ownership and essential to our understanding of the concept. But control is analytically prior to exclusion and better captures the nature of ownership. 204 One way to test this claim is to consider whether there are situations in which we would confidently say that there is no ownership where exclusion is present but not control. And there are—a landmine may be able to keep you off a plot of land, but the landmine does not own the land. The landmine can exclude, but it cannot exercise control. The person who placed it there, exercising his control over the land, is the owner. This is because control, not exclusion, is the essence of ownership.

In contrast, there are no circumstances of absolute control in which there is no possibility of exclusion, because control entails the ability to exclude. Thus, in every instance of clear ownership in which we find exclusion, we also inevitably find control—if you have absolute control over something, part of what that means is that you can exclude others from it. Since the same is not true in the other direction, control and not exclusion is the essence of ownership.

202 Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, supra note 37, at 730. Merrill was not the first, and no doubt will not be the last, to argue that exclusion—the right to exclude others—is at the conceptual heart of property, but I am here using his work as a stand-in for the claim. See also, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L.Q. 8, 12 (1927) ("[T]he essence of private property is always the right to exclude others."); see also Render, The Law of the Body, supra note 19, at 578 ("[T] hose who reject the bundle-of-rights model generally coalesce around a substantive model of the content of property rights that has as its core the concept of exclusive use.").

203 Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, supra note 37, at 731.

204 Notably, this argument meets Merrill's argument on his own terms, as one of his core arguments in favor of exclusion as the essence of property is its perceived conceptual anteriority to emergent incidents of property. See id. at 740 ("The first argument in support of an essentialist definition of property centered on the right to exclude is basically a logical one. It goes like this: if one starts with the right to exclude, it is possible to derive most of the other attributes commonly associated with property through the addition of relatively minor clarifications about the domain of the exclusion right.").
2. Penner's Separability Thesis

James Penner's sophisticated general theory of property explicitly includes a theory of its conceptual boundaries, which he calls the "separability thesis":

Only those ‘things’ in the world which are contingently associated with any particular owner may be objects of property; as a function of the nature of this contingency, in theory nothing of normative consequence beyond the fact that the ownership has changed occurs when an object of property is alienated to another.205

In other words, that which is separable—distinct from, contingently associated with, removable from—particular individuals is ownable; “[a] necessary criterion of treating something as property . . . is that it . . . might well not have been [ours].”206 From this, Penner concludes that organs, especially those the removal of which would cause death, “cannot be regarded as property” because they are not separable from ourselves.207 Likewise, our interests in our ideas or expressions cannot really be property, because they too cannot meaningfully be separated from ourselves.208

The problem with this thesis as a theory of what can be owned is twofold. First, it appears underdeveloped on its own terms—it’s a theory of what we own as opposed to who we are, but it is not clear it functions as a theory of what can be owned simpliciter.209 It’s not clear, for instance, how the separability criterion might apply to information or concepts, which is essential for a theory of the boundaries of property because much of what we talk about the limits of ownership in bioethics is about ownership of truths—genetic sequences or the biological implications of those sequences.

Consider Einstein’s theory of relativity. Einstein was the first to discover an essential truth about the universe. It is associated with him

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205 Penner, supra note 22, at 111.
206 Id. at 112.
207 Id. at 122.
208 Id. at 119 (“Whatever rights the inventor or the artist has, when we start speaking of property rights in ideas and artistic works, things begin to lose sense. A true property right in an idea or an expression would constitute a right or exclusion from that idea or that expression itself.”).
209 See, e.g., Claeys, Property, Concepts, and Functions, supra note 35, at 48 (noting that the separability theory assumes a “fundamental distinction between persons who are capable of exercising and claiming rights and objects separate from those persons”).
Property's Boundaries

("Einstein's theory," after all). And it is *contingently* associated with him, because surely someone else could have discovered it; it could have been someone else’s. This seems to suggest that the theory of relativity can be owned, but that makes little sense. On the other hand, in some sense Einstein’s articulation of the theory is like “an idea or an expression,” too tied up in personality to be separable.210 This would suggest—apparently correctly—that the theory of relativity cannot be owned, but on the odd ground that it *is* Einstein. In short, although the theory is helpful in distinguishing that which *is* us from that which we *own*, it applies less clearly in telling us what can be owned as an abstract matter.211

Second, the separability thesis runs into much the same challenge as the exclusion criterion—control is conceptually prior. If you can control something, you can separate it and alienate it—that’s part of what it means to absolutely control it. In contrast, there are things that are separable that you do not control, and that you do not own, maybe like Einstein and his theory of relativity. The blueness of the sky is separable (indeed, entirely separated from) any individual persons, but it cannot be owned because it cannot be controlled. Thus, although it is onto something important about the nature of ownership and can be helpful in some circumstances in adjudicating its boundaries, the separability criterion is entailed by and less general than a criterion of control.

3. The Labor Theory

Perhaps the most famous theory of property in history is John Locke’s, which holds that ownership arises from “mix[ing]” labor with anything an individual “removes out of the state that nature hath provided.”212 Although Locke’s was primarily a normative theory about who ought to

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210 Penner, supra note 22, at 119. Although Penner himself does not characterize intellectual property as ownership of information (instead he argues it is a government-backed monopoly), he suggests some sympathy to the notion that Einstein’s theory is non-contingently and ineluctably his. See id. (“The light bulb is Edison’s invention whoever makes use of it, and *Bleak House* is Dickens’s whoever reads it.”).

211 See Claeys, Property, Concepts, and Functions, supra note 35, at 49 (“Separability keeps the field of property away from the persons and focused on non-personal resources.”).

212 See Locke, supra note 37, at 185.
own what, it relies on an implicit theory of what can be owned—that with which it is possible to mix labor.

The challenge with this theory is that it rests on a crucial ambiguity about what it means to mix one’s labor with something—and how literally to take that imagery. Indeed, Locke’s examples of extracting, say, fruits and berries from the state of nature certainly involve labor, but it’s not clear what work the “mixing” metaphor is doing here, as the physical berries are after all unmixed, just moved. Such instances appear more straightforwardly to be the exercise of control over the berries. Since control entails agency, and agency entails some exertion of energy, it’s not clear whether the idea of “mixing” one’s energy with the item adds anything beyond a criterion that the thing be subject to human dominion, which is what the control criterion is all about.

And indeed, the imagery of mixing has led to substantial confusion in the philosophical literature. For instance, Robert Nozick, relying quite literally on Locke’s “mixing” imagery, famously criticized the labor theory as indeterminate: “If I own a can of tomato juice and spill it in the sea so that its molecules (made radioactive, so I can check this) mingle evenly throughout the sea, do I thereby come to own the sea, or have I foolishly dissipated my tomato juice?” In other words, one way of reading Locke’s theory is as requiring the conclusion that mixing one’s tomato juice with the sea makes one the owner of the sea. This is absurd and would be grounds for rejecting the theory. And it is absurd precisely because of the control criterion—by dumping one’s tomato juice, one loses control of the tomato juice rather than gains control of the sea; one no longer owns the tomato juice rather than now owns the sea. Many scholars have argued that taking the “mixing” metaphor this literally is a

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213 See, e.g., Jeffrey Friedman, Introduction to Locke, supra note 37, at 17–18) (“Locke’s purpose is, evidently, not so much to propose the correct theory of property rights as to deny the political authority Filmer derived from his incorrect theory [that the King’s ownership over the land gave him political sovereignty]. Absent Filmer’s claim that God gave the world to Adam and hence unlimited authority to kings, one may doubt whether Locke would have needed to discuss property at all in a political tract aimed at establishing a right of revolution.”); see also Walton H. Hamilton, Property—According to Locke, 41 Yale L.J. 864, 867 (1932) (“The fragment on property is not a detached essay, but a chapter in a purposive disquisition upon civil government. It is a skillful bit of dialectic aimed, not at the analysis of an institution, but to help along an argument against the divine pretensions of kings.”).

214 See Locke, supra note 37, at 185–86; see also Björkman & Hansson, supra note 13, at 210 (“Locke’s natural rights theory has the distinct advantage of providing a general account of property that gives some guidance to when legitimate ownership is present or not.”).

misreading of Locke, but to the extent that it is a fair reading of the labor theory, the control criterion better captures our understanding of the concept of ownership.

But if instead Locke’s theory is read as something more like a criterion of manipulability—that something can be owned to the extent it can be moved and changed—that is indeed what the control criterion captures. It is impossible to control that which you cannot change, and therefore that which you cannot change cannot be owned. In short, depending on how one reads Locke’s theory (which, to be fair, is implicit rather than fully articulated in his discussion of property), the control criterion either avoids the absurd conclusions that the “mixing” theory requires, or is largely getting at the same thing while avoiding a confusing metaphor.

4. Wilson’s “Mine-ness”

The final alternative theory of what can be owned is a new one, outlined by Bart Wilson in a recent book. Wilson disputes that ownership is in fact the conceptual core of property law and instead argues that property is rooted in the atomistic concept “mine.” The universal semantic prime MINE cannot, Wilson argues, be subdivided or defined except in terms of itself, and is conceptually prior to control or dominion: “Mine ... is not dominium. Mine is not absolute, nor is mine the right to exclude. Mine is mine like I is I and you is you. Mine is singular, atomic, reflexive, the core of property.”

Although I do not dispute the idea that there may be some irreducible conceptual singularity to the concept of mine-ness, that concept does not ground the law of property—or at least the concept of ownership as control is (even if itself derived) more parsimonious and less overinclusive as a theory of property. Indeed, while it is true that we can assert “this is mine” about everything that can be property, the problem is

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216 See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Labor, Exclusion, and Flourishing in Property Law, 95 N.C. L. Rev. 413, 437 (2017) (noting that Nozick’s hypothetical simply illustrates that the concept of labor does not “cover[] activity that exerts positive effort of no or negative moral value”).

217 See generally Wilson, supra note 37 (describing property as a “universal and uniquely human custom”).

218 See id. at 103 (discussing the origins of the word “ownership” in English and noting that it plays a unique role as a transitive verb); id. at 116 (“[Honoré] is compelled to put the word own in quotation marks for the obvious reason that the English transitive verb own doesn’t directly translate one to one into many (if any) languages.”).

219 Id. at 55 (“Mine means what mine means . . . .”).

220 Id. at 119.
that—precisely as Penner points with the separability criterion—we use the concept mine-ness in relation to all kinds of things that plainly are not property and have nowhere been understood as property—"it’s always been a dream of mine," “he was a friend of mine,” “you are the best thing that’s ever been mine." Indeed it seems possible to say “this is mine" about nearly everything with which one is connected or identified no matter how ephemeral and abstract, including “our talents, our personalities, our eyesight, or our friendships," things that no one thinks anywhere of as property.

Property is of course not about dreams, friends, and lovers. Nor, importantly, does Wilson point to any cultural or historical examples where the kind of mine-ness we feel in our essential personality has been conceptualized as property. Wilson’s theory thus suffers an inverted conceptual problem to the separability thesis—it correctly tells us that we cannot own truths about the universe (while you can say “the blueness of the sky is mine," it is meaningless), the theory fails to cleanly distinguish between that which we understand to be ourselves and that which is our property.

The reason that property is not about dreams, friends, or lovers is because we do not own these things. And we do not own these things because we cannot control them—friends and lovers because they have their own agency, and dreams because they simply arise in our consciousness. Indeed, one way to think of property is that it is not merely that about which we can assert “this is mine,” but that about which we can assert “this is mine” and exercise absolute control over. In short, the theory of property as rooted in ownership as control narrows the concept of mine-ness to precisely its application in property, as opposed to its more general role in personal identity.

IV. THE THEORY APPLIED

Understanding property law as grounded in a concept of ownership-as-dominion offers a straightforwardly litigable line of property’s

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221 Taylor Swift, Mine, on Speak Now (Big Mach. Label Grp. 2010); cf. Render, The Law of the Body, supra note 19, at 577 (“Linguistically, I lay claim to the right to use ‘my’ body in the manner that I see fit (short of harming the body of another), reserving no linguistic possibility of a more democratic management of this unique resource.”).

222 Penner, The Idea of Property, supra note 22, at 111.

223 Cf. Björkman & Hansson, supra note 13, at 212 (“It is common to say that a person ‘owns’ her body (but not that she ‘owns’ her freedom of expression or her right to vote).”.)
boundaries. **Ownable things** include anything over which it is conceptually possible to exercise absolute dominion. **Unownable things** cover anything over which it is impossible, in principle, for a human being to exercise absolute decision-making authority. This Part discusses some of the paradigmatic examples of things that can be owned under this theory—including organs, corpses, and labor—and unownable things—such as genetic information and personal data.

Finally, this Part addresses an essential challenge case for the theory of property law organized around the concept of ownership-as-dominion—intellectual property. Inventions—applications of facts about the world—can no more really be subject to dominion than the facts themselves. But our law has always recognized something resembling an ownership interest in invention or composition, a powerful challenge for a theory of property law as delimited by the concept of ownership. Below, I offer two responses from the theory of ownership-as-dominion to the challenge of intellectual property.

**A. Ownable Things**

The philosophical and legal debate over whether we own our bodies and their parts is centuries old—John Locke found it self-evident that we do; Kant that it was metaphysically impossible. The question continues to be debated in the law reviews today. The common law has weighed in after death, long holding that we have no ownership interest in our own corpses—and indeed that no one can own a corpse. But the desire to exercise control over our mortal remains is so intuitive that most states have created a statutory “quasi-property” right to control the disposition of our bodies after our death, qualified by states’ prerogative of autopsy and ensuring burial.

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224 Locke, supra note 37, at 185 (“Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right to but himself.”).


226 See, e.g., Render, The Law of the Body, supra note 19, at 549, 551.


228 See id. at 18–19.
During life, the question of whether we owned our bodies was largely academic until the advent of modern organ transplantation techniques. But since the 1950s, when organ transplantation became feasible, a lively debate has sprung up over ownership interests in organs—during life and after death. In many ways, this debate parallels older questions of whether individuals own their bodies—pitting those that argue that we own our bodies, and follow Locke in asserting largely intuitive grounds, and those following Kant who argue that one cannot own one's organs because one is a collection of one's organs. Similar controversies concern ownership in tissue samples or blood spots. And many philosophers have argued that human reproductive materials—sperm cells, egg cells, and embryos made during in vitro fertilization—cannot be owned.

From the theory of ownership as a descriptive relationship of dominion, the conceptual resolution is clear. We can exercise control over our bodies. In a state of nature—or with enough firepower—we can do

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229 See David Hamilton, A History of Organ Transplantation, at xiv (2012) (“It was not until the early 1950s that surgeons embarked with growing success on what was widely considered to be an unreachable mission, namely to successfully graft an organ from one person to another.”); see also Björkman & Hansson, supra note 13, at 212 (“[D]ue to transplantation surgery healthy organs can now be parted with for much better reason than in Kant’s time.”).

230 See, e.g., Render, The Law of the Body, supra note 19, at 576–77 (arguing that we “own” our bodies in part by observing that “our intuitive sense that we ‘own’ our bodies is deeply ingrained from an early age,” and that sense “seems only to accelerate as we pass into adulthood”).

231 See, e.g., David Hersenov, Self-Ownership, Relational Dignity, and Organ Sales, 32 Bioethics 430, 430 (2018) (“Material property has traditionally been conceived of as separable and thus external from its owner, otherwise it could not be something alienable and transferable. Combine this conceptual claim with the metaphysical claim that we are each identical to a living human animal and the result will be that self-ownership is impossible, for self-separation cannot be accomplished.”).

232 See, e.g., Deleso A. Alford, HeLa Cells and Unjust Enrichment in the Human Body, 21 Annals Health L. 223, 224 (2012) (discussing the “ongoing debate as to whether the ownership of cells is a legally protected interest”); Madison Jennings, Protected Genetics: A Case for Property and Privacy Interests in One’s Own Genetic Material, 23 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 1, 11 (2016) (“[C]onsumers and patients have the right to be informed, and the right to control what becomes of their own genetic materials.”); see also Gregory S. Alexander, Property, Dignity, and Human Flourishing, 104 Cornell L. Rev. 991, 1016 (2019) (arguing that Henrietta Lacks ought to have had an ownership interest in her cells on human flourishing grounds).

233 See source cited supra note 14.

234 See source cited supra note 16.

whatever we want with our bodies, and no one can stop us. The fact that, in contemporary society, most of us could not in fact prevent all others from interfering with our bodies is beside the point. The test is conceptual, not factual. After all, by virtue of living in a sovereign state equipped with a descriptive monopoly on violence, none of us in fact exercise dominion over anything. But people could control their bodies, and they are therefore the proper conceptual subjects of a property law grounded in ownership.

So too with corpses, organs, and tissue samples. Organs that have been removed from our bodies can clearly be the subject of dominion, same as any other personal property—if I have my kidney on my desk, I can smash it, preserve it in formaldehyde, or trade it for someone else’s, and no one can stop me. The question of organ ownership is more contested while organs are a part of our bodies, but here the same logic applies as with bodies themselves. While my kidney is in my body, I can do whatever I want with it. I can keep it from you; with enough local anesthesia and a steady hand I could take it out; or (perhaps more prudently) I can pay someone to take it out for me, but only on my terms. Organs and tissue samples, then, are ownable. With corpses the case is straightforward, and indeed, the only serious objection to the ownership of corpses has ever been normative—a question of what should be owned—rather than conceptual—what can be owned.  

236 See, e.g., House: After Hours (Fox television broadcast May 16, 2011).
237 On the conceptually distinct question of who owns organs, it is an uncontroversial principle of substantive property law that our organs are owned by each of us as the first possessor. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 28, at 57 (“[A]mong the ways that ownership can get started is for someone to possess a thing for the first time with the requisite intent.”). This is distinct from the question of what we might do with that ownership—perhaps we can deed a kidney to a research organization and reserve a life estate for ourselves. Alternatively, we might, for normative reasons, object to the alienability of human organs. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849, 1865 (1987).
238 See, e.g., Andrew Campbell-Tiech, A Corpse in Law, 117 Brit. J. Haematology 809, 811 (2002) ("Legislators and Courts have assumed for at least two centuries that no matter how little regard the populace pays to the welfare of its members whilst alive, in death the body of the citizen must be accorded a dignity which its erstwhile occupant might well have preferred to enjoy somewhat earlier."). Alternatively, the common law rule was justified on erroneous descriptive assumptions. See, e.g., Timothy Craig Allen, The Evolution of Decedent Ownership, 143 Archives of Pathology & Lab. Med. 1048, 1049 (2019) (“In the 17th century, the human body was considered philosophically to be the temple of the Holy Ghost, and thus, although men left their bodies for a short time at death, it was understood that they would require their bodies when they returned on Resurrection Day.").
In what would go on to become a classic casebook chestnut, John Moore began treatment for hairy-cell leukemia at the UCLA Medical Center in 1976.239 In the course of Moore's treatment, his physicians learned that his cancerous cells could potentially be lucrative for research.240 The doctors recommended that Moore have his spleen removed, as “necessary to slow down the progress of his disease,” but they had already decided to use portions of the spleen for research.241 They did not disclose to Moore their intended use of the spleen, but otherwise obtained his consent, informed as to the health risks and benefits, to the procedure.242 After extracting the spleen—and additional tissue samples on follow-up visits—the doctors isolated (and patented) an immortal cell line that Moore, in his complaint, alleged could be worth $3 billion.243 Moore sued for, inter alia, conversion.244

Similarly, as discussed above, Henrietta Lacks sought treatment for cancer in 1951, during which doctors took a sample of her cancerous cells without her knowledge or consent (but following standard practice at the time).245 They found that they were genetically unique and would continue to divide and generate new cells, and used the cells to create the first immortal cell line—HeLa—still routinely used in biomedical research and of nearly inestimable monetary value.246 Her estate has now sued biotechnology companies for unjust enrichment premised on, among other things, the “theft” of her cells.247 Similar cases in which human biological material is legitimately taken for some medical purpose and then information learned from those cells is used for some other purpose—leading to a property claim by the people from whom the

239 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 481 (Cal. 1990).
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 481–82. To be fair, Moore’s lawyers conceded that “the true clinical potential of each of the [cell lines] . . . [is] difficult to predict.” Id. at 482.
244 Id. at 482 n.4.
245 See Fresh Air, Interview with Rebecca Skloot, NPR (Feb. 2, 2010), https://www.npr.org/transcripts/123232331 [https://perma.cc/2W8Z-LYW6] (“They were taking cervical cancer tissues from any woman who walked into Hopkins with cervical cancer, and this was absolutely the standard treatment. And, in fact, it was considered the sort of top of the line.”).
246 See Skloot, supra note 2, at 5.
247 Lacks Complaint, supra note 1, at 12.
material had been taken as to the products of that information—arise with some frequency.\textsuperscript{248}

The theory of ownership-as-dominion explains the appropriate analytical process for these kinds of cases. John Moore and Henrietta Lacks owned their spleen and tumor cells, respectively, when they walked into the hospital—such things are ownable, and Moore and Lacks owned them under substantive property law as the first possessor.\textsuperscript{249} But this alone does not mean they have stated a claim for conversion in the doctors' appropriation of their biological materials. Rather, we must analyze under substantive property law whether they deeded that property interest to the doctors or abandoned their ownership by consenting to the medical procedures.\textsuperscript{250} Indeed, that is how the court may have ultimately ruled in \textit{Moore v. Regents of the University of California}—although it made suggestive noises that spleens, in principle, cannot be owned,\textsuperscript{251} Meredith Render has persuasively argued that the opinion is best read as \textit{assuming} Moore owned his spleen, but that he abandoned it when he consented to a splenectomy with no indication that he wanted the organ back.\textsuperscript{252}

But these cases, of course, are not really about the conversion of the physical tissue. John Moore did not actually want his spleen back; the

\textsuperscript{248} See, e.g., Greenberg v. Mia. Child.'s Hosp. Rsch. Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1066--67 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Michelle M. Mello & Leslie E. Wolf, The Havasupai Indian Tribe Case—Lessons for Research Involving Stored Biologic Samples, 363 New Eng. J. Med. 204, 204 (2010); see also Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 670 (8th Cir. 2007) (involving an dispute over the “ownership of biological materials contributed by individuals” between the university where the material was housed and a researcher claiming that “the contributing individuals could direct the transfer of their biological materials to him”).

\textsuperscript{249} See supra note 247 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{250} See, e.g., Ford v. Baerg, 532 S.W.3d 638, 641 n.2 (Ky. 2017) (summarizing elements of common law conversion).

\textsuperscript{251} See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 489 (Cal. 1990) (“[T]he laws governing such things as human tissues, transplantable organs, blood, fetuses, pituitary glands, corneal tissue, and dead bodies deal with human biological materials as objects sui generis . . . .”).

\textsuperscript{252} See Render, The Law of the Body, supra note 19, at 572--73 (“[T]he central holding of \textit{Moore} is merely an articulation of the standard for abandonment in the context of bodily material: we abandon our bodily material when we consent to its removal and make no provision for its disposition or return . . . So rather than denying the possibility that we own our bodies, the holding in \textit{Moore} actually \textit{relies} upon the assumption that we own our bodies. If Moore had no interest in his spleen prior to the splenectomy, the decision would be rendered incoherent.”); see also \textit{Moore}, 793 P.2d at 488--89 (“Moore clearly did not expect to retain possession of his cells following their removal . . . .”).
tissue sample taken from Lacks's cervical tumor is long-since gone.253 These cases are about a claim of ownership in the genetic information contained in the cells, which was used to derive profitable immortal cell lines. This is a question of the boundaries of property with which the theory of ownership-as-dominion can help us.

Information is not something over which dominion can be exercised by human agents. This is because we cannot, conceptually, do whatever we want with it—others (in conjunction with physical laws) can prevent us. I cannot prevent you from knowing the sky is blue, you can look up; I cannot sell the blueness of the sky, you wouldn’t want it; I cannot destroy that the sky is blue. The blueness of the sky is a fact about the universe subject to no human dominion—subject, indeed, to no dominion at all. The same is true of genetic information. We cannot exercise dominion over our genes or genomes. For one thing, we share 99.9% of the nucleotides in our genome with every other homo sapien—I cannot control HOXAl because if I refuse to give you a sample, you can get it from anyone else (or almost anything else alive, in the case of HOXAl).254 This basic intuition about the nature of ownership as dominion appeared to do some work in Moore, where the court noted that “the particular genetic material which is responsible for the natural production of lymphokines,” the product of the immortal cell line, “is . . . the same in every person.”255 Moore can’t own it if we all could too.

Even, however, the idiosyncratic 0.1% of our genomes that makes us different from other people is not something over which we can exercise dominion, even in principle. Much of it is shared by our closest relatives—we cannot own it if they can give it up.256 Even to the extent that we have idiosyncratic single-nucleotide polymorphisms that cannot

253 Moore, 793 P.2d at 489 n.20. Indeed, the court in Moore held that the cell line he was claiming ownership in was “both factually and legally distinct from the cells taken from Moore’s body.” Id. at 492–93; see also Heng, supra note 12, at 167 (“I contend that the continual divergence of chromosomal features (‘karyotype’) and DNA sequence in dynamic cancer-cell populations undermines debate over ownership of the HeLa cancer-cell line derived from Henrietta Lacks six decades ago.”).


255 793 P.2d at 490.

256 See, e.g., Natalie Ram, DNA by the Entirety, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 873, 877 (2015) (“Genetic information is shared, and it is shared immutably and nonvolitionally.”).
be interpolated from other people’s genetic information, we leave a trail of our unique genetic information everywhere we go, with everything we do.\textsuperscript{257} It is not something that we could conceptually prevent other people from accessing. It is not something that can be owned. Thus, \textit{Moore}—and federal cases that followed it—correctly rejected claims for conversion in genetic information, consistent with the boundaries of the concept of ownership at the heart of property law.\textsuperscript{258} If genetic information cannot be owned, it cannot be stolen.

This discussion complements the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis in the landmark 2013 case \textit{Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.}\textsuperscript{259} There’s some tension in the foregoing. I argued that Moore did not own his genetic information used to derive the immortal cell line because he could not possibly have exercised dominion over it—it is simply information in principle accessible to anyone. But the doctors in \textit{Moore} patented the immortal cell line, worth potentially billions of dollars.\textsuperscript{260} How can researchers own genetic information that individuals do not own, if, indeed, such things cannot in principle be owned?

They cannot. No one can own genetic information—not the individuals in whom the information was first found, and not the scientists who found it. \textit{Myriad} makes this clear. Before \textit{Myriad}, human genes were legally patentable, but this had always been controversial.\textsuperscript{261} In \textit{Myriad}, the Supreme Court agreed with the critics and held that naturally occurring human genes cannot be patented.\textsuperscript{262} And it did so precisely on the “implicit exception” to patentability that “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.”\textsuperscript{263} That which cannot be subject to human dominion, in other words, cannot be owned.

\textsuperscript{257} See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming ‘Abandoned’ DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 857, 858 (2006) (“We leave traces—skin, saliva, hair, and blood—of our genetic identity nearly everywhere we go.”).


\textsuperscript{259} 569 U.S. 576, 590–91 (2013).

\textsuperscript{260} 793 P.2d at 481–82.

\textsuperscript{261} See, e.g., Amanda S. Pitcher, Contrary to First Impression, Genes are Patentable: Should There Be Limitations?, 6 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 284, 284 (2003) (“[T]he benefits arising from gene patents overcome objections to their patenting . . . .”); Hubert Curien, The Human Genome Project and Patents, 254 Sci. 1710, 1710 (1991) (“A patent should not be granted for something that is part of our universal heritage.”).

\textsuperscript{262} 569 U.S. at 589.

\textsuperscript{263} \textit{Myriad}, 569 U.S. at 589 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012)).
To be clear, the fact that, as a conceptual matter, information cannot be owned does not preclude legislatures from granting people rights to control information that resemble ownership, which may even operate by explicit analogy to the concept of ownership. In other words, there is nothing about the fact that genetic information or browsing data cannot conceptually be owned that precludes legislatures from passing statutes that extend something like property protections to those kinds of things—nor does it even suggest anything about whether this would be a good idea. But it does suggest that those decisions must be made by citizens collectively through their legislative representatives, not by judges adjudicating the conceptual limits of ownership.

C. Intellectual Property

Myriad is an intellectual property ("IP") case, and it must be squared with an earlier intellectual property case—Diamond v. Chakrabarty, which held that organisms that are genetically engineered by scientists are patentable. The Court reasoned there that biological inventions are comparable to any other patentable invention—"a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature" that was "not nature's handiwork, but [the inventor's] own." Today there are many patents for living organisms outstanding. In deciding Diamond, the Court straightforwardly applied principles of intellectual property law—"Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor."

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264 See, e.g., Reinach, supra note 97, at 5 ("The positive law can deviate as it likes from the essential necessities which hold for legal entities and structures . . . ."); Baron, supra note 36, at 370 (2012) ("It is likely that, at the end of the day, individuals will as a matter of policy be granted some rights to control some of their personal information, but those rights will not follow from anything in property’s ‘nature.’"); Baltzer-Jaray, Bogged Down, supra note 135, at 167 ("Codified law can enact rules about promises, it can incorporate or not incorporate elements of justice, but regardless, it cannot touch the being and objective truth these entities have.").


266 Id. at 309–10.


Intellectual property is a challenge for the theory of ownership-as-dominion. After all, it appears to be ownership in information, which I’ve argued is conceptually impossible. And it is conceptually impossible, at least in the strongest sense. Chakrabarty’s oil-eating bacteria are just a particular sequence of nucleotides that in principle anyone could understand and arrange; Hamlet is just an arrangement of words that anyone could have in principle put together on their own; the steam engine follows straightforwardly from universally discoverable laws of thermodynamics.269

Intellectual property is a challenge for any theory of property.270 Indeed, there is a great deal of controversy as to whether it is properly thought of as property at all.271 This is perhaps the cleanest response the theory of ownership-as-dominion has to the challenge of intellectual property—it is not really property at all but that it is entirely a creature of statute built for policy reasons. Legislatures, of course, can pursue any normative goals they want however they want, not limited by concepts and their entailments.272 And one way in which legislatures can accomplish their normative prerogatives is by looking to the doctrines that courts have developed in common law and finding principles that might apply by analogy.

We might think of intellectual property in this way. It might not really be something that can be owned. But it’s possible that Congress looked at the substantive common law of property and decided that it was a good fit for what it was trying to accomplish with intellectual property—presumably pursuing normative ends involving incentivizing innovation and encouraging art. This is perfectly coherent and legitimate and would explain intellectual property’s complicated role as both not real

269 Cf., e.g., Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 Yale L.J. 1742, 1744 (2007) (“From the consumer’s point of view, information is nonrival and nonexcludable: one person’s enjoyment of the plot of Hamlet does not diminish another’s (if anything, the opposite), and preventing people from using information is difficult.”).
270 See, e.g., id. at 1744 (“At the core of controversies over the correct scope of intellectual property lie grave doubts about whether intellectual property is property.”).
271 Id.
272 See, e.g., Reinach, supra note 97, at 5 (“The positive law can deviate as it likes from the essential necessities which hold for legal entities and structures.”).
ownership, but related to and drawing on general principles of property law.

This response, however, may not be entirely satisfactory. And there is an alternative. In short, it might be that intellectual property is a rough approximation of a real kind of ownership—the temporary relationship of absolute control an inventor or artist in fact retains with respect to her creations.

There are two essential, ubiquitous forms of intellectual property—copyrights and patents. Copyrights resemble an ownership interest in creative works, "such as poems, novels, music, paintings, films, computer software, etc." In order to be copyrightable, a work must be "original"—"independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and . . . possess[ing] at least some minimal degree of creativity." In contrast, "[n]o author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates." Copyrights are limited in duration "for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author's death." Patents resemble an ownership interest in inventions. In order to be patentable, an invention must be (1) new, (2) useful, and (3) non-obvious. As discussed above, "[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable." Once granted, a patent endures for twenty years.

Each of these basic features of intellectual property law can be understood as constricting the reach of IP law—in a rough and stylized

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273 For instance, it is temporally limited, while most conceptions of ownership see it as necessarily temporally unlimited. See, e.g., Honoré, supra note 50, at 217 (listing the absence of term limitation as an essential incident of ownership).
274 See generally, e.g., Smith, Intellectual Property, supra note 269, at 1742 (describing intellectual property law's close relationship to the substantive common law of property).
276 Id. at 8.
way—to those things over which dominion could, in principle, be exercised on some reasonable assumptions. From this perspective, ownership of intellectual property can be seen as an approximation of conceptual ownership.

Of course, as mathematicians and philosophers never cease to remind us, it is possible that monkeys randomly typing could produce *Hamlet.* But it is vanishingly unlikely. As a matter of probability, people are not coincidentally churning out identical works of art at the same time. In fact, William Shakespeare could have exercised dominion over *Hamlet.* He could have kept it to himself; he could have burned it; he could have made Rosenkrantz and Guildenstern the heroes; or he could have handed over the text on the condition that the director give him a part. The director could respond, “Well, I’ll just write my own,” but it almost certainly would not have been *Hamlet.* Shakespeare could have acted like an owner of *Hamlet* and would have been justified in feeling that he really did own it in an important sense.

So too with inventions, but not quite so strongly. Inventions take work, ingenuity, and luck. It is often surely true that an inventor can, in fact, exercise this same kind of dominion over inventions—hide them, destroy them, offer access to them under certain conditions, etc. But practically speaking, this exercise of dominion is much less secure because it is much more likely that someone else can or will create that same invention relatively soon. Take the use of CRISPR-Cas9 as a human gene editing technology, the subject now of vicious patent battles between the scientists Jennifer Doudna and Feng Zhang who each developed the technology within months of each other. Indeed, stories of near-simultaneous invention are ubiquitous in history, and perhaps becoming more common. But still, an inventor can often and for some time control her invention absolutely.

From this perspective, the basic structure of intellectual property law is roughly consonant with the practical realities that inventors and artists

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285 Cf. Monkeys Don’t Write Shakespeare, Wired (May 9, 2003), https://www.wired.com/2003/05/monkeys-dont-write-shakespeare/ [https://perma.cc/4FXX-SQYF] (“Researchers at Plymouth University in England reported this week that primates left alone with a computer attacked the machine and failed to produce a single word.”).
287 See James H. Lubowitz, Jefferson C. Brand & Michael J. Rossi, Two of a Kind: Multiple Discovery AKA Simultaneous Invention is the Rule, 34 Arthroscopy 2257 (2018).
could in fact exercise dominion over their creations for at least some period of time. For this dominion to be possible, of course, the invention or work of art must not be a copy, it must be new, and it must not be obvious. If it were, even temporary dominion would be conceptually impossible—if an invention is obvious, as a matter of definition, its purported creator cannot decide what other people will do with it. The dominion of inventors and artists is, moreover, time-limited as a practical matter. Perhaps *Hamlet* is a singular achievement, but maybe we can imagine people randomly throwing paint at a canvas might produce works functionally identical to Jackson Pollack’s *Mural* every 150 years or so. The temporal protection for copyright is lengthy—the life of the author plus seventy years. The temporal protection for patents is much shorter, a mere twenty years, perhaps a rough approximation for how long, on average, it would take from an invention for another person to invent the same thing.

Of course, these rough approximations might be otherwise. We might think it so improbable that any creative work could really be created twice by coincidence that copyright is bona fide ownership. Similarly, we might think that the pace of invention has sped up so much that a twenty-year patent protection no longer makes sense as an approximation of actual dominion. But the point is that the basic contours of our intellectual property regime—originality requirements, strong temporal protections for things that are improbably replicated, and weaker temporal protections for things more easily replicated—roughly track the ways in which we would realistically expect creators or inventors could exercise dominion over their creations. From this perspective, intellectual property need not be seen as fundamentally inconsistent with the theory of ownership as control nor as a statutory chimera. There might be a real and important sense in which we own the creative works we make or the inventions we develop.

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288 Indeed, to the extent that the Rule Against Perpetuities can be seen as a common law limit on posthumous property ownership (which is also conceptually impossible; the dead cannot actually exercise dominion), copyright closely mirrors the rule, though tied to the life of the author rather than all lives in being. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 28, at 567. The point is that, given the effective dominion that artists could exercise over artistic creations in perpetuity, copyright is nearly that.
CONCLUSION

Legal theory has long maintained that the boundaries of property are a conceptually arbitrary policy question. This, I’ve argued, is wrong, and arises from a misconception about the importance and possibility of extra-legal concepts. If the concept of ownership did not exist outside of the law, common law adjudication of its boundaries would be an illegitimate enterprise. But ownership *does* exist outside of the law—whether a metaphysical category, a concept evolved into our thought, or a social construction. The concept carries with it certain descriptive entailments, most importantly for understanding its boundaries that it cannot exist where absolute control is impossible. This observation cuts through the morass of debates at the boundaries of property—organs, embryos, corpses, and other human biological matter can, conceptually, be owned; genetic and other information, no matter how personal, cannot be.

This is not to say, of course, that there *are* no policy questions that must be answered in designing a substantive positive law of property to govern the new things we can own, and in designing remedies for the real harms involved in the appropriation and publication of genetic information or personal data outside of it. Indeed, an understanding of the conceptual entailments of ownership is merely a descriptive first step, and we must still answer the more challenging normative questions of whether there are things that we can own but should not, who ought to own those things we can, and how we ought to govern ownership in particular kinds of things. But with this conceptual understanding, we can enter those debates with clarity and an agreed-upon understanding of the descriptive questions in the background. At the end of the day, conceptually, there are some things we can own, and some things that we can’t.
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