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The Delinquent “Toddler”

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The Delinquent
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The Minimum Age of Responsibility

By Merril Sobie

Twenty-first century juvenile justice jurisprudence has focused on the criminal responsibility of adolescents, including, notably, the interface between psychological and neurological development and social accountability. The focus has led to a growing awareness that teenagers should not be equated with or held as accountable as adults. For example, several states, including Connecticut, Illinois, and Mississippi, have raised the age of criminal responsibility from 16 or 17 to 18, with a corresponding expansion of juvenile court jurisdiction. Of potentially greater significance, the principle of diminished criminal responsibility has gained credibility. Witness, for example, the US Supreme Court holding that capital punishment cannot be imposed on persons under the age of 18 (Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)), while life without the possibility of parole cannot be imposed when a juvenile has been convicted of a nonhomicide offense (Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. (2010)). Simultaneously, several states have statutorily restricted the transfer of cases from the juvenile courts to the adult criminal court, partially reversing the late twentieth century “get tough” approach.

Overlooked has been the younger or preteen child. Most American states do not maintain a minimum age limitation for juvenile delinquency jurisdiction. Thirty-five states lack any statutory provision, permitting at least the theoretical prosecution of an infant. The remaining 15 have enacted statutes establishing minimum ages ranging from six to 10. The vast majority of American children under the age of 12 may be charged with criminal activity. The vast majority may consequently be subject to detention, confinement in residential institutions, and the adverse collateral consequences of a delinquency finding.

In 2008 (the most recent year of available relevant statistics), 40,748 American children under the age of 12 were referred to court for prosecution as juvenile delinquents (Nat'l Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, Easy Access to Juvenile Court Statistics: 1985–2008, OJJDP (2011), www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezajcs/). Of those, 7,752 were adjudicated as delinquent. Local court statistics confirm the national pattern. In 2010, 100 alleged offenders aged eight or nine were referred to the Maricopa County Juvenile Court in Phoenix. (See H. Ted Rubin, Increases in the Maximum Age of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 17 JUV. JUST. UPDATE 4, 14 (2011.).) In Memphis, Tennessee, 113 children 10 and younger, including eight children aged five and six, were referred to court in 2009. (Id.) Although prosecution of the very young is not a recent development, the phenomenon may have been fuelled in recent years by the “get tough” on juvenile crime approach and the prevalence of “zero tolerance” policies by public schools (a 2001 ABA resolution condemns “zero tolerance” policies). Given the low age cohort, it is not surprising that, as the OJJDP statistics indicate, most cases are diverted, withdrawn, or dismissed. However, even children who have not been formally adjudicated suffer the deleterious repercussions of arrest, police questioning, possible detention, and the intimidating nature of judicial proceedings. And the almost 8,000 who are found to be delinquent annually confront the possibility or the reality of incarceration or the curtailment of their freedom through probationary conditions and governmental supervision.

At the international level, most countries have established (CONTINUED ON PAGE 41)

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eligible for a period that begins once their sentence is complete. The exclusionary period ranges from a minimum of three years to a maximum of six, with a few bans extending indefinitely. Adjudicating juveniles as adults subjects entire families to the same restrictions placed on offenders. This puts many families in the difficult position of having to choose among losing public housing, living apart from their children, or committing a crime themselves by omitting their children from the application. For the families there is no good choice, and for the children, this can vastly increase the chance of recidivism.

Effects on Immigration
Adjudicating a juvenile as an adult can have catastrophic effects on immigrants and their families. People considered an adult for criminal purposes are also considered an adult for immigration and deportation purposes. (See Nat'l Lawyers Guild, Immigration Law and Crimes § 2:7 (2011), available at Westlaw IMLC § 2:7.) Once convicted of a qualifying offense (see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a), 1182(a)), a resident noncitizen is subject to deportation at the discovery and discretion of an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officer. Sometimes an individual will be deported upon the completion of a prison sentence, and, other times, an individual will be deported years later when an officer notices the prior conviction and decides to initiate proceedings. If someone who incurred an adult criminal conviction while a juvenile decides to apply for citizenship, even years after the offense, immigration authorities will have cause to scrutinize the individual's background. Upon discovery of a qualifying conviction, the individual may end up back in custody facing crushing consequences of an act committed long ago.

Conclusion
Studies have shown that two-thirds of children who commit crimes as minors do not reoffend later in life. (See Merril Sobie, Pity the Child: The Age of Delinquency in New York, 30 Pace L. Rev. 1061, 1089 (2010).) Those that do reoffend as adults will be subjected to the same collateral consequences as all other adult offenders, and the public has the previously mentioned mechanisms in place as safeguards against such repeat offenders. Those that do not reoffend do not deserve the same lifetime criminalization. As such, a system that automatically adjudicates children as adults is counterproductive. Saddling juveniles with an adult criminal record impedes personal efforts at reform and creates long-term societal expense. Children need room to reform, and a system that imposes adult convictions on juveniles only when necessary, and for only the most severe crimes, would be far less damaging than the practice of allowing the exception to craft the rule. After all, does anyone want to be judged by who they were at 14?

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minimum jurisdictional ages. (The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child requires that member states enact an unspecified age threshold.) In the developed world, the minimum age ranges from 10—for example, in Great Britain and Switzerland—to 15 in countries such as Norway and Finland. Fourteen is not uncommon, as in Germany, Italy, and Russia. Historically, the lack of a minimum age in the United States dates from the establishment of the juvenile courts in the early twentieth century. In the prejuvenile court era, the common law infancy defense was applicable, precluding the prosecution of children below the age of seven. Further, children above age seven but below age 14 were presumed to lack the capacity to discern the distinction between good and evil and hence the criminal intent necessary to sustain a conviction. Sir William Blackstone, the preeminent eighteenth century common law authority, commented that the presumption could be rebutted only by evidence proving that the child possessed the requisite capacity “beyond all doubt and contradiction,” a burden of proof substantially greater than the customary criminal standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Blackstone continued by observing that, although not unknown, the conviction of a child below age 14 was a rare event. The infancy defense effectively insulated almost all children for acts committed when they were less than 14 years of age.

The twentieth century watershed creation of the juvenile courts spelled the demise of the infancy defense. The issue of whether the infancy defense had any role to play in juvenile proceedings arose fairly quickly, and the decisions have almost uniformly resolved against recognition of the infancy defense in juvenile proceedings. Most of the decisions rest on the premise that the rehabilitative ideal and parens patriae doctrine upon which the juvenile court was founded are based, first and foremost, on the notion that the child is being helped, not punished. (Andrew M. Carter, Age Matters: The Case for a Constitutionialized Infancy Defense, 54 Kan. L. Rev. 687, 721 (2006).)

That view has largely persisted, see, e.g., In re Tywonne
evidence, but they cannot tell how police and prosecu-

Conclusio

maintaining a system that is essentially “age blind” raises, or at least should raise, several legal issues. One is competency, generally defined as the ability to understand the proceedings and materially assist in one’s defense. How many six-year-olds or, for that matter, 10-year-olds understand judicial proceedings and possess the ability to fully assist counsel? Second, the principle of specific intent or mens rea is deeply ingrained in criminal law jurisprudence. How many children below the age of 12 (or perhaps 14) possess the mens rea we require when the offender is older? Another issue is diminished responsibility. We increasingly apply the principle when adjudicating a 15-year-old as opposed to a 20-year-old, but have yet to develop diminished responsibility standards when adjudicating an eight-year-old as opposed to a 15-year-old. (An eight-year-old, like his or her older brethren, is usually subjected to the full restrictive panoply of juvenile delinquency dispositions.) And just what purpose is served? Does anyone believe that prosecuting a seven-year-old deters other seven-year-olds from committing similar acts, or that society needs protection against seven-year-old predators? An analysis of these principles is beyond the scope of this short article. Suffice to say that the American legal system has given scant attention to the underlying purposes and principles of the penal law as applied to the very young offender.

Errors can be introduced early on in the criminal process, and detecting them later is incredibly difficult. Once an informant statement is contaminated, once facts are dis-

Toxicologists may have shaped the testimony, even inadvertently. Errors can be introduced early on in the criminal process, and detecting them later is incredibly difficult. Once an informant statement is contaminated, once facts are disclosed in the interrogation room, or once a suggestion is made to an eyewitness, the opportunity to learn the truth may be lost. These innocent people were the lucky ones in one way, despite the ordeals they suffered, since DNA tests could later be done to free them. That is not true of the vast majority of criminal convictions, which do not involve usable DNA evidence. While these wrongful convictions are the tip of a much larger iceberg, we can learn from patterns of error in these trials to make our criminal justice system more accurate.