Abstract
This Article argues why human flesh, because of its inherent properties and its necessity for human survival, should not qualify as a tangible medium of expression under the Copyright Act of 1976. Through policy concerns and property law this Article demonstrates why the fixation requirement, necessary to obtain copyright protection of a “work,” must be flexible and eliminate human flesh as an acceptable, tangible medium of expression, to avoid the disastrous risk of the court falling into the role of “21st Century judicial slave masters.”
Recommended Citation
Arrielle S. Millstein,
Slaves to Copyright: Branding Human Flesh as a Tangible Medium of Expression,
4 Pace. Intell. Prop. Sports & Ent. L.F.
135
(2014).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.58948/2329-9894.1027
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pipself/vol4/iss1/5