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Professor Doernberg examines a tension within fourth amendment jurisprudence and sugqests a means of resolving it. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has conferred fourth amendment standing only upon those whose personal privacy interests have been disturbed. On the other hand, the Court has allowed such persons to invoke the exclusionary rule only in circumstances where, in the Court's view, it would serve as an effective deterrent. Professor Doernberg traces these two po1icies to different conceptions of the fourth amendment: the first interprets the amendment as a guarantor of individual rights; the second construes it as an instrument for securing a collective right. He then shows how the Court, by oscillating between these two conceptions, has eroded fourth amendment protections more severely than it could have done under either conception. The author suggests that the atomistic and collectice views of the fourth amendment be harmonized and sets forth a view of the proper scope of standing to invoke the exclusionary remedy under a dualistic conception of fourth amendment rights.